Transcript HMI Peer Review - Stanford University

HMI Reliability
Dale Wolfe
Reliability Engineer
LMSSC*ATC*LMSAL
[email protected]
650-424-3030
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
HMI00905 – Page DW-1
HMI Reliability
•
Requirements for HMI Reliability are derived from the SDO HMI Product
Assurance Implementation Plan, 2H00021
•
The following HMI reliability analyses are SDO MAR related deliverables covered
by DID 4.2
–
EEE Parts Stress Analysis (PAIP 4.3.2)
–
Reliability Prediction & Reliability Block Diagram (PAIP 4.3.3)
–
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis & Critical Items List (PAIP 4.3.1)
–
Limited Life Items (PAIP 4.3.4)
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
HMI00905 – Page DW-2
EEE Parts Stress Analysis
•
The stress analysis was performed at the most stressful part parameters that
can result from the specified performance and environmental requirements.
•
Stress analysis results are compared to EEE-INST-002 derating guidelines and
documented in 2H00233, Rev A, “EEE Parts Stress and Derating Analysis
•
Those parts that were determined to exceed their derating limits were resized,
redesigned, or removed from the system
•
Currently no parts exist in the HMI Instrument that exceed the derating limits of
EEE-INST-002
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
HMI00905 – Page DW-3
Reliability Block Diagram
•
HMI Reliability Block Diagram (full instrument)
Camera #1
CCD
Shutter
Motor &
Mech
Control
CEB
CCD
Camera IF
Data
Compress
& High
Rate I/F
Power
Converter
PCI to
Local Bus
Bridge
Board
Power
Converter
PCI to
Local Bus
Bridge
Board
RAD 6000
Processor
HK Data
Acquisistion
2 of 2 cameras required
CCD
Shutter
Motor &
Mech
Control
CEB
CCD
Camera IF
Data
Compress
& High
Rate I/F
RAD 6000
Processor
Camera #2
Tuning Motor &
Mech Control
Polarization
Selector &
Mech Control
Oven
Tuning Motor &
Mech Control
ISS
Optics
Tuning Motor &
Mech Control
Oven
Tuning Motor &
Mech Control
3 of 4 required
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
Polarization
Selector &
Mech Control
Polarization
Selector &
Mech Control
2 of 3 required
Aperture
Door Motor
& Mech
Control
Calibration /
Focus Wheel
& Mech
Control
Alignment Leg
Stepper &
Mech Control
Aperture
Door Motor
& Mech
Control
Calibration /
Focus Wheel
& Mech
Control
Alignment Leg
Stepper &
Mech Control
1 of 2 required
2 of 2 required
2 of 2 required
HMI00905 – Page DW-4
Reliability Block Diagram
•
HMI Reliability Block Diagram (degraded instrument)
Camera #1
CCD
Shutter
Motor &
Mech
Control
CEB
CCD
Camera IF
Data
Compress
& High
Rate I/F
Power
Converter
PCI to
Local Bus
Bridge
Board
RAD 6000
Processor
HK Data
Acquisistion
1 of 2 cameras required
CCD
Shutter
Motor &
Mech
Control
CEB
CCD
Camera IF
Data
Compress
& High
Rate I/F
Power
Converter
PCI to
Local Bus
Bridge
Board
RAD 6000
Processor
not required
Camera #2
Tuning Motor &
Mech Control
Polarization
Selector &
Mech Control
Oven
Tuning Motor &
Mech Control
ISS
Optics
Tuning Motor &
Mech Control
not required
Oven
Tuning Motor &
Mech Control
3 of 4 required
Polarization
Selector &
Mech Control
Polarization
Selector &
Mech Control
2 of 3 required
Aperture
Door Motor
& Mech
Control
Calibration /
Focus Wheel
& Mech
Control
Alignment Leg
Stepper &
Mech Control
Aperture
Door Motor
& Mech
Control
Calibration /
Focus Wheel
& Mech
Control
Alignment Leg
Stepper &
Mech Control
1 of 2 required
0 of 2 required
0 of 2 required
Not required
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
HMI00905 – Page DW-5
Reliability Prediction
•
The reliability prediction calculates the probability of success for the HMI
instrument over the 5-year mission.
–
•
Failure rate calculations are primarily derived from MIL-HDBK-217F
–
•
The HMI Reliability Prediction and Reliability Block Diagrams are documented in 2H00032,
Rev A.
Mechanism failure rates are derived from similar mechanisms on-orbit experience and life
testing
Changes from the PDR reliability calculation include the incorporation of RAL
CEB reliability numbers, update in mechanism cycling and use of vendor failure
rates for Actel FPGAs.
–
This resulted overall in a slightly higher HMI reliability calculation from PDR
Full
Instrument
Degraded
Instrument
Camera and Camera Electronics
(Includes Camera I/F electronics)
0.8651
0.9951
HMI Electronics
0.9590
0.9926
Mechanisms & Mech. Controllers
0.9737
0.9955
Oven/Optics
0.9990
0.9990
0.8070
0.9823
Subsystem
Total (5 years)
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
HMI00905 – Page DW-6
FMEA and Critical Items List
•
An FMEA is a procedure by which the ways an item or function can fail (failure
modes) are identified and the effects of the failures on performance (failure
effects) and mission objectives (severity) are evaluated.
•
The following severity categories are used in the FMEA for each failure mode.
Category
Severity
1
Catastrophic
Description
Failure modes that could result in serious injury, loss of life, or total loss of mission.
1R
Failure modes of identical or equivalent redundant hardware items that, if all failed,
could result in category 1 effects.
1S
Failure in a safety or hazard monitoring system that could cause the system to fail to
detect a hazardous condition or fail to operate during such condition and lead to Sev.
Cat. 1 consequences.
2
Critical
2R
Failure modes that could result in loss of one or more minimum mission objectives as
defined by the GSFC project office.
Failure modes of identical or equivalent redundant hardware items that could result
in Category 2 effects if all failed.
3
Significant
Failure modes that could cause degradation to full mission objectives and still meet a
minimum mission.
4
Minor
Failure modes that could result in insignificant or no loss to mission objectives.
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
HMI00905 – Page DW-7
FMEA and Critical Items List
•
Failure modes that affect the SDO or HMI mission adversely, category 1, 1R, 1S
and 2 are identified on a Critical Items List.
•
The critical items list is maintained within the FMEA where a risk mitigation
approach is listed for each item.
•
The FMEA and Critical Items list is documented in HMI document 2H00229, Rev
A.
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
HMI00905 – Page DW-8
Critical Items List
Critical Item
Mitigation approach
Power Converter subsystem Relay Select
circuitry:
Design is currently under review to possibly
remove this category 2 single point failure
– CAMERAS 1 & 2
– CCD DECONTAMINATION HEATERS
– OVEN CONTROLLERS 1 & 2
Affected components:
•SN54154J decoder
•54HC14 inverter
•HCPL523 optocoupler
•resistor
Optics/Optics signal path:
Lens, mirror, beam splitter
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
The optics are set up, aligned and tested on an
optical bench prior to being installed in the optics
package. Environmental testing will include
vibration testing and thermal cycling at
qualification temperatures. Testing, handling and
operation to be contamination and
environmentally controlled.
HMI00905 – Page DW-9
Limited Life Items
•
Limited Life items are defined as those items that are time or cycling sensitive
in nature and whose expected useful life is less than twice the required life
•
The limited life items are maintained in the HMI FMEA, document 2H00229
•
Mitigation actions are identified in the limited life items list to minimize potential
risk in meeting mission requirements and provide confidence in their use for the
duration of the HMI mission.
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
HMI00905 – Page DW-10
Limited Life Items
Expected
life
Required
life
Mechanisms Polarization
Selector
mechanism
hollow core
motor
160 million
operations
Mechanisms Michelson
Interferometer
(Tunable
Filter)
mechanism
hollow core
motor
Mechanisms Shutter Motor
and Bearings
Subsystem
Limited Life
Item
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
Failure Impact
Risk Mitigation
80 million
operations
Modulator does not
rotate resulting in a loss
of instrument data due
to inability to make
spectro-polarimetric
measurements and
produce 3-dimensional
vector magnetographs.
Redundancy (2 of 3 motors
required) has been incorporated.
Life test is in progress. Testing will
include vibration and thermal
testing. No history of failure with
similar mechanisms used in life
tests and on orbit for prior
programs.
40 million
operations
20 million
operations
Filter does not rotate
resulting in the loss of
ability to orient filter and
capture images at very
specific wavelengths of
light: degradation of
instrument data
Redundancy (3 of 4 motors
required) has been incorporated.
Life test is in progress. Testing will
include vibration and thermal
testing. No history of failure with
similar mechanisms used in life
tests and on orbit for prior
programs.
80 million
exposures
40 million
exposures
Shutter fails: loss of
instrument data from
one camera.
Life test is in progress. Similar
shutter mechanisms are qualified,
including life testing. Similar
shutters used on the MDI and
TRACE with no problems after
many millions of operations.
HMI00905 – Page DW-11
Summary
•
All EEE components meet the derating requirements of EEE-INST-002
•
Reliability calculations and Reliability Block Diagram are prepared based on the
latest HMI design and are documented
•
No category 1 single point failures exist in the HMI instrument
•
Category 2 single point failures are documented in the Critical Items List
–
•
The Power Subsystem single point failure will be addressed prior to the build of the flight
model HMI
Limited Life items are identified and risk mitigation is documented
Critical Design Review – 16-17 Nov 2004
HMI00905 – Page DW-12