Transcript WCLA MCLE 2-29-12

WCLA MCLE 2-29-12
• Three Cases in Sixty Minutes: Recent
Appellate Court Decisions (Professional
Transportation; Gruszeczka; Patel)
• Wednesday February 29, 2012
• 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm
• James R. Thompson Center Auditorium,
Chicago, IL
• 1 Hour General MCLE Credit
Professional Transportation v. IWCC
No.3-10-0783WC, filed 1-19-12
• 03WC036743: DA 3/26/03
• Petitioner Barry Clarke, 60 yo van driver injured right knee stepping
out of van
• 4-8-03 Dr. Michalow does scope R knee
• 10-24-04 Dr. Sheinkop does bilateral knee replacements (no
causation L knee; can drive)
• 7-26-05 Respondent IME Dr. Cohen ; RTW van driver
• 9-27-05 FCE light/medium
• 9-29-05 Petitioner IME Dr. Fletcher says sedentary work
• Looked for work?; 9 leads from VE (former air traffic controller and
weather observer)
• Disputed testimony that Respondent offered RTW (Commission
says Arb incorrectly allowed testimony over hearsay objection)
• VE says Petitioner can work as cashier
Professional Transportation v. IWCC
No.3-10-0783WC, filed 1-19-12
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Arbitrator’s Decision: 65% loss of use of the right leg; no causation on left leg
Commission Decision: “Commission finds that Petitioner provided sufficient
evidence to prove up the fact that he is an odd-lot permanent total…pursuant to
Section 8(f)”
Overall, the Petitioner presented evidence that both supports and negates a
finding of an "odd-lot" permanent total under Section 8(f) of the Act. It is likely
that Petitioner could find some sit down/sedentary job and/or light to lightmedium job given his potential transferable skills, education and experience.
However, it appears that Petitioner's age, Mr. Wolf's opinion that Petitioner has
nontransferable skills and Petitioner's current physical restrictions and condition
weigh heavier against finding that Petitioner is employable in a regularly wellknown branch of the labor market than does the possible that he has potential
transferable skills, education and experience that would weigh in favor of such
employment. The Supreme Court has stressed that an employee need not be
reduced to total physical incapacity before a permanent total disability award may
be granted. Furthermore, it is sufficient that one who, though not altogether
incapacitated to work, is so handicapped that he will not be employed regularly in
any well-known branch of the labor market may qualify as an "odd-lot" permanent
total. See City of Chicago 373 Ill.App.3d 1080 (2007).
Professional Transportation v. IWCC
No.3-10-0783WC, filed 1-19-12
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Appellate Court: On appeal, Professional argues that the Commission's award of PTD benefits
to the claimant on an "odd-lot" basis is against the manifest weight of the evidence
An injured employee can establish his entitlement to PTD benefits under the Act in one of
three ways, namely: by a preponderance of medical evidence; by showing a diligent but
unsuccessful job search; or by demonstrating that, because of age, training, education,
experience, and condition, there are no available jobs for a person in his circumstance.
In this case, there is no medical evidence which could support a claim of total disability
Further, in his brief before this court, the Petitioner makes no argument that applying for
cashier positions at nine auto dealerships and looking in the Sunday newspaper constituted a
diligent job search. We agree with the arbitrator that the evidence fails to support a finding
that the Petitioner’s meager efforts to find work constituted a diligent but unsuccessful job
search.
Petitioner, who is not obviously unemployable, had the burden of proving by as
preponderance of the evidence that he is so handicapped that he will not be employed
regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market
Wolf, Professional's vocational rehabilitation expert, concluded that Petitioner was capable
of performing the duties…In contrast, Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence that there
is no stable job market for a person of his age, skills, training, work history, and physical
condition.
Patel v. Home Depot
No. 1-10-3217, decided 2-2-12
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10-20-03: 19(b) tried after TTD cut-off on 2-14-03 and further treatment denied
Respondent stipulated that TTD owed from 11-29-01 to 10-29-02 (48 wks) and
then paid “advances” through 2-14-03 (15 wks)
11-2-05: Commission awards “35 4/7 weeks TTD” for unspecified period (2-14-03
cut off to 10-20-03 hearing date?)
Note that 11-29-01 to 10-20-03 is 98 wks of TTD not 35 4/7 wks
Commission also awards 19(k), 19(l) and 16 AF (total $22,000)
Commission gives Respondent unspecified “credit for its payment of $32,357.47.”
(TTD paid plus advances?)
Petitioner’s math: (98 weeks TTD + penalties + interest) – credit = $$ owed
($35,000 + $22,000 + $7,000) - $32,000 = $22,000
Respondent’s math: (35 weeks TTD + penalties) – credit = No $$$ owed ($10,000 +
$22,000) - $32,000 = 0
4-10-09: Commission denies Petitioner’s Motion for Penalties and Fees for nonpayment of award (filed 2-06?); “dispute about what is payable, but Commission
has no enforcement authority” and 19(g) provides for enforcement; Scott, 184
Ill.2d 202 (1998) says no penalties on penalties; pending 19(k) prevents filing of
19(g), Keystone Steel, 228 Ill.App.3d 429 (1992)
Patel v. Home Depot
No. 1-10-3217, decided 2-2-12
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Petitioner files 19(g); Respondent files Motion to Dismiss “on the grounds that it was entitled
to offset the credit against the benefit award.”
Judgment entered for Petitioner ($22,000) plus $47,000 attorneys fees, $5300 costs and
$13,000 interest
The instant case involves the construction of section 19(g) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(g)
(West 2008)). The construction of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo
Home Depot sought involuntary dismissal of Patel's application for entry of judgment on the
grounds that Home Depot does not owe Patel anything. Home Depot claims the decisions of
both the arbitrator and the Commission "destroy" Patel's claim, as both state an award in
favor of Patel and also the credit that Home Depot is entitled to because of its previous
overpayments. Because the amount of the credit exceeds the amount of the award, Home
Depot posits that the credit offsets the award to Patel and therefore Home Depot owes Patel
nothing. We disagree.
Although Home Depot may ultimately obtain the credit the arbitrator and the Commission
granted, it is not entitled to that credit under section 19(g). See Illinois Graphics Co. v.
Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469 (1994).
In the case sub judice, unlike the situation in Messamore, section 19(g) controls, so this court
must follow the principle set forth in Illinois Graphics. Moreover, Home Depot is not seeking
to apply its credit against future payments, but against the payment of benefits to which
Patel was previously entitled.
Gruszeczka v. IWCC
N0.2-10-1049WC, filed 2-14-12
• 4-20-09: Commission decision affirming Arbitrator’s denial
of benefits received by Petitioner’s attorney
• 5-4-09: Petitioner’s lawyer mailed Review to Clerk of Circuit
Court of DeKalb County according to affidavit (14 days)
• 5-14-09: Review file-stamped (24 days)
• Respondent files Motion to Dismiss for late filing and to
change venue
• Motion to dismiss denied and motion to change venue
granted (McHenry)
• McHenry denies reconsideration of Motion to Dismiss and
confirms Commission’s denial of benefits
• Parties cross appeal to Appellate Court
Gruszeczka v. IWCC
N0.2-10-1049WC, filed 2-14-12
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Section 19(f)(1) of the Act provides that a proceeding for judicial review of a Commission
decision “shall be commenced within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the decision.” The
timely filing of a request for the issuance of a summons and the timely exhibition of proof of
payment for the probable cost of the record are jurisdictional requirements which must be
strictly adhered to to vest subject-matter jurisdiction
Petitioner urges the adoption of a “mailbox rule” applicable to the commencement of an
action in the circuit court for judicial review under section 19(f)(1) of the Act, asserting that
the time of the mailing of the documents necessary to prosecute such action is the time of
filing for jurisdictional purposes
We believe, however, that the reliance upon Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authority is
misplaced, and we decline to follow Norris for the following reasons
If a mailbox rule were to be engrafted upon the 20-day commencement period mandated in
section 19(f)(1), it is the legislature that must do so, not the judiciary under guise of statutory
interpretation
To commence means to begin or to start (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 456
(1981))..cannot understand how one can begin or start any action in the circuit court before
the necessary documentation is presented to the clerk of the court…we vacate the judgment
of the circuit court as having been entered in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction and
we dismiss the claimant’s appeal
STEWART & HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: agree with the claimant and would hold that the
mailbox rule applies to the filing of appeals from the Commission to the circuit court.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent…Guidance in previous decisions which hold the mailbox rule
applicable to the filing of jurisdictional documents in appeals. In doing so, I note that the
mailbox rule has been applied to the filing of a petition for review from an arbitrator to the
Commission…Ambiguity should be resolved in favor of mailbox rule
Gruszeczka v. IWCC
N0.2-10-1049WC, filed 2-1
• What about general mailbox rule? (5 ILCS 70/1.25): Unless An Act
otherwise specifically provides, any writing of any kind or
description required or authorized to be filed with, and any
payment of any kind or description required or authorized to be
paid to, the State or any political subdivision thereof, by the laws of
this State: (1) if transmitted through the United States mail, shall be
deemed filed with or received by the State or political subdivision
on the date shown by the post office cancellation mark
• What about other instances of mailbox rule in WC rules? At least 6
instances? For example, 7040.10(d)(2)(B), authenticated transcript;
7040.70(e)(2), statement of exceptions (both 2 days mailing time)
• Venue? 19(f)(1) says “the county where any of the parties
defendant may be found”
Fourth Bonus Case
• Will County Forest Preserve District v. IWCC, No. 3-11-0077WC, Opinion
filed February 17, 2012
• However, respondent’s argument assumes that an injury to the shoulder is
an injury to the arm. This court has not had occasion to consider the
classification of a shoulder injury. Whether an injury to the shoulder is an
injury to the arm under the statutory schedule presents an issue of
statutory construction…Because the plain and ordinary meaning of the
statute establishes that the arm and the shoulder are distinct parts of the
body, if claimant sustained an injury to his shoulder, an award for a
scheduled loss to the arm would be improper…Since claimant’s shoulder
injury does not qualify as a scheduled loss to the arm, we turn to other
provisions of the Act for guidance…We find applicable the first subpart of
section 8(d)2. That provision provides for a person-as-a-whole award
where the claimant sustains serious and permanent injuries not covered
by section 8(c) or 8(e) of the Act…As such, we hold that benefits are
proper under the first subpart of section 8(d)2
• Shoulder is not ARM! Shoulder is MAW! Matter of Law?