Transcript Table 1. Estimates of casualties from a hypothetical

Biosurveillance and Bioterrorism:
Ronald M. Atlas
President American Society for Microbiology
Graduate Dean, Professor of Biology and Professor of
Public Health, and Co-Director Center for Deterrence
of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism
University of Louisville, Louisville KY
The Threat of Bioterrorism
Before September 11th--Predictions of Bioterrorism
We were... “ at the brink of a new age—what some experts call
catastrophic terrorism...I do not believe it is a question of
whether a lone terrorist or terrorist group will use infectious
disease agents to kill unsuspecting citizens; I’m convinced it’s
really just a question of when and where.” Michael Osterholm,
Former State Epidemiologist for Minnesota
After September 11th--Reality of Bioterrorism
Attack with Anthrax through the mail
Fear grips the Nation
Scientists become suspects
Science is needed
Anthrax Attack 2001 Unknowns
Who sent the letters?


Unknown--individual yet to be apprehended
Believed to be from US--sent by someone with access
to US biodefense program information
Where were the letters sent from

Certainly NJ--initially thought to be Trenton but now
thought that it may have been Princeton based upon
detection of spores in mailbox
Where did the anthrax come from


Ames strain originated in Texas--never in Iowa as
originally thought
Forensics indicate grown in last 2 years and clearly
same as the strain at USAMRIID
Anthrax Attack 2001 Unknowns
How many spores are required to cause
inhalational anthrax


Originally thought to be 8000-10000 spores based
upon animal studies
Fatal Connecticut case of 94 year old womain
indicates far fewer spores--means that secondary
contamination of mail can present serious health risk
Best prophylactic treatment


Vaccine for military
Doxycycline or Cirpofloxacin for those exposed-time period uncertain
Anthrax Attack 2001 Unknowns
Appropriate method for safeguarding the mail


Irradiation for high risk mail--can cause toxic
thermal decomposition products
Gloves reduce risk of cutaneous anthrax for mail
handlers
How to communicate to the public



Need to communicate uncertainties
Need to communicate real risk levels
Need to offer authoritative advice even when there is
uncertainty--problem in DC with postal workers
where CDC and HHS said what you do is up to you-we don’t know if you should be vaccinated or how
long you should continue taking antibiotics
What is the next threat
Impossible to tell which leaves us trying to defend against
many possible biothreat agents
Greatest risk placed on agents of mass destruction


Anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, plague, botulinum toxin,
hemorrhagic fevers
Aerosol dissemination
Is smallpox really the greatest threat?



Do North Korea, Iran, and Iraq have smallpox?
Are the Russian stocks secure?
Should Russia and US eliminate remaining stocks?
If smallpox is the greatest threat because it has been
eradicated and vaccination was stopped, should we cease
efforts to eliminate other diseases like measles and polio?
Smallpox: Clinical Features
Exanthem (Rash)



Begins on face, hands,
forearms spreads to lower
extremities then trunk over ~ 7
days
Synchronous progression:
macules  vesicles 
pustules  scabs
Lesions on palms /soles
USAMRICD: ater stage
facial lesions of
smallpox
Smallpox: Current Vaccine
Made from live Vaccinia
virus
Intradermal inoculation with
bifurcated needle
(scarification)

Pustular lesion/induration
surrounding central scab/ulcer 6-8
days after vaccination
WHO: Smallpox vaccine vials
Smallpox: Vaccination
Complications
WHO: Eczema vaccinatum
WHO: Vaccinia necrosum
WHO: Inadvertent
inoculation below eye
Smallpox Issues
Catastrophic public health consequences



Mass casualties which overwhelm medical
systems
High morbidity and mortality
Contagious
Vaccination
Cost-benefit analysis uncertain
 400-1000 deaths likely in US from vaccination
Quarantine

How should we respond?
Build detectors and sensors but there is a problem with
sensitivity--must be overly sensitive to avoid missing an
attack but that leads to false alarms and panic
Build public health response capacity
Stockpile drugs and vaccines but what to place in the
stockpile and how to deploy remains an issue
What should we do about smallpox vaccination?



Given high rate of adverse reactions, should we institute
mandatory vaccination--estimates are that it would result in 4001,000 deaths in US--at what point is the threat high enough?
How can we ensure efficacy of a new safer vaccine?
Current strategy is to produce enough vaccine within a year for
all Americans--but will ring vaccination work after an attack?
Current strategy is now based upon “mass vaccination”
Need more Research
NIAID research plan


Basic Research into microbes with bioterrorism potential, and the
specific and non-specific host defense mechanisms against these
agents
Applied/Translational Research with predetermined milestones and
the ultimate production of new/improved diagnostics, vaccines, and
therapies
NIH Research Priorities







Microbial biology
Host factors
Genomics
Therapeutics
Vaccines
Diagnostics
Expanded research resources (BL3, BL4)
NIH Bioterrorism Research Funding
TOTAL 2001
TOTAL 2002
TOTAL 2003
$25M
$275M
$1,748M
Basic research and development
$440.6M
Drug/vaccine discovery and development $591.9M
Clinical research
$194.3M
Research facilities intramural
$371.1M
Research facilities extramural
$150.0M
TOTAL
$1,747.9M
National Academies of Science:
Research needs to combat terrorism
Restructure government organizational structure
Develop NIH/Industry translational research
partnerships
Revamp FDA licensing process
Establish Agricultural CDC
Develop Vaccines and broad spectrum antimicrobics
Investigate Microbial forensics
Study Microbial Pathogenesis
CDC Approach
Increase funding to States for Public Health

Increase education and response capability
Enhance surveillance


Build Health Alert Network
Build Laboratory response network
Le v e l D Labora torie s
Agentspecif ic
labor ato ry
Le vel C
labor ato ry
Agentspecif ic
labor ato ry
Rapid-r esponse
and adv anced
technology laboratory
Le vel B
labor ato ry
Le vel A
labor ato ry
Specimen testing and referral
Training and consultation
Agentspecif ic
labor ato ry
Clinical Laboratories as Sentinels
for Bioterrorism
ER’s and their labs are key sentinels
Laboratory personnel require training



Methods to rule out non-BT agents
Mechanism to forward the balance
Safety for laboratory personnel
Variability in states’ training
Uniform procedures ideal
LRNB Level A Labs
(protocols available for anthrax at CDC and ASM web sites)
 Initial responsibility for the early detection of intentional
dissemination of biological agents
 Public health and hospital laboratories with low-level
biosafety facilities
 Will rule out organisms rather than actually identify
biological weapons
 Use clinical data and standard microbiological tests to
decide which specimens and isolates should be forwarded
to higher level biocontainment labs
 Staff trained in the safe collection, packaging, labeling, and
shipping of samples that might contain dangerous
pathogens to the next level laboratories in the network
LRNB Level B Labs
Core capacity for agent isolation and presumptive
testing of suspect specimens
State and local public health agency labs
Test for specific agents
Forward organisms or specimens to higher
biocontainment labs
Minimize false positives
Protect Level C labs from overload
Will maintain capacity to perform confirmatory
testing and characterize drug susceptibility
LRNB Level C Labs
Advanced capacity for rapid identification
Located at state health agencies, academic
research centers, or federal facilities,
Perform advanced and specialized testing
Capacity to perform toxicity testing
Employ advanced diagnostic technologies
Participate in the evaluation of new tests and
reagents
Determine assays to be transferred to Level B
LRNB Level D Labs
Highest level containment and diagnosis of rare and
dangerous agents
Specialized federal laboratories with unique experience in
diagnosis of rare diseases (e.g. smallpox and Ebola)
Develop or evaluate new tests/methods
Maintains a strain bank of biological agents
Maintain the highest biocontainment facilities
Conduct all tests performed in Level A, B, and C labs,
plus confirmatory testing and characterization
Capacity to detect genetically engineered agents
Medical Preparedness
Efforts to enhance medical preparedness
towards a bioterrorist attack:


developing new vaccines & medicinals
stockpiling of existing pharmaceuticals
Local and national response plans are
being developed to cope with the
potentially devastating impact of a
bioterrorist attack.
National Health Response Network
Drugs are stockpiled at various locations for
dispatch to locations where bioterrorism events
may occur
Ciprofloxacin in stockpiles for protection against
anthrax
Doses of available smallpox vaccine being
increased
System tested in simulations--some difficulties in
local distribution
CDC Biological Threat Categories
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) has divided biological agents that are the
critical biothreat agents into categories based upon
their risks for causing mass casualties in the event
of a bioterrorist attack.
CDC Biological Threat Category A
The highest priority agents that pose a risk to
national security
Easily disseminated or transmitted person-toperson
Cause high mortality
Potential for major public health impact
Might cause public panic & social disruption
Require public health preparedness
CDC Biological Threat Category A Agents

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
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

Variola major (smallpox)
Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
Yersinia pestis (plague)
Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism)
Francisella tularensis (tularaemia)
Filoviruses
Ebola hemorrhagic fever
Marburg hemorrhagic fever
Lassa (Lassa fever)
Junin (Argentine hemorrhagic fever)
CDC Biological Threat Category B

Moderately easy to disseminate

Cause moderate morbidity and low mortality


Require specific enhancements of CDC’s
diagnostic capacity
Enhanced disease surveillance
CDC Biological Threat Category B Agents

Coxiella burnetti (Q fever)

Brucella species (brucellosis)

Burkholderia mallei (glanders)

Alphaviruses

Venezuelan encephalomyelitis

Eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis

Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)

Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens

Staphylococcus enterotoxin B
CDC Biological Threat Category B Agents
(Subset List)
Food- or water-borne pathogens include but
are not limited to:

Salmonella species

Shigella dysenteriae

Escherichia coli O157:H7

Vibrio cholerae

Cryptosporidium parvum.
Food and Water as Targets
Water difficult

Already assume water contaminated and we
treat and test regularly
Food easy

Salmonella attack in Dalles Oregon
• Contamination of salad bars
• Over 750 illnesses
• Political election the target
CDC Biological Threat Category C
Includes emerging pathogens that could be engineered
for mass dissemination in the future due to:

Availability

Ease of production and dissemination

Potential for high morbidity and mortality

Major health impact
Preparedness for List C agents requires ongoing
research to improve disease detection, diagnosis,
treatment, and prevention.
CDC Biological Threat Category C Agents






Nipah virus
Hantaviruses
Tick-borne hemorrhagic fever viruses
Tick-borne encephalitis viruses
Yellow fever
Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
Suggested Policy Mechanisms to Reduce
Future Biological Weapons Threats
Tighten restrictions on access to dangerous
pathogens
Impose restrictions on the conduct and publication
of “contentious research,” i.e. fundamental
biological or biomedical investigations that produce
organisms or knowledge that could have immediate
weapons implications
Restrict access and dissemination of “relevant
information”
Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions Among the Research
Community, Industry, and the National Security Community. Gerald L. Epstein. Critical
Reviews in Microbiology, 27 (2001)
Restrictions on Access to Select Agents
 Possession of potentially dangerous biological agents
should be regulated more tightly
 Some individuals should not be given access to
dangerous pathogens
Physical security at institutions that maintain cultures of
potentially dangerous biological agents needs to be
reexamined to provide not only legal but also physical
barriers to help prevent unauthorized individuals from
obtaining such agents
 Are locks enough?
 Should armed guards secure laboratories with select
agents?
CDC Laboratory Registration/
Select Agent Transfer Program
These regulations place shipping and handling
requirements on laboratory facilities that transfer or
receive select agents capable of causing substantial
harm to human health. They are designed to ensure
that select agents are not shipped to parties who are
not equipped to handle them appropriately or who
lack proper authorization for their requests.
Currently regulates shipment of 36 select agents and
their disease related genes
Requires adherence to CDC biosafety manual
In effect since April 1997
USA Patriot Act
Imposes restrictions on possession of select agents






Restricts aliens from countries designated as supporting
terrorism from possessing select agents within the United
States
Restricts individuals who are not permitted to purchase
handguns, e.g. some individuals with a history of mental
illness or a criminal record, from possessing select agents
No provision for exemptions under any circumstances
Does not require registration for possession of select
agents
Requires that requests by law enforcement be kept
confidential so as not to alert would-be terrorists.
In effect since October 26, 2001
Definition of a Restricted Person
 is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year;
 has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
 is a fugitive from justice;
 is an unlawful user of any controlled substance;
 is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the US;
 has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to
any mental institution;
 is an alien who is a national of a country as to which the Secretary of
State has made a determination (that remains in effect) that such
country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism; or
 has been discharged from the Armed Services of the United States
under dishonorable conditions.
Patriot Act and Legitimate Research
The USA Patriot Act also makes it an offense for a
person to knowingly possess any biological agent,
toxin or delivery system of a type or in a quantity
that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably
justified by prophylactic, protective, bona fide
research or other peaceful purpose.
Senator Patrick Leahy warned during passage of the
Patriot Act, this provision could have unanticipated
ramifications depending upon how one defined
“bona fide” or “reasonably justified.”
U Conn case raises questions
Regulation of Possession of Select Agents
On December 12, 2001 H.R. 3448, the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Response Act of 2001, suported
by Representative W. J. "Billy" Tauzin (R-LA), was
passed by the House of Representatives, under suspension
of the rules.
On December 20, 2001 the Senate passed by unanimous
consent the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, S. 1765,
which is supported by Senators William Frist (R-TN) and
Edward Kennedy (D-MA).
On June 12, 2002 signed into law the Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act
Regulation of Possession of Select Agents
The provisions of the bioterrorism preparedness act:





Requires registration for possession (first step
notification by Sept. 10, 2002)
tracks the acquisition, transfer and possession of
certain biological agents and toxins
requires safeguards and security regulations to
be followed
collects information for law enforcement;
establishes a process for alerting authorities
about unauthorized attempts to acquire select
agents
Biopreparedness Act
 Requires registered facilities to submit the names of
individuals with access to select agents to the Attorney
General, who will use criminal, immigration, and national
security databases available to the federal government to
ensure that such individuals identified as restricted are
denied access to select agents and toxins
 Regulations remain to be issued
 How will we notify the Attorney General?
 What specific information will we need to submit?
 What will be the timeframe for notification?
 Will current research have to stop?
 Exempts medical uses but not necessarily investigational
products
National Security and Openness of Scientific Research
Are new mechanisms needed to govern scientific research
so as to lessen the probability of the development of
advanced biological weapons?

If so what should be done?
The research and national security communities have
different objectives, cultures, and norms, and are likely to
weigh the costs and benefits of proposed policy measures
differently

What should the National Academy and scientific societies like the
American Society for Microbiology do to foster the critical dialog
among these communities?
Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions Among the Research
Community, Industry, and the National Security Community. Gerald L. Epstein. Critical
Reviews in Microbiology, 27 (2001)
The potential for misuse of scientific information is
pitting national security concerns against the
traditional openness of biomedical research.
The anthrax attacks that followed the horror of
September 11 have made scientists and physicians
suspects as well as saviors.
The fear that information from that research may
fall into the wrong hands is causing great anxiety
within the scientific community and uncertainties
among the public and policy makers as to how to
balance national security with traditional openness
of science.
Concern Over Scientific Information
ASM made information available for the education of the
scientific community and to inform the public
 “The principle right now is one of openness in science--if
someone wants to publish a legitimate research paper
we’re not going to be the censor.” Ronald Atlas-President elect ASM
Position of openness of science draws scorn
“We have to get away from the ethos that knowledge is
good, knowledge should be publicly available, that
information will liberate us...Information will kill us in
the techno-terrorist age, and I think it's nuts to put that
stuff on Web sites.” Arthur Caplan--U. Penn. Bioethicist
Eric Lichtblau Response to Terror: Rising Fears That What We Do Know Can
Hurt Us, Los Angeles Times November 18, 2001
Even at the height of the Cold War era it was recognized
that “greater security would be achieved by the open pursuit
of scientific knowledge than by curtailing the free exchange
of scientific information.”

National Academy of Sciences 1982 Corson Report
“It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum
extent possible, the products of fundamental research
remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this
Administration that, where the national security requires
control, the mechanism for control of information generated
during federally-funded fundamental research in science,
technology and engineering at colleges, universities and
laboratories is classification.”

National Security Decision Directive #189. National Policy on the
Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information.
September 21, 1985.
ASM Opinion on Secrecy
“Terrorism feeds on fear, and fear feeds on
ignorance. The best defense against anthrax or any
other infectious disease is information – information
in a form that can be used by scientists and by
members of the public to guide rational and
effective actions to ensure public safety. Placing
major new barriers in the path of the flow of
information between scientists and between
scientists and the public is more likely to contribute
to terrorism than to prevent it.”
Abigail Salyers, Past President American Society for Microbiology
The US is trying to balance openness with national security
concerns but is struggling with how to achieve the right
balance.
“The key to maintaining U.S. technological preeminence is
to encourage open and collaborative basic research. The
linkage between the free exchange of ideas and scientific
innovation, prosperity, and U.S. national security is
undeniable…the policy on the transfer of scientific,
technical, and engineering information set forth in NSDD189 shall remain in effect, and we will ensure that this
policy is followed.”

Condoleezza Rice, Special Assistant to President Bush for National
Security Affairs affirmed the importance of openness of
fundamental research in a letter of November, 2001
Federal departments and agencies ordered to take steps to
protect information regarding weapons of mass destruction
as well as other information that could compromise national
security

Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the
President and Chief of Staff, for the heads of executive
departments. March 19, 2002.
Departments ordered to take steps to protect sensitive but
unclassified information that might reasonably be expected
to assist in the development or use of weapons of mass
destruction.

Memorandum from Laura Kimberly, Acting Director Information
Security Oversight Office, National Archives and Records
Administration, and Richard Huff and Daniel Metcalfe, Codirectors of Information and Privacy, Department of Justice. March
19, 2002.
Concern about sensitive biological information and the
threat of recombinant DNA technology was sparked by the
publication of experiments in which IL-4 genes were
inserted into mousepox viruses, resulting in near total
suppression of the immune response.

Jackson RJ. et al. 2001. Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by a
recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte
responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox. J.
Virology 75:1205-10.
The IL-4 mousepox study was done in Australia, beyond the
reach of US government regulations.
It was, however, potentially subject to restraint, raising the
question of ethical responsibility within the scientific
community.
Report demonstrating that artificially synthesized polio
virus genome produced infective pathogenic virus

Cello, J., A. V. Paul, and E. Wimmer. 2002. Chemical synthesis of
poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious virus in the absence of
natural template. Science express. July 2002/ Page 1/
10.1126/science.1072266.
Executive Branch called upon to “…examine all policies,
including national security directives, relevant to the
classification or publication of federally funded research to
ensure that, although the free exchange of information is
encouraged, information that could be useful in the
development of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons is
not made accessible to terrorists or countries of proliferation
concern.”

House Resolution 514. Introduced by Congressman Dave Weldon
“And this we do also: we have consultations, which of the
inventions and experiences which we have discovered shall
be published, and which not; and take all an oath of secrecy
for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep secret;
though some of those we do reveal sometime to the State,
and some not.”

Sir Francis Bacon 1626. The New Atlantis
“…our Nation’s progress depends on the free flow of
information. Nevertheless, throughout our history, the
national interest has required that certain information be
maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens,
our democratic institutions, and our participation within the
community of nations. Protecting information critical to our
Nation’s security remains a priority.”

President Clinton Executive order 12958. Classified National
Security Information. April 17, 1995.
Problem is that there is no clear definition of what
constitutes "sensitive information" in the Life Sciences.
“the concept [of sensitive but unclassified information] is so
squishy [ill defined] and fraught with danger that the only
sensible thing for the research community to do is to
demand [classification].”

William Wulf, President of the National Academy of Engineering,
Leo, A. 2002. Science and secrets. Technology Review, June 20.
Many academic institutions, like MIT, reject classified
research. A recent report recommended that MIT ban
classified research on its main campus to protect its
educational mission although faculty could conduct such
research on MITs Lincoln campus.

In the Public Interest. Report of the ad hoc faculty committee on
access to and disclosure of scientific information. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, June 12, 2002
US decisions have international ramifications
“National security requires scientific excellence. Scientific
excellence requires openness. Openness is inherently
international.”

Neil Lane. Scientific Advisor to President Clinton
If government moves toward restraining the flow of
information across national boundaries there will be an
inevitable clash with the academic research community that
is increasingly seeking international collaborations and
partnerships.

Skolnikoff, E.B. 2002. Protecting university research amid
national-security fears. Chronicle of Higher Education May 10.
Given the potential dual use nature of biodefense activities,
silence could raise suspicions of US research intent and lead
to illicit proliferation activities by others.
Thus we are left with a series of perplexing questions that
are at the heart of the debate between national security and
the openness of biomedical research and publication.

Should scientists be constrained regarding which questions they
can ask?

Should journals reject papers containing potentially sensitive
information?

Should secrecy clearances be required for attendees at biodefense
research meetings?

Should there be mandatory government review before publishing
information, even from unclassified studies and those not funded
by government?

And, perhaps the most difficult questions of all, exactly what is
sensitive information, and who is empowered to decide what is
potentially dangerous?
It will not be simple to achieve consensus between the
national security and scientific communities on questions
like:





Should more research be declared classified?
Should there be review boards to consider the national security
implications of all publications and presentations of research
results?
Should we impose restrictions on the conduct and publication of
“contentious research,” i.e., fundamental biological or biomedical
investigations that produce organisms or knowledge that could
have immediate weapons implications?
Must we restrict access and dissemination of such information?
How can one define what is dangerous and how can we design a
system that contains that danger while allowing legitimate
biomedical research to proceed in a manner acceptable to society?
The closest experience that the biological research
community has had with such contentious issues occurred in
the 1970s with the advent of recombinant DNA technology.
Then, the scientific community paused to examine the
consequences of the newly discovered power to alter
genetics and gathered in public at Asilomar.
“The issue is not whether areas of ‘forbidden knowledge’
should be defined in which research is prohibited. Rather, it
is about defining boundaries for ‘constrained knowledge’
whereby freedom of research enquiry is not impeded, but
access to certain forms of research data would be limited to
those with bona fide credentials… Asilomar is a model for
how science can independently regulate its own inquiries.
This ethos must now be reawakened.”

Poste, G. 2002. Biotechnology and terrorism. Prospect Magazine.
But, can we use our experience with the debate over
recombinant DNA technology as a model to confront
concerns about the potential misuse of biotechnology?
Can an open debate be held regarding the concerns about
bioterrorism and recombinant DNA technology without
compromising national security interests?
The controversy is likely to continue until we have a
national debate and reach consensus on how to balance
traditional openness of science with national security in the
new age of bioterrorism.
We must recognize that the advancement of the science of
recombinant DNA technology and the complex national
security issues raised by the threat of bioterrorism make the
task more complex than the problems faced at Asilomar.
The scientific community should come together to establish
the norms for information communication in the age of
bioterrorism.
It is up to us to define the standards and to establish the
framework to ensure that critical information is withheld
from terrorists while permitting the continued advancement
of biomedical research and the protection of public health.
This process needs to begin by defining what is sensitive
and then move to considering how best to protect that
information—going beyond classification to ethically
responsible citizenship.
We cannot do this alone. The scientific and national security
communities must establish a dialog and the outcome must
be acceptable to the public. And like Asilomar, the public
must be part of the process throughout.
ASM Resolution on Bioethics
The Council Policy Committee of the American Society for
Microbiology affirms the longstanding position of the
Society that microbiologists will work for the proper and
beneficent application of science and will call to the
attention of the public or the appropriate authorities misuses
of microbiology or of information derived from
microbiology.
ASM members are obligated to discourage any use of
microbiology contrary to the welfare of humankind,
including the use of microbes as biological weapons.
Bioterrorism violates the fundamental principles expressed
in the Code of Ethics of the Society and is abhorrent to the
ASM and its members.
ASM Publication Board Statement
 “The ASM recognizes that there are valid concerns
regarding the publication of information in scientific
journals that could be put to inappropriate use. The ASM
hopes to participate in the public debate on these issues.
Until a national consensus is reached, the rare manuscript
that might raise such issues will be reviewed by the ASM
Publications Board prior to the Society proceeding to
publication."
The editors of the ASM journals are trying to be responsible
stewards of scientific information and communication by
carefully balancing national security with the value of
advancing science for the benefit of humanity.
This is a policy of responsible citizenship--not one of
censorship
Concluding Remarks
Infectious diseases and bioterrorism present major
threats to national and global security
By enhancing global epidemiological surveillance
systems, by developing advanced diagnostics, and by
discovering new and better vaccines, antibacterials
and antivirals we will have the tools needed to comba
both natural outbreaks of infectious disease and
intentional acts of bioterrorism
We need to support increased investment and
research efforts aimed at eliminating the threats of
bioterrorism and of epidemics that can strike
anywhere in the world