Chapter Four - W. W. Norton & Company

Transcript Chapter Four - W. W. Norton & Company

Chapter Four Domestic Politics and War

Domestic Politics and War

 Unitary state assumption: the treatment of states as coherent actors with a set of interests that belong to the state.

 This assumption can be a useful starting place for analysis.

• However, states are legal and political constructs, not beings capable of taking actions

Domestic Politics and War

 War is costly. But the costs of war are distributed unevenly.

 Do wars serve the national interest?

• To answer such questions, we must consider domestic actors’ different interests

Domestic Politics and War

 Which domestic interests drive foreign policy choices depends on: • The strategic interactions between actors • The institutions within the state  War is the outcome of interaction between or among multiple states.

Core of the Analysis

 There are actors within the state who may benefit from war: • These actors may have institutional and organizational advantages • Their main effect is to increase the aggressiveness of the state’s foreign policy • Democratic political institutions can reduce their influence

National Vs. Particularistic Interests

 General (national) interest: • Something that most actors within the country share.

 Narrow or particularistic interests: • Interests held by a relatively small number of actors within the country

National Vs. Particularistic Interests

 An example: The US has had a consistent interest in oil and the Middle East.

• Nationally, oil is vital to the US’s military power and economy • Particularly, oil companies benefit from selling oil  War may sometimes arise because it furthers the narrow interests of particular actors.

Interactions, Institutions, and Influence

 Without the unitary actor assumption, individuals and groups with different interests come into play.

• Institutions determine which actors and interests have influence  Some actors may have strategic advantages.

• Due to the collective action problem, small groups may have more effective influence

Interactions, Institutions, and Influence

 The extent of a group’s political influence depends on its members ability to cooperate.

 Three kinds of actors: • Leaders who make foreign policy decisions • Organized groups within the country (bureaucratic actors and interests groups) • The general public

Interactions, Institutions, and Influence

 The bureaucracy: different organizations that make up a state’s structure.

• Includes the military, diplomatic corps and intelligence agencies  Interest groups: groups of individuals with common interests that have organized in order to push for policies that benefit their members.

Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold On to Power at Home?

 In 1982, Argentina sparked war with Britain when it invaded the Falkland Islands.

• The territory was not especially valuable and Britain had a far superior naval force  Both governments had domestic problems: • Both economies were in severe recessions

What Do Leaders Want?

 Leaders of states have many interests of their own: • Ideological beliefs, personal motivation, the desire to stay in power, etc.

 Strategic politicians can use their control of policy to share their political restraints.

• May use war to enhance their hold on power

The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive

 Rally effect: people’s tendency to become more supportive of their own government during a crisis.

 Approval ratings for a leader often jump at the onset of a war.

• After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2008, President George W. Bush’s approval rating jumped 35 percent

The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive

 People “rally around the flag” because international conflicts can: • Cause an increase in patriotism • Ease criticism of the government • Create a diversion from other problems • Give leaders an opportunity to scapegoat or blame the country’s problems on foreigners

The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive

 At times, political leaders may face a

diversionary incentive:

• A temptation to spark an international crisis in order to rally public support at home  Gambling for resurrection: • Taking a risky action, such as starting a war, when the alternative is certain to be very bad

Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?

 The 1997 movie Wag the Dog depicted a leader hiring a movie director to produce a fake war in order to boost his ratings.

 But there is little evidence that leaders systematically resort to force when they are in trouble domestically.

• International conflict is more often initiated by leaders who are politically secure

Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?

 Why do we not see stronger evidence of diversionary incentives?

• Perhaps most leaders are not as cynical as assumed and are not simply “office seeking” • Or, the political benefits of war relative to peace have to be large in order to eliminate the possibility of peaceful bargaining

Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?

 The size of the bargaining range is determined by the sum of war costs to both sides, a + b. • If State A expects war benefits to equal r, the total cost of war to State A is a – r  Yet, even if the benefit r is greater than a, a bargaining range could still exist that is shown by: a + b – r

The Political Costs of War

 War can also impose domestic political costs.

 Public support for war changes as the costs increase.

• The only US wars that remained popular throughout were WWII, the Persian Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan

The Political Costs of War

 Leaders who fight losing or costly wars are more likely to be removed from office than those who win wars.

 Leaders should see war as a gamble not only for the state, but for their political interests.

Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups?

 Though imperialism did not benefit Britain as a whole, it was very profitable for wealthy people who could invest overseas.

 A British economist, J. A. Hobson, argued that wars are fought to benefit military and business interests.

Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups?



Military-industrial complex:

• An alliance of military leaders and arms manufacturers who presumably have a vested interest in an aggressive foreign policy  While hawkish domestic interests do not lead directly to the breakdown of bargaining, they do create more opportunities for such failures.

Bureaucratic Politics and the Military

 Decisions about war and peace are not only shaped by state leaders, but also by the interests of bureaucratic organizations.

 These organizations generally seek: • Bigger budgets, more input into policy-making, and opportunities for personal promotion

Bureaucratic Politics and the Military

 The military is usually the most influential bureaucratic actor in matters of war.

 Does military influence over foreign policy decision-making affect a state’s belligerence?

• The military sees benefits to war that other actors may not • Yet, it is important not to equate the military with militarism

Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic Lobbies

 Interest groups organize around economic and ethnic motives.

 Economic motives: when an actor’s income depends on events in other countries  Ethnic motives: when groups are motivated by ethnic attachment or ideological interests to support or oppose a particular country

Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic Lobbies

 Economic actors do not always prefer belligerent policies.

• May depend on peaceful relations with other countries  Depending on where and how they do business: • Economic actors can have an interest in peaceful relations with some countries and/or hostile relations with others