Transcript H matrix - EURECOM

RAdio resource Management and Optimization
134 Sinchon-Dong, Seodaemun-Gu, Seoul, 120-749, Korea
Phone : +82-2-2123-7774
E-mail : [email protected]
Homepage : http://ramo.yonsei.ac.kr
School of EEE, Yonsei University
ACM Sigmetrics
W-PIN, London
Guaranteeing User Welfare in Network Service:
Comparison of Two Subsidy Schemes
Seung Min Yu and Seong-Lyun Kim
RAdio resource Management and Optimization Laboratory (RAMO)
School of EEE, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea
{smyu, slkim}@ramo.yonsei.ac.kr
Contents
•
Background (Motivation of the Study)
– User Welfare
– Two Subsidy Schemes
•
System Model
– User Demand, QoS, Service Price, and NSP’s Profit Maximization
•
Comparison
– Conventional, Price- and QoS Subsidy Schemes
•
Discussion
– A Hybrid Subsidy…
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Motivation
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User Welfare
“Some users cannot consume data because they are
economically unstable, or live in rural area”
Decrease of User Welfare?
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Players in Network Service
Regulator
Regulation
NSPs
Bertrand
Competition
(Price)
Cournot
Competition
(Capacity)
Networks
Demand
Users
QoS
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Two Subsidy Schemes
•
Price Subsidy Scheme
– The regulator gives an equal price subsidy to each user that accesses
network service.
– Source of the price subsidy is from the spectrum sales revenue.
•
QoS Subsidy Scheme
– The regulator gives all of the available spectrum amount to network service
provider (NSP) for free in return for providing a predefined QoS level to
users without any charge.
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System Model
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User Behavior
•
We consider three schemes.
– Price subsidy scheme
– QoS subsidy scheme
– Conventional scheme (no subsidy)
•
Each user decides whether to access the network or not
considering the service price and QoS.
•
Each user has own QoS requirement and willingness to pay for it
(User Type).
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Mathematical Notations
M : total number of users
k : NSP's spectrum usage amount
p : NSP's service price, p   0,1
q : NSP's QoS level, q   0,1
d : ratio of accessing users (if all users access the network, then d  1)
 : user type,    0,1
 : cost of the unit spectrum amount
p : price subsidy amount
q : QoS subsidy amount
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User Type and QoS Modeling (J. Walrand)
•
Price ≤ User Type ≤ QoS
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User Demand
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User Type, Demand, Service Price and QoS
•
Price and QoS conditions
<Conventional Scheme>
0
 cmin  pc
 cmax  qc
1
<Price Subsidy Scheme>
0
 pmin  p p  p
pp
 pmax  q p
1
 qmax  qq
1
<QoS Subsidy Scheme>
0
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q
 qmin  pq  q
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NSP’s Profit Maximization Problem
<Conventional Scheme>


kc
 c  pc d c M   c kc
d

1

p


 c
c 
k

1
c


max
pc , kc
kc  k
s.t.
max
p p ,k p
s.t.
<Price Subsidy Scheme>

kp
 p  ppd pM   pk p
1 p  pp
 d p 
k

1
p


kp  k
max
pq , kq
s.t.
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
 

<QoS Subsidy Scheme>


kq
 q  pq d q M
1  pq 
 d q 

k

1
q


q
1
q
k  kq

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
RAdio resource Management and Optimization
Comparison
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Optimal Solution
•
Conventional Scheme
•
Price Subsidy Scheme
•
QoS Subsidy Scheme
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Conventional- vs. Price Subsidy Scheme (1/3)
•
Maximal Spectrum Usage
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Conventional- vs. Price Subsidy Scheme (2/3)
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Conventional- vs. Price Subsidy Scheme (3/3)
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Price- vs. QoS Subsidy Scheme
k 
(b)5
k 
(a)2
3
3
User Welfare Gain (Uq/Up)
User Welfare Gain (Uq/Up)
NSP Profit Gain (Nq/Np)
2.5
NSP Profit Gain (Nq/Np)
2.5
Social Welfare Gain ((Uq+Nq)/(Up+Np))
Social Welfare Gain ((Uq+Nq)/(Up+Np))
2
Gain
Gain
2
1.5
1
1
0.5
0.5
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
QoS Subsidy Level
•
1.5
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
QoS Subsidy Level
If the regulator has sufficient spectrum for the network service, then the QoS subsidy
scheme will be a good choice for all players in the network service market.
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Discussion
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Summary
•
•
•
•
We introduced price and QoS subsidy schemes, and analyze the effect of
each scheme.
If the regulator has sufficient spectrum for the network service, then the
QoS subsidy scheme will be a good choice for all players in the network
service market.
On the other hand, if the regulator does not have sufficient spectrum, the
price subsidy scheme can be better for user welfare.
For taking advantage of both price and QoS subsidy schemes, we can
suggest a hybrid subsidy scheme.
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A Hybrid Subsidy Scheme
•
•
The regulator sells all of the available spectrum amount with a discounted
price (not free) and requires NSP to provide a predefined QoS level for free.
At the same time, the regulator gives a price subsidy to users from the
spectrum sales revenue.
(a)
3
User Welfare Gain (Uq/Up)
NSP Profit Gain (Nq/Np)
2.5
Social Welfare Gain ((Uq+Nq)/(Up+Np))
Gain
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
QoS Subsidy Level
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Q&A
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References
1.
Cisco, “Cisco visual networking index: Global mobile data traffic forecast update, 2010-2015,”
Cisco white paper, 2011.
2. S. M. Yu and S.-L. Kim, “Price war in wireless access networks: A regulation for convergence,”
Proceedings of IEEE GLOBECOM, 2011.
3. S. M. Yu and S.-L. Kim, “Two-Stage Competition, Pricing and Regulation in Communication
Networks,” submitted for publication.
4. R. N. Clarke, “Costs of neutral/unmanaged IP networks,” Review of Network Economics, vol. 8, no.
1, pp. 5, 2009.
5. European Commission, Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7
March 2002 on universal service and users rights relating to electronic communications networks
and services.
6. C. Bazelon, “Licensed or unlicensed: The economic considerations in incremental spectrum
allocations,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 110-116, 2009.
7. T. Nguyen, H. Zhou, R. Berry, M. Honig and R. Vohra, “The impact of additional unlicensed
spectrum on wireless services competition,” Proceedings of IEEE DySPAN, 2011.
8. A. Odlyzko, “Paris metro pricing for the Internet,” Proceedings of the ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, pp. 140-147, 1999.
9. J. Walrand, Economic Models of Communication Networks. New York: Springer, Ch. 3, pp. 57-87,
2008.
10. N. Shetty, G. Schwartz, and J. Walrand, “Internet QoS and regulations,” IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Networking, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 1725-1737, 2010.
11. R. Gibbens, R. Mason, and R. Steinberg, “Internet service classes under competition,” IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 18, no. 12, pp. 2490-2498, 2000.
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