Transcript Problems with Compliance with the Barcelona Convention and

Problems with Compliance with
the Barcelona Convention and it
Related Protocols
NILUFER ORAL
ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE BARCELONA CONVENTION AND ITS
RELATED PROTOCOLS
ATHENS 26-27 OCTOBER 2006
THE CONCEPT OF COMPLIANCE
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
 What is compliance under
international law?
 Vertical structure under
domestic/national compliance
structures versus horizontal structure
of international law
 How to promote compliance?
THE CONCEPT OF COMPLIANCE
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
 What should “compliance” mean for the
Barcelona Convention and its related
Protocols?
 Legal compliance?
 Quantitative/Technical compliance? Eg. 100%
submission of reports
 Qualitative compliance?
 Mediterranean Sea is de-polluted?
 Halting of all loss of biodiversity?
 Zero emissions?
 Zero dumping of all hazardous substances?
MAKING INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WORK
 Implementation
 Compliance
 Enforcement
IMPLEMENTATION
1. Negotiation of MEAs
-pre-negotiation
- during
- post
2. Applying the MEA
Mechanism for implementation include
 ad hoc conferences
 permanent institutional structures
 conference of the parties (CoPs)
 Permanent Secretariats and budget
IMPLEMENTATION
 Implementation of international environmental
agreements employ various techniques and methods
to achieve the objective of the instrument.
 The agreement may provide for the overall framework
leaving the details of implementation to Protocols and
other agreements, or in some cases may actually
provide for the technique or method to be used by the
Parties.
 These include the adoption of regulatory mechanisms,
EIAs, licensing and permits (eg. dumping, fishing),
monitoring and surveillance, best environmental
techniques or practices, standard setting (eg.
emissions, pollution levels), restrictions and bans (eg.
dumping), use regulations (eg. protected areas) and
others.
COMPLIANCE
 The goal of compliance is to promote the optimal
implementation of the objectives of the MEA and the
obligations undertaken by the Parties.
 Important to evaluate and assess whether the full
implementation of the MEA is producing the desired
result.
 Compliance mechanisms do not address the narrow
issue of simple adherence to the obligations under the
MEA but also operate to further the result that is
sought to be achieved: for example, the reduction of
land-based pollution.
 Methods to assess the effectiveness of the MEA
requires a means to monitor, report results and
assess these results. In this regard, compliance
serves to both increase knowledge of environmental
data as well as produce an end result of improvement
of the condition
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS
 Monitoring
 Reporting requirements by the States
 Assessment and Review of Implementation
 Indicators / measurements
 Compliance verification
 By Committee
 Secretariat
 Independent means (eg. NGOs)
 Non-compliance mechanisms
 Adversarial
 Supportive
 Other:
 Role of the Public (eg. Public complaint
procedure)
 Role of the Judiciary
1. MONITORING





Monitoring involves the collection and sharing of research
and data:
to promote compliance the exchange of scientific data
and other indicators of compliance play an important role
in the overall compliance mechanism.
The quality of the data is important and for this reason
open exchange and transparency is equally important.
Monitoring and surveillance, if properly conducted can
provide the valuable scientific data and information to
serve as a basis for regulations, laws and policy-making.
For example, the 1992 OSPAR Convention provides for a
specific definition of what monitoring is as “the repeated
measurement” of the quality of the environment and each
of its compartments, the activities or natural and
anthropogenic inputs that may affect the quality of the
environment and the effects of such activities. (Annex IV,
art. 1).
2. REPORTING




Reporting requirements by the States: Reporting is a
critical part of international environmental agreements as
it provides essential information on actions, results and
problems occurring at the national level.
The usual method is for the international instrument to
designate or require the designation of a reporting organ
that will receive and supervise this process. Reporting can
include reporting information obtained from research and
data collection, such as sample collections.
For example, scientific data regarding bathing water
quality.
Reporting increases transparency which in turn increases
the ability to take the necessary measures to protect and
preserve the marine and coastal environment. Reporting
can also include information regarding national legislation
and regulation of activities.
3. ASSESSMENT & REVIEW



Assessment and Review of Implementation. These
are also part of the reporting requirements. By making
reports and reviews available Parties or interested
organizations can assess the extent of implementation and
progress made towards implementation and realizing the
goals established.
Establishing a set of indicators that will provide reliable
information on the progress being achieved in
implementation of the MEA is important
These indicators than serve as the basis for assessing and
reviewing compliance. The assessment and review can be
done in different ways:



Conference of the Parties: Example, the Climate Change
Convention
Panel of Experts: Example the Montreal Protocol
Commission: Example the CCAMLR (has management powers
to facilitate nations to comply with the treaty requirements
4. VERIFICATION



Compliance verification: This process concerns the verification
of data and technical information to aid in the assessment
process of compliance. Furthermore, in the possible case of noncompliance verification can provide information as to the degree
and frequency of non-compliance.
Some international environmental agreements employ an
external verification process that conducts reviews of the Parties
and compliance. For example, the OECD conducts independent
reviews of the environmental performance of its member states.
The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance especially Waterfowl Habitat, for example,
provides for a commission, which upon the consent of the State,
will conduct a field visit with a member of the Secretariat and
experts, and submit a report with recommendations. The
procedure is to provide assistance and facilitate implementation
of the Convention in the country which may be experiencing
difficulties.
NGOs can play an important role in verification. Eg. Greenpeace
in whale reporting to the ICWR.
5. NON-COMPLIANCE



Non-compliance mechanisms: MEAs may include
non-compliance mechanisms, although many do not.
The non-compliance mechanism can take various
forms, such as the establishment of a body, which
could be a compliance committee.
Non-compliance mechanism can also serve the
function of an “early warning” system and serve in
facilitating compliance.
Non-compliance mechanisms can be nonconfrontational as a means of facilitating and
promoting compliance and assist the parties in
understanding their obligations on the MEA and in
this way avoid disputes amongst the Parties.
ENFORCING COMPLIANCE AT
THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
 The different means of securing compliance with
MEAS includes:
 1. Regulatory: Agency supervised
 2. Diplomatic means
 3. Consultation
 4. Judicial Remedies
 5. Compulsory and Binding Proceedings
FINANCING
 An important component for a successful
compliance mechanism requires adequate funding.
Such funding can either be obtained through
outside institutional funding such as GEF or the
World Bank, or a system of self-financing may be
established through a fund (eg. Kyoto Protocol,
Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depletion or the Civil
Liability Convention)
DIFFERENT COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS
UNDER EXISTING MEAS
1. AARHUS CONVENTION
2. KYOTO PROTOCOL
3. MONTREAL PROTOCOL TO THE
UNFCCC
AARHUS CONVENTION:






Innovative aspects of the compliance mechanism:
The Compliance Committee is made up of 8 independent experts
and not State Parties. Members express their own personal
opinions and do not represent a government.
Members of the Committee are nominated by Parties and
Signatories and also by NGOs within art. 10 para 5
Compliance Committee accepts not only submissions of the
Parties and referrals from the Secretariat but also
communications from the Public (Art. 15)
Transparency:
Submissions found to be admissible are open
to the public and posted on the UNECE website. Almost all
information in the Compliance Committee is open unless falls
within narrow confidentiality exception in Convention. Committee
meetings are open to the public.
Compliance Committee makes recommendations on submissions
but it is the MOPS who make the final decision.
KYOTO PROTOCOL





The compliance mechanism established by the Kyoto Protocol was
based on article 18 of the Convention on Climate Control by the
COPs which approved the regime in 2001 (COP-7).
The compliance committee of Kyoto began to function in March
2006. The purpose of the compliance mechanism is “to facilitate,
promote and enforce compliance with the commitments of the
Protocol.”
The Kyoto Protocol compliance regime created a unique structure
creating two different branches of the Committee: the facilitative
and the enforcement branches.
The Kyoto Protocol builds upon and enhances the Climate Change
Convention. It establishes binding emission limitations and
reduction commitments in its Annexes. The Protocol employs an
innovative flexible mechanism that allows for the trading of
emissions to meet these reductions
It also provides for penalties
KYOTO PROTOCOL
 Implementation of Kyoto is based on three pillars
 1. Accounting, reporting and review. Noncompliance based on CP report
 2. Mechanism to assist parties to meet their
obligations. If all measure are taken domestically
may not be economically feasible.
 3. Compliance
 Three stages of the Compliance Committee
 Pre-commitment period
 1st Commitment period
 2015—compliance assessment
 Procedures and mechanism for Compliance (2005
adopted)
KYOTO PROTOCOL


The structure of compliance committee:
Plenary:
 Facilitative Branch that promotes implementation of P and
commitment:





Enforcement Branch: Responsible for determining non-compliance
with commitments.




Provides advice to Parties.
Provide early warnings
Advise technical and financial assistance
Its decisions are final and cannot be appealed
Enforcement Brach will review any dispute as to calculations made by the technical
committee.
Enforcement can suspend eligibility
Enforcement can issue trading prohibitions and impose sanctions that include deducting 1.3
tons from its allotment for each ton exceeding its target.
The mechanism further provides for an appeal procedure by the
UNFCCC COP which serve as the Protocols MOP. However, the decision
of the Compliance Committee remains in force and only by a decision
of ¾ majority of the COP/MOP can the Committee decision be
overturned.
KYOTO PROTOCOL




Each Committee has a Chair and a Vice-chair. The
Committees consists of 40 persons (20 members and 20
alternatives) who serve in their individual capacities.
The Compliance Committee has met three times and the
Facilitative Committee has met just once upon a submission
on South Africa.
The UNFCCC has also established three funds (two under
the UNFCC and one under the Kyoto Protocol) to promote
compliance by developing countries by providing financing
for technology transfer, the preparation of national
programs.
The Kyoto Fund is unique as it is funded by both voluntary
contributions as well as 2 percent of proceeds from certified
emissions reductions by the clean development mechanism
under article 12, in effect creating a tax on business
transactions that would be used to finance an MEA
environmental fund .
MONTREAL PROTOCOL TO THE
OZONE CONVENTION





Provides for an Implementation Committee.
The Protocol also provides for a system whereby a Party can report
its own inability to comply, or other Parties can report noncompliance with corroborating information of other state parties.
The Implementation Committee may request further information and
even conduct on-site information gathering.
The Committee reports its findings to the MOPs including any
recommendations. The report is to be provided to the Party six weeks
in advance of the MOPs. The MOPs may take decisions of measures to
be taken to ensure full compliance.
An example took place in 1995 when the Russian Federation,
Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland and Ukraine submitted a joint
statement to the Implementation Committee that because of economic
problems that they might not be able to be in compliance with the
Protocol in 1996. The Implementation Committee conducted
consultations and prepared draft recommendations that were
submitted to the MOPs. The recommendations included international
financial assistance and the submission by Russia of annual reports on
progress in phasing out ozone depleting substances.
OTHER MEAs

MEAs that provide for an express compliance mechanism include:


Art. 34 of Cartagena
Art. 17 of the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade
Art. 17 of the Stockholm Convention on POPs
Art. 14bis of the Espoo Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context
MEAs that do not contain an express provision for Compliance mechanism but
provide for alternative means:
LRTAP Convention authorizes the Executive Body to establish a compliance mechanism
Basel Convention does not provide for a specific authorization for the establishment of a
compliance mechanism but at the sixth session of the CoPs they created a compliance
mechanisms (Decision VII/12 “Establishment of a mechanism for Promoting
implementation and compliance”) based on the obligation of the CoPs to review the
effective implementation of the Convention in Art. 15(5)(e)
Convention for the Protection of the Alps and its Protocols similar to the Basel
Convention through the CoPs decided to establish a compliance mechanism based on
Art. 6 that permits the CPs to establish permanent WGs when deemed necessary for the






implementation of the Convention.




CITES
CONVENTION FOR BIODIVERSITY
1982 LOSC
OTHERS
UNEP GUIDELINES ON
COMPLIANCE
 In 2003 UNEP adopted a set of
Guidelines on Compliance and
published an 800+ pages manual.
UNEP GUIDELINES ON
COMPLIANCE
 The UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and
Enforcement of MEAs define
 “compliance” as “the fulfillment by the contracting
parties of their obligations under a MEA and any
amendments to the MEA.”
 “Implementation as “all relevant laws, regulations,
policies and other measures and initiatives, that
contracting parties adopt and/or take to meet their
obligations under a multilateral environmental
agreement and its amendments is any.”
UNEP GUIDELINES ON
COMPLIANCE
 According to the UNEP Guidelines, an important
foundation for creating an effective compliance
mechanism one that will “facilitate” compliance
with MEAs begins at the negotiation stage. Ideally,
there should be :
 (a) a regular exchange of information among States;
 (b) consultations in between negotiation sessions on
potential problem issues for compliance;
 (c) workshops on compliance;
 (d) coordination at inter-governmental levels in
developing national positions and;
 (e) avoid overlaps with existing MEAs.
UNEP GUIDELINES ON
COMPLIANCE





The UNEP guidelines recommend the following approaches
to enhance compliance:
Clarity of the obligations in the MEA
National implementation plans could be included that
provide for monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess
whether the MEA is improving environmental conditions
Reporting: Parties can be made to make “regular, timely
reports on compliance” using a common format. Reporting
can also promote public awareness. UNEP guidelines caution
that reporting requirements not be too onerous and that
they are coordinated with other MEAs.
Monitoring: according to the guidelines involves the
collection of data that can be used to assess compliance.
UNEP GUIDELINES ON
COMPLIANCE
 Verification: Verifying data and information to see if
Party is in compliance. Can include cross-checking
data from different sources.
 Non-compliance mechanism: Does not have to be
punitive or adversarial but can operate as a
safeguard, or a system to clarify to provide
compliance support
 Dispute settlement provisions: In principle
dispute settlement provisions should complement
compliance mechanism. A number of methods can be
employed including good offices, mediation,
conciliation, fact-finding commissions, dispute
resolution panels, arbitration and other judicial
remedies.
UNEP GUIDELINES ON
COMPLIANCE
Recommendations for national implementation through national measures:

Compliance assessment

Compliance plan

Law and regulatory framework

National implementation plans

Enforcement

Economic instruments

National focal points

National coordination

Efficacy of national institutions

Major stakeholders

Local communities

Women and youth

Media

Public awareness

Access to administrative and judicial proceedings

Capacity building may also be needed for countries lacking the human and technical
resources.
BARCELONA CONVENTION AND ITS
RELATED PROTOCOLS





Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine
Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona
Convention), Barcelona, 1976 (as amended in 1995)
Protocol for the Prevention and Elimination of Pollution of the
Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft or
Incineration at Sea, as revised in 1995, (in force as of 2004)
Protocol on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against
Pollution from Land-Based Sources (LBS Protocol) ) (In force as of
17 June 1983
The LBS Protocol was amended as the “Protocol for the Protection of the
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and
Activities “ which was on 7 March 1996 but has not yet entered into force
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological
Diversity
in the Mediterranean (SPA and Biodiversity
Protocol) (entered in force as of 12 December 1999 - replacing the
Protocol concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas adopted on 3
April 1982 (Geneva, Switzerland), entered into force on 23 March 1986.
COMPLIANCE MECHANISM UNDER THE
BARCELONA CONVENTION AND ITS RELATED
PROTOCOLS






Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from
Ships and, in Cases of Emergency,
Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea (Prevention and
Emergency Protocol) (in force as of 17 March 2004 - replacing the
Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the
Mediterranean Sea by Oil and other Harmful Substances in Cases of
Emergency adopted on 16 February 1976 (Barcelona, Spain), entered
into force on 12 February 1978
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution
Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf
and the Seabed and its Subsoil (Offshore Protocol) ,Date adopted:
14 October 1994 (Madrid, Spain)
Not yet entered into force
Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
(Hazardous Wastes Protocol) Date adopted: 1 October 1996
(Izmir, Turkey),Not yet entered into force
MAP II (1996 – 2005)
MAP III (2006- 2015)
OBLIGATIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
BARCELONA CONVENTION
REVISED BARCELONA
CONVENTION

Article 4 of the Convention sets out the “general obligations”
which in summary are:


Article 4 (1) requires the Contracting Parties (CPs) to either
individually or jointly to take measures in accordance with
the Convention and Protocols to “prevent, abate, combat
and to the fullest possible extent eliminate pollution in
the Mediterranean Sea Area and to protect and enhance the
marine environment in that Area so as to contribute towards
its sustainable development”
Article 4(2) requires the CP pledge themselves to take
appropriate measures to implement the Mediterranean
Action Plan and to pursue the protection of the marine
environment and the natural resources…. And meet the
needs of present and future generations in an
equitable manner. Further, the CPs are to take into
account the recommendations of the Mediterranean
Commission on Sustainable Development in
implementing objectives for sustainable development.

Article 4 (3) …the CPs shall:





…in accordance with their capabilities, apply
the precautionary principle
apply the polluter pays principle
undertake environmental impact assessment
promote cooperation among states in EIA for
activities that are likely to have significant adverse
effect on the marine environment of another State
or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
commitment to promote integrated coastal zone
management


Article 5 Pollution by Dumping: CPs shall take
appropriate measures to prevent, abate and to the
fullest extent possible eliminate pollution from the
Mediterranean Sea caused by dumping from ships and
aircraft or incineration
Article 6 Pollution from Ships: CPs shall take all
measures in conformity with international law to
prevent, abate and to the fullest extent possible
eliminate pollution from the Mediterranean Sea caused
by discharges from ships and to ensure the effective
implementation in that Area if the rules which are
generally recognized at the international level relating
to the control of this type of pollution.

Article 7 Pollution from Exploration and Exploitation of the
Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil: CPs shall take all
appropriate measures to prevent, abate and to the fullest extent
possible eliminate pollution from the Mediterranean Sea resulting from
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed
and its subsoil.

Article 8: Pollution from Land-based Sources: CPs shall take all
appropriate measures to prevent, abate and to the fullest extent
possible eliminate pollution from the Mediterranean Sea and to draw
up and implement plans for the reduction and phasing out of
substances that are toxic, persistent and liable to biaccumulate
arising from land-based sources. These measures shall apply

(a) to land-based sources originating within the territories of the Parties, and
reaching the sea:

Directly from outfalls discharging into the sea or through coastal
disposal;

Indirectly through rivers, canals or other watercourses, or through runoff

to pollution from land-based sources transported by the atmosphere
PROTOCOL FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA BY DUMPING FROM SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT (DUMPING PROTOCOL)






Article 4 prohibits the dumping of wastes or Annex I substances
in the Mediterranean Sea area and
Article 5 requires a prior special permit for the dumping of
Annex substances and only after careful consideration of Annex
III factors.
Article 6 provides that for all other substances not falling within
the above provisions be subject to a general permit before
dumping into the sea is allowed.
Article 8 provides for an exception in the case of force majeure
Article 10 requires that each of the Parties designate a
competent authority and that records be kept of the nature and
quantities of the wastes permitted to fumped as well as the
location, date and method of dumping.
this.
PROTOCOL FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA BY DUMPING FROM SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT (DUMPING PROTOCOL









What are the compliance requirements ?
Reporting: Under the Protocol all CPs must report all permits for
dumping granted to the MEDU, and dumping allowed without a permit
due to reasons of force majeure must be reported immediately to the
MEDU.
MOPs: Every two years in conjunction with ordinary MOPs of the
Convention. Duty is to :
Keep under review the implementation of the Protocol and to consider
the efficacy of the measures adopted and the need for any other
measures;
Study and consider the records of permits issued of the dumping
that has taken place
Review and amend the Protocol as needed
Discharge any other functions as may be appropriate for the
implementation of the Protocol
Comment: The compliance mechanism provided within the Protocol
itself is general and simply requires the minimum review by the MOPs.
There is no mechanism provided that would actually promote, facilitate
or pressure compliance by the Parties to report. This is left to the
operation of the MOPs.
The Ninth CoP recommended that CPs send annual reports to the
MEDU. However as this is not legally binding CPs do not do
Protocol on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
against Pollution from Land-Based Sources (LBS
Protocol)







Article 1 The Parties are obliged (“shall”) to take “all appropriate measures to
prevent, abate, combat and eliminate to the fullest possible extent
pollution in the Mediterranean Area caused by discharges from rivers, coastal
establishments or outfalls, or emanating from any other land-based sources of
activities within their territories, giving priority to the phasing out of inputs of
substances that are toxic, persistent and liable to bioaccumulate”
Article 5 establishes further obligations which include inter alia:
1. Eliminate land-based pollution
2. Elaborate and implement, individually or jointly, national or regional actions
plans with measures and timetables for their implementation
3. Use of the best available techniques and environmental practices in
these plans [Annex IV]
4. Preventative measures to reduce to a minimum the risk of accidental pollution
Article 15 expressly provides that a 2/3rd majority decision by a MOPs for
adoption of a short-term and medium-term regional action plans
containing measures and timetables. These are to be notified by MAP to all
the Parties.
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and
Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean (SPA and
Biodiversity Protocol)

Article 3 established the general obligation of the Parties to take
the necessary measures to:





(a) “protect, preserve and manage in a sustainable and
environmentally sound way areas of particular or cultural value,
notably by the establishment of specially protected areas; (b) “protect,
preserve and manage threatened or endangered species of flora and
fauna.
Included in this obligation is the duty of the Parties to:
Identify and compile inventories of the components of
biological diversity important for its conservation and sustainable
use
Adopt strategies, plans and programmes for the conservation
of biological diversity and sustainable use of marine and coastal
biological resources and integrate these into their relevant sectoral
and intersecortola policies
Monitor the components of biological diversity and identify
processes and categories of activities that have or are likely to
have a significants diverse impact on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity and monitor their effects
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and
Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean (SPA and
Biodiversity Protocol)
Article 5- There is no affirmative duty to establish protected
areas “SPAMIs”
 Article 6- However, if a CP decides to do so the Protocol
provides for a number of duties and recommendations.
 Articles 7-8-9-10 apply to SPAMIs established
 However, Article 11 of the Protocol does provide for affirmative
duty for the CPs to take actives measures to protect flora and
fauna such as management, compile lists of endangered
species, prohibit activities such as the killing or taking.
REPORTING?
 Article 23 only requires reporting for :




The status of SPAMIs
Changes in delimitation or legal status
Possible allowed exemptions (arts. 12/18)
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and
Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean (SPA and
Biodiversity Protocol)

MOPs?











Article 26Every 2 years
Review implementation of the P.
Oversee the work of the Organization and related Center
Adopt guidelines and common criteria [Article 16 Spami]
Consider article 23 reports
Make recommendations to the CP
Examine Focal Point recommendations
Decide on inclusion of a SPAMI on the list
Any other matter
COMMENT: NO COMPLIANCE PROMOTION MECHANISM. VERY
PASSIVE APPROACH.
Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from
Ships and, in Cases of Emergency, Combating Pollution of the
Mediterranean Sea (Prevention and Emergency Protocol


It is the only Protocol which provides for a reporting
mechanism. REMPEC acts as the regional Center to which
reports are submitted and which relays these reports to MEDU
of MAP. MEDU reports to the CPs on matters related to the
Protocol.
Comment: The Euromed Cooperation on Maritime Safety and
prevention of pollution from ships [SAFEMED] Project in 2004
with funding from the European Commission represents a joint
initiative between the MAP countries and the European Union
to address the problem of vessel source pollution. This project
aims to remove the discrepancies in the implementation of IMO
instruments by Mediterranean Sea countries. It is an
interesting example of an inter-regional (EU and MAP)
compliance-promoting project. REMPEC is responsible for
implementation of the project.
PROTOCOL FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA AND
EXPLOITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND THE SEABED AND ITS SUBSOIL,
1994
 Not in effect yet.
 Post-Agenda 21 Chapter 17 (goal is to end dumping in the oceans)
 Article 3- General undertakings
 Parties obliged either individually, by bilateral or multilateral
cooperation take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate,
combat, control pollution resulting from activities and ensure
use of best available techniques, environmentally effective
and economically appropriate
 Duty is to ensure that activities do not cause pollution (but
see Art. 8)
PROTOCOL FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA AND
EXPLOITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND THE SEABED AND ITS SUBSOIL
 Criticism
 Makes the national regulations as a reference for
environmentally sound management of wastes produced
during exploration and exploitation and
 Allows dumping of oil platforms if not a threat to navigation
 OSPAR foresees eventual zero discharge and does see
platform dumping as a last option.
 OPSAR has detailed monitoring and assessment procedure
INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS






The European Environmental Agency Report: The EEA completed an
assessment of reporting requirements of the Barcelona Convention and its
Protocols
In its in-depth assessment the EEA found the following to be the “main
difficulties” in implementing the reporting obligations mechanism:
Lack of comparable and transparent information. Noting that there
was no standard format for compliance with reporting obligations which
hinders the Secretariat from compiling information.
Lack of harmonized reporting system: MAP does not have a reporting
system for the CPs to comply with, except for the Emergency Protcol
Lack of concrete and precise calendar according to which the Parties
should submit their reporting: MAP does not have a specific reporting
calendar.
Lack of compliance: The Cps submit incomplete reports and noncompliance with reporting periodicity. Because there is no binding
procedure there is no action on the part of the CPs or the Secretariat
duing the inerim period while a reporting system is being developed
INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS
The EEA identified the:

Lack of a legal structure to support the MAP.

Failure to provide for a specific and detailed framework as to
regulation of how, when and where the CPs have to comply with their
reporting obligations, the EEA believes that it can play a close
cooperative role.

EEA proposed a formal cooperation between the MEDU and the
itself in exchanging experience and know-how and would be able to:

Compile information to support reporting under the Barcelona
Convention and its Protocols through a collaboration agreement
with the UNEP MAP Co-ordinating Unit and its six regional activity
centers
INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS



PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
There is need for improved dissemination of information from
UNEP/MAP – an issue may be remedied once the UNEP/MAP Center
for Communication and Information is established in Italy (today
ERS/RAC) by 2006 - and more efficient participation of the UNEP/MAP
partners in the work relating to the Protocols, especially the proposed
one on ICAM (Integrated Coastal Zone Management).
Overcoming the language barriers in the region is another issue of
priority which significantly hinders the speed by which regional and
international policies are implemented at national level.
Limited capacity and funding for NGOs to monitor and report on the
many MEAs in addition to the Barcelona Convention and its related
Protocols.
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
HELCOM/BARCELONA HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES COMPLIANCE STUDY
 H. Selin and S. D. Vandeveer, “Hazardous Substances
and the Helsinki and Barcelona Conventions: Origins,
Results and Future Challenges”, Paper presented at the
Policy Forum Management if Toxic Substances in the
Marine Environment: Analysis of the Mediterranean and
the Baltic, Javea, Pain 6-8 October, 2002
REPORT: HELCOM




In 1988 the Parties to the 1974 Helsinki Convention adopted a
Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the Baltic Area of their intention to reduce discharges from point
sources of hazardous substances based on the best available
technology. They also understood the need for educe non-point
sources as well.
The Parties decided that their aim would be to achieve an overall
reduction of 50% of the total discharges no later than 1995.
However, by 1995 it was evident that they would not meet the target
of reduction of discharges of hazardous substances by 1995.
HELCOM Parties in 1998 adopted Recommendation 19/5 on hazardous
substances in which they adopted the goal of:


phasing out the discharge of hazardous substances into the Baltic Sea with
the ultimate aim of cessation by 2020 and;
reducing concentration in the environment near background values
naturally occurring and close to zero for human-made synthetic
substances.
HELCOM




HELCOM established a project team from the HELCOM Land-based
Group responsible for the implementation of Recommendation 19/5
with funding from the EU, Sweden and HELCOM.
One of the actions the team took was to reduce the number of
hazardous substances in the priority list from 43 to 35.
By 2001 the target of a reduction of discharges of hazardous
substances into the Baltic Sea by 35 priority substances had been
“largely met.”
The data was based on self-reporting by the Parties by questionnaires
that had been prepared by the Team and sent at the beginning in
which the Parties had been asked to provide data on discharges of
hazardous substances during the 1980s and 1990s. Although, it
should be added that one of the underlying causes of the reduction
may be attributable to the economic decline in the former Soviet Union
countries.
REPORT: BARCELONA






According to the Report:
Despite multitude of agreements related to hazardous substances
in the Mediterranean Sea, no results were obtained.
In response, in 1997 the CPs adopted a SAP for land-based
pollution to build domestic capacity and promote the
implementation of the LBS Protocol through national pollution
reduction plans.
The goal was the reduction in discharge of all 12 organohalogen
substances by the year 2000 in some domestic plans.
However, this was not achieved.
The current SAP has developed a phase-out calendar with the
target years of 2005, 2010 and 2025 with the goal of complete
phase-out of discharges into the Mediterranean Sea by the year
2025. Targeted substances include organic substances (PAHs,
PCBs, HCB, dioxins and furans), heavy metals (eg. mercutu,
cadmium, lead, zinc, copper, and chromium), orhanohalogen
cmpounds and hazardous wastes.
BARCELONA





The study noted that a continuing problem for the MAP was the failure
of the parties to meet their obligations under the Barcelona Convention
and its related Protocols.
This, they noted, included reporting on which domestic
implementation actions had been taken for hazardous substances.
In 2001 the Parties established a voluntary pilot reporting system, in
which seven Parties volunteered.
Overall, the report noted that most Mediterranean countries lack an
adequate monitoring system for hazardous substances.
Furthermore, that there is a lack of adequate understanding of the
Mediterranean environment and the human health effects of hazardous
substances
BARCELONA




The report noted that in the case of HELCOM the states in transition
had met the goal of 50% reduction, however noting that economic
factors played a role in this. However, an important factor noted was
that there was a high level of adherence and compliance with
procedural compliance by all the HELCOM Parties, in particular with the
reporting requirements (Art. 16).
There was a set of detailed scientific assessments.
This made it easier to assess the levels of compliance with substantive
obligations and implementation.
Had these measure not been taken there would have been much more
deterioration in the Baltic Sea. Signs of high compliance with
substantive obligations were the reduction in concentrations of
hazardous substances such as DDT, PCB, mercury and cadmium in the
Baltic Sea mammals.
BARCELONA






Whereas, the report observed that in contrast to HELCOM countries,
reporting by MAP countries had been “chronically” low,
This made assessment of compliance with substantive obligations
and implementation difficult.
Reporting that was made was found to be uneven in coverage and
quality.
Overall, the report concludes that environmental accomplishments
of international cooperation with the MAP regimes is small and
few in numbers and that there is very limited information on
the ecological quality related to hazardous substances.
For this reason very few conclusions can be made about compliance.
There is virtually no regional data on emissions on the concentration of
hazardous substances
BARCELONA








Despite numerous declarations and laundry lists of needed implementation
measures MAP continues to lack comprehensive programs for the
implementation of international commitments.
The reasons for this state of affairs can, according to the report, be
attributed to a number factors including:
MAPs low budget and the need for more financing;
The lack of state organizational capacity in many Mediterranean countries
making environmental protection difficult because the States do not have
the necessary obligations to institutionalize and administer domestic and
international environmental policy.
The report observes that one of the problems is that most capacity building
programs focus on enhancing technical capacity with education and training
programs and equipment.
However, there is also a need to develop administrative and implementation
capacity. Furthermore, the report notes that the Mediterranean Sea lacks
strong leadership countries in contrast to the Baltic Sea.
While the EU can be considered as a leader the problem according to the
report is that the EU Mediterranean Countries are weak in contrast to their
counterparts in the Baltic.
The Baltic has succeed in making a strong institutional linkage between the
EU and HELCOM which ahs not been achieved for the MAP.
Why as HELCOM been more successful
in achieving greater compliance than
MAP?



The report gives two reasons:
1. HELCOM has had
more successful assessment programs and studies have
shown that the better the implementation review the higher
the implementation rates. Implementation review serves to




a.
highlight state capacities
b. transparency
c. increase knowledge and awareness
2. HELCOM’s scientific and policy activities are closely linked
with HELCOM’s scientific and technical assessment so that
assessment is explicitly framed within terms of policy
relevance. Consequently, Baltic scientific assessment effect
regional and domestic policy making. Whereas, MEDPOL
research and assessment seems ti have very limited impact
on MAP policy-making.
CHALLENGES
 The report lists seven challenges for the management of
hazardous substances
 1. Encouraging ratification
 2. Engendering implementation and building state
capacities
 3. Financing cooperation
 4. Improving data availability, quality and comparability
 5. Strengthening existing regulations and incorporating
new issues
 6. Assessing and achieving environmental improvements
 7. Coordinating international management of hazardous
substacnes
CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS
 Need to reassess the issue of implementation and
compliance- why unsuccessful?
 Establish clear and realistic objectives
 Engage public
 Build finance resources
 Need to create a culture of compliance at internat’l and
nat’l levels
 Compliance mechanism should work to both facilitate,
support and only if all else has failed to institute some
form of “dispute settlement”
 Support NGOs with training as to serve as monitors
 Build judiciary awareness at nat’l level
 Build administrative capacity
 THANK YOU