Transcript Document
THE ROLE OF MICRO FINANCE IN
MEETING SA’s HOUSING CHALLENGE
1. Introduction
Access to Finance key to debate since 1994
The 1994 RoU between Banks and Government:
Delivered R10bn+ new mortgage loans under MIF cover;
Proved unsustainable as underlying risks prevailed
Less than 5% of 1.9m Government subsidized units since 1994 linked to
home loans
Underlying reasons for 1994 Banks/ Government RoU prevail:
Vanilla mortgage lending proved unsustainable
Most township areas remain under or un-serviced
Underlying risk profile of under-serviced areas improved little
New Government projects remain under-serviced
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1. Introduction
Alternative (intermediated) tenure/finance options in subsidized
segment:
Made limited impact (numbers)
Few if any so far proven sustainable/scalable
Remain dependent on soft funding
Secondary housing markets underperforming in:
Majority of township markets;
Areas of high transition
New Government subsidized projects:
Slowed down considerably by policy choices/ capacity
constraints;
Remain under-serviced with private finance
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2. The Financial Sector Charter
The FSC is a landmark for change:
Sector committed to sustainable transformation
Broad range of tenure/finance approaches envisaged
Commercial sustainability as foundation
Long term partnership between sector and Government possible
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2. The Financial Sector Charter
The FSC should result in:
Financial product innovation
Customer service transformation and innovation
Clear risk allocation between the private sector and Government
Multi facetted approach to delivery
Investment in new capacity especially at the intermediary level
Standardization and transparency
Recognition of incremental housing as a cornerstone of delivery
under the FSC
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3. Role of Micro Finance
1.9 million families during the past 10 years obtained:
Freehold title;
A starter housing unit
Starter units largely not suitable as mortgageable security due to:
Housing standards
Concentration of the poor
Environmental conditions impact on values
Distortive impact of capital subsidy on market values
Financial profile of beneficiary mix
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3. Role of Micro Finance
Families on these projects left 3 choices:
Be content with what they got;
Incrementally improve the units with cash when available
Gain access to non-mortgage finance and incrementally
improve their properties
Is cash savings a realistic solution?
Marginal incomes mean low or no savings
Saving term doesn’t match timing of need
Significant lump sum amounts needed
Cash route not a realistic route
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3. Role of Micro Finance
What are the alternatives available?
Fully guaranteed loans (pension backed)
Unsecured personal loans
Can these alternatives be accessed?
3 million people are regularly accessing unsecured loans
Many pension schemes allow borrowing for housing
So are there problems?
Yes and no
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3. Role of Micro Finance
Wide access to unsecured finance is already achieved
Loan size/ product choices are restricted by by law and
affordability
Pricing is high due to regulatory uncertainty, costs, risk and
inadequate competition
Delivery of finance and housing subsidy not linked
Delivery of finance and home improvements inadequately linked
FGL low priced (Prime -)
Substantial leakage
Erodes retirement provisions/ increases dependency on state –
questions as to whether it should be allowed
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3. Role of Micro Finance
Despite all of this an estimated R2 –3 billion per annum flows into
incremental housing
People are doing it for themselves while policy debates and
conferences to solve the “problem” are abundant
We need to recognise and support what people on the ground are
already doing for themselves
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3.
Role of Micro Finance
Do the economics of micro finance work for the borrower? – a real
life example:
Ms X a teacher in Kimberley takes a R25 000 20 year mortgage
@ 15% pa on average with a R330 p.m installment from a big 4
bank in 1992 to build a house (assuming she could get it).
She elects to pay R380 pm to pay the loan off faster/ save interest
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3. Role of Micro Finance
By 1999 she has:
Paid back R9 951.35 in capital (still owes R15 048 or 60% of
loan)
Paid interest in the amount of R21 968.65(87.9% of the loan
amount)
Paid an installment of 29% (R380) of her R1316 take home pay in
1992
The house was contractor built and we assume equated to the
market value at the time of delivery
She still has to repay every month and cannot borrow any new
money to improve the house
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3. Role of Micro Finance
The same Ms X takes 5 18 month unsecured payroll deducted loans
of R5000 each @ 40% pa NACM during the same period (1992 –
1999)
During this time she:
Repaid the full R25 000 capital (she owes nothing on the
house)
Paid a cumulative total of R6920 in interest (31.5% of the R21
968 she would have paid on the R25 000 bond and only 27.7%
cumulatively on the R25 000 capital she borrowed)
Paid the same installment of 29% (R380) of her R1316 take
home pay in 1992
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3. Role of Micro Finance
Today she owns a bond free house and continues to improve it
every year, taking small amounts.
She did the construction work with the help of her son and spent
capital on materials and specialists such as an electrician and a
plumber.
Her house today is 20% bigger than what she could have built for
R25 000 in 1992 through a contractor.
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3. Role of Micro Finance
Ms X made a rational economic decision in 1992
She escaped the indignity of living in a shack by helping herself
Her house is debt free today
She has more house for much less money today
She paid the “horrifying” interest rate of 40% pa or 2.67 times the
mortgage rate (15%) on her unsecured loans; yet
She paid much less (in nominal rands) than on a mortgage
She didn't have the need to ask Government for a handout
She remains a valued and profitable customer for her financier
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4. Where to from here?
Present price control in the Usury Act and the limitations and legal
uncertainty under the Exemption Notice
Inhibit innovation, investment and competition
Encourage inappropriate lending and borrowing
Has divided the market in two distinct segments:
• Low (regulated) priced, wide variety of choices for the haves
• High priced, limited choices for the have-nots (Exempt)
By regulation largely precluded low income borrowers from
access to:
• Overdrafts
• Revolving credit lines
• Credit cards
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4.
Where to from here?
A new National Credit Bill (2004) (replacing the existing laws)
proposes:
Price control across the market
Limitations on marketing conduct
Regulatory prescribed affordability requirements
Substantially increased cost of compliance
Massive penalties for credit providers
Weakening of credit provider contract enforcement capability:
• Prescribed delays in legal process
• 14+ new defenses debtors can raise in court under default
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4.
Where to from here?
Bill still under consultation before being submitted to parliament
The present Bill likely to exacerbate the ills of the present laws i.e.:
Reduced legal access to credit in formally employed sector
Limited prospects for legal access in informally employed sector
Substantially reduced competition in this market due to:
• Increased compliance cost of provision
• Increased compliance risk for providers
• Increased collection risk
• Regulatory limits on recovering such cost and risk
Large increase in illegal credit provision to fill gap
A downward revision of housing finance targets under the FSC
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4. Where to from here?
Pre-occupation with the effective rate at which people borrow:
Defies economic logic
Kill innovation, investment and competition and therefore choice
Regulatory interference in creditability assessment/ contract
enforcement will result in:
Inhibited innovation and competition
Rigidity, arbitrary exclusion and moral hazard
Increased risk aversion from credit providers
Consumers and providers will make rational choices given:
Enough competitive options
Transparent comparable disclosure
Predictable and legally certain outcomes
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4. Where to from here?
The FSC creates an opportunity for a new dispensation
Government subsidy policy and processes and private sector finance
and product delivery processes need to be aligned
Recent housing policy shifts bode well for such a dispensation
Progressive reform in the legislative environment for credit can make a
massive difference – the new Credit Bill needs serious revision
Regressive market interventions - especially government price control,
regulatory prescription in credit assessment and interference in contract
enforcement, can set the country back 15 years and frustrate the
achievement of the FSC finance goals in:
Housing
SME and Agriculture
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4. Where to from here?
The largest micro finance bank in SA today, service 1.2 million
customers annually with unsecured loans
It owes its existence to public policy interventions through DFI’s such as
the IDT Finance Corporation and the NHFC during its formative years
Its success is directly attributable to:
The ability to flexibly price for risk and cost
The ability to effectively collect in the legal system
Attaining critical mass and a track record with initial DFI (public
policy) support
Being able to offer shareholders attractive risk adjusted RoE’s
Being a fully regulated banking institution
Having a credit rating enabling sustainable funding
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4. Where to from here?
SA needs a number of such entities vigorously competing on:
Price
Product
Service
Government can start a new wave of capacity/ investment through:
Visionary legislative/ regulatory reform creating certainty and
stability in the credit environment
Recognizing and dealing with the causes of market failure (where it
is proven to exist) not the symptoms
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THANK YOU