Transcript Slide 1
Application of the Process Safety Management Standard in Canada Presented by: Holly Elke, CRSP, CSP, CMQ/OE Senior QHSE Advisor SH&E System & SPM Solutions Process Safety Management Process Safety Management Also called Safety Systems Management or Process Safety Management; The purpose is to manage the risk to personnel, property, production, the environment and the company reputation. Process Safety Management Regulated in 1992 by OSHA. Known as the Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, Explosives and Blasting Agents: OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119. Process Safety Management The main objective is to prevent the release of highly hazardous chemicals; such as toxic, reactive, flammable and/or explosive substances, which may cause harm to humans. Process Safety Management Processes that involve: Explosives, blasting agents and pyrotechnics; Chemicals, above a specified quantity in Appendix A of the PSM std; Flammable liquid or gas in excess of 10000 lbs. Must have a PSM program. Process Safety Management Key parts of a PSM program: Employee involvement; Process Safety Information (history, MSDS, P&ID’s, etc.) ; Process Hazard Analysis; Operating Procedures and Practices; Employee Training; Process Safety Management Key parts of a PSM program: Contractor Management; Pre- Startup Safety Review; Mechanical Integrity – critical equipment & QA; Non routine Work Authorizations; Managing Change (beyond replacement in kind) Process Safety Management Key parts of a PSM program: Investigation of Incidents; Emergency Preparedness Compliance Audits – verify effectiveness of PSM program. API 750 Process Hazards Management has similar requirements Process Hazards Analysis PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS STRUCTURE PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS What can go wrong? How likely is it? What are the consequences? FOUNDATION FOR PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS Historical Experience PHA Methodology Knowledge and Intuition Qualitative Risk Analysis Process Hazards Analysis is the predictive identification of hazards, their cause & consequence and the qualitative estimation of likelihood and severity. Qualitative Risk Analysis Frequency of Exposure Probability Loss = Likelihood FREQUENCY OF EXPOSURE: 4321- Frequent (at least daily) Occasional (> 1 occurrence per month) Rare (< 2 occurrences per year) No significant exposure (once every 3 years) PROBABILITY OF LOSS: 4321- Expected (“Happens often”; > 1 per month) Occasional (< 2 occurrences per year) Rare (< 1 occurrence every 3 years) Very Rare (“Once in the life of the facility”) Qualitative Risk Analysis SEVERITY CATEGORY Severity Likelihood = Risk Ranking HEALTH SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT FINANCIAL LOSS PUBLIC IMPACT Catastrophic – mutual aid required Major environmental impact to neighbouring receptors (public streams, vegetation, air, ground water) Extensive damage & extended downtime (Corporate) Serious impact - large community Major downtime (Division / Area) Serious impact - small community 6 One or more fatalities 5 Serious injury - permanent disability, lifethreatening occupational illnesses Significant Event full disaster response Off-site release or repeated noncompliance issues with potential for significant adverse impact 4 Serious injury - disabling occupational illnesses Serious threat emergency response (external agencies involved) Contained within the facility - large impact or repeat noncompliance issues Minor damage or downtime (Department) Minor – families affected 3 Temporary disability minor injuries, acute health effects Important occurrence potential emergency response Contained within facility - minimal impact & regulatory reporting required Minor damage or downtime (Individual processes) Minor – limited no. of individuals affected First Aid or less Noticeable occurrence reportable Contained within facility with no adverse impact below reportable levels Minor damage & no downtime Minimal to none 2 Qualitative Risk Analysis Severity Likelihood 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 2 2 4 6 7 3 2 6 7 8 4 3 7 8 9 RANK 1 AND 2: Lower priority. May require further study and/or action, as resources are available. RANK 3 TO 6: Medium priority. Should be considered serious and appropriate action should be taken. RANK 7 TO 9: Very high priority. Immediate action should be taken to reduce risks to a level as low as practicable. Qualitative vs. Quantitative PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS IDENTIFIES HAZARDS, estimates likelihood and severity, suggests improvements. RISK ANALYSIS ASSESSES HAZARDS USE ON EVERY PROJECT SELECTIVE - use when other methods prove inadequate or excessive in cost. QUALITATIVE - based on experience, knowledge and creative thinking. QUANTITATIVE - requires extensive data and special expertise. Most often done by MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM Done by ONE OR TWO SPECIALLY TRAINED PEOPLE Several methodologies available What-if or Hazid What-if/Checklist HAZOP FMEA Preliminary Hazards Analysis Also called: • Hazan • Risk Assessment • Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) • Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Elements of Facility Risk A systematic approach that considers the following process components: Process Design and Technology; Operational & Maintenance Activities & Procedures; Non Routine Activities & Procedures; Emergency Preparedness plans/ procedures; Training Programs. Process Hazards HAZARDOUS MATERIALS + PROCESS CONDITIONS Flammable materials Combustible materials Unstable materials Reactive materials Corrosive materials Asphyxiates Shock-sensitive materials Highly reactive materials Toxic materials Inert gases Combustible dusts High temperatures Extremely low temperatures High pressures Vacuum Pressure cycling Temperature cycling Vibration/liquid hammering Rotating equipment Ionizing radiation High voltage/current Erosion/Corrosion Human Factors or Errors HUMAN FAILURE ERRORS SLIPS • Competency exists • Intentions are correct • Slips occur while carrying out habitual, routine, skill based activity. VIOLATIONS MISTAKES • • • • • • • • • • Deliberate actions Different from those prescribed Carries known associated risks Ignores operational procedures Violation errors occur because of a perception of lack of relevance, time pressure or laziness. Incorrect intention Inadequate knowledge Incorrect information processing Inadequate training Mistakes occur because of incorrect assumptions or incorrect “tunnel vision” application of rules. Site or Location Hazards Adjacent facilities; Nearby communities; Transport availability; Availability of Utilities; Topography/ average weather conditions; Environmental sensitivity; Layout considerations regulations, standards location/spacing, occupancy, extreme process conditions. Environmental Issues “LIVING” ENVIRONMENT POTENTIAL IMPACTS Human impacts: Chronic and acute exposure to toxic materials through contaminated drinking water, agricultural products and air • • • • • Allergies Eye irritation Lung damage Genetic mutations Poisoning Wildlife impacts: • Migratory routes • Critical habitats for endangered species • Genetic mutations Domestic Animal Impacts: • • • • Contamination of feed & water Genetic mutations Poisoning Impact on agriculture and food supply Micro/Macro biological Impacts: • • • • • Ecosystems Food chain Surface and ground water Air quality Eradication of species The Deviation List # DEVIATION MEANING 1. Low / No Flow Reduction / partial or total loss of flow. Ex. Valve closed. 2. High Flow Excessive Flow. Ex. Control valve malfunction. 3. Reverse / Misdirected Flow Process stream not following primary path. 4. Leak / Rupture Leak - minor leak Ex. - Flange leak. Ex. Rupture - exchanger tube ruptures. 5. Loss of Containment Serious facility leak. Ex. Storage tank leaks - are adequate dykes and berms in place? 6. Hydraulic Surge Pressure wave. Ex. - Water Hammer. Consider high flow. 7. High Pressure Above design pressure or MAWP. 8. Low Pressure Below operating pressure. Ex. Pump failure. 9. Vacuum Condensing of gases, loss of liquid level. Ex. Maintenance - steaming of vessels. 10. HP / LP Interface Pressure Introduction of high pressure into a low pressure system. Ex. DP across control valve when flow on one side is 600 psig and flow on other side is 900 psig. 11. High Temperature Higher than design temperature. Ex. Temperature control valve failure. PHA Methodologies Hazard & Operability Study; What-IF, Checklist or What If/Checklist study; Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA, FMECA); Fault Tree Analysis (FTA); Or an appropriate equivalent methodology (Hazid, Hazcan) PHA Methodologies HAZOP Rigorous review of the design and operability of a system; Identify potential hazards and/or operability problems; Uses guidewords & parameters; Drawings broken into Nodes are assessed. What – If / Checklist Requires experienced and knowledgeable team members; A series of “what if” questions are asked for each system / subsystem; Each question represents the potential for equipment failure or an error in operating procedure. FMEA Initially used in aerospace and automotives to predict the reliability of complex products; The method determines how and how often the components of a product could fail; Evaluates the effects of failures on a system. Fault Tree Analysis Developed by Bell Laboratories for the US Air Force; Focuses on the possibility of one undesired event occurring; Maps the complex relationships that can cause the event by including all of the contributory factors that are known. Selecting the “Right Method” Purpose of the study; Type of results desired; Type of information available; Relative risks associated with the chemicals, the process and/or the facility location; PHA team experience level; Past Incidents; Development stage of facility. Corrective Action Management and Closure “Due diligence” can only be shown if every effort has been made to implement and verify that the actions needed to make the process safe have been taken. The Closure Loop Assign responsibility to recommendations; Use a flexible CAR management system that leaves a “paper trail”; Document the resolution of recommendations; Acceptance, rejection, substitution, or modification of any recommendation must be documented; Rejection of a recommendation must be communicated to the study team. QUESTIONS ?