Transcript Armed Robbery A Personal Experience (Bruce Young)

Cell Phone Technology to
Trace Violent Criminals
Bruce Young Rosebank CPF
Linkage Diagram 7 July - 20 October 2003
12 Calls
Suspect 2
"0723215448"
186 Calls
12 Calls
351 Calls
Suspect 1
0721100250
21 Calls
95 Calls
75 Calls
Suspect 8
0733083717
91 Calls
Sox
0722051327
Suspect 5
0721431894
1 Call
Duduzile Ncqobo
0723364454
2 Calls
Suspect 3
0725752149
545 Calls
Suspect 7
0726905036
169 Calls
134 Calls
1 Call
14 Calls
68 Calls
Nsqwekosi Mbatla
135 Calls
0733194662
Remigius Baloyi
0725482613
244 Calls
Evans Khumalo
825088623
Topics to be Discussed
The IMEI number and handset tracing
Call Records kept by cell phone providers
What is technically possible?
Handset Profiles
More advanced Vodacom's Look4me
Analysis of the Data
Level of Understanding & Training
The Police
Police Administrative Requirements
Police Capability to Analyse the Data
Commercial Implications
Cell Phone Providers
Cell Phone Technology to Trace Violent Criminals
Approach to the Law
Risk Approach
2004/11/06 - v3
The National Prosecuting
Authority (NPA)
Lack of clear guiding principles for issuing
court orders
Level of Understanding & Training
Community Policing Forums
Victim Support
Training Required
Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act
The Promotion of Access to Information Act
The Law
Constitutional Right to Privacy
Interception and Monitoring Act to be
Promulgated
What is Technically Possible
(1)
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Every handset has a unique 15 digit IMEI number (serial
no)
Accessible by typing *#06# on a GSM Phone
Cell phone providers record detailed call records of all
phone calls made (60-80 million per day)
Call records kept for 6 months (to change to 5 years)
If your cell phone is stolen and you don’t know the IMEI
the cell phone provider can tell you what it is.
Provided the IMEI is not changed the handset can be
traced and the new number(s) established
What is technically possible (2)
Handset
Profile
Contract
Basis
MSISDN
27828544454
27828544454
27727091544
27726444441
27727153959
27825142256
IMEI
IMSI
350984205611870
3509842056118701
3509842056118701
3509842056118701
3509842056118701
3509842056118701
Phone
Number
MSISDN
27727153959
27727153959
27727153959
27727153959
655018500169770
655018500169770
655017010071552
655016410044153
655017110008048
655015100174103
IMEI
Number
Call
Records
Start Date
2002/12/19 15:53
2002/10/28 07:43
2003/09/22 01:51
2003/09/22 05:16
2003/10/02 18:48
2003/10/06 13:33
Simcard
Number
End Date
2003/07/28 12:16
2003/09/20 13:50
2003/09/22 02:22
2003/10/14 01:15
2003/10/06 09:30
2003/10/06 13:33
Usage
Dates
Successful
Calls
4
3889
3
334
4
1
Unsuccessful
Calls
0
64
0
1
0
0
SP850
SP850
PPSMA
PPSMA
PPSMA
PPSMA
Nokia 6310i
Nokia 6310i
Nokia 6310i
Nokia 6310i
Nokia 6310i
Nokia 6310i
No of Calls
Made
Calls Made During
Robbery
IMEI
3506952050670503
3506952050670503
3506952050670503
3506952050670503
SP Code Handset Model
Call Date
Duration
Other Party
2003/09/21 23:12
63 826508660
2003/09/22 00:50
18 826508660
2003/09/22 00:53
29 826508660
2003/09/22 00:56
13 826508660
Phone
Location
Cell ID
11262-Mapetla-2
11262-Mapetla-2
11263-Mapetla-3
11262-Mapetla-2
What is technically possible
(3)
Suspect 1 Linked to All 3
Robberies
Suspect 2 Linked to 2
Robberies
IMEI Analysis
Suspect 1
350695205067050
3506952050670503
3506952084840903
3507781030546810
3509842056118701
3511132038765014
4486745746018201
4493337017364118
5200035104764200
Begin
End
Suspect 2
Begin
End
2003/09/17 08:18
2003/09/17 08:18 350990102860720 2003/11/15
2003/12/15
2003/09/14 00:20
2003/10/17 16:32 449209913430270
2003/10/23
2003/10/23
2003/10/29 23:35
2003/11/12 06:04 490548307121030
2003/10/17
2003/10/17
2003/10/24 18:17
2003/10/30 10:40 490526708556320
2003/09/19
2003/09/28
2003/10/02 18:48
2003/10/06 09:30 490535613015510
2003/08/09
2003/08/20
14-12-03 16:48
15-12-03 19:49
448903107949560
2003/08/20
2003/08/20
19-11-03 08:54
19-11-03 20:11
2003/10/31 21:55
2003/11/04 12:01
2003/10/12 11:12
2003/11/12 06:59
Victim 1
Victim 2
Victim 3
Victim 4
Victim 5
Victim 6
350695205067050
3509901028607210
490526708556320
5200035104764200
3509842056118701
350697109355570
Case 1
Case 1
Case 2
Case 2
Case 3
Case 2
IMEI No’s of Stolen Phones From 3
Separate Armed Robberies
What is technically possible
(4) - Look4me.co.za
0828544454 was in the vicinity of COEN STEYTLER AVE, CAPE TOWN CBD,
(cell Foreshore), CAPE TOWN, WESTERN CAPE, within the last 10min.
Accuracy 300m. 09/11/2004 09:35.
New Vodacom technology which
(theoretically) can be used to locate a
number or a handset via handset
tracing.
Location can be traced on a realtime basis on the internet provided
the handset is on.
Accuracy depends on cell phone
mast density and so is less accurate
in rural areas
Owing to its recent introduction this
has not been used much by the
police yet
The Police
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Cell Phone Technology is Used By the Police
(Serious & Violent Crime) But …
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Only used in a small number of high profile cases
Many armed robberies and murders could be
solved by this technology but are not
Bureaucratic procedures to pay cell phone
providers and with the NPA can cause long delays
causing trails
Level of training and understanding in the police
can be improved
Cell Phone Providers
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Provision of information to the police relating to criminal incidents creates
a significant administrative burden for cell phone providers (800
requests per month for Voacom)
Many of these requests stipulate information to be provided on multiple
numbers and significant work is required to comply with this.
Historically Vodacom had much more freely provided information to the
Police but the workload had significantly increased and there were
numerous cases of abuse where records were obtained under false
pretences.
For these reasons cell phone providers had instituted procedures with
the police involving using section 205 of the criminal procedure act which
requires the co-operation of the NPA
Cell phone providers agree that the current process is very inefficient
and involves the physical delivery of documents and a long paper trail
which can cause delays up to 6 months.
Cell phone providers are commited to providing assistance and are
investigating alternative legal mechanisms and procedures to assist
The National Prosecuting
Authority (NPA)
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If cell phone information is requested via a section
205 court order this needs to be signed by a
prosecutor from the NPA
NPA Prosecutors arbitrarily refuse to sign 205’s
No clear guidelines are available to the CPF forum
on what the NPA guidelines are
After pressure was applied to NPA they apparently
instituted guidelines but they are secret
Problems persist
The National
Prosecuting Authority
(NPA) – A case study
•In this particular case prosecutors
refused to sign 205’s relating to cell
phones stolen in armed robberies
•Head of NPA acknowledges
deficiencies
•Police officers often struggle to get
205’s signed and give up
Community Policing Forums
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Advice to Victims in the Rosebank
PolicePrecinct is done as part of victim
support
To Achieve Results it is Often Necessary
for Victims to Become Personally Involved
More Pressure is Still Required from the
Public
The Law
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Four Areas of Law Relevant to This:
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Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act dealing with the issuing of
court orders to compel the furnishing of information relevant to a
criminal investigation
The Promotion of Access to Information Act potentially allows the
victim to compel the service provider to provide information relating to
a stolen handset. (No NPA involvement required)
Constitutional right to privacy in chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights
Interception and Monitoring Act that is about to be promulgated
There is a lack of consensus and understanding
among the role players regarding what the legal
requirements really are
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The law is not clear
Cell phone providers are seeking expert legal opinion with a view to
simplifying procedures and issuing clear guidelines concerning when
205’s can be issued and when not
Next Step is a Workshop Involving:
Bradley Smith
Deirdre Penfold
Bruce Young
Pieter Bouwer
Director Johnson
Organisation &
Affiliation
Attendance at Workshop
Vodacom
Confirmed will attend
Johannesburg Area CPFConfirmed will attend
Rosebank CPF
Confirmed will attend
Facilitator
Confirmed will attend
Police, JHB Area
Confirmed will attend
Commissioner Reddy Police
NPA Chief Prosecutor
Arno van Wyk
JHB
NPA Chief Prosecutor
Johan Cronje
East Rand
NPA Chief Prosecutor
Lampies Lamprecht
West Rand
Director van Graan
Police, Legal Services
Abdul Mia
Cell C
Christopher Dobson MTN
Hilda du Plessis
MTN
former Vice Chair &
Navin Bachu
PRO of Midrand CPF
Senior Superintendent Police, Crime
Willem du Plooy
Intelligence
Police, Commissioner
Director Nyanda
Selebi's Office
Johannesburg Metro
Director Masoek
Police
Graham Wright
Mark Hankel
Rob Cells
Confirmed will attend
Declined
Confirmed will attend
No Reply
Confirmed will attend
To be contacted
Confirmed will attend
Confirmed will attend
Confirmed will attend
Confirmed will attend
Confirmed will attend
Confirmed will attend
Business Against Crime Considering attending
Engineering Informatics Confirmed will attend