DNDO - All Slides For Public Release

download report

Transcript DNDO - All Slides For Public Release

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Maritime Security Strategy for Radiological and Nuclear Threats

September 26, 2007

Vayl S. Oxford Director Domestic Nuclear Detection Office


 Defining the radiological and nuclear threat  Multi-layered approach to security  Developing a strategy to secure cargo – Operational solutions – Technical solutions – DNDO progress and programs  Developing a strategy to secure small vessels – Operational solutions – Technical solutions – DNDO progress and programs 2

Rad/Nuc Threat

 The risk of a terrorist acquiring and using a nuclear or radiological device is one of the greatest threats to the Nation – A robust, layered defense must be developed – Each layer must reduce the terrorist’s ability to use such threats against us  The layered defense concept includes: – Eliminating excess stocks of nuclear materials and weapons – Protecting existing stocks from theft or diversion – Detecting illicit movement of nuclear or radiological material overseas – Enhancing domestic detection and interdiction efforts 3

Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

A multi –layered, international system offers multiple opportunities for detection Second Line of Defense Materials Protection, Control, & Accountability Seaport and Border Scanning Coast Guard Inspection At-sea Interdiction Port-of-Departure Screening Potential source of SNM Potential target


Cargo Containers and the Supply Chain

 Almost 32,000 seagoing containers arrive and are off loaded at United States seaports each day  In FY 2006, that equated to 11.6 million cargo containers annually  Rad/nuc scanning is only one piece of supply chain security: – 24-Hour Rule – Advanced Targeting System – C-TPAT  Significant challenges: – Sheer volume – Requirement to facilitate continued flow of goods 5

Cargo Scanning Strategy

 Unshielded or lightly shielded materials – Current and next-generation passive radiation portal monitors detect radiation emitted by threat materials – Next generation radiation portal monitors promise to significantly reduce false alarm rates by identifying the radioisotope  Shielded materials – Gamma ray imagers detect dense materials used to avoid passive detection – Next generation imagers automate the detection of dense materials – Future systems may directly detect shielded materials

DHS and partner programs will deploy integrated technologies both domestically and overseas


Cargo Security – DNDO Progress & Programs

   

Radiation Portal Monitor Program

– Develop and deploy, in partnership with CBP, current- and next-generation radiation portal monitors to all U.S. ports of entry – Target completion date is FY 2013

Rail Test Center

– Established in FY 2007 at the Port of Tacoma.

– Will focus on identifying potential solutions for scanning cargo moved directly from ship to rail prior to exiting a port.

Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program

– Developing next-generation radiation portal monitors that can both detect

and identify

potential threats in cargo –


performance testing at Nevada Test Site and operational testing at the New York Container Terminal – Currently undergoing field validation at Los Angeles/Long Beach (CA), Newark (NJ), Detroit (MI), and Laredo (TX)

Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems

– Developing next-generation imaging systems that will automate the detection of high density materials – Initial testing planned in FY 2009/2010 7

Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program

Program Goals:

 Develop next-generation passive detection systems for multiple applications  Initial focus on fixed portals for POEs; substantial investment in rail, mobile, and re-locatable assets for non-POE venues  Provide 100% passive detection capability at all official POEs  Deploy fixed and re-locatable systems to non-POE locations 8

Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems

Program Goals:

 Develop and deploy a radiography system that automatically detects threat materials in mixed commerce without impeding the flow of commerce  Conduct radiographic inspection of up to 50% of all incoming cargo  Improved penetration capability 9

Small Maritime Vessels

 Vessels less than 300 Gross Tons  Includes all types: recreational boats, commercial fishing vessels, tugs, etc.

 Vessels with fewer security regulations & information required by law, such as – Automatic Identification System (AIS) requirement – 96 Hour Advance Notice of Arrival – 24 Hour Crew List  Significant challenges: – Relatively anonymous – Free to navigate on the water – Sheer volume and density 10

Small Maritime Vessel Strategy


Establish an efficient, risk-informed Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection (PRND) Program focused on smaller maritime threats – Exploit geographic choke points for efficiency – Establish buffer zones to limit potential consequences – Leverage targeting information to focus resources


: – Assist Federal, state and local agencies with deploying detection & reporting capability consisting of human-portable, mobile, & remote radiation detection systems for maritime applications – Assist with developing a maritime PRND CONOPS with alarm resolution & maritime operational threat response (MOTR) protocols – Provide training on equipment, CONOPS, and protocols – Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): communications infrastructure, information/data networks & collaboration amongst Fed, State & local agencies 11

Small Maritime Vessel Approach

   

Step 1 - Architecture Analysis

– Baseline current PRND capabilities within a maritime region – Conduct architecture “gap” analysis – Leverage Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) to identify maritime & law enforcement stakeholders

Step 2 – Design

– Assess geographic choke points & buffer zones to maximize opportunities to encounter, detect & interdict – Develop initial deployment strategy & CONOPS – Identify PRND technology requirements and system integration approach

Step 3 – Deploy Capability

– Field detection and reporting technologies – Commence training operational users – Enhance reach-back networks for situational awareness & information/data sharing

Step 4 – Assess & Document

– Conduct exercises – Refine protocols; share lessons learned 12

Enhancing Maritime Capability

 Detection equipment for the maritime environment includes: – Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS): Enhanced detection & standardized user interfaces.

– New technologies: Mobile/fixed standoff systems are being research & developed.  While detection equipment & technology are important, an effective PRND Program needs to be built around the




lanning – – – – –












upport  DNDO is actively working in all these areas to improve the Nation’s maritime PRND capability.


Handheld and Backpack Isotope Identifiers

Program Goals:

 Develop a lightweight (4.5 lbs) system with improved probability of identification, improved ability to communicate with a joint reach back center, and better durability at a price of less than $15K  Meet key operator needs (U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, U.S. Border Patrol, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and first responders)  Options include: – Weight and power reduction in Germanium devices – Advanced material (


Lanthanum Halides, Cadmium Zinc Telluride) – Cooling systems (


third-generation Stirling cooler) – Filling operational gaps through the purchase of capable COTS systems 14

Small Vessel Security – DNDO Progress & Programs

Port Partnership Initiative

– A DNDO team actively engages select high-risk port regions to increase awareness and assist Federal, state & local agencies establish an effective maritime PRND Program that will focus on the small maritime vessel threat 

CG-DNDO Joint Acquisition Strategy

– Assist CG to achieve full operational capability by 2007 

Maritime Module for PRND Program Management Handbook

– Assist state & local agencies establish a maritime PRND Program – Describes issues/concerns related to the unique maritime environment 

Maritime Test Campaign

– Establish a maritime test facility in 2008 – Initial focus will be to determine the effectiveness of mobile standoff detectors on small maritime vessels 

Enhancing Detection Capability

– Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS): maritime variant requirements are incorporated in spiral development 15


 DNDO is working to counter the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism throughout the maritime environment  The only way to successfully counter this type of threat is to layer detection assets between potential sources and targets  Cargo security is a major focus of current efforts, and DNDO is working closely with CBP to continue to improve detection capabilities at our ports  DNDO is increasingly focused on improving detection capabilities in the small vessel community, and is working with the Coast Guard and State and local officials to develop innovative solutions  No single solution will improve capabilities; a mix of operational and technical solutions will be required to address this challenge.