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MVE 6030
The Good Society and its Learnt Members
Topic 5
The Ideal Membership of the Good Society:
Citizenship and Nationality
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3
Liberalism
Distributive
Justice
Relational
Justice
Communitarianism
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Rawls’ Distributive
Justice of Primary Goods
Young’s Relational
Justice & Politics
of Differences
Rworkin’s distributive
Justice of Resources
Distributive Justice
Distributive
as Material
Justice
Preconditions
Sen’s Distributive
Justice of capabilities
Fraser’s Parity
of Participation
Relational Justice
Relational
as Cultural
Justice
Preconditions
Fraser’s Relational
Justice & Politics
of Recognition
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Liberalism
Impartial & Impersonal
Rules of Morality
Morally Dangerous for
Egoism & Emotionism
Moral
Dialectics
Moral Goods
Incarnated in
Communal Lives
Adhere to
Communal Practices
Neutral to
Rival Beliefs &
Ways of Life
Neutral to
Rival Interests
Morally Dangerous for
Collective Totalitarianism
Moral Agencies
Reinforced among
Fellow Agents
Adhere to
Communal Narrative
Communitarianism
Adhere to
Communal Traditiion
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Liberalism
Citizenship
Rights
Virtues
Obligations
Patriotism
Identity
Ethical
Responsibilities
Political SelfDetermination
Nationality
Communitarianism
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MVE 6030
The Good Society and its Learnt Members
(I)
Citizenship:
Membership in Modern Political Communities (i)
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Citizenship
It refers to the ideal-typical membership
endowed with subjects of a sovereign modern
state.
The conceptions of the modern state:
Max Weber’s conception: “A state is a human community that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is
one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically… the right
to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or
individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The
state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use
violence.” (Weber, 1946, p.78)
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Citizenship
The conceptions of the modern state:
Charles Tilly’s conception: “An organization which control
the population occupying a definite territory is a state insofar
as (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in
the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized;
and (4) its division are formally coordinated with one
another.” (Tilly, 1975, p.70)
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Citizenship
The conceptions of the modern state:
Accordingly, the modern state can be defined as a set of
power apparatuses, which can constitute effective rules
internally and externally over a definitive territory and the
residents within it. Hence, the modern state consists of the
following constituent features
•
•
•
•
the definitive territory
the definitive subjects
monopoly of use of physical force, i.e. sovereign power
the establishment of external and internal public authority
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Citizenship
The conception of citizenship:
Reinhard Bendix defines citizenship as individualistic
and plebiscitarian membership before the sovereign
and nation-wide public authority
Its development signifies “the codification of the
rights and duties of all adults who are classified as
citizens”. (Bendix, 1964, p.9)
Accordingly, citizenship can be defined as
institutionalized relationships between the state and
its legitimate subjects, i.e. citizens. These
relationships consist of citizens’ definitive rights and
obligations towards the modern state.
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Ronald Dworkin’s Liberal Conception of
Citizenship Rights
 Rights as trumps: Dworkin suggests, “Rights are
best understood as trumps over some background
justification for political decision that states a goal
for the community as a whole.” (Dworkin, 1984,
P.153) More recently he underlines, “Political rights
are trumps over otherwise adequate justifications
for political decision.” (Dworkin, 2011, P. 329)
Accordingly, in conceptualizing the idea of political
rights of citizens, we are to enquire the question:
“What kind of rights do we each as individuals have
against our state―against ourselves collectively?”
(Dworkin, 2011, P. 328)
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Ronald Dworkin’s Liberal Conception of
Citizenship Rights
Two basic principles of legitimacy: Dworkin
suggests that a state and its government can
impose a collective and coercive decision upon its
citizens unless it subscribes to two reigning
principles. He states, “No government is legitimate
unless it subscribes two reigning principle
principles. First, it must show equal concern for the
fate of every person over whom it claims dominion.
Second, it must respect fully the responsibility and
right of each person to decision for himself how to
make something valuable of his life.” (Dworkin,
2011, P. 2)
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Ronald Dworkin’s Liberal Conception of
Citizenship Rights
 In accordance to these two principles of equal
concerns and respects, Dworkin underlines that
“governments have a sovereign responsibility to
treat each person in their power with equal concerns
and respect.” (Dworkin, 2011, P. 321) In light of
Dworkin’s conceptions of political rights as trumps
of citizens over the sovereignty of the state, the
development citizenship rights can be approached
in the following two perspectives, namely historicalsociological perspective of T.H. Marshall and Wesley
Hohfeld’s jurisprudential (legal-philosophical)
perspective.
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T.H. Marshall’s Thesis of Development of
Citizenship Rights
 Contradictory trajectory of development of
capitalism and citizenship
 Capitalism is an institution based upon the principle
of inequality, which is in turn built on uneven
distribution of property and/or property right
 Citizenship is an institution based upon the principle
of equality, which is built on equal citizen status and
its derivative rights
 Development of citizenship is construed by
Marshall as means of abating social class
conflict
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T.H. Marshall’s Thesis of Development of
Citizenship Rights
 The Historical Trajectory of Development of
Citizenship Rights
 Development of civil rights in the 18th century and
the constitution of the Court of Justice and the Rule
of Law
 Development of the political rights in the 19th century
and the constitution of the parliamentary system and
the democratic state
 Development of the social rights in the 20th century
and the constitution of the social service departments
and the welfare state
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Wesley Hohfeld’s Conception of Rights





Rights as Liberties
Rights as Claims
Rights as Powers
Rights as Immunities
Thomas Janoski’s Classification of Citizenship
Rights with Hodfeld’s Conception
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The Theory of Citizenship Obligations
 Conception of citizenship obligations: The
concept of citizenship obligation can be
discerned as the rights of the state in forms of
claims or powers to its citizenship. “Citizenship
obligations may range from the sometimes
vague but other times enforceable requirement
to respect another person’s opinion and
position in life (i.e. general tolerance) to stateenforced civil obligations including conscription
and taxation under the penalty of
imprisonments.” (Janoski, 1998, p. 54)
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The Theory of Citizenship Obligations
 Typology of citizenship obligations
 “Supportive obligations consist of paying taxes,
contributing to insurance-based funds, and working
productively.”
 “Caring obligations to others and to oneself require a
person to respect others’ right, care for children and
a loving family, and respect oneself by pursuing an
education, a career, and adequate medical care.”
 “Service obligations include efficiently using service,
and actually contributing services - be it voter
registration, health care for the elderly, ‘pro bono’
work in public defense for lawyers, volunteer fire
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fighting, on youth service.”
The Theory of Citizenship Obligations
 Typology of citizenship obligations: …
 “Protection obligations involve military service,
police protection, and conscription to protect the
nation by bearing arms or caring for the wounded,
and social action to internally protect the integrity of
a democratic system through social service, protests,
or demonstrations.”
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The Theory of Citizenship Obligations
Approaches to the justification of citizenship
obligations
 The contractual and instrumental approach:
Obligations are conceived as returns to recipience
and acceptance of rights
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The Theory of Citizenship Obligations
Approaches to the justification …
 The community-based and legitimacy approach: This
approach avoids the narrowly instrumental approach to
citizenship obligation and asserts that “some obligations
do not entail rights” and discerns obligations with the
concept of “general exchange, which underlines “people
helping people who help other people.” (p. 61) The
approach claims that most citizens do not calculate a
right-obligation exchange on daily bases but tend to
adopt a ‘generalized exchange’ stance, in which “people
do not expect immediate and reciprocal returns form the
people they help, but they do expect to see their returns
materialize over time in building a decent life in a more or
less just society.” (p. 61)
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The Theory of Citizenship Obligations
Approaches to the justification …
Limiting obligation approach: This approach sees
citizenship obligations claimed or enforced by the state
upon its citizens may in conflict individual citizens’ rights.
For example individual citizens’ rights to smoke in public
venues are in conflict with the rights of the public to be
free from environments hazardous to health. Hence, this
approach asserts that in order to safeguard the violation of
individual citizens’ rights, the state could demand its
citizens to oblige only under four conditions: (p. 64)
there is a clear danger,
no reasonable exist,
the decisions in favor of society are least intrusive, and
effectors are made to minimize damage or treat the effects of28
constraining a right.
The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Criticism of “vote-centric” democracy:
The intrinsic dilemma of liberal democracy: C.B.
Macpherson underlines at the opening page of his oft-cited
work The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, “If liberal
democracy is taken to mean …a society striving to ensure
that all its members are equally free to realize their
capacities. … ‘Liberal’ can mean freedom of the stronger to
do down the weaker by following market rules; or it can
mean equal effective freedom of all to use and develop
their capacities. The later freedom is inconsistent with the
former. …The difficulty is that liberal democracy during
most of its life so far …has tried to combine the two
meanings.” (Macpherson, 1977, P. 1)
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Criticism of “vote-centric” democracy: …
The degradation of citizenship: The development of liberal
democracies in capitalist societies, especially those in
Europe and North America, in the twentieth century
witnessed the degradation of the ideal-typical conception
of democratic citizen, who is supposed to be rational,
reasonable, responsible, and active participants in political
decision-making processes in particular and public affairs
in general. With the rise of welfare state and politics of
seduction, citizens have been indulged and relegated to
become clients of the welfare states, consumers of welfare
service, desire-seeking free-riders in politics of seduction,
and spectators of politics of scandal in mass media.
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Criticism of “vote-centric” democracy:
The constitution of the “vote-centric” democracy: “In much
of the post-war period, democracy was understood almost
exclusively in terms of voting. Citizens were assumed to
have set of preferences, fixed prior to and independent of
the political process, and the function of voting was simply
to provide a fair decision-making procedure or aggregation
mechanism for translating these pre-existing preferences
into public decisions, either about who to elect or about
what law to adopt. But it is increasingly accepted that this
‘aggregative’ or ‘vote-centric’ conception of democracy
cannot fulfill norms of democratic legitimacy.” (Kymlicka,
2002, P.290)
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Theorizing deliberative democracy or “talkcentric” democracy
To overcome the shortcomings of “vote-centric”
democracy, numbers of social scientists and political
philosophers have advocated alternative models of
democracy to rectify if not replace the prevailing
“vote-centric” democracy. One of these is the
deliberative democracy, which aims to bring genuine
and engaging talks and deliberations among
reasonable citizens back into the decision-making
processes in democracy.
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Theorizing deliberative democracy or “talkcentric” democracy
What is deliberative democracy?
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson define
“deliberative democracy as a form of government in
which free and equal citizens (and their
representatives), justify decisions in a process in
which give one another reasons that are mutually
acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of
researching conclusions that are binding in the
present on all citizens but open to challenge in the
future.” (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, P. 7)
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
From this definition, Gutmann and Thompson
underline four essential characteristic of
deliberative democracy. These are
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Reason-giving: “Most fundamentally, deliberative
democracy affirms the need to justify decisions made by
citizens and their representatives. Both are expected to
justify the laws they would impose on one another. In a
democracy, leaders should therefore give reasons for their
decisions, and respond to reasons that citizens give in
return.” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, P. 3) Furthermore,
reasons put forth and accepted in the decision-making
process of the deliberative democracy are not confined to
“procedural” reasons and justifications but also include
“substantive” reasons and justification. In this reason-giving
and reason-justifying process, it is expected that
understanding, reciprocity, and cooperation can be faired
among most if not all parties concerns.
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Accessible: “A second characteristic of deliberative
democracy is that the reasons given in this process should
be accessible to all the citizens to whom they are
addressed.” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 4) In order to
input reasons and justifications into the democratic
deliberation and make them accessible to all citizens, these
reasons must be presented in comprehensible forms and
the deliberations must take place in public.
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Binding: “The third characteristic of deliberative democracy
is that its process aims at producing a decision that is
binding for some period of time.” (Gutmann & Thompson,
2004, P. 5) Talks taken place in deliberative democracy are
essentially different from conventional political debates and
arguments, in which engaging parties are simply try to
impose their preferences and reasons on their opponents in
a winner-take-all manner. The primary aim of talks in the
deliberative democracy is consensus building and
reciprocity constituting so that conclusion can be
researched and decision can be made that will have binding
effects on all citizens.
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Dynamic: The fourth characteristic of deliberative
democracy is that the process of deliberation itself should
be dynamic and continuous. “Although deliberation aims at
a justifiable decision, it does not presuppose that the
decision at hand will in fact be justified, let alone that a
justification today will suffice for the indefinite future. It
keeps open the possibility of a continuing dialogue.”
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, P. 6)
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Conception of the virtues of citizens
Reconceptualization of citizenship: In view of the
shortcomings of the vote-centric democracy and
politics of seduction, scholars begin to extend the
discourse on citizenship beyond the right-based and
obligation-based conceptions. They begin to enquire
the necessary skills, performances and dispositions
required of citizens in democratic processes.
Numbers of scholars have characterized this
dimension of democratic citizenship as virtue of
citizen or simply civic virtue.
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Conception of the virtues of citizens
William A. Galston underlines that one of the
structural tension in liberal democracy is “the tension
between virtue and self-interest.” (1991, P. 217) More
specifically, it is the tension between two dimension
of citizenship in liberalism. One the one hand is the
“interest-based” citizenship rights and on the other
the virtues required of democratic citizens. Galston
has characterized four types of civic virtues which he
thinks are instrumental the function of liberal
democracy. They are (Galston, 1991, Pp. 221-7)
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Conception of the virtues of citizens
 General virtues: They include courage, i.e. “the willingness to
fight and even die on behalf of one’s country” (P. 221); lawabidingness; and loyalty, i.e. “the developed capacity to
understand, to accept, and to act on the core principles of
one’s society” (P. 221).
 Virtues of liberal society: They include virtue of independence,
i.e. “the disposition to care for, and take responsibility for,
oneself and to avoid becoming needlessly dependent on
others” (P. 222); and the virtue of tolerance, i.e. “the relativistic
belief that every personal choice, every ‘life plan’, is equally
good, hence beyond rational scrutiny and criticism.” (P. 222)
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Conception of the virtues of citizens
 Virtues of liberal economy: They include entrepreneurial
virtues, i.e. enterprising dispositions such as “imagination,
initiative, drive, determination” (P. 223); and organizational
virtues of employee, i.e. traits such as “punctuality, reliability,
civility toward co-workers, and a willingness to work within
established frameworks and tasks.” (P. 223)
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The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
Conception of the virtues of citizens
 Virtues of liberal politics: They include basically the
disposition and capacity of reasonableness and tolerance. The
former include willingness and capacity to engage in public
discourse with communicative rationality and ethics as
Habermas has underlined (See Lecture Note on Lecture 4 and
5, E.5.c). The latter include the willingness and capacity to
respect viewpoints which are in opposition to one’s own; and
readiness and capacity to “narrow the gap” among
disagreements and antagonism or even the ability to arrive at
a consensual resolution. (see also Benjamin Barber, 1999)
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The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
Civil disobedience has been one of the important
topics within the discourse of citizenship
because it overlaps all three dimensions of
citizenship, namely
Civil disobedience as citizen right: It is argued that
citizens has the liberty not to comply to policy that
they consider to be wrong, unwise or damaging; to
law that they think to be unjust; and even law and
policy that are in opposition to one’s conscience.
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The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
Civil disobedience …
Civil disobedience as citizen obligation: The argument
can elevate to the level that it is not one’s liberty or
discretion to opt for noncompliance but one’s
obligation that one, as citizens of a democratic state
or even as a conscientious agent, has to act against a
policy or legislation that is wrong, unjust, unethical or
inhumane.
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The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
Civil disobedience …
Civil disobedience as citizen virtue: The argument can
also be formulated by juxtapose disobedience and
civility within the concept of citizen virtue. For
example, one may ask: Is non-cooperation, noncompliance, or overt defiance of a government policy
or law an act of virtue or vice of a citizen? How is
civility as one of the citizen virtue be reconcile with
act of breaking the law within the conception civil
obedience?
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The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
1. Conceptions of civil disobedience:
a. John Rawls’s conception: “I shall begin by defining
civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent,
conscientious yet political act contrary to law done
with the aim of bringing about change in the law or
policies of the government. By acting in this way one
addresses the sense of justice of the majority of the
community and declares that, in one’s considered
opinion the principles of social cooperation among
free and equal men are not being respect. …It allows
for what some have called indirect as well as direct
civil disobedience.” (Ralws, 1971, P. 365-366)
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The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
1. Conceptions of civil disobedience:
b. Jurgen Habermas’s conception: In an interview
made in 1986, Habermas said, “There are three
things to be said about that (referring to civil
disobedience). First: civil disobedience cannot be
ground in an arbitrary private Weltanschauung
(world view). But only in principles, which are
anchored in the constitution itself.
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
1. Conceptions of civil disobedience:
b. Jurgen Habermas’s conception: In an interview
made in 1986, Habermas said, “…..
Second: civil disobedience is distinguished from
revolutionary praxis, or from a revolt, precisely by the
fact that it explicitly renounces violence. The
exclusively symbolic breaking of rules ― which
furthermore is only a last resort, when all other
possibilities have been exhausted ― is only
particularly urgent appeal to the capacity and
willingness for insight of the majority.
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
1. Conceptions of civil disobedience:
b. Jurgen Habermas’s conception: In an interview
made in 1986, Habermas said, “…..
Third: a position, such as that defended by Hobbes,
Carl Schmitt, or …. In which the upholding of the law
is made only the highest, but the exclusive ground of
legitimation of a legal system, seems to me to be
extremely problematic, After all, one would very
much like to know under what conditions, and for
what purpose, the legal peace should be upheld.”
(Habermas, 1986, P. 225)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
1. Conceptions of civil disobedience:
c. Ronald Dworkin’s conception: “Civil disobedience…is
very different from ordinary criminal activity motivated by
selfishness or anger or cruelty or madness. It is also
different…from the civil war that break out within a
territory when one group challenges the legitimacy of the
government or the dimensions of the political
community. Civil disobedience involves those who do
not challenge authority in so fundamental a way. They do
not think of themselves…as seeking any basic rupture or
constitutional reorganization. They accept the
fundamental legitimacy of both government and
community; they act to acquit rather than to challenge
their duty as citizens.: (Dworkin, 1985, P105)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
1.
Conceptions of civil disobedience:
d. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato’s conception: “Civil
disobedience involves illegal acts, usually on the part of
collective actors, that are public, principle, and symbolic
in character, involve primarily nonviolent means of
protest, and appeal to the capacity for reason and the
sense of justice of the populace. The aim of civil
disobedience is to persuade public opinion in civil and
political society…that a particular law or policy is
illegitimate and a change is warranted. Collective actors
involved in civil disobedience invoke the utopian
principles of constitutional democracies appealing to the
ideas of fundamental rights or democratic legitimacy.”
(Cohen & Arato, 1992; quoted in Habermas, 1996, P. 383)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
2. Justificatory grounds for Civil Disobedience
a. The institutional assumption of civil disobedience: As the
preceding definitions suggest, advocates and organizers
of civil disobedience start off their campaign under the
working assumption that they are living “within a more or
less just democratic state” and that they “recognize and
accept the legitimacy of the constitution” (Rawls, 1971, P.
362) And their focal point of defiance is only on particular
law or policy, which they find so unacceptable or even
wrong that they have to defy it directly or indirectly. As a
result, the organizers and participants of a civil
disobedience campaign owe the law-abiding majority of
the community a burden of proof of their act of
disobedience.
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
2. Justificatory grounds for Civil Disobedience
b. Ronald Dworkin, a prominent scholar of jurisprudence in
the US, has induced three basic justificatory grounds for
civil disobedience.
 “Conscience or integrity-based” civil disobedience: He
points to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in the US. He
indicates, “Someone who believes it would be deeply
wrong to deny help to an escaped slave who knocks at his
door, and even worse to turn him over to the authority,
think the Fugitive Slave Act requires him to behave in an
immoral way. His personal integrity, his conscience, forbids
him to obey.” (Dworkin, 1985, P. 107)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
2. Justificatory grounds for Civil Disobedience
b. Dworkin, …justificatory grounds for civil disobedience….
 “Justice-based” civil disobedience: Dworkin points to the civil
rights movement and the anti-Vietnam-war movement in the
US during the 1960s in the US. He suggests that those
participating in these civil disobedient movements aim “to
oppose and reverse a program they believe unjust, a program
of oppression by the majority of a minority. Those in the civil
rights movement who broke the law and many civilians who
broke it protesting the war in Vietnam thought the majority
was pursuing its own interests and goals unjustly because in
disregard of the rights of others, the rights of the domestic
minority in the case of civil rights movement and of another
nation in the case of the war. This is “just-based” civil
disobedience. (Dworkin, 1985, P. 107)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
2. Justificatory grounds for Civil Disobedience
b. Dworkin, …justificatory grounds for civil disobedience….

“Policy-based” civil disobedience: Dworkin points to the movement
of occupying US military bases in West Germany during the Euromissile deployment debate in the 1980s. He suggests that “people
sometimes break the law not because they believe the program they
oppose is immoral or unjust…but because they believe it very
unwise, stupid, and dangerous for the majority as well as the
minority. The recent protest against the deployment of American
missiles in Europe, so far as they violate local law, were for the most
part occasions of this third kind of civil disobedience , which I shall
call ‘policy-based’. If we tried to reconstruct the beliefs and attitudes
of …the people who occupied the military bases in Germany, we
would find that…they thought that majority had made a tragically
wrong choice from the common standpoint. …They aim, not to force
the majority to keep faith with principle of justice, but simply to come
to its sense.” (Dworkin, 1985, P. 107)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
3. The function of civil disobedience in democratic and
rule-of-law state: Taking together John Rawls’, Jurgen
Habermas’ and Ronald Dworkin’s formulations, they
consensually point to the positive contribution of civil
obedience to the formation of the political culture of the
democratic and rule-of-law state (Rechtsstaat in
Germen)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
3. The function of civil disobedience ….
a.
John Rawls underlines, “Indeed, civil disobedience ( and
conscientious refusal as well) is one of the stabilizing devices
of a constitutional system, although by definition an illegal
one. Along with such things as free and regular elections and
an independent judiciary empowered to interpret the
constitution (not necessary written), civil disobedience used
with due restraint and sound judgment helps to maintain and
strengthen just institutions. By resisting injustice within the
limits of fidelity to law, it serves to inhibit departures from
justice and to correct them when they occur. A general
disposition to engage in justified civil disobedience introduces
stability into a well-ordered society, or one that is nearly just.”
(Rawls, 1971, P. 383)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
3. The function of civil disobedience ….
b. Jurgen Habermas characterized the civil disobedience (in the form
of occupying the US military bases in Germany) against the Euromissile deployment in Germany in early 1980 in the following
ways:
“The present movement gives us the first chance, even in
Germany, to grasp civil disobedience as an element of a ripe
political culture.” (Habermas, 1983; quoted in Specter, 2010, P.
156; my emphasis)
“The practice gives the German public, for the first time, the
chance to liberate itself from a paralyzing trauma and to look
without fear on the previous taboo question of the formation of a
radical democratic consciousness. The danger is that this chance
― which other countries with a longer democratic tradition
…have integrated productively ― will be passed up.” (Habermas,
1985; quoted in Specter, 2010, P. 156)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
3. The function of civil disobedience ….
c. Jurgen Habermas has also put civil disobedience against the
context of Rechtsstaat (the rule-of-law state) and suggests that
“The paradox of the Rechsstaat is that it must embody positive law,
but also stand for principles which transcend it, and by which
positive law may be judged. The Rechsstaat, wanting to remain
identical with itself, stands before a paradoxical task. It must
protect …against injustice that may emerge in legal forms,
although this mistrust cannot take an institutionally secured
form. With this idea of a non-institutionalizable mistrust of itself,
the Rechsstaat projects itself over the entirety of its positive
law.” (Habermas, 1983; quoted in Specter, 2010, P. 156)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
3. The function of civil disobedience ….
c. Jurgen Habermas ….
Immediately following the quotation, Mathew Specter underlines
that “Habermas claim that the paradox can be resolved by
citizens of ‘matured’ political culture because they alone show
the ‘sense of judgment’ necessary to decide how to act in
relation to unjust laws, or majority decision, with which they
agree. Civil disobedience was thereby figured as a necessary
component of a successful Rechsstaat.” (Specter, 2010, P. 167;
my emphasis)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
3. The function of civil disobedience ….
d.
Ronald Dworkin in retrospective reflection on the civil
disobedient movements of the US in the 1960s and 70s, he
suggests that “we can say something now we could not have
said three decades ago: that Americans accept that civil
disobedience ha s a legitimate if informal place in the political
culture of their community. Few Americans now either deplore
or regret the civil rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s.
People in the center as well as on the left of politics give the
most famous occasions of civil disobedience a good press, at
least in retrospect. They concede that these acts did engage
the collective moral sense of the community. Civil
disobedience is no longer a frightening idea in the United
States.” (Dworkin, 1985, P. 105)
The Obligation and Virtue to Disobey:
The Conception of Civil Disobedience
4. To summarize, we may map out the connection
between the rule of law, democratic political
participation and civil disobedience in the
following way
Humans are endowed with natural rights. They can join together to live reciprocally
& peacefully in communal form. Each of them by mutual agreement are willing to
surrender part of their natural rights to a public authority to form the state
The Rule of the State
The Rule of Democracy
The Rule of Law
The institutional paradox
Public order
built on legal
positivism
Legality
Legitimacy
Moral and/or
political value
based on
natural law
Conscience-based
Policy-based
Justice-based
Challenging the legality of majority rule on the ground of legitimacy
Civil Disobedience
Humans are endowed with natural rights. They can join together to live reciprocally
& peacefully in communal form. Each of them by mutual agreement are willing to
surrender part of their natural rights to a public authority to form
the state
Pros:
Civil Disobedience as
Fundamental Citzen right
The Rule of the State
guarding against the stae
The Rule of Democracy
The Rule of Law
Cons:
Civil Disobedience as
The institutional paradox
Pros:
Political-Participation
in liberal state:
Civil Disobedience as
Public order
Moral and/or
Self-defeating
effect
Moral
Rights
built on legal
political value
Legitimacy
Legality
positivism
based on
natural law
Conscience-based
Policy-based
Justice-based
Challenging the legality of majority rule on the ground of legitimacy
Civil Disobedience
Humans are endowed with natural rights. They can join together to live reciprocally
& peacefully in communal form. Each of them by mutual agreement are willing to
surrender part of their natural rights to a public authority to form the state
Proposals of political Reform
General election
ofof
Chief
Executives in 2017
The Rule
the State
General election of Legco in 2018
The Rule of Democracy
The Rule of Law
Cons:
The institutional Pros:
paradox
- Law breaking (simple legality)
- Delay & Denial of the basic
- Financial
political right of HK citizens
Public orderlost (instrumentalism)
Moral and/or
built on legal
Legitimacy
- Tyranny
of the populace
- Crisis
of ungovernabilitypolitical value
Legality
positivism
based on
natural law
Challenging
the legality of majority
rule on the ground
of legitimacy
Conscience-based
Policy-based
Justice-based
Occupying Central
as indirect Civil Disobedience
Civil Disobedience
Humans are endowed with natural rights. They can join together to live reciprocally
& peacefully in communal form. Each of them by mutual agreement are willing to
surrender part of their natural rights to a public authority to form the state
Proposals of political Reform
?????
General election
ofof
Chief
Executives in 2017
The Rule
the State
General election of Legco in 2018
The Rule of Democracy
The Rule of Law
Cons:
The institutional Pros:
paradox
- Law breaking (simple legality)
- Delay & Denial of the basic
- Financial
political right of HK citizens
Public orderlost (instrumentalism)
Moral and/or
built on legal
Legitimacy
- Tyranny
of the populace
- Crisis
of ungovernabilitypolitical value
Legality
positivism
based on
natural law
Challenging
the legality of majority
rule on the ground
of legitimacy
Conscience-based
Policy-based
Justice-based
Occupying Central
as indirect Civil Disobedience
Civil Disobedience
MVE 6030
The Good Society and its Learnt Members
(II)
Nationality:
Membership in Modern Political Communities (ii)
68
Nationality
It refers to the sense of comradeship of being the
member of the political community known as the
modern nation.
The conception of the nation
69
Nationality
The conception of the nation
Max Weber’s conception of the nation: “If the concept
of ‘nation’ can in any way be defined unambiguously,
it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical
qualities common to those who count as members of
the nation. In the sense of those using the term at a
given time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all,
that one may exact from certain group of men a
specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other
groups. Thus, the concept (of nation) belongs in the
sphere of values. Yet, there is no agreement on how
these groups should be delimited or about what
concreted action should result from such solidarity.”
70
(Weber, 1948, p.172)
Nationality
The conception of the nation
Anthony Smith’s definition of the nation: Smith has
defined that “the nation was a group with seven
features:
cultural differentiae (i.e. the ‘similarity-dissimilarity’ pattern,
members are alike in the respects in which they differ from nonmembers)
territorial contiguity with free mobility throughout
a relatively large scale ( and population)
external political relations of conflict and alliance with similar
group
considerable group sentiment and loyalty
direct membership with equal citizenship rights
vertical economic integration around a common system of
71
labour.” (Smith, 1983, p. 186; original numbering
Nationality
The conception of the nation
David Miller’s conception of the nation: Miller’s
defines the nation as “a community (1) constituted by
shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in
history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a
particular territory, and (5) marked off from other
communities by its distinct public culture.” (Miller,
1995, P.27)
72
Nationality
 The conception of nationality: Nationality refers
to the disposition, intentionality and capacity
that members of a nation are expected to
embodied. Miller furthers his formulation that
“the idea of nationality which I take to
encompass the following three interconnected
propositions.” (Miller, 1995, P.10)
73
Nationality
 David Miller’s conception of nationality…
 Nationality … three interconnected propositions…
National identity: It refers to that individuals have
developed and continuously possess a sense of
belonging to definite national communities, which they
believe “really exist” (Miller, 1995, P. 10). Furthermore,
members of a national community also hold that their
national identity is an essential part, if not most essential
part, of their personal identity. This proposition claims
that “identifying with a nation, feeling yourself inextricably
part of it, is a legitimate way of understanding your place
in the world.” (Miller, 1995, P. 11)
74
Nationality
 David Miller’s conception of nationality…
 Nationality … three interconnected propositions…
Ethical obligations: Nationality implies a “claims that
nations are ethical communities. They are contour lines in
the ethical landscape. The duties we owe to our fellownationals are different from, and more extensive than, the
duties we owe to human beings as such.” (Miller, 1995, P.
11) These national ethical duties may further be
juxtaposed with one’s duties family, religious group, or
other human associations. These ethical obligatory claims
also imply restrictions that they only apply within definite
national boundaries, “and that in particular there is no
objection in principle to institutional schemes ―such as
welfare states― that are designed to deliver benefits
exclusively to those who fall within the same boundaries
75
as ourselves.” (Miller, 1995, P. 11)
Nationality
 David Miller’s conception of nationality…
 Nationality … three interconnected propositions…
Political self-determination: “The third proposition is
political, and states that people who form a national
community in a particular territory have a good claim to
political self-determination; there ought to be put in place
an institutional structure that enables them to decide
collectively matters that concern primarily their own
community. Notice that …I have phrased this cautiously,
and have not asserted that the institution must be that of a
sovereign state. …Nevertheless national selfdetermination can be realized in other ways, and as we
shall see there are cases where it must be realized other
than through sovereign state, precisely to meet the
equally good claims of other nationalities.” (Miller, 1995,
P.
76
11)
Nationality
 Perspectives in National Identity Study
In light of studies in nationalism and national
identity generated since the second half of the
20th century, two sets of dichotomous
perspectives could be synthesized.
77
Nationality
 Perspectives in National Identity Study…
 In relation to the nature of the concept of national
identity, there seems to be two dichotomous
theoretical stances prevailing
Essentialism: Essentialism approaches national identity
as essentials or attributes, which are naturally endowed or
structurally determined. This perspective takes national
identity as well as gender identity or class identity as
given facts and preexisting reality. Hence, the formations
of national identities are conditioned, shaped, or
determined by sets of essentially fixed traits, such as
biological consanguinity, racial origins, place of birth,
cultural and linguistic heritage, etc.
78
Nationality
 Perspectives in National Identity Study
 … two dichotomous theoretical stances …
Constructionism: Constructionism approaches national
identity as socially constructed reality, which are
negotiable and maneuverable. They are on the one hand
collectively constituted in social process or even social
movement, such as national liberation movement, and
individually constructed in deliberately presentations and
articulations.
79
Nationality
 Perspectives in National Identity Study …
 In relation to the origins of the national identity,
there are two adversary perspectives, namely
“primordialism” and “modernism”.
Primordialism: It attributes the origin and/or the
contributing factors to national-identity formation to some
“primordial ties” inherited from the ancient past, such as
sense of kinship; feeling of consanguinity; earth
boundedness and geographical embeddedness.
80
Nationality
 Perspectives in National Identity Study …
 …two adversary perspectives …
Modernism: It attributes the rise of nationalism and the
formation of national identity to their instrumental and
functional contributions to modernization and more
specifically industrialism. It emphasizes the contribution
of national identity to the formation of a common ground
for the secular and anonymous lifestyle of factory
production, market exchange, urbanism, democratic
participation, etc.
81
Modernism
Constructionism
Essentialism
Primordialism
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
The paradoxical natures of the nation-state :
Throughout the developing trajectories of the
nation-states, their two constituent sites, namely
the state and nation, have been in paradoxical
relationship in most of the time. The paradox is
primarily espoused by the different institutional
natures of the two human aggregates.
83
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
The paradoxical natures of the nation-state :
For the state, it is a human organization formed
primarily by naked physical forces and then
institutionalized by political and legal authorities,
desirably in the form of constitutional-liberal
democracy. It demands its human subjects complete
compliances and imposes sovereign and nondisputable power over its territory
84
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
The paradoxical natures of the nation-state :
For the nation, it is a human community formed by a
“specific sentiment of solidarity”. This psycho-cultural
sense of solidarity and “we-group feeling” may take
on various forms and shapes in different historical
and socio-political contexts. They have unleashed
tremendous collective human efforts in accomplishing
epical movements in the forms of independent
movements or national liberations or in waging
devastating wars in the forms of ethnic cleansings or
genocides.
85
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
Empirical contexts of the nation-state
formations:
86
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
Empirical contexts of the nation-state
formations:
“The distinction between states and nations is
fundamental… States can exist without a nation, or
with several nations, among their subjects; and a
nation can be coterminous with the population of one
state, or be included together with other nations with
one state, or be divided between several states. The
belief that every state is a nation, or that all sovereign
states are national states, has done much to
obfuscate human understanding of political realities.
…
87
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
…the nation-state formations: …
“…..A state is a legal and political organization, with
the power to require obedience and loyalty from its
citizens. A nation is a community of people, whose
members are bound together by a sense of solidarty, a
common culture, a national consciousness. Yet in the
common usage of English and of other modern
languages these two distinct relationship are
frequently confused.” (Seton-Watson, 1977, P. 1)
88
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
…the nation-state formations: …
“According to recent estimates, the world’s 184
indendent states contain over 600 living language
groups, and 5,000 ethnic groups. In very few countries
can citizens be said to share the same language, or
belong to the same ethnonational group.” (Kymlicka,
1995, P. 1)
89
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
The Historical Trajectories of Nation Building
The first generation of nation building in Western
Europe and American in 18th -19 centuries
Nation-building through revolution and constitution of the
republics
• The French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen proclaims that “the
source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation; no group, no
individual may exercise authority not emanating expressly therefore.”
(quoted in Connor, 1994, p. 39)
• The Constitution of the United States writes, “We the people of the
United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote
the general welfare, and secure the blessing of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United
State of America.”
90
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
The Historical Trajectories of Nation Building
The second generation of nation building in Eastern
Europe in the first half of the 20th century
Scattered national fragments in Eastern Europe, especial in
Balkan peninsula, as the results of wars between imperial
powers of the East and the West, and between Christianity
and Muslim
Nation-building project under the ruling of authoritarian
socialist party-states after WWII under the patronage of the
Soviet Union.
91
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
The Historical Trajectories of Nation Building
The third generation of nation building in Asia and
Africa in the second half of the 20th century
Independent movements in European colonies after WWII
Nation building took the form of ‘state-based territorialism’
(Smith, 1983)
Separatism in independent states of former colonies, e.g.
India continent and Malaysia peninsula
92
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
The Historical Trajectories of Nation Building
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and EastEuropean socialist bloc after 1990s.
Formations of nation-states of former Soviet publics
Dissolution of former East-European socialist states into
ethnic-states and unleashed bloody ethnic wars and
genocides
93
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
The Historical Trajectories of Nation Building
The Project of Nation Building in China
From empire-based territorialism to hereditary nationalism
• Imperialist invasion to the Ching Empire: The birth of national awareness
• The nationalist revolution and the separatism of the warlords
From hereditary nationalism to acquired nationalism
• The Japanese invasion and the united front of the Nationalist and
Communist parties
• The establishment of the People Republic of China in 1949: The
constitution of the sovereign state of multiple nations
• The economic liberalization of PRC in 1978 and the emergence of the
“context of pluralistic unity”多元一體格局
• The Students movement in 1989
• Olympic game and ethnic disturbance in Tibet in 2008
• Ethnic disturbance in Xinjiang in July 2009…
94
Development of the Modern Form of Political
Community: Nation-State
The Historical Trajectories of Nation Building
The constitution of the national identity for subjects of
the HKSAR: Controversies over the Moral and
National Education: Curriculum Guide (Primary 1 to
Secondary 6)
95
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Meaning of patriotism:
Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition: In his oft-cited article
entitled “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” MacIntyre defines
patriotism as “a kind of loyalty to a particular nation
which only those possessing that particular
nationality can exhibit. Only Frenchmen can be
patriotic about France.” (MacIntyre, 2002, P. 44)
96
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Meaning of patriotism:
Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition: …
Furthermore, MacIntyre characterizes that patriotism
as a kind of attitude supportive towards one’s own
nation and evaluative of its merits and achievements
are extremely particularistic in nature. That is,
“patriots does not value in the same way precisely
similar merits and achievements when they are the
merits and achievements when they are the merits and
achievements of some nation other than his or hers.
For he or she ── at least in the role of patriot ──
values them not justice as merits and achievements,
but as the merits and achievements this particular
97
nation.” (MacIntyre, 2002, P. 44)
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Meaning of patriotism:
Leo Tolstoy’s definition of “extreme patriotism”:
Tolstoy states that “The sentiment (of patriotioism), in
its simplest definition, is merely the preference of
one’s own country or nation above the country or
nation of any one else.” (Tolsky, 1969, quoted in
Nathanson, 1993, P. 4) He goes on to emphasized that
patriotism may consist the following features.
“1. A belief in the superiorty of one’s country
2. A desire for dominance over other contries
3. An exclusive concern for one one’s own country
4. No constrints on the pursuit of one’s country’s goals
5. Automatic support of one’s country’s military policies.”
98
(quoted in Nathanson, 1993, P. 29)
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Meaning of patriotism:
Leo Tolstoy’s definition of “extreme patriotism”:
It must be underlined that Tolstoy did not himself
identify with such a extreme version patriotism. In
fact, he formulates it for criticism and he goes on to
state that “this sentiment is …very stupid and
immoral.”
99
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Meaning of patriotism:
Stephen Nathanson’s definition of “moderate
patriotism”: He stipulates that patriotism need not
have the features that Tolstoy attributes and thus that
it need not be open to his criticisms. Moderate
patriotism involves the following features:
1. Special affection for one’s country
2. A desire that one’s country prosper and flourish
3. Special but not exclusive concern for one’s own country
4. Support for morally constrained pursuit of national goals
5. Conditional support of one’s country’s policies.”
(Nathanson, 1993, P. 34)
100
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Criticism of patriotism from the deontological
and liberal perspectives in value and morality
enquiry
According to the deontological perspective in morality
enquiry, all evaluation and moral judgments are
supposed to be judged according to some impersonal
and impartial criteria or rules. However, for patriotism
it “requires me to exhibit peculiar devotion to my
nation and you to yours. It requires me to regard such
contingent social facts as where I was born and what
government ruled over that place at that time, who my
parents were, who my great-great- grandfathers were,
and so on, as deciding for me the question of what101
virtuous action is.” (MacIntyre, 2002, P. 45)
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Criticism of patriotism from the deontological
and liberal perspectives in value and morality
enquiry
According to the deontological perspective in morality
enquiry, all evaluation and moral judgments are
supposed to be judged according to some impersonal
and impartial criteria or rules. However, for patriotism
it “requires me to exhibit peculiar devotion to my
nation and you to yours. It requires me to regard such
contingent social facts as where I was born and what
government ruled over that place at that time, who my
parents were, who my great-great- grandfathers were,
and so on, as deciding for me the question of what102
virtuous action is.” (MacIntyre, 2002, P. 45
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Criticism of patriotism …
… Accordingly, the deontological “moral standpoint
and the patriotic standpoint are systematically
incompatible.” (MacIntyre, 2002, P. 45)
103
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Criticism of patriotism …
Furthermore, according to the liberal perspective in
moral enquiry, the criteria and rules, which moral
judgments should follow, should not only be impartial
and impersonal but should also
be “neutral between rival and competing interests;”
be “neutral between rival and competing sets of beliefs about
what the best way for human beings to live is;”
take individual human being as the basic unit in moral
evaluations and “each individual is to count for one and
nobody for more than one;” and
apply to all moral agents universally “independent of all
particularity.” (MacIntyre, 2002, P. 47)
104
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Criticism of patriotism …
…the liberal perspective in moral enquiry, …
Accordingly, it is obvious that patriotic standpoint of
morality, which base its judgment on the
particularistic interest and form of life and belief of
one own nation, will not be incompatible with that of
the liberal but will simply be treated a vice
105
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
In search of morally justifiable or virtuous
ground for patriotism
MacIntyre indicates first of all that “For patriotism and
all other such particular loyalty can be restricted in
their scope so that their exercise is always within the
confine imposed by morality. Patriotism need be
regards as nothing more than a perfectly proper
devotion to one’s own nation which must never be
allowed to violate the constraints set by the
impersonal moral standpoint.” (MacIntyre, 2002, P. 46)
106
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
…virtuous ground for patriotism…
As a communitarian, MacIntyre is quick to stress that
there “is never morality as such, but always the highly
specific morality of some highly specific social order.”
(P. 48) And “it is an essential characteristic of the
morality which each of us acquires that is learned
from, in and through the way of life of some particular
community.” (P. 48) ….
107
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
…virtuous ground for patriotism…
As a communitarian, …. MacIntyre further specifies
that the distinct rules of morality derived from the way
of life of a particular community are therefore (P. 48)
specific “practices” and responses to the natural and social
situations in which a community found and formed itself;
specific “narratives” through which a community and its way
of life evolve and develop through its own history
specific “tradition” and social arrangements and orders
which have been institutionalized in the way of life of a
community
108
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
…virtuous ground for patriotism…
Built on this communitarian version of moral rules,
MacIntyre further rejoin the liberal’s version of freefooting (impartial and neutral) moral agents by
specifying that
the moral goods pursued by moral agents are always
embedded in “the enjoyment of one particular kind of social
life, lived out through a particular set of social relationships.”
(P. 49) Therefore, “rules of certain kind are justified by being
productive of and constituted of goods of a certain kind
…only if …these particular sets of ruleincarnated in the
practices of …these particular communities are productive or
constitutive of ….these particular goods enjoyed at certain
particular times and places by certain specifiable individuals.”
(P. 49)
109
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
…virtuous ground for patriotism…
…….MacIntyre further rejoin the liberal’s version of
free-footing (impartial and neutral) moral agents …
a moral duty and agency performed by a moral agent “is
characteristically and generally a hard task for human being.”
MacIntyre underlines that “I can only be a moral agent
because we are moral agents, that I need those around me to
reinforce my moral strengths and assist in remedying my
moral weakness. It is general only within a community that
individuals become capable of morality.” (P. 49)
110
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
…virtuous ground for patriotism…
Taken together, MacIntyre asserts that patriotism can
be accepted as a virtue on conditions that
“If first of all it is the case that I can only apprehend the rules
of morality in the version in which they are incarnated in some
specific community;
“if secondly it is the case that the justification of morality
must be in terms of particular goods enjoyed within the life of
particular communities;
“if thirdly it is the case that I am characteristically brought
into being and maintained as a moral agent only through the
particular kinds of moral sustenance afforded by my
community, then it is clear that deprived of this community, I
am unlikely to flourish as a moral agent.” (P. 50)
111
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Dialectics between liberalism and
communitarianism in the controversy over
patriotism
Confronted with the two rival and incompatible
moralities, namely morality of liberalism and that of
patriotism, MacIntyre suggests that “one way to begin
is to be learned from Aristotle, …we shall do well to
proceed dialectically.” (P. 50)
112
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Dialectics
One the one hand, from the viewpoint of the morality
of liberalism, patriotism is “a permanent source of
moral danger.” (P. 54) It is because the morality of
patriotism will always argue for exemption from
general of morality principles in the interest or even
common goods for one’s own nation. MacIntyre
agrees that such accusation from the liberals “cannot
in fact be successfully rebutted” by the patriots. (P.
54) Therefore, MacINtyre suggests that morality of
patriotism must be extremely careful in examining
their arguments and justification for exemption from
moral principles for the sake of national goods. ….
113
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Dialectics
….MacIntyre specifically underlines that “whatever is
exempted from the patriot’s criticism the status quo of
power and government and the policy pursued by those
exercising power and government never need be so
exempted. What then is exempted? The answer is: the
nation conceived as a project, a project somehow or other
brought to birth in the past and carried on so that a morally
distinctive community was brought into being which
embodied a claim to political autonomy in its various
organized and institutionalized expressions.” However,
such patriotic claim for the overall project of the nation can
pose moral danger “to the best interest of mankind” as the
case of the project of the Nazi Germany. (P. 52)
114
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Dialectics
… Hence, the exemption is by no means absolute and
must be critically examined dialectically and
continuously.
115
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Dialectics
On the other hand, MacIntyre underlines once again
that “liberal morality of impartiality and impersonality
turns out also to be a morally dangerous phenomenon
in an interesting corresponding way. For suppose the
bonds od patriotism to be dissolved: would liberal
morality liberality be able to provide anything
adequately substantial in its place?” (P. 54) ….
116
Is Patriotism a Virtue or a Vice? A Value and
Moral Enquiry
Dialectics
....“A central contention of the morality of patriotism is that
I will obliterate and lose a central dimension of the moral
life if I do not understand the enacted narrative of my own
individual life as embedded in the history of my country.
For if do not so understand it I will not understand what6 I
owe to other or what others owe to me.” (P. 55) As a result,
each individuals will probably come together simply for the
pursue of naked self- interest and competition for
maximization of one’s own profit like the institution of the
capitalist market or simply for pleasure seeking and instant
gratification to mass media and mass consumption
markets. In the end, the morality of liberalism will be
relegated into morality of emotionism as MacIntyre
117
criticizes at the beginning of After Virtue. (2007)
Liberalism
Impartial & Impersonal
Rules of Morality
Morally Dangerous for
Egoism & Emotionism
Moral
Dialectics
Moral Goods
Incarnated in
Communal Lives
Adhere to
Communal Practices
Neutral to
Rival Beliefs &
Ways of Life
Neutral to
Rival Interests
Morally Dangerous for
Collective Totalitarianism
Moral Agencies
Reinforced among
Fellow Agents
Adhere to
Communal Narrative
Communitarianism
Adhere to
Communal Traditiion
118
Liberalism
Distributive
Justice
Relational
Justice
Communitarianism
119
MVE 6030
The Good Society and its Learnt Members
The End
120