Transcript Iran - SETA

Iran’s Nuclear Program:
Contending Perspectives
Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri
San Francisco State University
SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010
Iran’s Nuclear Program
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Historical Overview
1957: The US and Iran sign a civilian nuclear cooperation
pact. The US provides technical aid and several kilograms of
enriched uranium to help the country build its first nuclear
reactor.
1967: The US provides “a package containing 554 kilograms
of highly enriched uranium and 112 grams of plutonium”
(Entessar, Middle East Policy, Summer 2009:26).
1974: The shah, encouraged by the US to diversify Iran’s
energy resources, launches a program to build 23 nuclear
reactors (The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 29, 2009:15).
Historical Overview …
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Mid-1970s: The Iranian government receives
nuclear assistance from other nations,
including West Germany (MidGemany’s
Kraftwerk Union–KWU—and Siemans),
France, India and South Africa.
Several companies in these countries became
Iran’s leading nuclear-power plant contractors.
Historical Overview
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The Cold War pressures may have driven a
nascent desire for nukes:
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“According to the Shah, Iran did not fear an attack
from the Soviet Union, but rather from Afghanistan
and Iraq acting as proxies for Soviet aggression. To
counter this threat, the shah told Eisenhower that
Iran needed a ‘crash program’ to obtain highly
mobile forces with atomic weapons.” (Entessar,
2009: 28).
History …
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1979: Islamic Revolution overthrows the shah.
Nuclear cooperation with the West ends.
“Ironically, newly declassified U.S. documents
reveal a remarkable continuity between the
shah’s nuclear logic and that of the Islamic
Republic.” (Entessar, 2009:28).
1980-1988: During the Iran-Iraq war, Baghdad
bombs Iran’s two nuclear reactors at Bushehr.
History …
1995: Russia signs a deal with Iran to build a
lightweight water reactor at Bushehr.
 2002: Iranian exiles reveal the existence of a facility
to enrich uranium at Natanz and a heavy-water plant
at Arak.
 2003: The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) accuses Iran of failure to comply with
international safeguards, but finds “no evidence” of
an attempt to build a bomb.
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History ….
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2004-2006: the EU-three negotiations fail and
the UN Security Council broadens sanctions
against Iran.
2003: National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)
show that Iran has stopped its military activities
insofar as its nuclear program is concerned.
2008: The UN adopts its third round of
sanctions resolution against Iran.
History …
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Oct. 1, 2009: Geneva: Iran agrees to an
arrangement whereby Iran sends its lowenriched uranium to either Russia or France for
processing and will receive needed nuclear
energy for cancer and medical-related purpose.
Mid-Nov. 2009: Iran signals it is rejecting the
West-backed idea.
The stalemate continues.
The Post-War Iran
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The Iraq-Iran war altered the perception of the
threat.
“The single most important driving force in
Iran’s nuclear calculus is its threat perception.
Iran belongs to no regional security structure.
Nasser Hadian, a political scientist at Tehran
University: Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution
“Iran’s strategic loneliness” has continued.
No Author Listed, “Iran's key nuclear sites,” British Broadcasting Company.com, Accessed Through the Internet,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4617398.stm
Iran’s Economic Rationale
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Aims to produce 7000 megawatts of electricity by
2020.
Meet per expected 7% per annum growth in energy
consumption.
 Save $4 billion revenue, substituting nuclear energy for oil.
 Self Sufficiency- “Independent Nuclear Fuel Cycle”
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Mahmoud Monshipouri, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: What Comes Next?,” Meed Quarterly Report, September 12, 2003, p. 4.
Kayhan Barzegar, “The Paradox of Iran’s Nuclear Consensus,” World Policy Journal, 26 no 3, (2009), p. 26.
Nuclear Decision Making
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Division among policymakers
All power truly rests with Khamanei
 Some jockeying for influence
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Rafsanjani, rebukes Ahmadinejad for playing nuclear
chicken, jeopardizing Iran’s negotiating leverage.
 "We possess nuclear technology that is not
operationalized yet. Any time we decide to weaponize it,
we can do so rather quickly.“
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–
Rafsanjani, 2005
Strategic Plans
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Chess vs. American Football
Washington has surrounded Iran with bases in
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar and massive troop
buildups in Afghanistan and Iraq.
 The US nuclear-equipped naval carriers patrols the
Persian Gulf.
 Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manochehr Mottaki: any
future U.S.-Iran negotiation will not resemble
American football; rather it will be akin to a chess
match.
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Surrounded by Nuclear Powers
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Threat Perception
Surrounded by nuclear states
 Israel (200 war heads and not a signatory to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
 Pakistan and Indian
 Both nuclear armed states are not signatories to
the NPT.
 Pakistan (anti-Shia Taliban a possible threat if in
power).
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The Iranian Question
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“…the nuclear impasse is a consequence of
a far wider problem between Iran and the
United States, not its cause. A nuclear
solution will not solve the Iranian question.”
(Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran, 2006).
Regional Power
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Iran’s highest priority is not to become a nuclear
player. Instead, Iran’s most important ambition
is to take control of the Persian Gulf region, a
region that is running out of oil (Robert Baer,
ex-CIA operative, The Devil we Know).
Empire by proxy: Iran intends to export its softpower of Islamism and anti-colonialism
throughout the region.
Containment
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Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science at
the MIT:
We can Live with a Nuclear Iran. Deterrence
and containment can still work: “… as we
contemplate the actions, including war, that the
United States and its allies might take to forestall
a nuclear Iran, we need to coolly assess whether
and how such a specter might be deterred and
contained.” (The NY Times, Feb. 27, 2006:A19).
Problems of Containment
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Containment would be neither a perfect nor a
foolproof policy. It would not be a substitute for the
use of force.
Costs: the US will have to shelve its call for domestic
political reforms in Arab dictatorships and overlook
objectionable Chinese and Russian behavior on other
matters.
(James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran Gets
the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2010).
Deterrence
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Juan Cole (Univ. of Michigan): Iran’s leadership is
seeking what is sometimes called the “Japan Option”
or a “rapid breakout capability” (“nuclear latency”).
Unlike North Korea, India, and Pakistan, Tehran
“genuinely does not want to actually construct and
detonate a nuclear device.
Most senior Iranian leaders wish to avoid those heavy
sanctions, having seen what they did to Iraq.
Iran’s nuclear policy is more of an exercise in
deterrence than it is an offensive move.
A View from Tehran
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Iran is not in violations of Article IV, Para. 1 of the
NPT: “ … inalienable right of all the Parties to the
Treaty to develop, research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II
of this treaty.
Iran’s parliament (Majlis) never ratified the Additional
Protocol (AP), yet Iran voluntarily allowed 35
unannounced inspections between 2003-2007. Since
March 2007, however, Iran has disallowed such visits
(Muhammad Sahimi, Politicizing the IAEA against Iran,” Tehran Times, March
15, 2010:1 and 15).
A View from Tehran
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Current Iranian leadership sees US-Iran relations
as a zero-sum game.
They act rationally to maximize their power.
“Bomb” or “rapid breakout capability” takes the
forcible regime-change option off the table. It is
seen in Tehran as deterrence.
The current regime in Iran worries less about
internal threat and more about “external threat,”
as they seem to have necessary control
mechanisms for dealing with internal threat.
A View from Tehran
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Current Iranian leaders think in terms of
structural realism, self-help, balance of power 
nervous but resilient peace.
Iranian strategy is not cultural or ideological, it is
structural.
It is a classic case of self-help in a tough
neighborhood.
Five-Plus-One Talks
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Iran makes a nuclear offer with five-plus-one talks.
Iran: uranium could be exchanged in Turkey, Brazil, or
Japan.
Five-plus-one: take the bulk of this uranium to Russia
and France in one shipment and send it back as fuel
rods to be used in a small research reactor Iran has for
producing medical isotopes.
Iran has rejected this plan, proposing instead to swap
the material in small amounts.
Options
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Sanctions: are not efficacious. Have not worked
with Iran: have not strangled Iran in the last 30
years. Have had a crippling impacts on the
ordinary people
Sanctions on the gas import (Iran’s imports
nearly one-third of its gas from China) will make
life difficult for the Iranian people.
China and Russia are not in favor of such
sanctions. Neither are India and Brazil.
Options
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Military option: is not viable. A military attack
will have a consolidating impact on the current
regime.
It will plunge the region into chaos.
It will skyrocket the price of oil.
Hard to get China and Russia on board on any
military strike against Iran.
Room for Diplomacy
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The US and NATO forces cannot fix Afghanistan and
cannot win a civil war in Afghanistan; cannot operate in
tribal areas in Pakistan; neither can the Pakistani army.
For dealing with more tensions in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, we need to have Iran’s support for the
regional stability.
Security guarantee for Iran in the context of direct,
bilateral negotiations between Iran and the United
States.
Iran demands recognition as a regional power.