BOTSWANA COMPETITION BILL

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Transcript BOTSWANA COMPETITION BILL

ANTI-COMPETITIVE AND ANTI CORRUPTION ACTS BIRDS OF A FEATHER ?

by

Thula Kaira - CEO

Presentation to the Zambian Anti-Corruption Commission/DCEC Gaborone Thursday, 6th June 2013

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

1. Introduction 2. Why we should protect competition 3. Principles of Competition Policy 4. Botswana’s Competition Act 5. How we operate 6. Competition Policy & Corruption 7. Birds of a feather…?

1. INTRODUCTION

The Government of Botswana through its Cabinet adopted the National Competition Policy for Botswana in July 2005 The Policy was preceded by an Economic Mapping Survey (2002) that noted high levels of unemployment, increasing dominance of foreign firms in Botswana’s economy, etc

Arising from the Policy, the Government through its Parliament enacted the Competition Act in 2009 whose objectives in its preamble are to:

Establish the Competition AuthorityOutline its mandateRegulate competition in the economy

This is not unique to Botswana as such exist in over 130 countries, including BRICS, USA, EU, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe , etc

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THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY IS A Govt Agency Accountable to Govt through the Minister Guided By Other over-arching National Policies

2. WHY PROTECT COMPETITION?

UN SET of Principles & Rules on Competition

… States, in their control of restrictive business practices, should ensure treatment of enterprises which is fair, equitable, on the same basis to all enterprises, and in accordance with established procedures of law. The laws and regulations should be publicly and readily available

Monopoly markets are slow to innovate and adapt to new ways of doing business A National Competition policy will assist the Government and all its agents to ensure fair business opportunities for both foreign and local firms. Competition policy & law provides a set of rules and principles that are not based on privilege but conducive to and responsive to leveled-ground or fair competition

3. PRINCIPLES OF COMPETITION POLICY

Transparency Procedural fairness Non Discrimina tion

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The WTO is a multilateral trade organisation that has recommended a fair, transparent and non discriminatory multilateral trading system

Botswana is a member of the WTO and has voluntarily promulgated rules of fostering fair competition in the domestic economy through the Competition Act

Implementation of such a law has to adhere to the best international principles of transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness

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4. BOTSWANA’S COMPETITION ACT

1. Private Commercial enterprises The Law applies to: 2. The State’s commercial activities

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ELEMENTS OF THE COMPETITION ACT OF BOTSWANA VERTICAL AGREEMENTS : - Resale Price

Maintenance

CARTELS : - Price-Fixing

- Bid Rigging/ Collusion - Market/ Customer Allocation

ABUSE OF DOMINANCE : - Excessive

Pricing - Predatory Pricing - Territorial Restraints - Tied Selling

MERGERS -

Acquisitions -Takeovers Amalga mations

Vertical Agreements

These are agreements that businesses have from the production/supply source through logistics, wholesale/warehouse, retail ending up with the consumer

What contracts, conditions, agreements, arrangements, practices are in place to move a product from manufacturing to retailing? Long-term exclusive supply contracts effectively close out new entry

Transparent, fair, non-discriminatory?

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CASE EXAMPLE Vertical Agreement

Medical Aid Funders (MAFs) have entered into some form of arrangements with the Medical Service Providers (MSPs) such as dentists, gynaecologists, paediatricians etc on how much MAFs will pay for services rendered by MSPs to consumers (patients)

Patients pay high monthly subscriptions to MAFs but MSPs still claim extra payments from patients – invoicing system blurred

Is the system pro or anti-competitive?

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Horizontal Agreements (HAs)

HAs are any manner of formally or informally coordinated common market behaviour by competitors eg banks agreeing to have uniform bank charges or bakers agreeing to sale bread at the same price

HAs constitute the most serious offences in anti-trust and attract huge fines in RSA, USA and Europe. Record cement cartel fine of US$1 billion in India

They create ‘unfair-profits’ for the crooks

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CASE EXAMPLE of Horizontal Agreement

A group of car repair garages in Gaborone have allegedly conspired not to compete on price and so, they provide collusive quotes to insurance companies (bid rigging/collusive tendering)

They assist each other when requested with ‘cover prices’ high above the normal charges

Is this pro- or anti-competitive?

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Abuse of Dominance/Monopolisation

Abuse of dominance provisions are directed at enterprises which are larger in a market, which in Botswana is any firm with at least 25% market share

The law prescribes conduct that dominant firms cannot engage in as the effect is more severe in a market esp. for SMEs

It is important to ensure that markets have as many players as possible to provide a competitive market system

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CASE EXAMPLE on Abuse

Exploitative/excessive pricing is one form of abuse by a market player. At the Competition Authority, an IT tender produced a monopoly technical winner at P5.8 million

UNDP (the funders) questioned what kind of IT infrastructure CA needed at P5.8m and requested we verify the pricing of our needs or readvertise tender

Renegotiations resulted into a P2.4 million

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Mergers and Acquisitions

Mergers, takeovers, amalgamations or combination of ownership into multiple controlled and/or single firm under same hands is a way of reducing the number of players in a market, reducing competition/ choice and increasing market dominance

Most competition laws thus have provisions to ensure that there is an inquiry and assessment before a proposed merger or takeover is effected in a market

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CASE EXAMPLE of Mergers and Acquisitions

G4S is the dominant player in the private security business in Botswana, with an estimated market share of over 60%. It attempted to takeover a small player with less than 5% market share (Shield Security)

The CA refused to authorise the takeover as it was going to increase G4S dominance; reduce competition; and reduce consumer choice (price, service, etc)

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5. HOW WE OPERATE

CA initiates an investigation on its own or after a

complaint

CA can summon persons to produce evidenceCA can search business premises after obtaining a

court warrant

CA can seek assistance of police, DCEC, PPADB, etcCA can appoint adhoc inspectorsCA can cooperate with foreign CAsCompetition Commission (CC) makes final

decisions (except on mergers/takeovers)

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The Judicial Process Court of Appeal High Court Competition Commission Competition Authority

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6. COMPETITION POLICY & CORRUPTION

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Competition policy and law deals with both the public and the private sector While the corruption law does extend to deal with persons directly, competition law in Botswana deals with the corporate entity – thus fines are meted not to persons, but to firms Competition & corruption in public service are intertwined through ‘rent-seeking’

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 

Rent Seeking is spending resources in order to gain by increasing one's share of existing wealth, instead of trying to create wealth. The net effect of rent-seeking is to reduce total social wealth, because resources are spent and no new wealth is created. Rent-seeking implies extraction of uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to productivity. SOURCE: Conybeare, John A. C. (1982). “The Rent-Seeking State & Revenue Diversification,” World Politics, 35(1): 25-42 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rent-seeking

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 

In our society, rent-seeking reduces competition and breeds corruption the moment competition is frustrated/reduced

Rent seeking is higher where there are limited opportunities for growth/ wealth creation A lax public officer who is a sole decider or has discretionary authority in a key process may create a loophole for rent-seeking activities e.g., use of agents in immigration or customs clearance

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Concepts related to ‘rent-seeking’ that may reduce competition and breed corruption are:

Lobbying for tariffs to be imposed on imported products to protect local competitors

Introduction & processing on import permits

Regulatory capture

State-capture by strong interest groups who may influence policy & funding pertains

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The economist’s natural approach to corruption control is to appeal to the concept of competition as it is argued that bribes are harder to sustain where perfect competition prevails…a way to reduce corruption is to introduce competition at the level of the official receiving bribes: When a bureaucrat dispense a scarce benefit, the existence of competing officials to reapply in case of being asked for a bribe will bid down the equilibrium amount of competition

SOURCE: Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Corruption: A study of political economy. New York: Academic Press, 1978 (as quoted by Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, Rents, Competition and Corruption, The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, Issue 4 (Sep., 1999), 982-993 http://www.people.hbs.edu/rditella/papers/AER Rents%26Corruption.pdf

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An economic system based on the rule of law and fair competition can only function well, if trust accompanies contracts, i.e. if economic actors can calculate risks and probabilities attached to events and outcomes in the future. A high intensity of corruption induces an additional uncertainty and hence not only affects distortion of competition.

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Also, in a corrupt society, pressure groups might try to prevent enactment of a law that could control as much as restrict their own activities.

Hypothesis... A high level of corruption reduces the probability of enactment of a competition law.

SOURCE: Factors accounting for the enactment of a competition law – an empirical analysis, Report by Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan, September 2005, Halle Institute for Economic Research 29

Where monopoly/oligopoly control a market, the State may wish to engage private companies to perform specific tasks or public works or provide services. To the extent that only a very small number of companies can practically carry out the work, the ground is fertile for corrupt practices (such as overcharging, providing low quality work or delivering the work late). Such a condition obtains, eg, in defence projects

SOURCE: United Nations CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION, United Nations action

against CORRUPTION and BRIBERY, September 1997 http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/corrupt.htm

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7. BIRDS OF A FEATHER…?

Both competition and anti-corruption policies relate to good economic governance and curbing ‘unholy’ advantage Both lead to loss of competitiveness in an economy as unworthy people gain in commerce and industry Information sharing and assistance in investigations by enforcement agencies should thus be a national interest issue Formalisation of cooperation through MoUs

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KE A LEBOGA…

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

Thula Kaira - CEO Competition Authority Plot 50664, Fairgrounds Private Bag 00101 Gaborone, BOTSWANA Tel: +267 393 4278 Fax: +267 312 1013

EMAIL: [email protected]

[email protected]

WEBSITE: www.competitionauthority.co.bw

FACEBOOK: Competition Authority – Botswana TWITTER: @CompetitionBots