Transcript Slide 1

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONRY
STOCKPILE ISSUES
John S. Foster, Jr.
2005 IFPA-Fletcher Conference
15 December 2005
PRESENT-DAY STOCKPILE
•Purposes
–Assure – provide ‘umbrella’ for Allies
–Dissuade – would-be nuclear proliferators
–Deter –WMD-armed adversaries
–Defeat – any adversary, any conflict (NPR; QDR)
•Aims
–Inhibit proliferation
–Reduce stockpiles, to Moscow Agreement levels
•Reduces worst-cases risks
–Limit collateral damage
–Respond convincingly to differing objectives of all
potential adversaries
•Differing in time, place, circumstance, adversary,…
STOCKPILE STATUS I.
•First, the Good News
–Decade of stockpile stewardship has provided
critical information on materials, weapons functioning
•New tools (being) developed-&-exercised to better
explore weapons-pertinent areas (e.g., NIF, Zx machines)
•Maintained cadres of weapons-cognizant personnel
–Defects found in stockpile have been found, fixed
•Some through surveillance, analysis and laboratory tests
•Some by nuclear tests (prior to 1992 test-cessation)
–Serves a stark reminder that reliabilities may not be 100%
–Consequence: We can say that the current
stockpile is safe and reliable
•“…to the best of our knowledge-&-belief”
STOCKPILE STATUS II.
•Three major areas of concern
First, of immediate concern, warheads are old –
many past their design lifetimes
∙Refurbishment is necessary –Life Extension Programs underway
−INFRASTRUCTURE has deteriorated seriously
–No manufacturing capability for ‘pits’ for the past 13 years, or until after
2021?
–Only major power ever unable to serial-produce the weaponry at the
foundation of its military security
–Now urgent to ‘turn around’ this situation
»E.g., unsafe weaponry dismantlement must be performed
−LEPs without testing introduce changes of ultimatelyunknown consequences
∙Reductions in reliability may result
– And ‘common mode’ flaws may creep in, unrecognized as such
∙If we should discover such a failure, the Reliable Replacement
Warhead could be helpful – crucial point in its favor
– Simpler support infrastructures may well suffice
– Generically different’ design hedge against LEPs’ failure modes
STOCKPILE STATUS III.
•Three major areas of concern, continued
Second, looking ahead, the “enduring stockpile” is ‘tuned’ to
deter all-out Soviet attack
•Still credible to deter all-out near-peer attack
•But high-yield, ‘dirty’ (high fission-fraction) explosives
–Major ‘collateral damage,’ e.g., blast/heat/fallout on ‘innocent
bystanders’
–As well as fallout on Allies – and on US forces-abroad
•US deterrence posture lacks credibility against rogues
–If used, only disproportionate force-levels available, costs-incurred,…
Third, stockpile architecture can be seen as failing
expectations of the…
•…values-set of the American people
–“Just war” tenets flouted? Geneva Convention breached?
•…Allies: “…you would destroy the village in order to save it?”
•…International community
–Force-levels employed, potential collateral damages incurred wouldn’t
correspond to early 21st century notions and measures of “military
necessity”
STOCKPILE ARCHITECTURAL GOALS I.
•Hold-at-risk leadership elites of potential adversaries
–Directly-&-immediately: No place for decision-makers to hide!
•‘Hostage’ populations – arguably unable to control ‘leaders’
•Pursue them underground – as deeply as necessary
–They’re currently at 100-150+ meters – and will go deeper
•Challenge is to defeat deep underground bunkers with
strictly-minimized collateral damage
–Must develop better penetration-&-emplacement concepts
•For both advanced conventional and advanced nuclear means
•For a few meters’ penetration-depth,10 kT might be required
–If we could emplace at half-depth to target, 1 kT might readily suffice
»Would not crater at all (i.e., if >100 meters’ depth)
•Penetration/emplacement technologies not extensively explored
–NAS Study Report – Yes, physics won’t permit B-61 to ‘free-fly’ deeper
STOCKPILE ARCHITECTURAL GOALS II.
•Collateral damage suppression
–Have gained greatly improved delivery accuracy against most
all target-types, in most operational circumstances
•Precision, Effects-Based Targeting – revolution in air-to-ground
effectiveness
–Extend it to nuclear ordnance
•‘Robust’ precision-targeting enables at least 10X yield-reductions
–We know how to ‘clean up’ nuclear explosives drastically:
we’ve done it!
•Two dozen successful ‘Plowshare’ tests extensively proved
capabilities
•Can decrease total weapon fission yields to less than 0.5 kT
–From levels of 10s to 100s of kT: 100-1000X reductions over extant
devices
–Largely obviating “fallout” and associated collateral damage
–And deep emplacement well before detonation further
minimizes radiation, blast, heat: all appear only underground
•Potentially can entirely contain the explosion
•NAS Study didn’t consider deep emplacement technology-set
STOCKPILE ARCHITECTURAL GOALS III.
•Respond to the threats posed by ‘modern EMP’
–Originating from low-yield warheads of novel characteristics, bursting in
space over target regions of thousands to millions of km2 area
•‘Found’ by EMP Commission: extended studies of foreign EMP activities
•≤10 kT, detonated at dozens to hundreds of km altitude
•“Different in kind, not in degree” from Cold War EMP
–Possession of small numbers of such weapons by an adversary could
provide a unique deterrent
–EMP usage widely discussed by two (near-)peer potential adversaries
•E.g., Russian-American parliamentary delegation exchange in May 1999; use
against U.S. C3I capabilities
•E.g., ChiComs, in context of the 7th Fleet’s possible defense of Taiwan
•Primary U.S. response must be ‘hardening’
–Mission-essential aspects of (select) U.S. military forces
–National survival-essential civilian infrastructures, e.g., electrical grid
•Essential ‘backup’ response is deterrence-in-kind
–EMP threatens electronics/electrical systems – not human life directly
–All extant U.S. deterrents thus are innately disproportionate
–U.S. has >2 dozen pertinent nuclear test results to support weaponization
NECESSARY ADVANCES I.
•Deter attacks against the U.S. and its military
–E.g., effectively eliminate ‘technological surprise’ prospects
•Renewed commitment of Intelligence Capabilities to comprehensively
understand-&-anticipate key foreign developments
•Vigorous ad hoc DoD, DoE programs
•Enhance the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent
against the full set of potential adversaries that present
themselves
–Credibility to friends-&-Allies crucial to dissuade them from
going nuclear
•Challenge: high-reliability modernized weaponry without a necessity
for nuclear testing
–Compliance with “military necessity” aspects of international
laws-of-war
•As well as “just means” aspects of the moral premises of “just war”
•E.g., learn how to credibly threaten enemy political elites “in worst
case” without threatening their populations
NECESSARY ADVANCES II.
•Broaden the capabilities of the stockpile
–Currently deters only near-peers
–Lacks credibility to deter new adversaries
•Focus on holding-at-risk leadership elites, deterring (novel) attacks
•“High yield, dirty” stockpile weaponry lacks credibility to
adversaries
–Stockpile can’t be confidently maintained for much longer
•Extensively-decayed infrastructure
–Even time-urgent weapon dismantlements are behind-schedule
–Nuclear weaponry can’t be realistically abandoned
•No credible alternatives for ‘offensive’ or ‘defensive’ deterrence
•And none are upcoming
–Basic fixes are mandatory – and are now quite urgent
NECESSARY ADVANCES III.
•DoD must engage Congress and the American people
to build a consensus for rational, essential actions
–Intelligence must credibly-&-competently inform debate
–Key Allies must give “informed consent” re fundamentals
–Military Services, DTRA, NNSA surely will “do their part”
–But DoD – i.e., OSD, JCS and STRATCOM – must “lead
out”
•Actions
–Timely development of essential weaponry
•E.g., RRW, deep penetration/emplacement means, reduced collateral
damage systems
•With supporting examination of political and military policy, strategy,
tactics and requirements
–Creation of supporting infrastructure for current weaponry
NECESSARY ADVANCES IV.
“America is sleepwalking through history,
armed with nuclear weapons.”
John Hamre, Washington Post, 5-02-05
─ Yes, that is the “far field” perception
─“Close in” those responsible in DOE and DOE
are struggling to develop a national consensus
on needed nuclear capabilities
•It’s now in the National interest to
anticipate-in-advance the “wake-up calls”
•“We have been warned”