Transcript Kein Folientitel

MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Determinants of cost-effective
management agreements
•
Marianne Penker
•
•
Institute of Agricultural Economics
University of Natural Resources and Appplied Life Sciences, Vienna
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An Austrian implementation analysis
•
Hans Karl Wytrzens, Birgit Kornfeld, Wolfgang Ressi
•
Austrian Academy of Science
Oesterreichische Nationalbank
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Outline
Introduction
Material and methods
Results
•
Demand for landscape goods and eco-services
•
Supply of landscape goods and eco-services
Conclusions
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Introduction
Management agreements for creating and enhancing
landscape goods
‘Bio-economic transformation’ of human-controlled inputs
into biological output (Nuppenau, 2001)
The ‘production of nature’ entails payments to landholders
and expenses for administrative services
Success of management agreements has been assessed
on the basis of financial input or uptake
Peculiarities of the implementation process are scarcely
regarded as determinants of their cost-effectiveness
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Material and methods
Theories of implementation research and new
institutional economics
Results of two empirical analyses
exploratory surveys 07-11 1999, follow-up interviews 06-08 2001
 Policy documents, guidelines, homepages
 Mail questionnaires, semi-structured oral in-depth interviews
government experts in the nine Federal Provinces, national
agencies, project officers and conservation experts
Qualitative comparative content analysis
information was transcribed, summarised, annotated, structured and
comparatively analysed
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
EU agri-environmental schemes
E U a g ri-e n viro n m e n ta l
schem es
A re a
(in h a )
S m a ll S tru c tu re s
4 ,7 2 9
0 .4
3 8 ,3 4 7
1 5 .2
N e w L a n d s c a p e F e a tu re s
5 ,6 9 3
3 .2
C o n s e rva tio n P la n
1 ,8 9 7
0 .2
E c o lo g ic a lly V a lu a b le A re a s
P a ym e n ts
(in m ill. E u ro )
T o ta l o f s c h e m e s c o -a d m in is te re d b y c o n s e rva tio n
1 9 .0
A ll 3 2 E U a g ri-e n viro n m e n ta l s c h e m e s
5 8 8 .5
•
(BMLF, 2002)
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Provincial stewardship schemes
S te w a rd s h ip s c h e m e s o f
th e F e d e ra l P ro vin c e s
B u rg e n la n d
A re a
(h a )
P a ym e n ts
(m ill. E u ro )
2 .9 6 0
0 .8 0
C a rin th ia
150
0 .0 4
L o w e r A u s tria
200
0 ,0 6
U p p e r A u s tria
910
0 .2 8
S a lz b u rg
n /a
1 .4 0
1 .7 7 8
0 .5 0
T yro l
903
0 .6 6
V o ra rlb e rg
200
0 .0 7
4
< 0 ,0 1
S tyria
V ie n n a
T o ta l
4 .8 1
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Challenges
• Maximum achievement of ecological and recreational objectives with limited public resources
• Direct bargaining with landholders
• Divergent interests of landholders, residents,
city dwellers, conservationists and tourists
• Co-ordination of numerous organisations and
individuals
• Targeted PR to win partners in agriculture, forestry
tourism, NGOs and communes
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Demand
 No direct ‘Coasian’ bargain, intermediary broker
 Demand defined in political-administrative debate
 Manifested implicitly in the level of financial incentives
offered for certain eco-services
 Whether it meets the societal preferences is not systematically verified by economic or social assessments
 Payments depend solely on the foregone profit and the
extra expenses
 Varying societal preferences for different landscape
goods are not reflected
 Centrally governed landscape enhancement is supply
driven rather than demand oriented
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Successful implementation
Stages of implementation
Success
Stewardship
scheme
Failure
Take-up
Participation in
scheme
Agreement
No participation
Compliance
Compliance with
contract
Behaviour in accordance with contract
Breach of
contract
Effectiveness
Intended effects
on the landscape
Achievement of
scheme objectives
No or unintended
landscape effects
O u tp u t
R e s u lts
O u tc o m e
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Output and outcome
A d m in istra tive
s e rvice s b y
g o ve rn m e n t
a g e n cy
E x a m p le s
S ite in sp e ctio n , co n clu sio n o f co n tra cts,
co m p lia n ce ch e ck, e va lu a tio n , P R ,
co n su ltin g , d a ta m a n a g e m e n t
O u tso u rce d a d m in . S ite in sp e ctio n , co m p lia n ce ch e ck,
s e rvice s
e va lu a tio n ca rrie d o u t b y N G O s o r
p riva te b u sin e ss
E co -se rvice s
p ro vid e d b y th e
la n d h o ld e rs
In te rve n tio n s fo r th e e n h a n ce m e n t o f
la n d sca p e s, h a b ita ts a n d sp e cie s
p ro te c tio n
H a b ita t-re la te d
e co lo g ica l re su lts
m , m ², n u m b e r o f n e w ly e sta b lish e d ,
cu ltiva te d o r d e v e lo p e d h a b ita ts,
w ild life c o rrid o rs, b u ffe r zo n e s
N o n h a b ita t-re la te d C h a n g e s in m icro clim a te , ch a n g e s in
e co lo g ica l re su lts
p o p u la tio n size o f e n d a n g e re d sp e cie s,
e ffe cts o n b io d ive rsity
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Efficiency and effectiveness
Effectiveness (demand-outcome relation)
Objectives
Resources
Services/
Behaviour
Landscape
Effects
Demand
Input
Output
Outcome
Efficiency (input-output relation)
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Causes for deviation of the actual
outcome from the intended one
Planning
failure
Implementation
failure
Uncontrollable causes
Alleged
deviations
Deficient
assessment of
demand
Selection of
inadequate sites
Negative externalities of other
land uses
Faulty deduction
of target values
from objectives
Unrealistic
formulation of
objectives
Faulty / insufficient
eco-services (deliberate / negligent
breach of contract
Degradation of
supplying
habitats
Unsuitable
indicators
Deficient
knowledge of
causalities
Unfavourable
timing
Weather
Faulty
determination of
actual outcome
Deficient
estimation of
incentive effects
Deficient equipment and operating resources
Nature
catastrophes
Faulty
determination of
deviation
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Determinants of success
Input
Description
Management implications
Natural
resources
Adequate sites (ecological
value, endangerment,
potential, corridors)
Habitat maps, conservation plans, site
inspections, comparative ecological
assessments, market place
Labour &
hum. cap.
Skilled and committed
contractors
Training and extension services, definition
of target groups, long term co-operation
Physical
capital
Adequate equipment and
Investments not subsidised (collective
material (machinery, conownership, NGOs lending equipment and
text-specific seeds & plants) providing site-specific seeds and plants)
Knowledge
Knowledge of contextsensitive management
techniques
Trial and error, integrating knowledge of
NGOs (hot spots, explore new techniques),
endogenous knowledge
Social
capital
Trust, networks and cooperation
Events and institutions (Conservation Plan)
providing face-to face contact between land
holders, project officers and beneficiaries
Institutions
Procedures for negotiations, Transparency and accountability of state
incentives for innovation
behaviour, balanced multi-level governance,
and competition
competitive outcome-oriented strategies
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Tradeoffs between different
inputs
More flexible provincial funds
are used to tap the full potential of EU and national funds (fixed payments to
landholders)
Tradeoffs between different inputs
human capacity building, testing of new management techniques, trust- and
network-building measures, payments for land and labour
Increasing uptake
–
–
reducing farmers’ transaction costs of participation (trust and motivation)
reveal additional gains of participation (e.g., the eco-image of farms)
Redirection of efforts towards increasing costeffectiveness by picking out those applications
– offering crucial sites
– promising skilled and committed land holders
on-farm conservation plans, extension and training, participation and strategic
landscape planning, new & more context-sensitive management techniques
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Conclusions I
The implementation analysis
1) Systemises the causes of deviations in the actual
outcome from the intended landscape impact
2) Identifies determinants for cost-effective
management agreement
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How valuable and promising the sites are
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The efforts of committed and skilled contractors
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Trust and networks
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Suitable equipment and material
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Context-sensitive management techniques
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The degree to which institutions encourage efficiency
and equity
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Conclusions II
3) Indicates that payments to landholders alone are
unlikely to provide the intended landscape impacts
4) Points out institutional shortfalls
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Mechanisms of value articulation and aggregation
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Mechanisms for selecting valuable sites and promising
contractors
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Systematic determination of property rights for newly
developed landscape assets
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Clear differentiation between assets to be protected by
mandatory regulations and those by voluntary agreements
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Institutions to encourage diverse, de-central management
strategies, competition and innovation in order to reduce
the risk of policy failure