Transcript Why Change is Hard

Agenda
Part 3
 Part 3 Why is change is hard?
 Calls for change [from the top!]
 War is getting harder:
 Cadets face challenges
 Casualty of our own success?
 “Where’s the beef?” Evidence is there
 The Army thinks it’s reforming itself?
 How about society?
 What are we going to expect?
 The Result
 Conclusion
“Professional attainment, based upon prolonged study, and collective
study at colleges, rank by rank, and age by age … those are the title
reeds of the commanders of the future armies, and the secret of future
victories.”
Winston Churchill, (Speech at Westminster College, Fulton,
Missouri (5 March 1946).
Calls for Change
“Warfare is becoming more complex at lower and lower
levels, and our professional military education system must
continue to evolve to develop the thinking warriors the future
will require. I understand that the way your career timelines are
managed now, we can not just add more educational
requirements without relieving some of the other demands on
your time. I think eventually reconciling this tension between
professional education and other assignments required
for career development is going to require a fundamental
reassessment of what an Army career means and how
success is measured.”
Congressman Ike Skelton
Remarks to Space & Missile Defense
Symposium and Exhibition Dinner,
Association of the United States Army
(8 December 2004)
War is Getting Harder
Cadets face challenges
 War is the norm, peace is the exception
 Our adversaries seek adaptive advantage through
asymmetry
 We have near-peer competitors in niche areas
 Conventional force-on-force conflicts are still
possible
 There is an enormous pool of potential combatants
armed with irreconcilable ideas
 Our homeland is part of the battlespace
 The rest of the Army is adapting to these challenges NOW
War is Getting Harder
Casualty of our own success?
Allows for pursuit of
Political Correctness:
diminishes standards to
create professionalism
& undermines trust in
organization
HOW?
Change POI
Holistic
Change
ROTC
OCS
USMA
What?
Strategic Leaders
Strategic Lieutenants
Must revisit leadership &
professionalism
Factors of Resistance:
• Lack of “Shock” to force changesociety largely not impacted by
changing and distant operating
environment (only on TV)
•U.S. society’s definition of
individual success? Not against
“the pursuit of happiness” but
when does enough become
enough? “Global responsibility?”
• Ends drive means, impact value
system--selfless vs. selfish
leadership--decades of
“cheerleading”--real truth hurts
Competency Development
Dealing with complex problems must
accelerate
Δ = Increased Rigor; move from
quantity to quality based
Why?
Dramatic changes in
operating
environment
Reinvent
Culture
Decreasing? Δ = Time
But how much?
How does this impact
Emotional Development?
War is Getting Harder
“Where’s the beef?”
 Lieutenants need more, earlier:
 “Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq,”
Major Isaiah Wilson, Cornell University (October 2004)
 “Educating the Post-Modern U.S. Army Strategic Planner: Improving the
Organizational Construct,” Major Isaiah Wilson, SAMS (2002-2003)
 “Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus,” Mark Lewis, Armed
Forces and Society, (Fall 2004)
 Not A Good Day To Die – The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda, by Sean
Naylor (forthcoming, Summer 2005)
 “Stifling Innovation: Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders Today,” (SSI, AWS,
2002), “the reality is that junior officers are seldom given opportunities to be
innovative in planning training; to make decisions; or to fail, learn, and try
again.”
 3rd ID After Action Review (Iraq, Summer 2003)
 “Officer of 2030” (Office of Net Assessment Summer of 2003-04)
 “Developing Adaptable Leaders” (SSI, AWC, Summer of 2004)-If allowed, LTs
adapted well, but received little Education or Training in the Problems They
Would Deal With Before Their Arrival in Iraq
 “Learning to Adapt to Asymmetric Threats,” (Institute of Defense Analysis, Dec
2004)
War is Getting Harder
“Where’s the beef?”
 There is also data that tells us that we are not going
to create “adaptive leaders”:
TABLE 2 ED Percentage at Three Year
Markers for West Point Cadets
TABLE 1. Level of CD and ED in USAWC Students
SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL
COGNITIVE
Stage
Freq. (n = 36)*
%
Stratum
Freq. (n = 41)
%
2
0
0
III
9
22
3
1
2
III-IV
3
7
3-4
15
42
IV
21
51
4
20
56
IV-V
6
14
5
0
0
V
2
5
* Different numbers of useable results were available for each assessment from
a total of 44 officers. Of the 44, 38 were USAWC students and the
remaining 6 were from ICAF.
Stage
Freshman
Freq. (n =
38)*
Sophomore
%
Freq. (n =
52)
Senior
%
Freq. (n =
32)
%
2
8
21
12
23.
1
2
6.3
2-3
24
63.
2
27
52.
0
10
31.
3
3
6
15.
8
10
19.
2
14
43.
7
3-4
0
0
3
5.7
6
18.
7
* Different numbers of students participated at each interval making the investigation ‘cross-sectional’
rather than truly ‘longitudinal.’ Nonetheless, these findings should approximate longitudinal results.
 Cadet Command’s proposed and past curriculum have focused
on Leader and Organizational Development issues within time;
in the here and now of incumbents’ and units’ behavior, rather
than examining what matures across time to cause them
War is Getting Harder
The Army thinks its reforming itself?
Laying the foundation
for the rest of the Army
Does ROTC Select,
Develop, Evaluate
and Commission
A CampaignCapable and
Expeditionary
Officer with the
right skills?
Army Force Design
• Modularity – immediate need for versatile, cohesive units
• Shed excess and redundant capabilities
Expeditionary Mindset
• Army in contact, engaged in ongoing operations
• Fight on arrival w/ aggressive, intelligent, empowered Soldiers
Joint Mindset
• Joint interdependent capabilities based Army
• Conduct sustained warfare in a Joint environment
Future Land Power Capabilities
• Sustained interoperability across the full spectrum of Ops
• Future Combat System (FCS) / Network-enabled Ops
Army Culture
• Continuous immersion in the Army’s Warrior Ethos
• Warriors first, specialists second
War is Getting Harder
The Army thinks it’s reforming itself?
Decrease
Field Artillery Units
Air Defense Units
Engineer Units
Armor Units
Certain Logistic Units
2004 - 2009
100,000 soldiers
retrained and
reallocated
Increase
Military Police units
Transportation units
Civil Affairs units
Special Operations units
Biological Detection units
Military Intelligence units
All officers must have foundation w/adaptibility and intuition
Most Significant Army Restructuring in the last 50 Years




Divesting Cold War structure to better fight 4th Generation War
Relieve stress on high demand units (reduce overhead/increase units)
Improve readiness and deployability of units (life-cycle)
Execute Military-to-Civilian Conversions – free-up Soldiers to deploy
How About Society?
What Charlie Moskos Found
 The Moskos’ proposals = insights for reform of ROTC:
 Two-thirds of high school graduates go to higher education
 “About half will graduate with a bachelor’s degree”
 “Each year 1.2 million young people graduate with a bachelor’s degree”
 “40 percent intend to go on to some form of graduate work”
 “Average college graduate today leaves with about $19,000 in debt”
 “Average debt of one who attends graduate school is $38,000!”
 Cost of not reforming the system:
 Lowering of entrance standards
 Higher entry pay and larger enlistment bonuses
 An expanded recruitment force with attendant costs
 Increased contracting out of military functions
 More recruitment of non-American citizens, and
 More strains on IRR
From the “The Citizen Soldier: The Ideal and Reserve Culture”
by Dr. Charlie Moskos (October 2004)
How About Society?
What Charlie Moskos Found
 The Moskos’ proposals = insights for reform of ROTC:
 A 15-month enlistment option with generous educational benefits
 Counterbalance the prevailing econometric approach with social
psychological theories in recruitment analysis. For recruitment purposes,
nothing would be more meaningful than one’s friends joining the Army
 Consider a cohort enlistment for certain colleges to serve in a specified
peacekeeping mission.
 Emphasize military service as a rewarding experience between
undergraduate and graduate school
 Link all federal aid to college students to some form of national service. We
have created a G.I. Bill without the G.I.
“Let us also keep in mind the long-term benefits for the country if
military service became more common among privileged youth. We
will have future leaders in civilian society with a rewarding military
experience—and who will be future informal recruiters. This can only
be to the advantage of the armed services and the nation.”
Dr. Charlie Moskos “The Citizen Soldier: The Ideal and
Reserve Culture” draft (October 2004)
How about society?
Y-Gen Expects?
Industrial Age
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Success = Scale + Scope
Top Down - Centralized
Vertical Integration
Information Hoarding
Local Awareness
Arms Length Relationships
Make and Sell
Inwardly Focused
•
•
•
•
New Rules
New Behaviors
New Competencies
New Relationships
Information Age
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Success = Adaptability + Agility
Empowering the “Edges”
Virtual Integration
Information Sharing
Increased Transparency
Collaboration & Synchronization
Sense and Respond
Externally Oriented
Accelerated Innovation &
Experimentation
What are we going to expect?
The new LT?
 Future LTs must be adaptive and have intuition:
 Commanding units that operate dispersed—but cannot rely on
technology
 Leading more powerful units—at all levels!
 Influence decisions at all levels of war
 Transition from complex unit fighting to humanitarian tasks
demanding different skills, based on decision making skills =>
Both are Key to Success
“The US military must overcome the way it has trained and educated
leaders. Defense officials are moving ahead to overcome Cold-War
era training to create a new generation of leaders who aren't
constrained by what the doctrine says.”
General Richard B. Myers, CJCS
September 2004
What are we going to expect?
Old vs. new POI, or is it?
POI
Current POI
produces leaders
who use:
Use when
time is
Advantages
Disadvantages
Not critical
• Can justify decision to others
• Manages large amounts of
information
• Relies on subject matter expert
contributions
• Decision maker can feel as
comfortable as possible, while
dealing with uncertainty
• Time consuming
• Requires large amounts of
information input
• Does not develop decisionmaking abilities of those
involved, particularly of
subordinates
Critical;
during crisis
situations
• Requires little time
• Can work with relatively little
current information
• Requires less planning time
• Leads to increased tempo and
increases ability to maintain the
initiative against the enemy
• Requires large experience
base on the subject prior to
use
• Requires moral courage
• Decision maker assumes
increased risk without group
absolution from staff
planning
“Analytical decision
making”
Proposed POI
produces leaders
with:
Adaptability and
intuition
The Result!
The Army’s Proposal-Combining the Old w/New
 How the Army develops these future LTs remains flawed
Functional
(not in concept but in details):
Training
(ABN/Ranger,
Scout Leader)
Increasing Rigor later
vs. sooner?
Baseline
BOLC I
First Unit
Assigned
Ft Benning
IN
AR
FA
AV
Ft Bliss
AD
EN
MP
CM
Ft Knox
SC
MI
TC
MS
Ft Sill
QM
OD
AG
FI
BOLC II
Functional
Training
(ABN/Ranger,
Scout Leader)
BOLC III
What happens to a lieutenant
that fails the standard?
Task Training
Cognitive Skills
education
War is Getting Harder
Conclusion
While the world and war are changing
around us:
Our own success is now our worst enemy
Due to lack of significant “shock”
Allows us to only adjust “around the edges”
We want to see our society advance, but
Definition of success works against selfless
service
Too divorced to take the time to understand
Today’s global problems have an impact