Transcript Gas Advisory Council EU-Russia Energy Dialogue Workstream

Третий энергопакет ЕС и
формирование новых
газотранспортных мощностей
А.А.Конопляник, д.э.н., проф.,
Советник Генерального Директора, ООО Газпром экспорт,
Профессор кафедры «Международный нефтегазовый бизнес»
РГУ нефти и газа им.Губкина
IX Международная конференция
«ЭНЕРГЕТИЧЕСКИЙ ДИАЛОГ РОССИЯ-ЕС: ГАЗОВЫЙ АСПЕКТ»,
Круглый стол 2 «Правовые основы европейского газового рынка»,
14 мая 2014 г., Штайгенбергер Грандотель, Брюссель, Бельгия 1
Third EU Energy Package &
development of new gas
transportation capacities
Dr. Prof. Andrey A.Konoplyanik,
Adviser to Director General, Gazprom export LLC,
Professor, Chair “International Oil & Gas Business”,
Russian State Gubkin Oil & Gas University
IX International Conference “Russia-EU Energy Dialogue: Gas Aspect”,
Round Table 2 “Legal background of the EU gas market”,
14 May 2014, Steigenberger Grandhotel, Brussels, Belgium
2
Historical Russia-EU gas supply chain
EU-25/27 border
Since 2004/07
LTC
Retail
supplies
CIS
“New” EU-25/27
LTC
Russia
LTGEC
Wholesale
supplies
Export Supplies
Production
Till 2004
“Old” EU-12/15
COMECON
USSR
EU-12/15 border
C
B
A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
A
EU internal gas market architecture according to
Third EU Energy Package
(entry-exit zones with virtual trading points/hubs)
-
Hub B
Hub A
Hub D
Hub C
Source: 17th Madrid Forum (Jan
2010), Energy Regulators of EU
Member States
Pipelines-interconnectors
between EU zones
Supplies to the EU from non-EU
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A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
Third EU Energy Package affects Russia-EU Gas
supply chain: how to materialize potential benefits
EU-12/15 border
Till 2004 “Old” EU-12/15
Since 2004/07
LTC
Retail
supplies
EU-25/27 border
USSR
COMECON
CIS
“New” EU-25/27
LTC
Wholesale
supplies
Russia
LTGEC
Export Supplies
C
B
Production
A
… BUT direct economic consequences for Russian
LTGEC both within the EU & Energy Community
Treaty area, both clearly conflicting with existing
trade model (in-EU on-border supplies to
Third EU Energy
Package = reform
of“Old”
internal EU-15
EU
wholesale trade …
Informal consultations/WS-2
RF-EU GAC concentrate mostly
on these aspects of EU TEP
wholesale EU importers) but potentially
positive for new/adapted trade model
(direct access to end-users)
A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
Third EU Energy Package
in gas: development
Step 2
Step 1
Step 1
Factual order of preparation
Step 2
Preferable order of preparation
Announced Sept.2007, entered
into force 03.09.2009, was to be
transposed into national laws by
03.03.2011; as of today most of
(not all) EU MS has transposed…
3rd EU Gas Directive 73/EC/09 (on common rules in gas)
Regulation 713/2009
(ACER)
EU Gas Target
Model
Step 2
Step 1
Regulation 715/2009
(access to natural gas networks)
Framework
Guidelines
…
1
Step 1
Network
Codes
…
Step 2
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CAM
NC
Work in progress – to be finished by end2014? Still window of opportunities!!! Incl.
for RF-EU energy cooperation!!!
A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
GTM preparation was initiated, inter alia,
at first round of informal Russia-EU expert
consultations on EUTEP (Jan’2010)
What is fundamental fault of current
“default mechanism” in draft Busn.
Rules for creation of new capacity
• “Auctions are the default mechanism for the allocation of
incremental/new capacity” (Business Rules, art.III.1.5), but:
– Incremental/new capacity = yet non-existing capacity,
– To allocate non-existing capacity you should first create it, but CAM
NC deals with existing capacity only => implementation of CAM NC
rules to new capacity is economically incorrect in principle
– To allocate (trade) existing capacity and to create (invest in
development of) not yet existing capacity is not the same => trade &
investment are NOT synonyms, but different types of economic
activity => their mixture seems to be a systemic long-term default in
EU (energy) legislation (the reason for Art.21/36 in 2nd/3rd Directives)
– ACER intention to put “investment” into Procrustean bed of “trade” is
counterproductive since considers the first just as occasional (from
time to time) deviation from the latter => procedural faults in ACER
Guidance reproduced in ENTSOG Busn.Rules, at least for new cap.
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A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
Procedural risks & uncertainties of
OSP in current draft Busn.Rules –
results of wrong ACER concept
CAM NC
Third Energy Package
OSP (in its current vision
by ACER => ENTSOG)
OSP (in Strawman proposal/17.09.2013;
14.01 & 26.02 SJWS presentations, etc.)
Auction
Draft Busn.Rules (ACER Guidance) approach: OSP = deviation from
CAM NC (auction) procedure => each such “deviation” is subject to NRA
approval with no clear rules for & responsibility of NRA actions => lack of
transparency, perceived risks, seems as if OSP = exemptions route
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A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
Creating new capacity in unbundled gas
market: how “to minimize investment risks
& uncertainties to tolerable level” (P.Lowe /
GAC) for all parties in gas supply chain
Bundled gas market
Unbundled gas market
Pricing
mechanism
(1) Cost-plus, (2) Netback replacement value
(1) Net back replacement value (price
indexation), (2) Spot/futures pricing
Who takes
investment risk
End-users
Shippers & TSOs
Who manage
capacity &
commodity
markets
VIC = in one face
producer & supplier
(commodity) & TSO
(capacity)
Producers & traders (commodity) &
TSO (capacity) => different parties in
term commodity & capacity contracts
Comparative
value of
investment risks
Bundling minimizes
invest. risks in creating
new capacity (no
contractual mismatch)
Unbundling objectively (by definition)
increases invest. risks due to potential
mismanagement of two markets (risk
of contractual mismatch)
Economic background of
RF position & proposal:
cross-border projectbased ring-fencing, etc.
Demand for TSO coordination => cooperation
=> JV (between/within IPs) to provide for
financeability of creation of new capacity 9
A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
Incremental Proposal & New
Capacity: proposed correlation
between CAM NC & NC HTTS
Existing Incremental
New Capacity
Capacity Capacity
Capacity
Auction
Auction
Coordinated Open
allocation
Season (+ crossmechanism
border project ring(CAM NC +
fencing + new
amendment)
project-based ITSO)
Tariff
System- SystemProject-based
methodology based
based
(cross-border project
(draft NC
ring-fencing through
HTTS)
pay-back period)
(*) CAM NC = Capacity Allocation Mechanism Network Code; NC HTTS = Draft
Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures
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A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
Auction & Open Season are two
different economic models => separate
procedures within TEP/CAM NC
Market test
Incremental vs New Capacity
Incremental
Capacity
Auction
Incremental Capacity
offered by TSO to
market participants
(potential shippers) =
top bottom approach
=> system-based
CHINESE WALL
BETWEEN TWO
PROCEDURES
Criteria: 1IP, size...
At least until
economic test on
COS gives
negative result
(see reserve
slides)
Criteria: new IP,
2IP+, size...
New Capacity
Coordinated Open
Season (COS)
New Capacity requested
by market participants
(potential shippers) from
TSO = bottom up approach
=> can/should be projectbased
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A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
Initiator
How auction & COS procedure can
coexist in ENTSOG Incremental Proposal
NRA
TSO
10YNDP
Central
planning
(political
reasoning)
Market
evaluation
(upside down)
=> TSO to
offer
Capacity:
Incremental
Allocation:
Auction
Econ
test
Yes
No
Either/or
Ship
per
Market test
(bottom up)
=> TSO to
test, shippers
to book, TSO
to invest
Long-term
capacity
deficit still
keeps on
No
Capacity:
New
Allocation:
Coordinated
Open
Season
(COS)
Longterm
capacity
deficit
does not
appear
Econ
test
A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
FID
IC
&
NC
FID
Yes
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Strawman “project-based” proposal
for OSP – yet not considered
New cross-border capacity project life-cycle
Invest.+pay-back period
Post-pay-back
OSP (Strawman-based proposal)
CAM NC + draft NC HTTS
-Project-based approach through pay-back
-Tariff as swing parameter in economic test
-NPV as criteria for economic test
-Fixed tariff through pay-back period
-F-factor =100% (90% - shippers demand, 10%
-NRA guarantees, securitized by EU fin. Inst.)
-No cost socialization
-Cross-border unitization, ITSO for unitized
project, coordination within single project
-Costs/revenues reallocation within project
-No contractual mismatch…
-System-based approach
-Volume as swing parameter
-WTP as criteria
-Floating tariff
-F-factor established by NRA,
flexible, less 100%
-Huge cost socialization (1-F)
-Cross-border coordination for
existing & not yet existing cap.
-…between diff. market areas
-Risk contractual mismatch…
Cross-border (“transportation route”) new capacity principle: until capacity is built &
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paid-back – OSP procedure based on project-based (not system-based) approach
A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
Draft solution for TSO coordination for
new cross-border capacity within E-E
EU zones: COS, ring-fencing, ITSO
Parameters of
new IPs/CBPs to be
coordinated within
chain of the zones and
with supply contracts
backing demand for
new capacity within
each zone
Hub A
Hub B
Hub D
Hub C
Pipelines-interconnectors
between two neighbouring EU zones =
= single IPs with bundled products
Supplies to EU from non-EU
Non-EU
producer
Its EU
customer
New Capacity = multiple IPs with bundled products to
be balanced, cross-border coordination of TSOs to avoid two types of
contractual mismatches:
(1) at each IP: between term supply & transportation contract, and
(2) at all IPs on the route from zone to zone: between bundled
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products at each IP
A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
Way forward
• To develop draft Business Rules for OSP for crossborder new capacity based on project-based approach
(Strawman proposal)
• To test step-by-step applicability of both OSP
procedures (comparative analysis in the form of
business game/case study) based on:
– Current version of ENTSOG draft Business rules (based on
ACER Guidance)
– Strawman proposal (17.09.2013, 14.01, 26.02, 08.04.2014)
• ENTSOG team with Prime Movers to organize such
case study/business game as part of “Impact
Assessment” requested by letter of DG ENERGY to
ENTSOG (K.D.Borchardt, 19.12.2013)
A.Konoplyanik, Brussels, RGO-Euogas Conf, 14.05.2014
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Thank you for your attention
Andrey A. Konoplyanik
[email protected]
[email protected]
www.konoplyanik.ru