This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija SPECIFIC CONTENT OF THE SAFETY REPORT Ike van der Putte [email protected]

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

SPECIFIC CONTENT SAFETY REPORT (REF. SEVESO I AND II, WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES CONSIDERING SEVESO III)

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

SECTIONS OF THE DIRECTIVES RELEVANT TO THIS PRESENTATION 96/82/EC DIRECTIVE (SEVESO II) AS AMENDED BY 2003/1005/CE ARTICLE 9/ ARTICLE 10 SAFETY REPORT - SAFETY REPORT AND ANNEX II – MINIMUM DATA TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE

Additional Notes based on SEVESO III ANNEX II minimum data Safety Report and ANNEX III – Safety Management System

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

General obligations of the operator A clear general requirement is imposed on the operator of a Seveso-type establishment (article 5 of the Directive). More specifically: “…the operator is obliged to take all necessary measures to prevent major accidents and, in the case of such an accident, to limit its consequences for man and the environment” “…the operator is required to prove, at any time, to the public authority responsible for carrying out the duties under the Directive (so-called Competent Authority) that he has taken all the necessary measures as specified in the Directive”.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

Obligations of the operator – Safety report UT article 9/ 10 Member states shall require the operator of an Upper Tier establishment to produce a safety report for the purpose of demonstrating that • • • • • a major accident prevention policy (MAPP) and a safety management system (SMS) have been put into effect; major-accident hazards are identified and necessary measures have been taken to prevent such accidents and to limit their consequences for man and the environment; adequate safety & reliability have been incorporated into the design, construction, operation and maintenance of any installation; internal emergency plans have been drawn up, supplying information to enable the external emergency plan to be drawn up; information for land-use planning decisions has been given.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

TASK OF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY IN RELATION TO SAFETY REPORTS (1) • The Competent Authority is required to examine the safety report and to communicate the conclusions of its examination to the Operator.

• Before finalizing these conclusions, the Competent Authority may request further information from the Operator; in addition an inspection of the establishment, in accordance with Article 18, “Inspections” may be carried out to verify whether the information contained in the safety report corresponds with the situation as it is in reality.

• The conclusions should generally be in written form, and they should make reference to the date of the safety report in question and any other supplementary documentation reviewed for this purpose.

A pro forma statement by the Competent Authority that the safety report has been received and seems complete will not be sufficient.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

TASK OF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY IN RELATION TO SAFETY REPORTS (2) The conclusions should make reference to general conclusions based on the safety report in general and to specific cases of accuracy where individual examples have been examined in detail. Deficiencies and inaccuracies must be described where identified,

however it is not expected that the competent authority should identify every single inaccuracy

.

Note:a large number of deficiencies and inaccuracies may lead the competent authority to reject the safety report and require that a revised document is submitted.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

IN SUMMARY

The Competent Authority • • • • • examines the Safety Report requests further information from the operator (if necessary) decides to allow or prohibit (Art. 17/ art 19 ) the bringing into use or continued use of the establishment communicates conclusions to the operator. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

Article 9/ 10 : Safety Reports

This article of the Directive requires that an operator of an upper-tier Seveso type establishment produce a safety report In the Seveso II Directive(96/82/EC) significant additional requirements (including the MAPP and SMS) were introduced as part of a more comprehensive “safety report”.

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THRESHOLDS

Annex I Two categories based on quantities stored  Lower Tier  Upper Tier Upper Tier has more responsibilities This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

REQUIREMENTS LOWER TIER

General Obligations Notification Major Accident Prevention Policy Modifications Accident Reports Cooperation with Authorities This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

OBLIGATIONS UPPER TIER

Lower Tier Obligations and Safety Report (incl. MAPP & SMS) Internal Emergency Plans Information to Public This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

The requirements for policies and management systems which apply to a

lower tier

establishment are: similar to those for an upper tier establishment except that: • the Directive states that the requirements should be proportionate to the major-accident hazards presented by the establishment, • it is not necessary to prepare a detailed report for demonstrating how the Safety Management System has been put into effect; • the document setting out the MAPP must be ‘made available’ but need not necessarily be sent to the competent authorities.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

Risk assessment

Fine tuning of scenario definition based on risk evaluation results and impacts of risk reduction measures This Project is funded by the European Union Collation of Information on process/activity Hazard Identification Hazard Screening Iterative Process Scenario Definition (High Risk Hazards Only) Risk Evaluation

Risk Assessment Risk Reduction

Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

Risk Assessment

Review Existing Preventative/Control Measures Identify Further Preventative/ Control Measures Carry out Cost/Benefit Analysis Review for Acceptability – As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) Accept or Implement Preventative/ Control This Project is funded by the European Union

Risk Reduction Risk reduction

Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

ANNEX II

MINIMUM DATA AND INFORMATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE SAFETY REPORT SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 9/ 10 I. Information on the management system and on the organization of the establishment with a view to major accident prevention (ref article 7 and Annex III: MAPP & SMS) II. Presentation of the environment of the establishment III. Description of the installation IV. Identification and accidental risks analysis and prevention methods V. Measures of protection and intervention to limit the consequences of an accident This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

I. INFORMATION ON THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT WITH A VIEW TO MAJOR ACCIDENT PREVENTION THIS INFORMATION SHALL CONTAIN THE ELEMENTS GIVEN IN ANNEX III.

(a) the major accident prevention policy (MAPP) should be established in writing and should include the operator's overall aims and principles of action with respect to the control of major-accident hazards; (b) the safety management system (SMS) should include the part of the general management system which includes the organizational structure, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and resources for determining and implementing the major-accident prevention policy (7 SMS issues described in detail); • organization and personnel • identification and evaluation of major hazards • operational control • management of change • planning for emergencies • monitoring performance • audit and review This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

II. PRESENTATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT A. description of the site and its environment including the geographical location, meteorological, geological, hydrographic conditions and, if necessary, its history; B. identification of installations and other activities of the establishment which could present a major-accident hazard; C. description of areas where a major accident may occur.

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

III. DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTALLATION A. description of the main activities and products of the parts of the establishment which are important from the point of view of safety, sources of major-accident risks and conditions under which such a major accident could happen, together with a description of proposed preventive measures; B. description of processes, in particular the operating methods; C. description of dangerous substances: 1. inventory of dangerous substances including: — the identification of dangerous substances: chemical name, CAS number, name according to IUPAC nomenclature, — the maximum quantity of dangerous substances present or likely to be present; 2. physical, chemical, toxicological characteristics and indication of hazards, both immediate and delayed for man and the environment; 3. physical and chemical behaviour under normal conditions of use or under foreseeable accidental conditions.

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IV. IDENTIFICATION AND ACCIDENTICAL RISK ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION METHODS A. detailed description of the possible major-accident scenarios and their probability or the conditions under which they occur including a summary of the events which may play a role in triggering each of these scenarios, the causes being internal or external to the installation; B. assessment of the extent and severity of the consequences of identified major accidents including maps, images or, as appropriate, equivalent descriptions, showing areas which are liable to be affected by such accidents arising from the establishment, subject to the provisions of Articles 13(4) (SR public info) and 20 (confidentiality); C. description of technical parameters and equipment used for the safety of installations.

NOTE SEVESO III: also review of past accidents and lessons learned to prevent these

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V. MEASURES OF PROTECTION AND INTERVENTION TO LIMIT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT A. description of the equipment installed in the plant to limit the consequences of major accidents; B. organization of alert and intervention; C. description of mobilizable resources, internal or external; D. summary of elements described in A, B, and C above necessary for drawing up the internal emergency plan prepared in compliance with Article 11 (Emergency plans).

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

In Summary

CONTENTS OF UPPER TIER SAFETY REPORTS Minimum SEVESO requirements for a SR (Upper Tier) 1.

Description of establishment and neighboring environment 2.

3.

Dangerous Substances (Quantities vs SEVESO Qualifying quantities ) Hazard Analysis (HA) : safety critical equipment/circuits 4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Major Accident Scenarios (Reference Scenarios), Phenomena with consequences outside the establishment Worst Case Scenarios (WCSs) Consequence Zones (Z1, Z2, Z3) Risk Assessment RA (Consequence based or QRA) Domino Safety Management System of the company as implemented in the establishment __________________________________________________________________________________ Ref. G. PAPADAKIS - SEVESO SERBIA 24 th June 2013 This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

Safety Report Structure and development

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

STRUCTURE OF SAFETY REPORT

Introduction - Background Safety Management System

   Major Accident (MA) Prevention Policy  MA Organisation MA Planning Risk Control Systems  Performance Measurement  Audit and Review This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

STRUCTURE OF SAFETY REPORT (CONTINUED)

Description of the Environment Description of the Installation

 Principal Installations  Facilities for Limiting the of a Release  Unit Operations Consequences  Areas with Potential for MAH  Hazardous Materials on Site This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

STRUCTURE OF SAFETY REPORT Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Measures of Prevention, Control and Intervention References Attachments - Basis of Safety, Site Plans, Meteorological Data, Inventory of Hazardous Materials, Extracts from Site Risk Assessments This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

SAFETY REPORT HAZARDS Basis for Inclusion in Safety Report Multiple types - fire, explosion, toxic gas release Highest risks Offsite impacts Environmental impact Demonstrate ALARP This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

SAFETY REPORT HAZARDS (CONTINUED)

Dust Explosion Hydrogen Release - Fire & Explosion Toxic Gas Release Solvent Tank Farm Fire Environmental Release

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

SAFETY REPORT DEVELOPMENT

Collaborative effort with CA

 Worked through Employers Group  Worked with CA individually

Biggest problem - getting direction on specifics, e.g. modelling end-points. CA learning also

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

COMPLIANCE - INTERDEPENDENT EVENTS

Carry out risk assessment Develop scenarios and carry out modelling Develop internal emergency plans Supply information for external emergency plans Inform Community

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

COMPLIANCE - INTERDEPENDENT EVENTS (CONTINUED)

Submit Safety Report HSA review and agree report Specified areas agreed, impact on external emergency plans Carry out necessary modifications/ implement procedures, e.g. Siren

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DISCUSSIONS WITH HSA

DEMONSTRATE acceptable risk Worst Possible vs Worst Credible Emergency Services need Worst Case Specified Distance vs Consultation Distance Dangerous Dose vs ERPG Little credit for good SMS

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DISCUSSIONS WITH HSA (CONTINUED)

Consider Escalation Use Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) to demonstrate credible Address hierarchy of Elimination, Reduction, etc.

Specified areas for rivers?

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DISCUSSIONS WITH HSA (CONTINUED)

Consider flooding/high water table Consider Heritage sites Containment rather than modelling for Environmental risks Appropriate data for modelling

This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

RESOURCES

Risk Assessment

Consultant for 9 months Safety Engineer for 6 months Process Engineers for 10 weeks

Safety Report

Consultant for 6 months Safety Engineer for 4 months Staff for 1 month This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

REFERENCES

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances(OJ L 10, 14.1.1997, p. 13) – consolidated version DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC Planning for Emergencies Involving Dangerous Substances for Slovenia. Final Report. Contract no: SL-0081.0011.01. 28 February 2012. I.van der Putte: Regional Environment Accession Project (REAP). Nethconsult/BKH Consulting Engineers/RPS. Subcontractors: AEA Technology, URS/Dames & Moore, EPCE, Project Management Group, REC Hungary This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium