Transcript WEEK #6 THE THEORY OF RECOLLECTION (Meno) (2-17-04)

WEEK #6
THE THEORY OF
RECOLLECTION
AND METHOD OF
HYPOTHESIS
(Meno)
(2-21-06)
Tonight’s Thesis
• Two Features of classical Platonism (the
theory of recollection & the method of
hypothesis) are introduced in the Meno in
response to an underlying problem in the
Socratic dialogues
– Not committed to developmentalism
– Although developmentalism may arguably
be the best explanation
Agenda/Argument
• Outline of Meno
–
It naturally falls into three distinct portions.
•
•
The portion aimed at defining virtue or testing Meno’s
knowledge (70a-80a)
The methodological digression (80a-86c)
–
•
Begins with Meno’s paradox and introduces the theory of
recollection
Virtue is both teachable and not teachable (86c-100c)
–
Introduces and practices the method of hypothesis
• First third resembles the Socratic
dialogues
Agenda/Argument Continued
• The covert problem in elenctic dialogues
• An argument that the paradox at 80d-e is natural
consequence of this problem
• An argument that the Theory of Recollection in
the Meno provides the theoretical framework for a
solution to this problem
• An argument that the conversation with the slave
boy establishes that the problem is solvable
• An argument that the Method of Hypothesis is the
method Socrates recommends in light of this
problem
Outline of Meno
1.
Testing of Meno’s Knowledge (70a-80a)
A. Setting up of Question (70a-71e)
i. Is virtue teachable? (70a)
ii. Priority of definitional knowledge (70a-71c)
iii. Meno’s claim to know (71d-e)
B. First Answer: A man’s virtue, a woman’s virtue, a
child’s virtue … (71e-73c)
C. Second Answer: Capacity to govern men (73c-d)
D. Third Answer: Virtue is justice (73d-77a)
i.
E.
F.
Explanation of question (73e-77a)
Fourth Answer: Desire for fine things and ability to
acquire them (77b-78b)
Fifth Answer: Ability to acquire fine things (78b-79e)
2.
The Methodological Digression (80a-86c)
A. The paradox (80a-e)
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Meno’s recognition of ignorance (80a-b)
Socrates’ repeated disavowal (80c-d)
Meno’s paradox (80d)
Socrates’ paradox (80e)
B. The theory of Recollection (81a-e)
C. The Conversation w/ SB (82a-86a)
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
Question (82a-e)
Refutation of answers (83a-84d)
Arrival at true belief (84d-85c)
Description of process to knowledge (84c-d)
Conclusion (84d-86a)
D. Conclusion (86b-c)
3.
The Teachability of Virtue (86c-100c)
A. Method of Hypothesis (86c-87c)
B. Argument that virtue is teachable (87c-89c)
C. Argument that virtue is not teachable (89d-96d)
i. If teachable, then teachers (89d-e)
ii. Anytus: virtuous statesmen do not teach virtue (90a-94e)
iii. Meno: Sophists don’t teach virtue
D. The true belief solution (96d-100c)
i. True belief is sufficient for virtue (96d-97c)
ii. Distinction between knowledge & true belief (97c-98b)
iii. Virtue qua true belief is acquired by divine dispensation
(98b-100c)
Key Features in Apology as found in
the Meno
1. Profession of Ignorance
•
Meno 71a-b & 80c-d
2. Concern for the Soul
•
Meno: the what is virtue and is virtue teachable
questions
3. Manner of Practice: examines those who
seemed to be wise both [a] to themselves and [b]
to many others
•
Meno claims knowledge at 71c-e, 80b
Key Features Continued
4. Immediate Aims: to investigate and examine
those who seem wise in order [a] to show him
that he is not, if he is not and [b] to learn from
him, if he is.
•
Meno 71d & esp. 84a-c
5. Consequences: [a] he quickly incurred their
hatred and [b] gained a reputation for wisdom
•
Sting-ray analogy
6. Three Classes of Examinees
– Politicians (21c3-22a8) - Meno
– Poets (22a8-c8)
– Craftsmen (22c9-e5)
7. Concern with definition
Covert Problem
• Socrates took himself to lack knowledge, and
• Socrates sought the knowledge he lacked.
• How?
– Learned from one who knows (e.g. Hippias Minor 372c2-8)
– Discover on one’s own (Laches 186d-187a)
• In the Socratic dialogues the only method Socrates appears
to pursue is the former
– E.g. Laches 200e1-201a7
• But problems for learning from another
– No one knows
– Charmides 167b-172c
– Protagoras 313c-314a
Hippias Minor 372c2-8;
But I have one wonderfully good trait, which
saves me: I’m not ashamed to learn. I inquire
and ask questions and I’m very grateful to the
one who answers, and I’ve never failed in
gratitude to anyone. I’ve never denied when
I’ve learned anything, pretending that what I
learned was my own discovery. Instead I sing
the praises of the one who taught me as a wise
person, and proclaim what I learn from him.
[trans. Smith]
Laches 186d-187a
… so I now call on you not to let Laches go, or
Nicias, but to question them, saying that Socrates
denies having any knowledge of the matter or being
competent to decide which of you speaks the truth,
because he denies having been a discoverer of such
things of having been anyone’s pupil in them. So,
Laches and Nicias, each of you tell us who is the
cleverest person with whom you have associated in
this matter of educating young men, and whether you
acquired your knowledge of the art from another
person or found it out for yourselves, and if you
learned it from some one, who were your respective
teachers, and what other persons share the same art
with them. [Sprague trans.]
Laches 200e1-201a7
Well it would be a terrible thing, Lysimachus, to be
unwilling to join in assisting any man to become as good
as possible. If in the conversation we have just had I had
seemed to be knowing and the other two had not, then it
would be right to issue a special invitation to me to
perform this task; but as the matter stands we are all in the
same difficulty. Why then should anybody choose one of
us in preference to another? What I think is that he ought
to chose none of us. … what I say we ought to do ... is to
join in searching for the best possible teacher (didaskalon),
first for ourselves - we really need one - and then for the
young men, sparing neither money nor anything else.
What I don’t advise is that we remain as we are.”
[Sprague trans.]
The Paradox
Context: Both admit ignorance
•
•
Meno: I used to be told, before I began to meet you, that yours was
just a case of being in doubt yourself and making others doubt also:
and so now I find you are merely bewitching me with your spells and
incantations, which have reduced me to utter perplexity. ... For in
truth I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed, and I am at a
loss what answer to give you. And yet on countless occasions I have
made abundant speeches on virtue to various people--and very good
speeches they were, so I thought--but now I cannot say one word as
to what it is. [79e7-80b4; Lamb trans.]
Socrates: If the sting-ray numbs others by being numb itself, then I
resemble it; but if not, not. For it is not by being clear myself that I
make others at a loss, but by being more at a loss than anyone that I
make others at a loss. So now, for my part, I have no idea what virtue
is, whilst you, though perhaps you may have known before you came
in touch with me, are now as good as ignorant of it also. But none the
less I am willing to join you in examining it and inquiring into its
nature. [80c6-d4; Lamb trans.]
Meno’s version
[a] In what way, Socrates, will you search for that thing
which you do not know at all what it is? [b] What sort
of thing, of those things you do not know will you set up
as the object of your search? [c] Or even if you should
happen upon it, how will you know that this is what you
didn’t know? (80d5-8)
1.
2.
3.
4.
If A does not know x, then A does not know what to search for
(beginning problem; ([Ab])
If A does not know x, then, even if A happened upon x, A cannot
know that this is x. (ending problem; [Ac])
If A does not know what to search for nor even if A happened upon
x, A could not know that this is, then A cannot search for x.
So, if A does not know x, then A cannot search for x ([Aa])
Socrates’ Version
I know what you mean, Meno. Do you know how contentious an
argument you are introducing, [a] that it is possible for a person to
search for neither what he knows nor what he does not know? For,
[b] he could not search for what he knows - for [c] he knows it and
there is no need to search for it - nor [d] could he search for what he
does not know - for [e] he does not know what to search for. (80e1-5)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Either A knows x or A does not know x
If A knows x, then A does not need to search for x [Bc]
So, if A knows x, then A cannot search for x [Bb]
If A does not know x, then A does not know what to search for [Be]
So, if A does not know x, then A cannot search for x [Bd]
So, A cannot search for x, i.e. search or inquiry (directed selfdiscovery) is impossible [Ba]
Full Version: Meno’s Paradox
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
Either A knows x or A does not know x
If A knows x, then A does not need to search for x [Bc]
So, if A knows x, then A cannot search for x [Bb]
[1] If A does not know x, then A does not know what to search for
(beginning problem; [Ab] & [Be])
[2] If A does not know x, then, even if A happened upon x, A cannot
know that this is x. (ending problem; [Ac])
[3] If A does not know what to search for nor even if A happened
upon x, A could not know that this is, then A cannot search for x.
[4] So, if A does not know x, then A cannot search for x ([Aa] &
[Bd])
So, A cannot search for x, i.e. search or inquiry (directed selfdiscovery) is impossible [Ba]
Issues Surrounding the Paradox
• Directed inquiry
• Equivocation (Euthydemus 276a-277c)
• Objects of knowledge – propositions, entities,
universals
• Knowledge appears to be an all or nothing affair
– Robust knowledge suggested by priority of defintion
– Priority of definition in the Meno
Priority of Definitional Knowledge
• [PD] If A fails to know what F-ness is, then A fails to know
anything about F-ness.
– neither that x is F or x is not-F
– nor that F-ness is G or that F-ness is not G
• Evidence
– … I am so far from knowing whether virtue is teachable or not that
I do not know at all what virtue itself is.” Indeed, Meno, this my
situation; I am as poor as my fellow citizens in this regard and I
blame myself for not knowing at all about virtue. Not knowing
what a thing is, how would I know what sort of thing it is? Or do
you think that it is possible for someone who does not know at all
who Meno is to know whether he is fine or wealthy or well-born or
the opposite of these? [Meno 71a1-b7]
Meno 86d-e
Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself, we should not
have begun considering whether virtue can or cannot be
taught until we had first inquired into the main question of
what it is. But as you do not so much as attempt to control
yourself--you are so fond of your liberty-- and both attempt
and hold control over me, I will yield to your request--what
else am I to do? So it seems we are to consider what sort of
thing it is of which we do not yet know what it is! Well, the
least you can do is to relax just a little of your authority, and
allow the question--whether virtue comes by teaching or
some other way--to be examined by means of hypothesis. I
mean by hypothesis what the geometricians often do in
dealing with a question put to them, for example …
Meno 100b
We will know clearly concerning this [that
virtue comes to us by divine inspiration] when
before we attempt to seek how virtue comes
about in men, we attempt to seek what virtue
is itself by itself. [100b4-6]
Return to Problem
• Only ways of acquiring this knowledge that is so
valuable to Socrates in Socratic dialogues
– Learn from others who know
– Discover on one’s own
• Socratic dialogues presented problems for learning
from others
• Meno’s paradox presents problems for discovering
on one’s own
What Needs to be Shown
• The theoretical framework that explains the
possibility of directed self-discovery: the
theory of recollection
• The possibility of directed self-discovery:
the conversation w/ slave boy
• The method to employ in making the
possibility an actuality: the method of
hypothesis
Theory of Recollection
(Meno 81a-e)
• Priests & Priestesses
• The soul is immortal
• So, it has seen (heorakuia) all things here
and in Hades
• So, it has learned everything
• All nature is akin
• So, having learned one thing, one can learn
everything else
Issues Surrounding the Theory of
Recollection here
• Pushes learning back to previous existence
– Looks circular
– Directed learning
• Previous learning looks to be a form of sense perception of
abstract objects
• Two processes
– Process of recollecting one thing
– Process of deducing everything else from that
• How does it resolve the paradox?
– Reject [3]?
– Reject [7]?
Transition to CSB
• M: Yes, Socrates, but what do you mean by saying that we do not
learn, and that what we call learning is recollection? Can you instruct
me that this is so?
• S: I remarked just now, Meno, that you are a rogue and so here you are
asking if I can instruct you, when I say there is no teaching but only
recollection: you hope that I may be caught contradicting myself
forthwith.
• M: I assure you, Socrates; that was not my intention I only spoke from
habit. But if you can somehow prove to me that it is as you say, pray
do so.
• S: It is no easy matter, but still I am willing to try my best for your
sake. Just call one of your own troop of attendants there, …
• S: Now observe closely whether he strikes you as recollecting or as
learning from me. [81e3-b7; Lamb trans.]
Conversation w/ Slave Boy
I.
Question & Profession of Knowledge
1.
II.
And now [the slave-boy] thinks he knows what sort
of line it is from which the eight-foot square will
come to be. [82e5-6]
Examination of Knowledge (83a-84d)
1.
2.
3.
First answer & response (83a-c)
Second answer & response (83c-e)
Recognition of ignorance (84a-d)
1.
2.
But, by Zeus, Socrates, I do not know (84a1-2)
Commentary (84a-d)
III. Arrival at True Belief (84d-85c)
IV. Description of the Process to Knowledge (85cd)
Description of the Process to
Knowledge
If someone asked him these same questions
again and in a variety of ways, you know that
in the end he would know these things less
accurately than no one... Without anyone
teaching him, but only asking him questions
he will come to know, recovering himself this
knowledge from himself... And recovering
oneself knowledge in oneself is recollection,
isn’t it? [85C1-D7]
Conclusion of the CSB
I would not confidently assert the other things
said in defense of this account, but that we
would be better and braver and less idle if we
believe that one ought to inquire concerning
those things he fails to know than if one
believes it is not possible to discover nor
necessary to inquire concerning those things
one fails to know, I would fight for in both
word and deed as far as I am able. [86b6-c2]
3.
The Teachability of Virtue (86c-100c)
A. Method of Hypothesis (86c-87c)
B. Argument that virtue is teachable (87c-89c)
i. X is teachable ↔ x is knowledge
ii. Virtue is knowledge
iii. So, virtue is teachable
C. Argument that virtue is not teachable (89d-96d)
x is teachable ↔ x has teachers (89d-e)
Pace Anytus: virtuous statesmen do not teach virtue (90a94e)
iii. Pace Meno: Sophists don’t teach virtue
iv. So, virtue is not teachable
i.
ii.
D. The true belief solution (96d-100c)
i. True belief is sufficient for virtue (96d-97c)
ii. Distinction between knowledge & true belief (97c-98b)
iii. Virtue qua true belief is acquired by divine dispensation
(98b-100c)
Method of Hypothesis
Introduction
“Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself, we should not
have begun considering whether virtue can or cannot be
taught until we had first inquired into the main question of
what it is. But as you do not so much as attempt to control
yourself--you are so fond of your liberty-- and both attempt
and hold control over me, I will yield to your request--what
else am I to do? So it seems we are to consider what sort of
thing it is of which we do not yet know what it is! Well, the
least you can do is to relax just a little of your authority, and
allow the question--whether virtue comes by teaching or
some other way--to be examined by means of hypothesis. I
mean by hypothesis what the geometricians often do in
dealing with a question put to them; for example,” [86d3-e5]
Geometrical Example
“whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a
triangular space in a given circle: they reply--‘I cannot
yet tell whether it has that capability; but I think, if I may
put it so, that I have a certain helpful hypothesis for the
problem, and it is as follows: If this area is such that
when you apply it to the given line of the circle you find
it falls short by a space similar to that which you have
just applied, then I take it you have one consequence,
and if it is impossible for it to fall so, then some other.
Accordingly I wish to put a hypothesis, before I state our
conclusion as regards inscribing this figure in the circle
by saying whether it is impossible or not.” [86e6-87b2;
Lamb trans.]
Method
1. Find Equivalent Question/Hypothesis
1. Proposition if true entails truth of original
disputable proposition
2. Proposition if false entails falsity of original
disputable proposition
2. Examine the truth of Equivalent
Question/Hypothesis
Virtue Example
So let us speak about virtue also, since we do not
know either what it is or what qualities it possesses,
let us investigate whether it is teachable or not by
means of a hypothesis, and say this: Among the
things existing in the soul, of what sort is virtue, that
it should be teachable or not? First, if it is another
sort than knowledge, is it teachable or not, or, as we
were just saying, recollectable? Let it make no
difference to us which term we use: is it teachable?
Or is it plain to anyone that men cannot be taught
anything but knowledge? [87b2-c3; Grube trans.]
Equivalent Question/Hypothesis
• Virtue is teachable ↔ virtue is knowledge
• Equivalent question:
– Whether virtue is teachable = whether virtue is
knowledge
• The two questions are equivalent on the assumption that
– X is teachable ↔ x is knowledge
– Recall Protagoras 361a3-c2
• Hypothesis
– Virtue is teachable ↔ virtue is knowledge
– Virtue is knowledge
Examination of Equivalent
Question
• “The next point to consider seems to be
whether virtue is knowledge or something
else.” [87c11-d1; Grube trans.]
• Upward & Downward paths: Phaedo
101d1-e3
• Upward path: 87c-89c
• Downward path: 89d-96d
Phaedo 101d1-e3
But you , ..., would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis
and give that answer. If someone then attacked your
hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not
answer until you had examined whether the consequences
that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one
another. And when you must give an account of your
hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will
assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best
of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable,
but you will not jumble the two as the debaters do by
discussing the hypothesis and its consequences at the same
time, if you wish to discover the truth. [Grube trans.]
Examination/Confirmation of
Equivalent Question
• First one identifies a further hypothesis from
which the original hypothesis can be derived and
shows how this derivation goes until one reaches
something adequate and [upward path]
• Second one examines the consequences of the
hypothesis to be whether they are consistent with
other background beliefs or information
concerning the topic under discussion [downward
path].
Upward Path
1. Virtue is good (87d2-3)
2. If x is good, then x is knowledge (87e189a2)
•
This premise is arrived through a series of
examples; epagoge
3. So, virtue is knowledge (89a3-4)
Downward Path
•
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The question under discussion is whether virtue is knowledge
–
I am not saying that it is wrong to say that virtue is teachable if it is
knowledge, but look whether it is reasonable of me to doubt whether it
is knowledge.” [Meno 89d?; Grube trans.]
If virtue is knowledge, then virtue is teachable
If virtue is teachable, then there are teachers of virtue
–
Tell me this: if not only virtue but anything whatever can be taught,
should there not be of necessity people who teach it and people who
learn it . I think so. Then again, if on the contrary there are no teachers
or learners of something, we should be right to assume that the subject
cannot be taught? [89d6-e2; Grube trans.]
But, the kaloi kagathoi are not teachers of virtue pace Anytus (89e-95a)
•
Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, Thucydides
The Sophist and poets are not teachers of virtue pace Meno (95a-96d)
So, no teachers
•
Now there seem to be no teachers of virtue anywhere?—That is so.
[Meno 96c6-7; Grube trans.]
So, virtue is not knowledge