Political Sophistication and Issue Responsibility: An

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Transcript Political Sophistication and Issue Responsibility: An

Blame and the Great Recession
Chapter 6 in
The Blame Game: How Citizens Attribute Responsibility for Political Outcomes
Brad T. Gomez
Florida State University
J. Matthew Wilson
Southern Methodist University
How do citizens attribute responsibility
for socio-political outcomes?
How did citizens attribute blame for the
financial crisis of 2007-2010?
• Who is most likely to be blamed for the crisis, and why?
• What causes some individuals to narrowly focus their
blame while others assign blame diffusely?
• Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution
• Data:
• Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP),
November, 2008.
• Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES),
October, 2010.
Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution
• Citizens systematically vary in the way in which they
attribute responsibility
• Political Sophistication – The individual’s “tendency to
pay close attention to politics, to have ready at hand
banks of information about it, to understand multiple
arguments for and against particular issue positions,
and to recognize interrelationships among those
arguments” (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, 21).
Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution
• Low sophisticates tend to bring few attributional targets to
bear and, when allocating responsibility amongst those
targets, tend to concentrate blame (credit) to a single
actor (typically, the most “obvious” actor/cause).
• High sophisticates tend to bring a larger number of
attributional targets to bear and tend to allocate
responsibility amongst those targets in diffuse ways.
The Car Doesn’t Start!
Must Be a Dead Battery!
The Car Doesn’t Start!
• The battery
• The battery terminal
cable connections
• The starter
• The alternator
• Bad spark plugs
• The fuel injection system
• Dampness inside the
distributor cap
• A loose timing belt
• Low fuel
Source: Deanna Sclar. 1999. Auto Repair For Dummies. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
Hypotheses
• Hypothesis 1: More sophisticated respondents should,
on average, identify more targets as holding “at least
some responsibility” for the financial crisis than their
less sophisticated counterparts.
• Hypothesis 2: More sophisticated respondents should
be more diffuse in their allocations of blame for the
financial crisis, while less sophisticated respondents will
be more concentrated.
Hypotheses
• Hypothesis 2a: More sophisticated respondents will
ascribe less blame to the president than their less
sophisticated counterparts.
• Hypothesis 2b: Less sophisticate respondents will
assign a higher rate of blame to President Obama
relative to President Bush than will high sophisticates
(A Recency Bias).
• Hypothesis 2c: More sophisticated respondents will
tend to assign less blame to their primary target,
whoever that might be, than the less sophisticated.
Data
2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, FSU Module
• 1,620 Respondents
• Political Sophistication is measured as a knowledge battery
asking Nancy Pelosi (House Speaker), Dick Cheney (Vice
President), Gordon Brown (British Prime Minister), and John
Roberts (Chief Justice of the United States)
2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, FSU Model
• 1,000 Respondents
• Political Sophistication is measured as a knowledge battery
asking Nancy Pelosi (House Speaker), Joe Biden (Vice
President), David Cameron (British Prime Minister), John
Roberts (Chief Justice of the United States), Majority of U.S.
House (Democrat) and Senate (Democrat)
2008 CCAP Study
Please order the following groups in terms of who you think
deserves the most blame by dragging them to the slots to the
right.
President Bush
Wall Street financial institutions/banks
Federal government regulators
The Federal Reserve
Democrats
Republicans
People/homeowners who borrowed too much
Congress
FIGURE 6.1. Percentage of Survey Respondents Giving the Actor the Highest Rank of Blame,
November, 2008.
35
Percentage of Respondents
30
25
20
Full Sample
15
Low Sophisticates
High Sophisticates
10
5
0
Bush
Wall St.
Bankers
Federal
Regulators
Federal
Reserve
Democrats Republicans
Regular
Congress
People/Home
Ow ners
Data: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, 2007-2008 Panel Study (FSU Module), November Wave.
TABLE 6.1. Probit Model of Ranking President George W. Bush as Primarily to Blame
for the Financial Crisis, November, 2008.
Independent Variables
Constant
Ideology (Liberal)
Party ID (Democrat)
Age
Gender (Female)
Race (Black)
Education
Political Sophistication
Log Likelihood
LR χ2
% Predicted Correctly
% Reduction in Error
N
* p < .10
** p < .05
Estimate
(S.E.)
- .992***
(.205)
.156***
(.050)
.199***
(.028)
.002
(.003)
.085
(.097)
.304**
(.175)
- .126***
(.048)
- .257**
(.124)
-479.577
180.21 (7)***
78.02
0
1410
*** p < .01, one-tailed test
Δ
0.16
0.30
- 0.06
0.04
0.02
0.07
- 0.13
2010 CCES Study
Below is a list of actors who may or may not be responsible for
the economic downturn experienced during the past few years.
In your opinion, which of these actors holds at least some
responsibility for the economic downturn? (Check all that apply)
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
The Federal Reserve
Home Owners
Wall St. Banks
Global Markets
Tim Geithner
Congress
Bill Clinton
Henry Paulson
2010 CCES Study
In each case, respondents were asked a follow-up question, in
which they had to allocate a percentage of total responsibility
(which could be 0%) to each actor that they had identified in the
first stage (summing to 100%).
100
0
50
Frequency
150
200
FIGURE 6.2. Number of Actors/Factors Blamed for Financial Crisis, October, 2010.
0
2
4
6
8
10
# of Actors Blamed
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
TABLE 6.2. Event Count Model of Attributions of Blame for Financial Crisis, October, 2010.
Independent Variables
Estimate
Robust S.E.
Constant
1.187
.075***
Ideology (Liberal)
- .016
.012
Party ID (Democrat)
- .031
.011***
Age
- .001
.001
Gender (Female)
- .041
.029*
Race (Black)
- .277
.061***
Education
- .014
.010*
Political Sophistication
Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Wald χ2 (d.f.)
N
Model Type:
Poisson Goodness of Fit χ2 (d.f.)
.729
.064***
-2079.85
299.59 (7)***
986
Poisson
932.95 (978)
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01, one-tailed test
.25
FIGURE 6.3. Predicted Probability of Number of Attributions of Blame for Financial
Crisis by Level of Political Sophistication, October, 2010.
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
Low Sophistication
High Sophistication
0
2
4
6
8
10
# of Actors Blamed
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
FIGURE 6.4. Average Proportional Distribution of Blame for Financial Crisis, October, 2010.
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
Note: Entries represent the average proportion of blame given to each actor by survey respondents.
TABLE 6.3. OLS Model of Diffusion of Attributions of Blame for Financial Crisis, October, 2010.
Independent Variables
Constant
Estimate
Robust S.E.
.492
.038***
Ideology (Liberal)
- .002
.007
Party ID (Democrat)
- .014
.006***
Age
- .001
.001
Gender (Female)
- .010
.015
Race (Black)
- .133
.031***
Education
- .001
.005
Political Sophistication
F-test
.254
.035***
21.93***
R2
.17
N
986
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01, one-tailed test
TABLE 6.4. OLS Models of Proportion of Blame Attributed to Presidents Bush and Obama for
Financial Crisis, October, 2010.
President George W. Bush
Independent Variables
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
Constant
Ideology (Liberal)
Party ID (Democrat)
.307
.004
.061
.037***
.007
.006***
President Barack Obama
Ratio of Obama to Bush
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
.127
- .008
- .037
.030***
.006*
.005***
7.654
- .083
- 2.997
2.810***
.575
.505***
.001
.000***
.140
.048***
Age
- .001
.001
Gender (Female)
Race (Black)
Education
- .003
.141
- .003
.015
.035***
.006
.017
- .012
- .013
.011*
.016
.004***
.739
.327
-1.171
1.122
1.344
.416***
Political Sophistication
- .135
.036***
- .057
.026***
- 5.599
2.461**
F-test
R2
N
78.84***
.37
986
46.53***
.24
986
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01, one-tailed test
23.99***
.16
986
TABLE 6.4. OLS Models of Proportion of Blame Attributed to Presidents Bush and Obama for
Financial Crisis, October, 2010.
President George W. Bush
Independent Variables
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
Constant
Ideology (Liberal)
Party ID (Democrat)
.307
.004
.061
.037***
.007
.006***
President Barack Obama
Ratio of Obama to Bush
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
.127
- .008
- .037
.030***
.006*
.005***
7.654
- .083
- 2.997
2.810***
.575
.505***
.001
.000***
.140
.048***
Age
- .001
.001
Gender (Female)
Race (Black)
Education
- .003
.141
- .003
.015
.035***
.006
.017
- .012
- .013
.011*
.016
.004***
.739
.327
-1.171
1.122
1.344
.416***
Political Sophistication
- .135
.036***
- .057
.026***
- 5.599
2.461**
F-test
R2
N
78.84***
.37
986
46.53***
.24
986
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01, one-tailed test
23.99***
.16
986
TABLE 6.4. OLS Models of Proportion of Blame Attributed to Presidents Bush and Obama for
Financial Crisis, October, 2010.
President George W. Bush
Independent Variables
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
Constant
Ideology (Liberal)
Party ID (Democrat)
.307
.004
.061
.037***
.007
.006***
President Barack Obama
Ratio of Obama to Bush
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
.127
- .008
- .037
.030***
.006*
.005***
7.654
- .083
- 2.997
2.810***
.575
.505***
.001
.000***
.140
.048***
Age
- .001
.001
Gender (Female)
Race (Black)
Education
- .003
.141
- .003
.015
.035***
.006
.017
- .012
- .013
.011*
.016
.004***
.739
.327
-1.171
1.122
1.344
.416***
Political Sophistication
- .135
.036***
- .057
.026***
- 5.599
2.461**
F-test
R2
N
78.84***
.37
986
46.53***
.24
986
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01, one-tailed test
23.99***
.16
986
TABLE 6.4. OLS Models of Proportion of Blame Attributed to Presidents Bush and Obama for
Financial Crisis, October, 2010.
President George W. Bush
Independent Variables
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
Constant
Ideology (Liberal)
Party ID (Democrat)
.307
.004
.061
.037***
.007
.006***
President Barack Obama
Ratio of Obama to Bush
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
Estimate
Robust
S.E.
.127
- .008
- .037
.030***
.006*
.005***
7.654
- .083
- 2.997
2.810***
.575
.505***
.001
.000***
.140
.048***
Age
- .001
.001
Gender (Female)
Race (Black)
Education
- .003
.141
- .003
.015
.035***
.006
.017
- .012
- .013
.011*
.016
.004***
.739
.327
-1.171
1.122
1.344
.416***
Political Sophistication
- .135
.036***
- .057
.026***
- 5.599
2.461**
F-test
R2
N
78.84***
.37
986
46.53***
.24
986
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01, one-tailed test
23.99***
.16
986
TABLE 6.5. OLS Models of Proportion Blame Attributed to the Actor Held Most Responsible
for Financial Crisis, October, 2010.
Independent Variables
Constant
Ideology (Liberal)
Estimate
Robust S.E.
.566
.038***
- .001
.006
Party ID (Democrat)
.016
.006***
Age
.001
.001
Gender (Female)
.010
.015
Race (Black)
.113
.028***
Education
.002
.005
Political Sophistication
F-test
- .200
.034***
17.71***
R2
.13
N
986
Data: Cooperation Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2010 (FSU Module).
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01, one-tailed test
Conclusions
• Citizens who are low in political sophistication tend to attribute
responsibility in relatively simple ways.
• Citizens who are high in political sophistication tend to attribute
political responsibility in functionally different and more
complex ways.
• The cognitive processes that we outline in our Theory of
Heterogeneous Attribution work well in explaining attributions
of blame for the financial crisis.