Transcript Choosing in Groups

CHOOSING IN GROUPS
MUNGER AND MUNGER
Slides for Chapter 9
Voting as a Collective Action Problem
Outline of Chapter 9
 Reasons for abstention
 Voting and collective action
 The classical model
 Turnout and strategic uncertainty
 Collective action
 Duty and expressive voting
 Self-interest and probability
 The paradox of not voting
 Conclusion
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
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Reasons for abstention
 Apathy
 Little perceived difference between candidates
 Belief that one’s vote is unlikely to influence outcome
 Bigger picture
 Particular election is unimportant in the greater scheme of things
 Weather
 Bad weather raises cost of voting
 Lack of trust
 Politicians will not improve the situation regardless of vote
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
All rights reserved.
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Voting and collective action
 Participation rate is product of four ratios:
 Each step is a potential barrier to participation
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
All rights reserved.
4
The classical model
 Three circumstances in which eligible voter might not vote:
 Indifference: No important differences between options
 Alienation: All options are too far from voter’s position
 Expected net benefit: Cost of voting is high enough to deter the voter
 Classical model does not include voter’s consideration of what others will do
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
All rights reserved.
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Turnout and strategic uncertainty
 Voting is costly in terms of time and inconvenience
 If voters believe their candidate is far ahead/behind, one vote won’t affect outcome
 Voters more likely to vote if they believe race is close
 Voting is a collective action problem
 If no one else votes, one person can show up to the polls and become dictator
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
All rights reserved.
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Collective action
 Free riding is a problem in elections
 I assume that others will vote, so I don’t need to
 I can get the benefits of voting for free, without voting
 Downsian model
 Incorporates sense of civic duty
 I vote if:
 where:
 P is prob. of my vote swinging election
 NCD is net benefit from my candidate winning
 D is benefit I receive from voting (civic duty)
 C is cost of voting
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
All rights reserved.
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Duty and expressive voting
 If D > C, I always vote, regardless of probabilities
 Voting is a consumption activity, rather than a rational investment
 In this case, rational choice theory is not particularly enlightening
 Voting as fashion: might do it just to be seen
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
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Self-interest and probability
 If the electorate size is 2N+1, my vote is decisive if others split votes evenly
 The probability of this is given by
 For electorate of 1 million, prob. is 8/100,000
 Non-trivial
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
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The paradox of not voting
 In Downs’ model, if p = 0, no one will vote
 If no one votes, then p = 1.
 Game theory provides means of resolving paradox
 Mixed strategy equilibrium
 Data vs. theory: more people vote than theory predicts
 Models of “voter taste” address this gap
 Altruism
 Stigma of not voting
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
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Conclusion
 “Investment” model of voting under-predicts turnout
 “Consumption” model provides account of determinants of voting
 However, voting involves choice, not just consumption
 Problematically, voters fail to update beliefs in light of information
 Is there an obligation to vote?
 Democracy requires participation
 However, ignorant voters will often choose incorrectly
 Takeaway:
 Healthy skepticism, while maintaining core optimism
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University.
All rights reserved.
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