Transcript PRIMITIVE IDENTITY - Ruđer Bošković Institute

PRIMITIVE IDENTITY
Boran Berčić
Department of Philosophy
University of Rijeka
Bishop Butler (1692-1752)
Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel
Preface § 39 (1726-1792)
Everything is what it is, and not another
thing.
G.E.Moore: Principia Ethica
• Good is undefinable just as yellow is
undefinable. We recognize it, we inuitit it,
but we can not define it.
Good
• What is good? (Meaning)
• Which things are good? (Criterion)
Good
• x is good iff x promotes happines
• x is good iff an impartial observer would
say that x is good
• x is good iff people accept x
• x is good iff x develops people potentials
Truth
Meaning and Criterion
• What is truth? (Meaning)
• Which sentences are true? (Criterion)
Tuth
p is true iff ...
• p is true iff p is useful in interaction with
enviroment
• p is true iff p is coherent with accepted
beliefs
• p is true iff p is a product of reliable
scientific method
• p is true iff p is either part of immediate
experience or constructed out of it
Sameness
Meaning and Criterion
• What is sameness? (Meaning)
• Which entities are the same? (Criterion)
• What is identity? (Meaning)
• Which entities are identical? (Criterion)
Transcendentals
• Unum, Verum, Bonum
• Even more general than categories.
Therefore, undefinable!
Definition
• Square is equiangular and equilateral
quadrilateral.
Fingerprint
Fingerprint
Fingerprint
Juan Vucetich (1858-1925)
Fingerprint and Identity
• a and b are the same person iff they have
the same fingerprint.
• The same fingerprint is a very good
indicator that a and b are the same
person, but “a and b are the same person”
does not mean “they have the same
fingerprint”.
PIN and Identity
• a and b are the same person iff they have
the same JMBG or the same OIB. (social
security number)
• The same JMBG presupposes the same
person. If one person has two JMBG’s or if
two persons have the same JMBG, it is
simply a mistake. Personal identity is
primitive in respect to the JMBG.
Memory and Identity
• a and b are the same person iff they have the
same memory.
• (1) In order to rule out Q-memory, my memory
has to be mine. (2) People with complete
amnesia remain the same persons. (3) My
doppelganger has the same memory as I do but
he is not me.
• Hence, personal identity is primitive in respect to
the memory.
Memory as Evidence
• In the cases of body swap, memory is evidence
that we dealing with the person a in the body of
b. If she knows something that only she can
know, it is evidence that she really is a.
• It can also be evidence that psychic really is in
contact with the person a, or it can be evidence
that b shared the prison cell with a.
Agency and Identity
• a and b are the same person iff they have
the same life plans.
• However, (1) more than one person can
have the same life plans, and (2) life plans
of one person can change through life.
SOLARIS
Stanislav Lem 1961
Rea1 and Rea2
(Andrei Tarkovsky 1972)
Rea1 and Rea2
(Steven Soderbergh 2002)
Rea1 and Rea2
• They are the same person because they have
the same memory, the same character traits, the
same values and plans, ... all the visual
properties in common (Leibniz’s Law). If
anything is continuer of Rea1, Rea2 is the
closest continuer.
• They are not the same person because
spatiotemporal continuity between the two is
broken, Rea1 is buried for good down on the
Earth, she did not resurrect. Also, Rea2 is made
of different stuff.
Sets
• A and B are the same set iff they have the
same elements.
• Renata and Cordata have the saem
elements but are not the same set.
• Triangular and Trilateral necessarily have
the saem elements but are still not the
same set.
Nations
Oton Iveković: The Croats' Arrival at the Adriatic Sea
Nations
• Are we the same nation?
•
•
•
•
Forefathers (assimilation)
Language (Canada, Switzerland, ...)
Religion (Germans, Americans, ...)
Territory (Jews, Gipsies, diasporas, ...)
Nations
• Therefore, C-making characteristics are
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions
for C, they are rather evidence that there
really is nation C.
Spatiotemporal Continuity
• a and b are the same thing iff b is
spatiotemporally continuent with a.
• However, (1) things can be decomposed
and composed again, and (2) things can
undergo radical transformations and
become other things.
Spatiotemporal Continuity
• Spatiotemporal continuity can be seen as
socalled operational definition of identity.
• This liquid is acid means Litmus paper will
turn blue if you put it in.
• There is 220 volts in this wire means If you
connect it to the voltmeter, the voltmeter
will show 220 volts.
Essentialism
How to account for the identity through change?
• Find their essential property and if they have the same
essential property than they are the same thing!
• a and b are the same thing iff they have the same
essential property.
• a and b are the same thing iff they have the same
haeccity.
• a and b are the same thing iff they have the same
thisness.
• a and b are the same thing iff they have the same bare
particular.
• a and b are the same thing iff they have the same
supstratum.
What follows from the failure?
• There are neither necessary nor sufficient
conditions for F.
• (1) Therefore, there are no F’s.
• (2) Therefore, there are F’s but they satisfy
some weaker condition like family resemblance,
stereotype, etc.
• (3) Therefore, there is some degree of
arbitrariness in F’s.
• (4) Therefore, there are F’s but they are primitive
(undefinable).
What makes ... ?
• What this thing makes this thing?
• Nothing! This thing just is this thing!
• What this thing makes the same as that
thing?
• Nothing! This thing just is that thing!
What makes ... ?
• a and b are the same F. (Relative Identity)
• What makes a an F?
• Nothing! It just is an F!
• What makes a and b the same F?
• Nothing! They just are the same F?
• What F makes F?
• We can give a list of F-making characteristics?
What makes ... ?
• Ambiguity
• What makes it the same?
• What makes you say it is the same?
• All proposed criteria of identity are in fact
answers to the second question, not to the
first.
Synchronic and Diachronic Identity
• Criterion of Individuation
• What makes this thing one and the same thing in
the given moment? (Synchronic)
• Criterion of Identity Through Time
• What makes this thing one and the same thing
through time? (Diachronic)
• Both questions should have the same answer.
Answer to the first should ipso facto be answer
to the second.
Counting
• In order to count things, we must have a criterion of
individuation: how many houses in town, how many
books on the shelf, how many people in the room, how
many dogs in the park, etc.
• (1) What makes one thing one? (not two things or half of
one thing)
• (2) What makes this thing at t2 one and the the same as
that thing at t1? (that thing at t1 still exists and it is not
some third thing at t2)
• (3) What makes an F an F? (not an G or an not-F)
• (1) and (2) are primitive but (3) is not.
Synchronic Identity
• What makes this chair this chair?
• (1) What makes this chair this chair?
(Question about individual essence)
• (2) What makes this chair a chair?
• (Question about species essence)
• (1) is primitive, (2) is not
4D
• The view that diacronic identity is primitive
rules out four-dimensionalism.
• According to 4D, things persist through
time by having temporal slices linked by
causal relation. So, according to 4D,
persistence is not primitive but rather
analysable.