Transcript Slide 1

BASIC
THREAT & RISK
ASSESSMENT
OVERVIEW
LEVEL TWO – ERASE STRATEGY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Canadian Centre For Threat Assessment &
Trauma Response and Safer Schools Together is
dedicated to ensuring safe and caring school
communities and would like to acknowledge the
BC Ministry of Education for its commitment in
preventing bullying and ensuring safe and caring
school communities by initiating the ERASE
Bullying strategy (Expect Respect and a Safe
Education).
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN CANADA
The Taber Response Project
Photograph by: Calgary Herald Archive
 The Taber School shooting occurred on April 28, 1999, just eight days after the
Columbine School shooting in Colorado. Trauma response initiatives, headed
by J. Kevin Cameron, Executive Director of CCTATR, led to the Alberta
Government identifying the need to further examine incidents of this scope.
Mr. Cameron was seconded by the Alberta Government and so began his
investigation into not only trauma but eventually threat assessment.
Consultations with U.S. sites that experienced school shootings
 The findings from these consultations shaped the field of Violence
Threat/Risk Assessment and Trauma Response from that point forward.
EVOLUTION/DEVELOPMENT OF
VIOLENCE THREAT/RISK ASSESSMENT
The field of Violence Threat/Risk Assessment is a
relatively new field.
As with any new field, there is an evolutionary process
that it experiences.
We are now in the 9th edition of the Protocol. The
British Columbia Ministry of Education’s adaptation of
the Level Two Training Guide has become the 5th edition
of the training manual.
Threat Assessment has been referred to as the “missing
link” in violence prevention. It is the process of
deliberately trying to connect the dots or data that paints
the picture that someone is moving on a pathway
towards serious violence before the violent act occurs.
All threats must be taken seriously and assessed in a
timely manner.
VTRA’s four basic steps include:
Identifying worrisome or threatening behaviour.
Using a multi-disciplinary team to conduct a
violence threat risk assessment.
Determining if a threat maker actually poses a risk.
Intervening appropriately.
UNI-DIMENSIONAL ASSESSMENTS
- are the plague of the violence threat/risk assessment world.
They can occur when one person of any professional
background such as mental health, policing, or school
administration chooses to interview the individual in
question without validating the interview data, and without
investigating history regarding past violence, suicide
attempts, or other factors.
It is important to avoid uni-dimensional assessments
because they do not provide an accurate and
comprehensive understanding of the potential level of risk.
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENTS
- are required to determine accurate levels of risk
and appropriate intervention.
A multi-disciplinary assessment brings together
groups of professionals from diverse disciplines to
provide comprehensive assessment data and
contextual variables. This allows you to determine an
accurate level of risk and appropriate intervention
strategy.
APPLICATION OF VTRA
*Every school should have a Stage I VTRA team and
every school district should have a district-wide
team or personnel who can parachute in on school
cases when extra support is required.
*The district VTRA team leader (principal or
designate) must be notified of all activations of the
Stage I or II protocol.
*The team is focused on collecting readily available
data through a locker check, police check, and student
file/record review that indicates the threat maker has
“engaged in behaviour consistent with their threat.
APPLICATION OF VTRA
Stage I - VTRA Team Leadership and Team Activation
Once the Stage I team is activated, leadership is shared and the
team collaboratively decides initial steps that need to be taken
for immediate data collection and any immediate risk-reducing
interventions.
o School principals are responsible for disciplinary measures
that may need to be taken to ensure the overall safety of
students and staff.
o Police are responsible for determining if a parallel
investigation focusing on the criminal aspect of the case
will go forward while addressing public safety concerns.
Stage 1 - Data Collection
and Immediate RiskReducing Intervention
Stage I VTRA Teams must include the following three
professionals and others as the team or committee deems
appropriate on a continuous or case-by-case basis.
School Principal and/or designate
Clinician (e.g. psychologist, counsellor, social worker)
Police of Jurisdiction
Stage II (consultation and/or information sharing phase)
Other
LEVELS OF RISK
Low categorization of risk does not imply no risk, but
indicates the individual is at little risk for violence, and
monitoring of the matter may be appropriate.
Medium categorization of risk indicates the individual is at
an elevated risk for violence, and the measures currently in
place or further measures, including monitoring, are
required in an effort to manage the individual’s future risk.
High categorization of risk indicates the individual is at
high or imminent risk for violence, and immediate
intervention is required to prevent an act of violence from
occurring.
Stage II - Comprehensive Risk
Evaluation
Stage II involves a multi-disciplinary risk evaluation which often
includes some or all of the following:
police-based threat-assessment units
psychology, psychiatry, mental health, child protection, youth
probation, and others
Stage II is focused on further data collection beyond the initial
data set obtained by the Stage I Team and as such, the Stage II
members are charged, in collaboration with the Stage I Team,
with the formal risk assessment and evaluation which may
include the use of tests and measures.
RISK ASSESSMENT
Note:
After the initial level of risk is assessed and immediate riskreducing interventions have occurred, a further risk assessment
may be required.
 Risk Assessment is the process of determining if an individual
may pose a further risk to a known or unknown target or
targets in an unknown period of time.
o a more comprehensive evaluation of all risk-reducing and risk-enhancing
factors affecting the student. It determines long-term interventions and
treatment goals.
o conducted by professionals who have completed advanced threat/risk
assessments.
Stage III -Longer Term Treatment
Planning
 Stage III requires reconvening all the Stage I and II team
members who are involved in the case for the development
and implementation of a comprehensive multi-disciplinary
intervention, and to determine a follow-up date for case
review.
 The agency that will take the lead at this point is the one
that is the most appropriate at the time: every case on its
own merit!
 In complex cases, one agency may take the initial lead, but
after stabilization another may assume the
leadership/coordinating role.
DETERMINING WHEN TO ACTIVATE A
VIOLENCE THREAT/RISK
ASSESSMENT
IMMEDIATE RISK SITUATIONS
These situations include armed intruders inside the building or on
the periphery who pose a risk to some target or targets, or active
shooter and attacker scenarios.
When immediate risk is identified, the principal will:
 contact the police and take steps to ensure the safety of all school
members (e.g. perimeter lockdown, full-scale lockdown, and other
protective measures).
In these cases, a threat is posed and the matter is one of immediate
police intervention and protective school response.
AUTOMATIC STAGE I VTRA
ACTIVATION FOR:
 Serious violence or violence with intent to harm or
kill
 Verbal/written threats to kill others which are “clear,
direct, and plausible”
 Internet website / threats to kill others
 Bullying - verbal, physical, cyber, and social via
repeated patterns of behaviour and victimization
AUTOMATIC STAGE I VTRA
ACTIVATION FOR:
 Possession of weapons including replicas
 Bomb threats and making and/or detonating
explosive devices
 Fire setting
 Sexual intimidation or assault
 Gang-related intimidation and violence
Note: Criminal Charges
 In cases of violence or criminal acts, the police officer on the V-TRA
team has “first call” as to whether charges will be laid.
 If the officer chooses not to proceed with criminal charges, Stage I will
continue.
 If charges are laid, the officer of the V-TRA team often will refer it to
another member so that they may stay on the team and participate in
the Stage I process.
 An investigation does not prevent the remaining members from
continuing the Stage I process.
 Collaboration will continue among the members, not withstanding
each member has his/her own “jurisdiction”.
WORRISOME BEHAVIOURS
Those that cause concern for members of the school
community that may indicate a student is moving towards
engaging in serious violent behaviour.
This could include:
drawing pictures
writing stories in class
making vague statements that do not, of themselves, constitute
“uttering threats” as defined by law, but are cause of concern for some
members of the school community because of their violent content.
The majority of high-risk behaviour, from Kindergarten to
Grade 12, falls into this category.
WORRISOME BEHAVIOURS
When in Doubt Check It Out!
In many cases, following up on Worrisome Behaviours results in
good early intervention measures. There are also cases where a
little data leads to a lot and what seems like a minor case can
quickly evolve to the formal activation of the VTRA team.
First Hypothesis in Threat
Assessment:
“It is a cry for help!”
THREE PRIMARY HYPOTHESES IN VTRA
One: Is it a conscious or unconscious “Cry for help”?
•Why would someone consciously or unconsciously give preincident signs or indicators?
Two: Conspiracy of two or more! Who else knows about it?
Who else is involved?
Pairing
Virtual Pairing
Leakage
THREE PRIMARY HYPOTHESES IN VTRA
Three: Is there any evidence of fluidity?
• Fluidity refers to the way a person can move from thoughts of
homicide to thoughts of suicide and is also referred to as
psychological shifting. Fluidity is important because the first
hypothesis in a VTRA is that the threat is a cry for help.
IMPLICATIONS
If we only assess in the homicidal domain, or
fail to assess at all, because the threat maker is
non-traditional, we miss an opportunity to
intervene.
In some cases we may run the risk of the
student residing in the suicidal domain and
completing a suicide.
SERIOUS VIOLENCE IS
EVOLUTIONARY
An individual who engages in serious violence does not
spontaneously make the decision to harm someone. In some
way, the individual’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviours moved
them closer to the act before the act was committed.
An individual who has never conceived of committing a serious
violent act does not suddenly assault or kill someone. No one
just snaps.
•There are signs that indicate that an individual is moving along a
pathway to violence.
EVOLUTION OF VIOLENCE: KEY
CONCEPTS
Pathway to Violence
The pathway to serious violence is not a straight line. As an individual moves
along a pathway to violence, that person is influenced by a large number of
factors. The individual’s motivation will fluctuate, as will the emotional state.
It is vital that the VTRA team be aware of these fluctuations and assesses the
person’s behaviour over a period of time.
KEY POINTS REVIEW
Serious violence is an evolutionary process no one just snaps.
Everyone moves along a “Pathway of Justification”.
Suspension of the student without TA often adds to the justification
process.
The biggest problem in the aftermath of high-profile violence is “under
reaction” to often blatant indicators someone is moving on a pathway to
serious violence.
First hypothesis in threat assessment “It’s a cry for help”!
The pathway to serious violence is not a straight line.
“Good kid with no history of violence” is the quote that kills.
KEY FACTORS/CHARACTERISTICS TO BE
CONSIDERED WHEN ASSESSING VIOLENCE:
Dehumanization:
the process that allows a person to emotionally, psychologically,
and cognitively distance themselves from the nature of the act.
Frequency/Intensity/Recency (FIR):
the factors to be tracked when a change in baseline behaviour
is noted.
Empty Vessel:
An individual who is not connected to a healthy mature adult
will search for people or things to identify with.
“What are they filling themselves up with?”
EMPTY VESSELS
Do not allow yourself to be fooled by first looks.

The individual is well liked, comes from a good family, is a good
student, etc.

Mere portrayal of these images does not indicate
connectedness.

There may be a much different story going on than what is
being portrayed on the outside.

If we can determine that there is a lack of connection, the next
question we ask is “What are they filling themselves up
with?”
Empty Vessels
What are They Filling Themselves Up
With?
KEY POINT: (Imitators vs. Innovators)
Most threat makers are Imitators, not Innovators.

If we do not give them anything to fill themselves up
with, they will find it themselves.

Is what they are filling themselves up with going to
influence their violence potential?
Our children will be what they fill
themselves up with.
 Movies
 Media
 Games
 Writings
 Drawings
 Music
GIRL VIOLENCE
“Violence and Bullying in girls can be subtle,
but still requires response.”
Girls are often overlooked as we believe most violence occurs
with boys.
Females seem to indulge more in emotional or social bullying. A
girl who has significant power and influence in school or social
settings can become a puppet master. While boys or girls can be
puppet masters, the majority of puppet masters are female.
VTRA and Bullying Prevention
The foundation of the VTRA model as relates to both violence prevention
and bullying prevention is the emphasis on school dynamics.
Naturally Open schools consistently work to be emotionally connected to
each other in respectful ways that include healthy staff-to-staff relations,
student-to-staff relations, and parent-school relations.
When these exist there is an increased openness by concerned students
and bystanders to report to adults when someone is in need.
Naturally Closed schools or Traumatically Closed schools may be so
emotionally disconnected that they see nothing until it is too late, or view
their role in bullying prevention as insignificant or unnecessary as they state
that, “bullying has been around for years and always will be.”
The VTRA model assists schools in identifying and preventing the extreme
acts of bullying that are becoming far too common in this generation.
CYBER-BULLYING
Cyber-bullying is not limited to girls, but we see more
girls engaging in cyber-bullying behaviour.
 increasing and becoming more concerning every year
 online attacks are increasingly clever and creative
The simple way to define this behaviour would be to
call it what it is: social assassination.
SOCIAL ASSASSINATION
Using YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, blogs, forums, and
other such sites to attack the character and reputation of
others. ( Hate Contracts )
Technology (mobile devices including iPhones or other smart
phones):
 can facilitate bullying, exclusion, and social isolation
 allow youth to access social networking sites anytime they
wish and send picture and video messages
 Technology is a true gift for cowards who bully.
 They don’t have to look at their victims and they don’t have
to deal with immediate, negative reactions from bystanders.
LOCKER AND BEDROOM
DYNAMICS
• In hundreds of cases in Canada we have
found the evidence of planning in either
the threat maker’s locker at school,
their bedroom at home, or both.
• In some cases, such as the 1999 Taber
School Shooting, the evidence was found
too late, after the violence had occurred.
But in most cases, the evidence has been
uncovered during the formal violence
threat/risk assessment (VTRA) and
intervention process, and before
violence or more serious violence could
continue.
HUMAN TARGET SELECTION
Primary factors that influence the magnitude of school
shootings and other traumatic events include:
Human Target Selection:
Justification
Current target or targets
History of violence/human target selection
If we understand the threat maker’s history of violence and who
that violence has been directed at, we can more easily determine
if there is a “clear and discernible pattern of offending” and a
higher likelihood to act out against a specific human target.
SITE SELECTION
Site Selection:
 conscious or unconscious belief that the site is the
cause of all their pain, and therefore a justifiable target
 belief that they are less likely to get caught
 site of opportunity
Site selection can be placed on a continuum - from
psychological fusion to the site on one end, and site of
opportunity on the other.
Critical Periods: Ground Zero and
Impact Zone
Predictable time frames for increased threat-making and
threat-related behaviours

Critical Period 1 – two weeks post incident

Critical Period 2 – 1 month prior to Christmas

Critical Period 3 – the anniversary of the incident within the
impact zone

Critical Period 4 – when we are caught in the impact zone of
another incident (parallel process)

Critical Period 5 –unique to each school and community system
SYSTEMS THEORY
 views trauma intervention as a complex and
comprehensive process.
 requires schools and communities to address the
trauma context by looking at:
ostructure
ofunction
ohistory
 provides insight into how different systems respond
to trauma.
 assists multi-disciplinary VTRA teams to assess highrisk behaviour from both a behavioural and a
systems perspective.
UNDERSTANDING THE SCHOOL AS
A SYSTEM
Respond
 refers to the emotional/behavioural
response to the crisis or traumatic event
System
 refers to the relationship dynamics
between the school administration, staff,
students, parents and others within the
formal organization
UNDERSTANDING THE SCHOOL
AS A SYSTEM
Not all school systems respond in the same way. Multiple
schools exposed to identical traumatic stimuli can respond in
dramatically different ways.
Before attempting to provide support to a school, crisis
responders should be acutely aware of the following:
Trauma history of the school
School’s pre-trauma functioning
Leadership structure of the school
Information-sharing process between administration, staff,
students, and parents
School’s attitude to the crisis response team
School’s beliefs and expectations about recovery
TES MODEL:
Types of Systems
Naturally Open School Systems
Naturally Closed School Systems
Traumatically Open School Systems
Traumatically Closed School Systems
VIOLENCE THREAT/RISK
ASSESSMENT &
MANAGEMENT
FACTORS IN THREAT
ASSESSMENT
A team must have as many details as possible in
order to effectively evaluate a threat. (Stage I
Threat Assessment Report Form).
If the threat is “clear, direct and plausible”, the
Stage I protocol should be activated.
Always work from the leading hypothesis that
most threats are a cry for help.
FACTORS IN THREAT
ASSESSMENT
A threat that contains specific details about targets,
weapons, locations, and motivation is much more likely to
be carried out. The more detail contained in a threat, the
more thought that has gone into the planning.
Specific Plausible Details:
Can identify target(s), weapon, method, time, location –
higher risk
More detail and thought invested – higher risk
More plausible – higher risk
Less specific data – lower risk
Specific but not plausible details – lower risk
THREAT ASSESSMENT VS RISK
ASSESSMENT
 Threat assessment is the process of determining
if a threat maker actually poses a risk to the
target or targets threatened. Many individuals
engage in threat-making behaviour but few
actually do harm to others or themselves.
 Risk assessment is the process of determining if
an individual may pose a further risk to a known
or unknown target or targets in an unknown
period of time.
DETERMINING WHEN TO ACTIVATE A
VIOLENCE THREAT/RISK
ASSESSMENT
IMMEDIATE RISK SITUATIONS
These situations include armed intruders inside the building or on
the periphery who pose a risk to some target or targets, or active
shooter and attacker scenarios.
When immediate risk is identified, the principal will:
 contact the police and take steps to ensure the safety of all school
members (e.g. perimeter lockdown, full-scale lockdown, and other
protective measures).
In these cases, a threat is posed and the matter is one of immediate
police intervention and protective school response.
AUTOMATIC STAGE I VTRA
ACTIVATION FOR:
 Serious violence or violence with intent to harm or
kill
 Verbal/written threats to kill others which are “clear,
direct, and plausible”
 Internet website / threats to kill others (refer to
Appendix B for abbreviations commonly used on the
Internet)
 Bullying - verbal, physical, cyber, and social via
repeated patterns of behaviour and victimization
AUTOMATIC STAGE I VTRA
ACTIVATION FOR:
 Domestic violence
 Possession of weapons including replicas
 Bomb threats and making and/or detonating
explosive devices
 Fire setting
 Sexual intimidation or assault
 Gang-related intimidation and violence
Note: Criminal Charges
 In cases of violence or criminal acts, the police officer on the V-TRA
team has “first call” as to whether charges will be laid.
 If the officer chooses not to proceed with criminal charges, Stage I will
continue.
 If charges are laid, the officer of the V-TRA team often will refer it to
another member so that they may stay on the team and participate in
the Stage I process.
 An investigation does not prevent the remaining members from
continuing the Stage I process.
 Collaboration will continue among the members, not withstanding
each member has his/her own “jurisdiction”.
TYPES OF THREATS
Note:
Threats may be written, verbal, drawn, posted, or gestured only.
Four Categories (as noted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation - FBI):
Direct threat: identifies a specific act against a specific
target and is delivered in a straightforward, clear and
explicit manner.
Indirect threat: tends to be vague, unclear and ambiguous.
Veiled threat: is one that strongly implies, but does not
explicitly threaten, violence.
Conditional threat: warns that a violent act will happen
unless certain demands or terms are met.
TYPES OF THREATS
Some veiled and indirect threats may not meet the
standard of law for criminal charges but do warrant
assessment.
Example:
a target who is the subject of a gang-related hand sign
that denotes “let’s get him” or “take him out”.
a particular student of concern who has used a nonverbal but veiled throat cutting gesture prior to
severely beating his targets.
“clear and discernible pattern of offending”
VIOLENCE/BULLYING
When violence or bullying occurs, the following general
guidelines can help administrators to determine if the case should
be dealt with as a disciplinary matter only, or as a violence/threat
risk assessment case.
Consult with a VTRA member if:
 Lower baseline violence appears unprovoked
 Clear victim and perpetrator dyad with power imbalance due to age,
size, social power, or other factors
 No intent to harm present
 If the frequency, intensity, recency (FIR) of the violence denotes an
increase in behavioural baseline of the perpetrator(s)
ACTIVATE VIOLENCE
THREAT/RISK ASSESSMENT
TEAM AND PROTOCOL IF:
 Serious violence occurs
 There is intent to seriously injure the target(s)
 When illegal weapons including knives, guns,
replicas, machetes, and others are brandished or
used in the commission of the offence
 Direct, clear, and plausible threats to kill or seriously
injure are communicated
WORRISOME BEHAVIOURS
Those that cause concern for members of the school
community that may indicate a student is moving towards
engaging in serious violent behaviour.
This could include:
drawing pictures
writing stories in class
making vague statements that do not, of themselves, constitute
“uttering threats” as defined by law, but are cause of concern for some
members of the school community because of their violent content.
The majority of high-risk behaviour, from Kindergarten to
Grade 12, falls into this category.
WORRISOME BEHAVIOURS
When in Doubt Check It Out!
In many cases, following up on Worrisome Behaviours results in
good early intervention measures. There are also cases where a
little data leads to a lot and what seems like a minor case can
quickly evolve to the formal activation of the VTRA team.
ASSESSING VIOLENCE AND
THREATS
Data Collection
The Interviewer
“An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to
successful threat assessment.” (Fein, et. al. 2002)
thoughtful probing
viewing information with healthy skepticism
paying attention to key points regarding pre-attack
behavior
ASSESSING VIOLENCE AND
THREATS
Data Collection
The Interviewed
The following individuals should be interviewed when a formal
threat assessment is activated:






teachers and other school staff
Students
target(s)
threat maker(s)
parents/caregivers
others
ASSESSING VIOLENCE AND
THREATS
Prior to conducting a series of interviews, beyond that of the
reporter, the team should ask the following questions:
1.“How much time do we have?”
2.“Who will be interviewed?”
3.“In what order will we interview them?”
4.“Who will interview whom?”
Depending on the severity of the case, one VTRA member may
serve as the primary interviewer to ensure continuity of data
collection and interviewing technique, i.e. criminal charges - police
member ; health issues - clinical member.
ASSESSING THREATS
Threat: an expression of intent to do harm or act out
violently against someone or something. Can be
spoken, written, or symbolic.
Two Critical Principles:
 All threats and all threat makers are not equal.
 Most threat makers are unlikely to carry out their
threats.
BUT: All threats must be taken seriously and evaluated.
WORRISOME BEHAVIOURS:
Majority of threat-related behaviour falls in this category.
Worrisome behaviours are those that cause concern for members
of the school system and may indicate that a student is moving
toward a greater risk of violent behaviour:
 drawing pictures and writing stories in class (depicting violence)
 making vague statements that do not of themselves constitute
“uttering threats” as defined by law.
Identifying and following up on worrisome behaviours results in
earlier interventions which produce better outcomes.
MOTIVATION AND EMOTIONAL
STATE OF THREAT MAKER
Key Concepts:
 Baseline Behaviours
o method used to formally determine baseline behaviour
functioning.
 Motivation
o cannot always be known with complete certainty, but
understanding the motivation of a threat maker is always
key to evaluating a threat.
UNAUTHORED THREATS:
ASSESSMENTS AND INTERVENTION
Note:
As of the writing of this protocol, there are no known cases
in North America where an unauthored threat to kill was issued
and a homicide occurred on the day the threat stated
 They are typically threats to commit a violent act against an individual(s),
specific group, or site.
 They may be found written on walls or sidewalks, posted on the internet,
letters left behind, etc.
 Although they may be credible in the world of terrorism, in the field of
school-based threat assessment, the lack of ownership (Authorship) denotes
lack of commitment.
 Never the less, there are steps that should be followed.
UNAUTHORED THREATS: ASSESSMENTS
AND INTERVENTION
1) Assess the unauthored threat:
In determining the initial level of risk, V-TRA teams
should consider the language of commitment in the
letter.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Amount of detail in the letter or note (Location where
violence is to occur, Target(s), Time, Date, Justifications,
etc).
Threatened to do what with what (Kill, Murder, Ruin your
life, etc)
Method of delivery of the threat (who found/received the
threat, When did they receive it, how, who else knows, who
did they tell, etc).
Is the threat clear, direct, plausible, and consistent.
UNAUTHORED THREATS:
ASSESSMENTS AND INTERVENTION
2) Identifying the Threat Maker:
In many cases the author is never found, but steps can be taken to
identify who the author(s) are.
1.
2.
3.
Hand writing analysis.
Word usage (phrases and expressions that may be unique).
Spelling (errors, or modifications that may be unique).
END OF OVERVIEW
THANK YOU!
For additional information please contact Theresa
Campbell at [email protected]