Transcript Research Methodologies 研究方法

What is Deliberative Polling®?
And Other Forms of Public Consultation
什么是协商民意调查
和其他民意调查方法
Key Components
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Scientific Random Sampling
Advisory Council
Pre and post deliberation questionnaires
Small group deliberation
Plenary session with experts and policy
makers
• Media coverage
What is Deliberative Polling®?
Deliberative Polling® Timeline
4
Forms of Public Consultation Used
Around the World
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Participatory Budgeting
Town Meetings/Public Hearings
Consensus Conference
Planning Cells
Citizen Jury®
Using Public Consultation and Deliberation
Methods
• Examples
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Public Agenda
Viewpoint Learning
Wisdom Council
Everyday Democracy
National Issues Forum
• Organizations in HK – Civic Exchange, Urban
Renewal Authority
• Websites – NCDD (thataway.org), Deliberative
Democracy Consortium (www.deliberativedemocracy.net), civicus.org
Participatory Budgeting
• In Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, France
(Saint-Denis), Spain (Barcelona), Canada
(Toronto, West Vancouver), Belgium
(Brussels)…
Participatory Budgeting
• Used to determine municipal investment
• Constitution was written to grant regions and
cities broad powers and authority over federal
budgets and includes explicit participatory
mechanisms
• In Brazil, started in 1989 in 13 municipalities,
most famous in Porto Alegre, Brazil
• Has been used in over 180 Brazilian
municipalities
Participatory Budgeting – The Process
• Three Main Participation Forums
– Municipal Administration
– Regional Assemblies
– The Communities
• Yearly cycle
– March/April – municipality prepares budget for the next year
and balance of the previous year is done
– Assemblies until July
– July – submissions of new plans to Participatory Budget Council
– September – Projects analyzed and voted on via a priority list
– December – Investment matrix
– March/April – Final approval and cycle continues
Scheduling Problems
• Cycle requires discussion of priority list from
May to August
• Municipal cycle requires accurate estimate of
revenues and expenses for next year’s budget
by August 15
– Thus, discussion occurs on list of projects without
knowing the exact resources available
In Porto Alegre
• City of Porto Alegre divded into 16 regions and 6 discussion topics:
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Transport and circulation
Health and social assistance
Education, sports, and leisure
Culture
Tourism and economic development
Urban and environment development
• And, 16 thematic priorities, including… (registered citizens vote for
4 priorities)
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Drinking water
Drainage
Pavements
Schools
Health
In Porto Alegre
• Different grades & criteria for investment
decisions
– i.e. poor districts, more drainage -> higher
multiplier (more points)
– Equitably distributed according to real needs
• Participation
– Broad participation of the poor and those living in
urban infrastructure
– Difficulty reaching extremely impoverished
groups, women, young people,
– Unrepresentative
In Porto Alegre - Participation
In Porto Alegre
• Survey on PB in Porto Alegre
– Representative Sample, 2006
• Close to 85% had heard of PB
• Knowledge of PB rules – less than 25% know most of
the rules
• Close to 60% never speak during PB meetings
• About 40% spend 4-8 hours on PB
In Porto Alegre
• Actual Projects in PB
– 2/3 of projects are small – under US$198,000
– High rate of project completion
• Critiques from the World Bank Report
– Participation/Quality – higher quality participation
among participants
– Operational Cycle
– Representativeness
– Technical Supervision – technical analyses of
projects, cost-benefit estimation
Town Meetings in the US
• Well-documented by Frank Bryan, Jane
Mansbridge
– Bryan – comprehensive study of New England
town meetings from 1968 to 1998
– He noted…
• People in the room have power – sometimes voting on
laws that don’t affect themselves; people not in the
room have no power
• People were often denied the right to speak, example
of the Governor being denied to speak
– Participation
Town Meetings in the US
• Jane Mansbridge – Beyond Adversary
Democracy
– Town Meeting in a small Vermont Town vs. a bigcity at a adolescent center
– Vermont Town tackled a zoning issue
• Town meetings –
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Tends towards concensus
Frequent unanimous votes
Resolution through secret ballot
Formal presentation/informal comments
Usually a few hours
Town Meetings – Extreme Voices
• Article by Morris Fiorina (1999) titled “A Dark
Side of Civic Engagement”
• Fiorina recounts a town where extreme voices
took over the public town meetings
– Hindered policy process
– Dominated by extreme voices, interest groups
– Concludes that “the relationship between political
engagement and social welfare may well be Ushaped” – where societies are at either extremes
with too little or too much
Planning Cells
• Conceived by Peter Dienel
– First in 1972, Schwelm (Germany)
– Implemented 170 times, 40 locations
• Spain, South Africa (People’s Planning Units), Sweden
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25 people, 2 moderators (1 man, 1 woman)
Delegated commissioning body
Discussing alternative solutions
4 days – 4 working units, in small groups of 5
With final recommendations and assessments presented
to a commissioning body as a Citizen’s Report
– Participants are compensated, monetarily
Citizen Jury®
• Originated by Ned Crosby at the Jefferson
Center
– Began in 1974
– Selected through quota sampling
– Usually 18-24 individuals
– 5 day period
– With “witness testimony”, court room-like process
where information reflects a spectrum of
viewpoints
– Participants called “jurors” put forth a
recommendation at the end of the process
Citizen Jury®
• 2002 project on Global Climate Change with EPA (US)
– Asked about potential impacts of global climate, likelihood
of effects on humans/national resources, and suggested
next steps in tackling climate change
• Participants’ reactions
– Pam Alton, a juror, said that she “…learned a great deal
this week and have seen how I can make changes in my
own life…regarding this issue.”
– Sandy Carter, a juror, said she “would strongly recommend
a Citizens Jury project on any topic that would greatly
impact our society when you would want to get a true
cross-representation of what the ‘common man’ thinks
once he is educated on a subject.”
Citizen Jury®
• 2005, Implementation of community engagement
methods in Western Australia
– Participants presented their findings at a conference to
governments ministers, researchers, etc
– Government ministers were impressed with the
recommendations
• Participants’ reactions
– One juror: “my knowledge and commitment to public
issues have increased dramatically and I shall take that
away with me and try to spread the word.”
– Another juror: “empowered with knowledge and assured
that we…can come together and make respectful decisions
regarding our community…”
DELIBERATION AND ITS CRITICS
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Criticisms of Deliberation
• Participation Inequality
• Social Influence
• Polarization
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Participation Inequality
• Deliberation requires certain skills
– People who have more education or experience
will participate more
– Not just talking in public, but presenting your
views
– People with less experience are at a disadvantage
• Because there is limited time, those who
participate more will influence discussions
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Social Influence
• Because of society, some people will have
more influence than others
– Men, Educated, Higher Income, Race
• So, even if everyone participates, some
people’s opinions may not be considered
• Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser, Jane
Mansbridge
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Polarization
• Groups who deliberate will become more
extreme
– Example: Pro-healthcare group, if they deliberate
with each other, will become even more prohealthcare and argue for more extreme policy
• Cass Sunstein
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Evidence from Critics
Jury and Mock Juries
• Hastie, Pernod and Pennington (1983)
• Men talk more than women
• More educated talk more than less educated,
increasing linearly
• Strodtbeck, James and Hawkins (1957)
• People from higher status occupations participate more
than people from lower status occupations
– Foreperson are usually male, white, educated
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Evidence from Critics
• Cass Sunstein – “The law of group
polarization”
– Social Comparison Theory (Festinger, 1954)
• people, by nature, need to evaluate their opinions and
behaviors and how we do so by comparing ourselves
with others
• Example: your favorite group does something you
disagree with – do you continue support or change
groups?
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Evidence from Critics
• when a group has differences in opinions, individuals
will want to move closer to the group’s opinions and at
the same time, individuals will want to persuade group
members to change their opinions
• Myers and Lamm (1975)
– “people desire to perceive and present
themselves favorably in relation to others”
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Evidence from Critics
– Persuasive Argument Theory (Vinokur and
Burnstein, 1974)
• sheer quantity of arguments can influence peoples’
opinions.
• majority numbers of arguments are on one side, then
the resulting opinions will likely be on the more
persuasive side or the side with the most number of
arguments.
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Evidence from Critics
• Schkade, Sunstein and Hastie (2006)
– Experiment in Colorado
– 10 small groups discussed three issues: global
warming, gay marriage, and affirmative action
– Result: 80 percent of the liberal groups and 93
percent of the conservative groups polarized
• Reasons for these results:
– Consensus, no information, time limitation, no
moderators
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Participation
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Methodology and Datasets
• Used discussion transcripts from five Deliberative Polls; 4
online and 1 face to face DP
– 2002 foreign policy
– 2004 primaries
– 2004 general election
– 2005 health and education
– 2003 national issues convention on foreign policy
– national, random, representative samples
• Face to Face vs. Online DPs
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Methodology
 Participation
 Individual-level Data
 amount of time
 amount of words
 number of statements made
 only for 2004 primaries and 2005 health and
education DP
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Participation
Total Time Used (in minutes)
by gender
Women
Poll 5
14.5
p = .298
Men
Poll 3
Women
Men
13.1
12.9
p = .916
12.7
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Participation
Total Words Used
by gender
Women
Poll 5
1933
p = .407
Men
1788
Women
Poll 3
1516
p = .987
Men
1511
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Participation
Poll 5
Total Statements Made
by gender
Women
p = .227
Men
Poll 3
13
12
Women
19
p = .954
Men
19
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Participation
• Education Level – College degree or beyond
– Higher educated contributed more
• 3 of 3 categories in Poll 3
• 0 of 3 categories in Poll 5
• Income Level – $60,000/year or more
– Higher income contributed more
• 2 of 3 categories in Poll 3
• variable not available in Poll 5
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Participation
 Race – White vs. Non-White
 Whites contributed more
 1 of 3 categories in Poll 3
 0 of 3 in Poll 5
 Age – 50 years or more
 Older participants contributed more
 0 of 3 categories in Poll 3
 2 of 3 categories in Poll 5
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Participation
2004 Primaries – Participation as a
function of Demographics and Knowledge
Total Minutes
Total Words
Total Statements
B
(SE)
B
(SE)
B
(SE)
20.539⁺ (12.263)
Constant
5.189 (9.904)
1584.17 (1261.608)
Male
-.747 (1.940)
-118.215 (247.099)
-.567 (2.402)
4.331 ⁺ (2.258)
Higher Educated
426.490 (287.718)
2.403 (2.797)
Higher Income
1.436 (2.048)
336.929 (260.911)
1.147 (2.536)
5.994 ⁺ (3.255)
White
.437 (2.628)
56.019 (334.815)
Democrat
1.632 (2.076)
133.248 (264.508)
2.913 (2.571)
Republican
-1.571 (1.972)
-173.924 (251.235)
-1.148 (2.442)
Ln(age)
.220 (2.694)
-253.203 (343.191)
-3.863 (3.336)
T1 Knowledge 13.592 ** (4.092) 1835.891 ** (521.270) 18.922 ** (5.067)
Adjusted R2
.084
.107
.075
F
3.58**
3.49**
3.26**
N
225
225
225
**p<.01, *p<.05; ⁺p<.10; p-values are two-tailed
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Participation
2005 Health & Education – Participation as
a function of Demographics and
Knowledge
Constant
Male
Higher Educated
White
Democrat
Republican
Ln(age)
T1 Knowledge
Adjusted R2
F
N
Total Minutes
Total Words
B
(SE)
B
(SE)
-3.294 (8.869)
883. 760 (1202.918)
-.338 (1.302)
-30.404 (176.626)
1.712 (1.307)
267.951 (177.270)
-7.201 ** (2.032) -878.524 ** (275.611)
.771 (1.543)
-11.670 (209.410)
-.910 (1.743)
-179.651 (236.466)
5.709 ** (2.181)
439.807 (295.750)
.568 (3.349)
-164.193 (454.208)
.045
.024
3.36**
2.25*
351
351
**p<.01, *p<.05; ⁺p<.10; p-values are two-tailed
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Total Statements
B
(SE)
-8.143 (7.168)
-.647 (1.053)
-.081 (1.057)
-4.538 ** (1.643)
.710 (1.248)
-.713 (1.409)
6.263 ** (1.763)
-8.504 (7.169)
.044
3.30**
351
Social Influence
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Social Influence
Example
Movement toward
T1 Male coded as “1”
0
T1 Higher
Educated
T1
T2
Movement away from
T1 Higher Educated
coded as “0”
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
T1
Male
1
Influence of Higher Status Participants
Poll
No. of
Small
Groups
Proportion
of small
groups
moving
towards:
T1 Male
Proportion of
small groups
moving
towards: T1
Higher
Educated
Proportion
of small
groups
moving
towards:
T1 Higher
Income
Proportion
of small
groups
moving
towards:
T1 White
2002
2003
2004p
2004ge
2005
15
24
16
15
30
0.517
0.521
0.438
0.558
0.542
0.714
0.583
0.448
0.467
0.499
0.617
0.520
0.479
0.489
-
0.450
0.438
0.563
0.500
0.467
Average
20
0.515
0.542
0.526
0.484
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Social Influence– Across
15 Deliberative Polls
Proportion of small
groups moving
towards: T1 Male
Proportion of small
groups moving
towards: T1 Higher
Educated
Proportion of small
groups moving
towards: T1 Higher
Income
Proportion of small
groups moving
towards: T1 White
Australia
0.4
1
0.6
-
British Crime
0.4
0.6
-
0.2
British Europe
0.75
0.5
-
0.25
British General
Election
0.5
1
0.75
0.25
British Health
0.538
0.538
0.462
0.615
British Monarchy
0.25
0.5
-
0
Bulgaria I
0.692
0.692
0.692
0.385
China
0.4
0.5
-
-
Greece
0.167
0.333
0.167
-
New Haven
0.333
1
0.667
0.333
NIC I
0.286
0.571
0.429
0.571
NIC II
0.667
0.556
0.667
0.667
Utilities, Cpl
0.375
0.5
0.25
0.375
Utilities, Swepco
0.25
0.375
0.75
0.625
Utilities, Wtu
0.375
0.375
0.5
0.5
0.426
0.603
0.539
0.398
Dataset
Source: Robert C.
Luskin, James S.
Fishkin, Kyu Hahn,
and Alice Siu,
"Downsides of
Deliberation? Pol
arization,
Consensus, and
Social Influence in
Small Group
Discussion."
Center for
Deliberative
Democracy,
Stanford
University
http://cdd.stanford
.edu
Average
Summary: Participation, Social
Influence and Deliberation
• There is not one demographic variable that
consistently dominated deliberations in both
DPs
• Higher status participants did not dominate
deliberations
• Higher status participants were not more
influential
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Polarization
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Group Polarization
Example
Toward midpoint
coded as “1”
Toward midpoint
coded as “1”
0
.5
More Extreme
coded as “0”
1
More Extreme
coded as “0”
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Group Polarization
Poll
No. of
Small
Groups
15
24
16
15
30
Proportion of small
group means
moving away from
midpoint
0.481
0.713
0.734
0.389
0.425
Proportion of
small groups
with decreasing
variance
0.556
0.694
0.531
0.611
0.549
1
2
3
4
5
Average
20
0.548
0.588
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University
Polarization –
Across 15 Deliberative Polls
No. of
Small
Groups
No. of
Indices
Proportion of
small group
means moving
away from
midpoint
Australia
24
5
0.525
0.617
British Crime
20
5
0.460
0.530
British Europe
16
4
0.563
0.328
British General Election
15
4
0.383
0.650
British Health
15
13
0.518
0.564
British Monarchy
15
4
0.567
0.567
Bulgaria I
17
13
0.394
0.511
China
16
10
0.475
0.706
Greece
15
6
0.333
0.233
New Haven
16
3
0.479
0.542
NIC I
26
7
0.582
0.637
NIC II
24
9
0.713
0.694
Utilities: Cpl
16
8
0.594
0.625
Utilities: Swepco
14
8
0.518
0.598
Utilities: Wtu
14
8
0.429
0.634
17.5
7.1
0.502
0.562
Poll
Source:
Robert C. Luskin, James S.
Fishkin, Kyu Hahn, and Alice Siu,
"Downsides of
Deliberation? Polarization,
Consensus, and Social Influence
in Small Group Discussion."
Center for Deliberative
Democracy, Stanford University
http://cdd.stanford.edu
Average
Proportion with
decreasing
variance
Summary
• Analyzed empirical evidence of what actually
happens inside deliberation
• Evidence is contrary to arguments of
deliberative critics
– Higher status individuals do not consistently
dominate or influence fellow group members
– Polarization is not consistently present
Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Stanford University