Transcript The Devolution of Canada’s National Employment Service

Donna E. Wood, University of Victoria
[email protected]
IAEVG Presentation
June 4, 2014
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All developed countries have a public employment
service (PES) that connects job seekers with
employers
Canada is a federation with 14 powerful governments
In social policy matters Canada is considered as the
most decentralized federation in the OECD world
Provinces have large areas of competence plus fiscal
capacity
The federal government (Ottawa) can act unilaterally
as we have an ineffective Senate to represent regions
Employment and training powers have historically
been contested between Ottawa and the provinces
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1996 Ottawa offers to devolve the PES
Devolution triggered by 1995 Québec referendum;
need for ‘flexible federalism’ and reduced spending
Realized through bilateral administrative (not
constitutional) agreements: Labour Market
Development Agreement (LMDA) and Labour Market
Agreement (LMA) between 1996 and 2010
New arrangements supported by both Liberals and
Conservatives in Ottawa
By 2010 80% of programs under provincial control
and management
In 2013 Ottawa decides to re-assert control: Canada
Job Grant Agreements and LMDA review
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How did the devolution story play out?
What is the federal role today?
How are provinces managing these new
responsibilities?
What interventions have they chosen?
What governance arrangements have they
chosen?
How do these compare?
Why happens next in the federal-provincial
world?
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Provincial labour market offices in 1910s with federal
contributions
1940 constitutional amendment gives Ottawa
unemployment insurance; provinces retain social
assistance as well as training
Renewed conflict starts in 1960s and becomes
competitive in 1980s
Pre-LMDA Ottawa has network 500 Canada
Manpower offices; few provinces offer services
LMDAs and LMAs start to restore harmony in 1990s
Provinces pleased: flexibility to meet local needs;
improved coordination; most irritants removed
Federal government left with accountability ‘light’;
loss of visibility; hard to lead even though they pay
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LMDA agreements (focused on Employment Insurance
clients) transferred federal staff, assets and funding
Early LMDA movers: Alberta, New Brunswick,
Manitoba, Québec, Saskatchewan, NWT and Nunavut
1996-2000
Ontario finally comes on board 2007
From co-managed to devolved LMDA agreements:
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island,
Newfoundland & Labrador and Yukon 2009-2010
LMA agreements (for non EI clients) 2008-2009
Complementary transfers for disabled persons
($222m) and older workers ($80m)
About 80% of cost of provincial programming covered
by Ottawa
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Jurisdiction
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The early
movers
Alberta
New Brunswick
Manitoba
Québec
Northwest
Territories
Saskatchewan
Nunavut
Ontario comes
on board
Ontario
From comanaged to
devolved
British Columbia
Nova Scotia
Newfoundland
and Labrador
Prince Edward
Island
Yukon
Total
LMDA
implementation
date
Nov. 1,
April 1,
Nov. 27,
April 1,
Oct. 1,
Total federal
positions
Total LMDA
funding
LMA date
Total LMA
funding
Total
LMDA/LMA
allocations
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
204
170
118
1084
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106.9m
91.1m
44.8m
589.1m
3.2m
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
52.5m
11.4m
18.0m
116.6m
1.3m
159.4m
102.5m
62.9m
705.7m
4.5m
Jan. 1, 1999
April 1, 2000
114
37.7m
2.8m
2008
2008
15.1m
1.2m
52.8m
4.0m
Jan. 1, 2007
1007
552.7m
2008
200.0m
752.7m
Feb. 2, 2009
July 1, 2009
Nov. 2, 2009
470
196
177
278.7m
80.2m
131.9m
2008
2008
2008
66.4m
14.1m
9.3m
345.1m
94.3m
141.2m
Oct. 5, 2009
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27.1m
2008
2.1m
29.2m
Feb. 1, 2010
n/a
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3,620 positions
3.5m
$1,950.0m
2009
n/a
1.0m
$509.1m
4.6m
$2,459.1m
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Youth programming ($240m managed by Service Canada)
Aboriginal programming ($245m managed by 80
organizations through ASETS program)
Pan-Canadian programming ($76m): job bank, Labour
market information, literacy, foreign credential
recognition, occupational classification, trades
certification, labour mobility, research
Recent federal retreats from labour market issues: national
sector councils; Canadian Council on Learning; skills
tables; literacy secretariat
Feeble intergovernmental system
No national labour market research institutes or support
for provincial organizations to connect on a pan-Canadian
basis
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Provinces expected to chose interventions from:
employment assistance services (EAS); skills
development; wage subsidy; self employment; or job
creation partnerships
15 years of reporting provides limited pan-Canadian
synthesis or interprovincial comparison & analysis
51% active Employment Insurance (EI) and 16% reachback; few under-represented groups
2011/12 646,296 individuals received 962,673
interventions
Slide over time to short term EAS interventions and
away from training (from 53% to 83%)
Evaluations demonstrate that skills development is
most effective intervention, yet mostly EAS on offer
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LMAs hearkened back to mid-1990s when
Ottawa assisted under-represented groups
LMA/LMDA simultaneous implementation was
challenging for co-managed provinces
Programs are similar to LMDA services
Even less reporting: only 2 consolidated
provincial reports (2008/09 and 2009/10)
More emphasis on skills development vs. EAS
compared to LMDAs
Services focused on vulnerable groups
Evaluation report demonstrated strong results
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Focus on governance & management
arrangements:
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Interagency cooperation or ‘one-stop’ shops
Marketization of service provision
Decentralization
Partnerships and networks
Framework for comparison draws on
international literature, especially in European
Union and OECD
Almost 100 so far interviews in British Columbia,
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Québec
Interviews just completed in Nova Scotia, PEI,
New Brunswick and Nfld. & Lab.
Ontario and Ottawa to be approached this fall
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Alberta: services for social assistance (SA) clients and
career services for all. Pre-existing cooperation.
Political stability.
Québec: coalition of business, labour, NGOs
demanding federal transfer. Coalition retained
through political changes. Pre-existing integration of
employment & SA programs.
Manitoba: 2-tiered SA system. Large aboriginal
involvement through ASETS. Political stability.
Saskatchewan: need to update college and SA system.
Large aboriginal involvement. Political changes.
BC: parallel fed-prov system until 2009. Contracted
provincial services. Political changes.
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Alberta and Québec have provincially managed
one-stop shops: 57 Alberta Works offices and
150 LEC’s in Québec
Saskatchewan (19) and Manitoba (16) have
provincially-run employment offices. SA
separate.
LMDA and LMA money managed by same
Ministry
72 WorkBC Employment Services Centres, all
contracted out. SA offices separate. ED Ministry
manages LMA money through different contracts
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Following 2 year consultation British
Columbia lets province-wide contracts,
choosing 47 prime contractors, all governed
by a provincial model
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba have
‘mixed model’ of civil servants and placespecific contracts with for-profit and NGO
involvement
Québec also has ‘mixed model’ but almost
exclusively with NGOs who are ‘partners’, not
‘contractors’
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Alberta and Québec divide policy and service
delivery function. Considerable flexibility at
regional and local level, using provincially
determined framework
Saskatchewan and Manitoba divide authority
by business line; local flexibility unclear
British Columbia highly centralized. Business
model for EPBC and decision-making on LMA
programming managed out of Victoria.
Regional and local offices provide input on
contractors chosen
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Québec has highly institutionalized structure:
CPMT, 17 regional councils, 30 sectoral
councils, all set in law
Manitoba has 16 sector councils plus
Advisory Council on Workforce Development
Detailed governance model for EPBC.
Consultations on BC JobsPlan and regional
committees
Alberta and Saskatchewan have adhoc
consultations and industry committees as
needed
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CPMT putting new structures in place in
Québec
Alberta developing an aboriginal workforce
development strategy
Saskatchewan and Manitoba (where ASETS
organizations and aboriginal population are
large) have parallel and cordial relationships,
but largely ad hoc arrangements
BC ASETS holders still recovering from
implementation of EPBC and loss of federal
funding
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LMDA and LMA choices over 17 years have given
provinces considerable flexibility
It is provinces- not Ottawa- that have the
expertise in labour market matters today
Each has found their own way to connect to their
employers and other stakeholders
Huge upheaval of the system through Canada Job
Grant agreements: uncertain impact
LMDA review now underway through HUMA
committee as well as pan-Canadian meetings:
uncertain impact
For sure less provincial flexibility: better or worse
programming?
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Policy field has been transformed through bilateral
arrangements. Each province has chosen what works for them
Ontario, NS, NB, PEI and Nfld & Lab research concluding
Considerable federal-provincial constitutional and financial
interdependence requires improved federal-provincial
cooperation than we have now
New partnerships are required
◦ Consolidated F/P/T transfer, simplified accountability
◦ Improved transparency and capacity for research
◦ A renewed Forum of Labour Market Ministers
◦ Institutionalized connections to business, unions, NGOs
and ASETS holders (pan-Canadian and within province)
Window of opportunity for change and improvement
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