Transcript U.S. Foreign Policy

U.S. Foreign Policy
Nixon through Carter
Nixon & The Vietnam Problem
• Nixon wished to reshape relationships b/t US & China
& USSR, but first had to deal with Vietnam.
▫ As Repub after 2 consecutive Demos, anticomm credentials a must.
▫ Likewise, RMN believed that if the USSR & China perceived the
US as weak, they would be unwilling to negotiate a mutual
reduction in tensions.
 Toward this end, decided an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam was
unacceptable.
• RMN settled on 2 pronged, but symbiotic plan
▫ Gradual withdrawal of US troops
 Slow to appease “silent majority” who still supported the war- but deliberate to
assuage growing protest
▫ Vietnamization of the war
 US would train & arm the ARVN (South Vietnamese Army)
Richard Nixon, Vietnam, & Detente
• In ‘70, unease in SE Asia obscured RMN’s plan.
▫ The comm supporting govt of Prince Sihanouk was
overthrown and a republic was est’d Cambodia.
▫ When comms began moving on Phnom Penh, RMN
ordered air strikes on Cambodian targets (secretly)
 Caused rioting on college campuses (most famously the Kent
State University killings)
▫ It was clear from domestic response in US, it would be
fruitless (politically) to continue the war in this direction.
▫ Focus returned to Vietnam- where NV was pressing
forward now that US had withdrawn from the battlefield
Re-Americanization & The End in Sight
• When NVA launched surprise attack in Spring, 1972,
RMN brought US forces back into the war
▫ Ordered massive bombing of Hanoi & mining of NV harbors
to keep Chinese supplies from getting through.
▫ Simultaneously, offered Hanoi withdrawal of US forces in 4
months if all POWs released & a cease-fire est’d.
▫ Hanoi refused (they wanted him to give them Saigon)
• Now RMN’s policies bore fruit:
▫ USSR went ahead with a peace summit (while the US
was conducting their bombing campaign)
▫ China expressed its support for a negotiated
settlement
• N. Vietnam had lost its 2 strongest allies
An Honorable Peace?
• Month before ‘72 election, Hanoi signaled desire to
negotiate, but in SV, Thieu refused.
• NV then balked at going forward- RMN ordered largest
bombings ever in ‘72 (including civilian centers in Hanoi & Haiphong)
• The Christmas bombings produced huge outcry,
but in January, ’73, NV returned to the peace talks
& a cease-fire was signed.
• The US could now focus on its relationship with
USSR & China
▫ 2 years after peace talks ended, NV launched massive attack in SV; new pres
Gerald Ford refused to recommit US forces- Saigon fell to NVA in 4/30/75
• The specter of Vietnam its resulting syndrome
affected US politics for decades.
Nixon & the Diplomacy Question
• Vietnam left US faltering in “ideological mire”
▫ Anti-comm had not resulted in victory in V. (in Cuba &
Korea) should we engage in diplomacy w/ Enemy?
▫ During 1st decades, Cold War realpolitik (diplomacy based on
power considerations, instead of morals or ideals) dovetailed w/ idealpolitik
(diplomacy must always align with ideology), now this wouldn’t work
 Comm clearly not monolithic, not confined to single flavor.
 What was appropriate response?
 Realpolitik: Use diplomacy to keep power balanced
 Idealpolitik: Refuse to negotiate with either USSR or China
▫ Nixon agreed w/ NSA Kissinger
 Balancing power meant acknowledging right to
exist of all nations- comm & demo
 Play upon differences of comm w/in USSR & China
The Kissinger Philosophy
• Kissinger’s realpolitik was based on the idea that the
US was not in a struggle of good vs. evil, but in
competing ideologies
• We should defend our interests, but aggressive
“crusades” were not conducive to peaceful coexistence
• Détente (or an easing of tensions) became the focus
▫ The USSR had caught up with us militarily
 Contaiment by force (or threat of force) was impossible
▫ USSR was committed to a weltpolitik (global policy)
▫ But US refused to absolve itself of its obligations
 NATO, Taiwan, S. Korea, etc.
 Diplomacy must be used to curtail Soviet aggression &
preserve those regions under US protection
The Kissinger Philosophy
• For HK, “linkage” was key to managing USSR
▫ A series of agreements and understandings on subjects
like arms control, trade, etc. b/t the 2 countries would
give the USSR a vested interest in maintaining peace.
• Not to say we were warm & fuzzy w/ USSR
▫ The Am. “big stick” would still be there, but would be
supplemented with enough carrots to show our desire
was for peaceful coexistence
• Linkage also meant the different subjects
themselves were tied
▫ Progress could not be achieved in trade, unless the
Soviets were willing to go forward on arms control
Let’s eat
the white
man’s egg
roll!
I wonder
if these
guys are
screwing
with me?
I told him the
dog was
chicken!
Nixon & China (background)
• 1st place where HK’s policy saw fruit was with China.
▫ Soon after its revolution, tensions b/t China & the USSR
erupted into what came to be known as the Sino-Soviet
Split
 Russians called Mao “Hitler”
 Chinese called Russians “fascists” bent on global hegemony
(a quote from Marx!)
▫ The main concerns were nationalism & land
 Like Yugo, China refused to be part of a Soviet “empire”
 Yugo (under Tito) had refused to be a member of the Warsaw Pact
 China shared a 4500 mile border with the USSR (approx 1k less than
US-Canada border)
 USSR claimed land that China had claimed
• In 1969, Soviet forces & Chinese
battled for a 1.5 mile
uninhabited island in the middle
of the Ussuri River.
• Zhenbao/Damanskii Island was
uninhabited, but claimed by
both sides.
• The conflict resulted in
thousands of troops dispatched
to island and resulted in over
about 1k deaths
• In 1991, Russia & China signed
an agreement giving the island
back to the Chinese permanently
Nixon & the China Card
• 1st thing RMN & HK did was officially recognize the
PRC (prior to this, it didn’t exist: Taiwan was China)
▫ By calling China by its chosen name (PRC), RMN
acknowledged its right to exist- opening the door to
diplomatic relations
▫ Led to invitation to world table-tennis championships
▫ Which paved way for presidential visit w/ Mao & Zhou
• Next step was trade
▫ RMN began trade with the PRC, but stopped short of
selling arms (didn’t want to create a rift w/ USSR)- it
allowed its allies to do this instead
▫ Using the perceived threat of a Sino-US alliance, RMN
leveraged a more open relationship w/ USSR.
Nixon, Arms Control & Detente
• The issue of nuclear arms control became central focus
of détente .
▫ In ‘72, w/ US-China relations opening, the US & USSR
were engaged in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (SALT).
▫ Seeing their enemy becoming cozy with their enemy,
changed Soviet leaders regarding nuclear missiles.
 Parity was goal
 Nuke stockpiles were limited
 2ND Round of talks were scheduled (SALT II), which
reached even more sweeping set of reductions under Ford
 Which the Senate refused to ratify, but both govts abided by it
for the most part
The Soviet Economy & Détente
• In the 70s, the Soviet econ was in shambles
▫ Military build-up at cost of secondary industries
▫ Long lines for basic necessities
▫ Industries needed for econ growth were not there
• USSR was behind & falling further behind
▫ Only industrial society where peacetime life expectancy was
dropping & infant mortality was rising!
 Poor diet (due to ag policies), alcoholism, etc
 Brezhnev recalled the effect of poor econ growth on Khrushchev
(fired) and knew his days were numbered
• He (& Soviet leaders) allowed US industries to exploit
Russian natural resources (in Siberia) in exchange for loans,
food, & shares in the profits
The Limits of Détente
• While the global superpowers reduced tensions, rest of
the world not so fortunate• CW tensions had infected the developing world
▫ Latin America
▫ SW Asia (Middle East)
▫ Africa
▫ SE Asia
Latin America After WWII
• From end of WWII through the 1960s, Latin America was
the site of aggressive interventionism from the US
▫ Irony was that Lat Am aided the Allies during WWII, but
received no aid after the war (while our enemies did)
▫ The 50s saw US intervention in
 Puerto Rico: anti-US revolution put down by troops
 Guatemala: CIA-sponsored coup d'état
 Panama: US troops put down anti-US protests
▫ The 60s saw it in
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Cuba: CIA sponsored Bay of Pigs “invasion”
Panama: Citizens shot for protesting for the canal’s return
Dominican Repub: Marines sent in during election
Guatemala: Green Berets sent in against govt rebels
Latin America & Nixon
• Nixon was determined to kill JFK’s Alliance for Progress
▫ Congressional critics pointed out its failures &
▫ RMN’s veep, Nelson Rockeller reported after visiting that
LatAm countries were closer to revolution now than in 1960)
• Nixon proclaimed LatAm countries wanted “trade, not aid”
▫ Toward that end, began opening US markets to LatAm goods
 Lowering tariffs
 Setting up the GSP (General System of Preferences)
• GSP didn’t help Venezuela & Ecuador in 1973 when the US
denied trade preferences w/ OPEC members during the oil
embargo
• When Peru nationalized its industries, Nixon chose to ignore itthen came Chile
Chile & Nixon
• In 1970, Socialist Salvador Allende became president of
Chile w/ 36% of the vote (2 pts above his predecessor)
• Allende barely held control of his govt at start of adminthen his socialist tendencies kicked in & ruined him
▫ He nationalized US industries in Chile (w/o compensation)
▫ Invoked a class warfare model w/i Chile
• Nixon apparently willing to overlook Peru, but not Chile.
▫ He ended US credit to Chile & seized financial assets (urging
allies to follow suit)
• Allende had more than enough credit w/ comm nations.
• He expanded his class warfare ideas and alienated the
middle & upper classes and the military
• Nixon responded by sending the CIA to undermine him
Chile & Nixon
• RMN authorized CIA to undermine Allende- mistake
• Allende was already undermining himself- & quickly, too
• When it came out we were involved
▫ Reignited anti-Americanism on the continent
▫ LatAm countries blamed US for toppling democratically
elected govt & installing a military strongman
• If we had let nature take its course, Allende’s own people
would have overthrown him (sooner, rather than later!)
• Afterward, LatAm countries began uniting togetheragainst US
▫ OAS delegates met separately, then called the US rep to listen
to their ideas
▫ Separate LAES (Lat Am Econ Sys) created- excluding US
Skyjackin’ in Flight
• By the early 1970s, tensions b/t the US & Cuba had
eased
▫ US had backed off its JFK era aggression
▫ Castro was getting tired of the constant skyjackings
 From 1958-2007, approx 100 hijacking events b/t US and
Cuba
 Int’l pressure is great upon Fidel
• The door was open to expanding détente policy
• Then came Angola
Civil War in Angola
• In ‘75, civil war began after Portuguese (last Euro power to retain colonies)
finally gave up its possessions.
▫ Angola had provided a buffer b/t black Africa & white supremacist S.
Africa & the Rhodesias)
• After 3 factions battled for control: MPLA (USSR), FLNA (US &
PRC) & UNITA (US & S. Africa) fought a war that lasted for 27 yrs
▫ MPLA received aid (weapons, jets, “military advisors”, etc.) from Cuba
▫ This resulted in the US (under Ford & Kissinger) aiding UNITA
 Fearful of another Vietnam, the Senate refused to support it.
• Kiss & Ford: although not a vital interest, Soviet behavior could
not be ignored & was incompatible w/détente
• Soviets: supporting nat’l movements w/i their rights & not
incompatible w/ détente
• Result was a protracted renewal of Cold War proxy wars…
US & Ethiopia & Somalia
• USSR next intervened in conflict b/t Somalia & Ethiopia.
• The war b/t Muslim Somalia & Christian Ethiopia was ironic for
the nature of its external involvement
▫ In 1974, the govt of Haile Selassie was overthrown in a Marxist
coup that resulted in a pro-Soviet military junta being est’d.
▫ Meanwhile Somalia had undergone its own military coup & was
ruled by strongman (Siad Barre) also supported by the USSR
• Barre had decided upon an expansionist policy and the result
was a “politics makes strange bedfellows” strategy.
▫ The US had remained out of E. African politics when Ethiopia fell
to communism
▫ We saw an opening: a USSR-supported nation waging war against
another USSR-supported nation (& Somalia got short end of stick)
▫ US began supporting Barre (who kicked out Soviet advisors) w/
100m/year- (but he still lost to Ethiopia, which remained comm until 1989)
The Oil Crisis of 73
• The decision by OPEC in 1973 to limit oil production
was met with sympathy by many 3rd World countries
(known collectively as the G77).
▫ OPEC was standing up to the Industrialized World (G7)
▫ Ironically, higher gas prices were felt most in the G77
 Crippled new industries & petrol-based ag programs
• Despite effects, G77 did not form coalition w/ US, W.
Europe, & Japan to force OPEC’s hand▫ Feared angering them & losing promised econ help
(which didn’t come anyway)
▫ Schadenfreude: Weak were causing the Strong to suffer
• Oil crisis affected world: G7 suffered econ stagflation,
resulting in massive drop in foreign aid
OPEC’s Failure
• OPEC’s control was met with high hopes by the G77
▫ OPEC would use their leverage to raise prices of natural
resources in G77 countries
▫ Similar cartels would develop among G77 countries for their
goods: Tin, Copper, Etc.
▫ OPEC would use its new-found wealth to aid G77
• None of these hopes found ground to take root
▫ OPEC fragmented as members began underselling cartel
▫ No new cartels developed
▫ OPEC profits went to NY banks where it was lent at market
rates to G77 countries (who were unable to pay it back & sank deeper in debt)
Foreign Policy Under Carter
• US foreign policy changed with Jimmy Carter’s assumption to
presidency
• Carter’s values meant Kissinger’s realpolitik retired in favor of
idealpolitik (based on moral rejuvenation of our own govt)
• Carter believed key to re-creating the consensus upon which
American foreign policy was built, was to focus on promoting
democracy & protecting human rights
Carter & Interdependence
• Carter rejected Kissinger’s Machiavellian balance of power in
favor of a more open trans-national approach: interdependence
• Interdependence had 4 underlying assumptions
▫ 1. Nuclear weapons had ensured world peace
 As a deterrent to even conventional warfare (fear of escalation)
▫ 2. Econ & welfare issues as important as nat’l security
 Countries more focused on “low politics” than “high politics (improving their
citizens’ standard of living)
▫ 3. In this new age, socio-econ goal could not be met alone
 West needed developing countries raw materials
 DN needed our tech & industry
▫ 4. Power politics could not resolve welfare issues
 Coercive politics would not solve long-term needs- end up alienating countries
whose support is vital to socio-economic self-interest
US & Egyptian-Israeli War
• In 1973, Egypt & Syria attacked Israel on Yom Kippur
▫ Israel had captured the Sinai in ‘67 & cont’d to occupy it
▫ USSR saw opp for increased influence
 Sent huge airlift of offensive arms to Arab states
 Opposed any cease-fire that didn’t involve Israeli pullout of Sinai
 Called on Arab states to join war (& voiced approval of OPEC embargo)
• Nixon sent massive airlift of military supplies
• Israel recovered quickly
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▫
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Took back the Golan Heights & pushed back into the Sinai
Egypt called upon US to pressure Israel to accept cease-fire
When US refused, USSR threatened to intervene
US ends up pressuring Israel, to avoid escalation
• Kissinger believed time was ripe for a peace settlement
The Sadat-Begin Accords
• While US & USSR discussed how a MidEast peace
plan to look, Anwar Sadat (Egypt) & Menachim Begin
(Israel) bypassed the middlemen and began
negotiating one-on-one
• Sadat was the first Arab leader to acknowledge Israel’s
right to exist & 1st to speak to the Israeli Knesset
• However, peace was more complicated than wanting it
▫ Sadat: Return to ‘67 borders (return Sinai, West Bank, Gaza & Golan) in
exchange for peace
▫ Begin: WB & Gaza was hereditary land reconquered (Judea &
Samaria)
 Also proposed that Palestinians be given self-rule, not selfdetermination
• Talks broke down and the US reentered the picture
Carter & Middle East Peace
• JC believed peace possible if 3 conditions were met
▫ Israel returned to ‘67 borders
▫ Palestinians were part of the process
▫ Arab states had to recognize Israel & end hostilities
• Begin proved problematic
▫ Interpreted UN Res. 242 so WB & Gaza was Israeli land
▫ Opposed a Palestinian state
▫ Promoted more Israeli settlements in WB & Gaza
• Sadat had allowed for immediate peace & recognized
Israel’s security needs (he was reasonable & Begin showed bad faith)
• Finally, in ‘78 JC took a gamble & invited both men to
Camp David in MD
Camp David Accords
• While at Camp David, JC, AS, & MB discussed what
could be done to achieve peace
• After much deliberations, a tentative settlement was
reached- one where Sadat made most of concessions
▫ No guarantee on w/drawal from WB or Gaza or even
Palestinian self-determination
▫ Israel recognized “legit rights of Palestinians”
▫ Temp halt on new settlements on WB
▫ Egypt signed a peace treaty (strongest of Arab states)
• Instead of trend in peace settlements, was condemned
by Arab states (Jordan, SA, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria & S. Yemen)
• Arab states became more hostile to US meddling &
Israel resumed its settlements
▫ 3 years later AS was assassinated by a fellow Egyptian
Collapse of Carter’s Foreign Policy
• Interdependence never quite took root during the
1970s.
• USSR saw JC as weak and ignored his appeals to
universal moral standards
▫ Cont’d building up its trad military (outspent us by
upwards of 50%)
• For them new North-South axis (G7 v G77) was still
not nearly as relevant as the East-West axis of old
▫ Poured $$ into G77 countries; fueled regional conflicts
▫ 3 events signaled death of Carter’s moral diplomacy
 Invasion of Afghanistan
 Marxist Rev in Nicaragua
 Hostage Crisis in Iran
Invasion of Afghanistan
• The decision by the USSR to invade Afghan occurred when
the Marxist rev that occurred there seemed in danger of
being overthrown by Islamist rebels
• USSR worried about radical Islam (which had taken over Iran & Pakistan)
spreading into Afghan & then infiltrating the USSR (it had 50
million Muslims on its Southern border)
• In ‘79, invoked Brezhnev doctrine: sent troops & military aid
▫ No socialist state will be surrendered to counterrevolution
▫ Expected no real response from US (maybe token
condemnation)
• Carter: action deplorable; changed opinion on USSR goals
▫ Became more hard-line
 Boycott of Olympics
 Halted high-tech trade & embargoed grain
The Nicaraguan Revolution
• In ‘60s, nationalist rebels protested govt corruption & brutality
• Sandinistas (FSLN) hated by US-supported Somoza govt, giving
Nics the idea that Sands were a viable opposition (they weren’t)
• Sandinistas gained great pop as Somoza cont’d screw things up
• Then Somoza’s son (a high-ranking govt official himself) participated in
assassination of an opposition newspaper editor. Civil war.
• In ‘79 war ended w/ Sandinistas supported by Cath Church,
much of the populace, & international govts (Somoza was assassinated in Par)
• Sandinistas inherited a country in ruins.
▫ 1.6 bill debt, 50,000 dead, & 600,ooo homeless, econ
• US condemned the revolution & Cuban alliance to spread rev in
Lat Am (i.e. El Salavador)
• Reagan began arming/training rebels (Contras)
The Iran Hostage Crisis
• The one real inconsistency in JC’s foreign policy was his
approach to Iran.
▫ Since ‘20, Pahlevi dynasty ruled Iran, but w/ assumption of Reza Shah
Pahlevi, human rights took nosedive
▫ Son Mohammed was worse: during the ‘60s & ‘70s political opponents
were imprisoned & tortured by SAVAK (Iranian CIA)
▫ When Islamist rebels began clashing w/ the govt in ’78, it was only a
matter of time
▫ In early ‘79, the Shah was overthrown & Islamic Repub of Iran was est’d.
▫ B/c US supported Pahlevi, condemned by new leader Ayatollah Khomeini
• Khomeini, Islamist cleric, est’d theocratic rule in Iran
• Late ‘79, Shah came to US for med treatment- Iran protested
violently (wanted him back in Iran standing trial for his crimes) & group of college
students invaded US embassy & took occupants hostage
• By time it ended 444 days later, JC thoroughly discredited &
Ronald Reagan was president
Conclusion
• US foreign policy in the 1970s began w/ the US trying
to extricate itself from Vietnam and ended w/ our
complete humiliation in Iran.
• In b/t we saw relations cool, then reheat w/ the USSR
& US prestige roller coaster up and down in the 3rd
World as Carter’s human rights focus attempted to
make up for the Machiavellian attitudes of
predecessors only to result in increased regional
conflicts which we were ill-prepared to engage