Transcript WEEK #4 THE UNITY OF VIRTUE (Protagoras) (2-3-04)

WEEK #4
THE UNITY OF VIRTUE
(Protagoras)
(2-7-06)
Agenda
• Review
• Introduction to Protagoras
 Introduction to Unity of Virtues
 Other Substantive Theses and Issues
 Outline of the Protagoras
 The Unity of Virtues Doctrine
 Vlastos’ view & argument
 Penner’s view & argument
 Protagoras 328d-330b
 The Last Elenchos
Last Week to This Week
• Socrates’ Practice
 Elenchos
 Ignorance
 Definition
 Last Week’s Thesis
 Testing Knowledge Claims
 By Testing Consistency of Beliefs (not truth or falsity
of thesis)
 Alleged Consequence (objection)
 Merely a Destructive Critic
 But Positive/Constructive Theses
 E.g., the Unity of Virtues in the Protagoras
Vlastos’ Misplaced Motivation
It left me with this question: if that were all
Socrates expected to get from the elenchus –
exposure of his interlocutors’ inconsistencies
– where did he find positive support for those
strong doctrines of his on whose truth he
based his life? If the elenchus, his only line
of argument, gave those doctrines no
rational grounding, what did? Grote had not
been troubled by that question because he
found it possible to believe that Socrates’ own
positive convictions and his critical assaults
on those of others ran on separate tracks. I
could not. I could not reconcile myself to
Grote’s missionary of the examined life who
was a dogmatist himself.
Plato
•
•
•
•
•
The gods are moral
Virtue is knowledge
Virtue makes one happy
Weakness of the will is impossible
It is wrong to harm your enemies
Questions
• Objections, responses, puzzles concerning last week’s
thesis?
• Primary Questions for Tonight
 What is the Unity of Virtues doctrine?
 The virtues – courage, piety, justice, temperance, & wisdom – are in
some sense the same
 Vlastos/Penner debate
 Why attribute this doctrine to Socrates or Plato?
 S asks “whether excellence is one thing, and justice and soundness
of mind and holiness parts of it, or whether all of these that I’ve just
mentioned are different names of one and the same thing?”
[Protagoras 329c6-d2; Taylor trans.]
 Protagoras responds that they are different
 S appears to ‘refute’ this answer in the remainder of the dialogue
 But: Rep. IV, Euthyphro 12, Laches 198a1-b2
 What defense does Socrates/Plato give for this doctrine
(assuming he holds it)?
Laches 197e10-b2
• Socrates: ... And you, Nicias, tell me again from the beginning
- you know that when we were investigating courage at the
beginning of the argument, we were investigating it as a part
of virtue?
• Nicias: Yes, we were.
• Socrates: And didn’t you give your answer supposing that it
was a part, and, as such, one among a number of other parts,
all of which taken together were called virtue?
• Nicias: Yes, why not?
• Socrates: And do you also speak of the same parts that I do?
In addition to courage, I call temperance and justice and
everything else of this kind parts of virtue. Don’t you?
• Nicias: Yes, indeed.
• Socrates: Stop there. We are in agreement on these points,
... [Sprague trans.]
Other Items of Interest in
Protagoras
 Protagoras’ Great Speech
 320c-323c
 Theaetetus
• Denial of Akrasia (352a-357e)
• Hedonism
 352a-357e
 Gorgias 491d-499b
 Irwin/Kahn
 Simonides’ Poem (338e-347a)
Simonides’ Poem
• For a man, indeed, to become good truly
is hard,
In hands and feet and mind foursquare,
Fashioned without reproach.
• Nor ringeth true to me
That word of Pittacus -And yet ‘twas a sage who spake -- Hard,
quoth he, to be good.
Simonides & Akrasia
• For Simonides was not so uneducated as
to say he praised those who do nothing
bad of their own free will, as if there were
people who do bad things freely. For I am
pretty much of this opinion, that no
intelligent man believes that anyone does
wrong freely or acts shamefully and badly
of his own free will, but they well know that
all who do shameful and bad things do so
other than freely. [Protagoras 345d6-e4;
Taylor trans.]
Outline of Protagoras
•
I.
Dramatic Date: 433
Conversation w/ Hippocrates & the What is a Sophist
Question (309a-314c)
II.
Arrival & Introductory Scene w/ Protagoras (314c317e)
III.
A Second Question (317e-328c)
IV. A Third Question – UV I (328d-334c)
V.
An Interlude on Method (334c-338e)
VI. Simonides’ Poem (338e-348c)
VII. UV II (348c-360e)
VIII. Paradoxical Conclusion (361a-d)
I. Conversation w/ Hippocrates
A. Hippocrates thinks Protagoras is wise & wants
to learn from him
B. Socrates asks H. what a sophist is (312c)
C. H. offers three answers which get rejected
1. The sophist is a person ‘knowledgeable in learned
matters’ (312c6)
2. The sophist is master of the craft of making people clever
speakers (312d6-7)
3. The sophist is someone who is master of the craft of
making people clever speakers about what he (the
sophist) knows. (312e3-4)
D. Socrates’ answer: The sophist is a merchant or
pedlar of goods for the nourishment of the soul; i.e.
a merchant or pedlar of learning (313c4-7)
Protagoras 312b8-c4
• ‘I mean that you are going to entrust your soul to
the care of a man who is, as you agree, a
sophist. But I should be quite surprised if you
even know what a sophist is (hoti de pote ho
sphistes estin). And yet if you don’t know that,
you don’t even know what it is that you are
handing your soul over to, not even whether it
something good or bad’
‘Well, at least I think I know,’ he said.
‘Tell me, then, what do you think a sophist is (ti
hege einai ton sophisten)?’ [Taylor trans.]
III. A Second Question
A.
B.
What benefit will H. receive?
P. will teach him the political art
1.
2.
3.
C.
Socrates doubts that virtue can be taught
1.
2.
D.
“the proper management of one’s own affairs, how best to run one’s
household, and the management of public affairs, how to make the
most effective contribution to the affairs of the city in both word and
action.” [Protagoras 318e5-319a2; Taylor trans.]
Which Socrates understands with Protagoras’ approval as “the art of
running the city, and to be promising to make men into good citizens.”
( [Protagoras 319a3-5; Taylor trans.]
By 320c1 this has been taken as equivalent to ‘teaching arete’
the Athenians don’t think so since they let any one advise concerning virtue
but not concerning shipbuilding, for example. [319b-d]
virtuous people cannot hand on their virtue [319e-320b]
P’s response
1.
2.
3.
the Athenians are right to let everyone give advice re virtue - the Great
Speech [320c-323c]
nevertheless, the Athenians think that it can be taught because they punish
those who do not have it [323c-324d]
why good men have wicked sons [326e-328c]
IV. Third Question: UV I
A. The Question Posed [328d-330b] - we will
come back to this at length
B. The First Elenchos: Piety=Justice [330b331c]
C. The Second Elenchos: Temperance=Wisdom
[332a-333b]
D. The Third Elenchos: Temperance=Justice
[333b-334c]
VII. Third Question: UV II
A. Restatement of Positions [348c-349d]
B. The Fourth Elenchos: Wisdom=Courage
1. An initial argument [349e-351b2]
2. Introduction of hedonism [351b-e]
3. The argument for the Superiority of Knowledge
[352a-358d]
4. A second argument [358d-360e]
VIII. Paradoxical Conclusion
A. Socrates: virtue is knowledge but cannot be
taught
B. Protagoras: virtue can be taught but is not
knowledge
Unity of Virtues
The Competing Interpretations
• Vlastos’ Equivalence View
– the five virtue terms - ‘courage’, ‘piety’, ‘temperance’, ‘justice’,
and ‘wisdom’ - are each names of different things, but that any
one who has one of them has the others as well.
– courage <-> piety <-> temperance <-> justice <-> wisdom
– Cordate/Renate example
• Penner’s Identity View
– the five virtue terms each refer to the same thing - what he calls
a motive force
– courage = piety = temperance = justice = wisdom
– The morning star/evening star example
• Identity View Entails Equivalence View
Arguments for Vlastos
• The Identity View is implausible
– Perhaps because it entails that the virtue
terms mean the same thing
• Socrates is committed to the Parts of
Virtue Doctrine elsewhere
– Last elenchos in Laches
– Meno 73d-75a
– Gorgias462e ff.
– Euthyphro 11e-12e
Laches 197e10-b2
• Socrates: ... And you, Nicias, tell me again from the beginning
- you know that when we were investigating courage at the
beginning of the argument, we were investigating it as a part
of virtue?
• Nicias: Yes, we were.
• Socrates: And didn’t you give your answer supposing that it
was a part, and, as such, one among a number of other parts,
all of which taken together were called virtue?
• Nicias: Yes, why not?
• Socrates: And do you also speak of the same parts that I do?
In addition to courage, I call temperance and justice and
everything else of this kind parts of virtue. Don’t you?
• Nicias: Yes, indeed.
• Socrates: Stop there. We are in agreement on these points,
... [Sprague trans.]
Meno 73e1-74a6
Virtue, Meno, or a virtue?
What do you mean by that?
What I would in any other case. To take roundness, for
instance; I should call it a figure, and not figure pure and
simple. And I should name it so because there are other
figures as well.
You would be quite right--just as I say there are other
virtues besides justice.
What are they? Tell me. In the same way as I can tell you of
other figures, if you request me, so do you tell me of other
virtues.
Well then, courage, I consider, is a virtue, and temperance,
and wisdom, and loftiness of mind; and there are a great
many others. [Lamb trans.]
Euthyphro 12c3-e5
Soc. Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also
reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also fear. But
there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended
notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and
number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me
now?
Euth. Quite well.
Soc. That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked
whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether
there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more
extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?
Euth. No, I think that you are quite right.
Soc. Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what
part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for instance, if you
had asked me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I
should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure
having two equal sides. Do you not agree?
Euth. Yes, I quite agree.
Soc. In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice piety or holiness is
that part of justice which attends upon the gods. is piety or holiness, that I may
be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am
now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their
opposites. (Jowett trans.)
Arguments for Penner
• Fits Protagoras 328d-330b better
• Fits the four elenchoi in the Protagoras
better
• Fits the end of the Laches and Charmides
better
• Fits Socrates’ use of the ‘What is F-ness?’
question better
What is F-ness?
• Ubiquity in dialogues
• Euthyphro 6d9-11
– I did not bid you to tell me one or two of the many
pious actions but that form itself that makes pious
actions pious (Grube trans.)
• Nominal/Real Definition
• Priority of ‘Definition’
– If A fails to know what F-ness is, then A fails to know
anything about F-ness (neither that x is F, nor that Fness is G)
Laches
 Conflict between


Courage is a part of virtue
Courage is knowledge of ‘daring & fearful’
 Courage is knowledge of ‘daring & fearful’ entails
courage is all of virtue
 We are supposed to conclude that courage is all of
virtue


It is knowledge of good and evil
It is not a part of virtue
 Socrates, however, proposes that courage is a part of
virtue (190d & 198a-b)
Charmides
• Conflict between
 Temperance is knowledge of knowledge
 Temperance is beneficial
 The only thing beneficial is knowledge of good and
evil, i.e., the whole of virtue
 We are supposed to conclude that temperance
is not knowledge of knowledge
 Rather, temperance is knowledge of good and
evil, i.e., the whole of virtue
The Questions
Is virtue a single thing, with justice and
temperance and piety its parts, or are the
things I have just listed all names for a single
entity? (329c6-d2; L/B trans.)

Either
A. JTPCW are parts of virtue, or
B. JTPCW are names for a single entity


Protagoras chooses A
Socrates does not immediately begin his argument
against Protagoras (even assuming that is what
Socrates does later)
Second Question
Parts as in the parts of a face: mouth,
nose, eyes, and ears? Or parts as in the
parts of gold, where there is no
difference, except for size, between parts
or between the parts and the whole?
(329d4-8; L/B trans.)

Either
1. Parts like parts of gold (similar), or
2. Parts like parts of a face (dissimilar)

Protagoras chooses 2
Clarification of Protagoras’ View
• Some individuals possess one part and
not the other
– Do some people have one part and some
another, or do you necessarily have all the
parts if you have any of them?
– By no means, since many are courageous but
unjust, and many again are just but not wise.
(329e2-6; L/B trans.)
• Each part is different from the others
(330a3)
Clarification Continued
• Each part differs from the other in itself and in its
power.
– And does each part also have its own unique power?
In the analogy to the parts of the face, the eye is not
like the ear, nor is its power the same, and this
applies to the other parts as well: They are not like
each other in power or in any other way. Is this how it
is with the parts of virtue? Are they unlike each other,
both in themselves (auto) and in their powers
(dunamis)? (330a4-b1; adapted L/B trans.)
• None of the parts are like each other (330b3-6)
Vlastos’ Three Theses
• Option [A]: The Unity Thesis
– the names of the virtues are all names of one
and the same thing
• Option [B1]: The Similarity Thesis
– the virtues resemble one another in all
respects
• Option [B2]: Denial of Bi-conditionality
– An individual can possess one of the virtues
without possessing one of the others
Restatement of Protagoras’ View
• Question
Wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and piety – are
these five names for the same thing, or is there
underlying each of these names a unique thing, a thing
with its own power, each one unlike any of the others?
(349b1-6; adapted L/B trans.)
• Answer
All these are parts of virtue, and that while four of them
are reasonably close to each other, courage is
completely different from all the rest. The proof that
what I am saying is true is that you will find many
people who are extremely unjust, impious, intemperate,
and ignorant, yet exceptionally courageous. (349d2-8;
L/B trans.)