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The German model of risk distribution in supplementary occupational pensions Csaba Burger, Gordon L Clark Exeter, 7th January 2010 1 Research background • The German pension reform of 2001 was a milestone on the road towards pension individualisation; it • decreased the level of the public pensions; • enhanced the voluntary, funded, occupational (and private) pension system (Riester-pensions); • and therefore shifted investment risks to employers and individuals. • The aim of this research is to • Understand the nature of risk involved in the new occupational pensions; • Discuss the importance of the employee’s risk-related decisions; • Investigate the employee-level determinants of risk-related decisions. • Our paper • Gives an overview of German occupational pensions from the nineteenth century onwards; • Explains the unique, low-risk environment of the German pension system; • Reinforces existing research on risk-aversion and behavioural finance. 2 Occupational Pensions in Germany – the legal environment Before 1974 Right to occupational pensions Immediate risk sharing Institutional risk sharing At the employer All risk at the employee No strong legal requirements Sources: BetrAVG, VAG, Wiedemann (1991) 1974 – 2001 1974: Occupational Pensions Act Some employee rights After 2001 2001: „Riester” Pension Reform Employee has the right for an occupational pension Employers bear the risk of pension provision Minor institutional protection (with some external providers) Complex institutional protection 3 Two choices define the risk situation: scope and sharing Choice I: Risk Scope Choice II: Risk Sharing (from the Employee’s View) • Direct insurance • Life insurance: taken by the employer, beneficiary is the employee • Provided by life insurers • Low administrative burden • Defined benefit • Guaranteed positive rate of return • Permitted defined rate of return is maximised for new contracts: decreased from 3.25% in 2002 to 2.25% in 2008 • Pensionskasse • Traditional institutions with the exclusive mission of pension provision • Similar rules to direct insurance • (German) Defined contribution • Guaranteed non-negative rate of return • Nominal value of contributions plus subsidies (less the cost of insurance) must be guaranteed • Pension funds • New institutions in 2001 • Aim: to imitate the returns of the Anglo-Saxon pension funds • Liberal investment policies Low risk in these occupational pensions 4 Investment and institutional regulations limit occupational products’ risk exposure Regulation of investment risks Institutional regulation • Regulated by the Insurance Act(s) and Solvency II (EU-directive) • Quantitative (asset allocation) requirements • Rules on permitted asset types, asset mixing, geographical regions, etc. • More liberal rules for pension funds • Reporting and controlling processes • Regular ALM reports • Mandatory stress-tests with 4 scenarios • Transparency requirements • Tight supervision, intervention rights (BAFin) • Liability order for pension provision: 1. External provider, if fails, then 2. Re-insurer: Protektor AG (for pension funds: PSVaG), if fails, then 3. Employer • Not all Pensionskassen are re-insured – in exchange for even tighter supervision 5 The research question Offer may be limited by the employer Defined benefit Offer determined by the Employer Direct insurance Pensionskasse (German) defined contribution Research question: What are the determinants of the actual risk distribution between the employer and the employee? Pension fund 6 Decisions are modelled by binary-logistic and multinomial regressions on a unique, proprietary database Dependent variables 1. Product choice Data 2. Defined benefit or defined contribution • Database of a German occupational pension provider • 270 000 employees, linked to • 12 000 employers • Details of the pension contracts • Enrolment dates from the start of 2002 till the end of 2008 Explanatory variables • • • • Gender Age in the year of enrolment Yearly contribution amount Source of financing (if there is employee contribution) • Enrolment year (2002, 2003, …, 2008) Employer offer 7 The analysis follows the two-steps of the sales process: employer choice limits the employee’s options 8 Findings reinforce existing theories and show the specialities of the German situation Results • Similar results both for product choice and for DB-DC variables • Usual risk-related variables • Gender, age are have explanatory power: male and the young are more risk-tolerant • The higher the savings amount, the more risk the employee is willing to take • No employee financing implies the most risk-averse product • Specific environmental characteristics • The later the enrolment happened (2002-2008), the less risk the individual was willing to take • The financial crisis of 2008 hardly had any effect – results are a part of a greater trend • Employer: the larger the company, the more options are available; the more likely employees choose risky products • Germany is distinctive for the low risk environment rather than the low risktolerance 9 Selected references • Beckstette A. und Zwiesler H.J. (2004): ‘Die Abgrenzung beitragsbezogener Pensionspläne aus Sicht des Asset-Liability-Managements’. Preprint Series. Fakultät für Mathematik und Wirtschaftswissenschaften Universität Ulm • Börsch-Supan, A., Reil-Held, A. and Schunk, D. (2008) ‘Savings incentives, old-age provision and displacement effects: evidence from the recent German pension reform’. Journal of Pension Economics & Finance, 7 (3): 295-319 • Burger, Cs (forthcoming) ‘The role of social partners in transforming the German welfare state’. Draft version of the paper is available from the author at request. • Clark G L, Knox-Hayes J, Strauss K (2009) ‘Financial sophistication, salience, and the scale of deliberation in UK retirement planning’. Environment and Planning A 41(10) 2496 – 2515 • Strauss, K (2009) ‘Cognition, context, and multimethod approaches to economic decision making’. Environment and Planning A 2009, volume 41, pages 302-317 • Wiedemann, G (1991) Die arbeitsrechtliche Entwicklung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung in Deutschland 1920-1974. Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 1991/31, pp 157-178. [email protected] 10