Transcript Istituzioni di economia

LEZIONE 3
Tassazione del risparmio e degli
investimenti in economia chiusa e aperta
Tassazione internazionale delle società - PARTE I
Clamep
8 crediti – 50 ore
27.9.2010-2.11.2010
Effetti sul risparmio e sugli investimenti di una
imposta sui redditi di capitale (economia chiusa)
r
S
(p-rn)/ p = cuneo
fiscale %
p=MPC
r0
Cuneo
fiscale
rn =MRS
I
I1
I0
S,I
2
(NB ipotesi che il risparmio sia canalizzato solo nell’acquisto di beni capitali)
Cuneo fiscale sul risparmio e sugli investimenti
Imprese
Tassazione dei profitti
Risparmiatore
Finanziamento con capitale
proprio:
• Dividendi
• Pulsvalenze
Si pone il problema di doppia
tassazione degli utili di impresa
Finanziamento con debito:
• Interessi
Non si pone il problema di doppia
tassazione perché i profitti tassabili
sono al netto interessi passivi
Cuneo di imposta sugli
investimenti: p -r
Cuneo di imposta sul risparmio:
r-rn
3
Tassazione del risparmio e degli
investimenti
In economia chiusa sia che si tassi il
risparmio, sia che si tassino gli investimenti,
un’imposta sul reddito di capitale:
 introduce un cuneo tra rendimenti lordi
(sull’investimento) e netti (sul risparmiatore)
 riduce S e I
Nel caso della tassazione del risparmio si può
annullare questo cuneo con ET (CFT o PPT).
Nel caso degli investimenti il ragionamento è
un po’ più complesso, ma vi sono comunque
sistemi neutrali (vedi lezione 2).
4
Principi di tassazione internazionale dei
redditi di capitale: principio di residenza
 Principio di residenza: i redditi percepiti all’estero
sono tassati nel paese di residenza del percettore,
alla stessa aliquota a cui sono tassati i redditi di
origine interna
rH (1-tH) =rF (1-tH)
rH=rF=r
 Si uguagliano anche i rendimenti lordi: è rispettata la
Capital export neutrality (CEN)
 La CEN garantisce una efficiente allocazione
internazionale dello stock di capitale (il capitale va
dove è più produttivo e non dove è meno tassato)
 Perché si realizzi è necessario poter accertare i
redditi esteri
5
Residence principle and CEN (Griffith et al, 2008)
A pure residence-based tax gives us capital
export neutrality (CEN) - investments from the
UK are treated the same for tax purposes
regardless of the destination.
 While consistent residence-based taxation ensures
CEN, this type of neutrality may also be attained
even if source countries tax the income from inbound
investment, provided residence countries offer a full
credit for foreign taxes against the domestic tax bill
(vedi dopo).
6
Principi di tassazione internazionale dei
redditi di capitale: principio di fonte
 Principio di fonte: i redditi esteri sono tassati solo nel
paese fonte (esenzione nel paese di residenza)
rH (1-tH) =rF (1-tF)
 Si uguagliano solo i rendimenti netti: è rispettata la
Capital import neutrality (CIN)
 La CIN garantisce un’efficiente allocazione
internazionale del risparmio
 Ma i capitali tendono a muoversi dove le aliquote sono
più basse: c’è incentivo alla concorrenza fiscale
 In presenza di aliquote diverse, il rendimento lordo è
diverso e la CEN è violata (non c’è una allocazione
efficiente del capitale)
7
Source principle and CIN (Griffith et al, 2010)
 A pure source-based tax gives us capital
import neutrality (CIN) - investment into the
UK is treated the same for tax purposes
regardless of the country of origin. CIN is
achieved when foreign and domestic
investors in a given country are taxed at the
same effective rate and residence countries
exempt foreign income from domestic tax.
8
Ancora su CEN e CIN (Devereux, 2010)
 CEN implies that
a) the international tax system will not distort the location
decisions of any individual investor,
b) the pre-tax rate of return in all jurisdictions will be the
same (production will be efficiently organized), but
c) investors in different jurisdictions may face different
post-tax rates of return on their investment, and hence
different incentives to save.
 CIN implies that
a) the marginal pre-tax rates of return will differ across
jurisdictions (there will not be production efficiency),
but
b) investors in different jurisdictions will face the same
post-tax rate of return on each of their investments, and
hence all face the same incentive to save.
9
CEN holds in both countries if tAA = tAB and tBA = tBB: that is, each individual
investor faces the same effective tax rate on the returns from both assets. In
this special case, equalizing post-tax rates of return for either investor will
ensure that the pre-tax rates of return from the two assets will also be equal,
implying that production will be efficiently organized. In this case as well, both
investors can hold both assets—though if their tax rates differ— tAA = tBB—
then their post-tax rates of return will also differ.
By contrast, CIN holds in both countries if tAA = tBA and tAB = tBB: that is both
investors face the same effective tax rate when investing in a single asset. In
this case, and assuming that the effective tax rates on the two assets are
different from each other, equalization of post-tax rates of return will not
generate equalization of pre-tax rates of return. However, the post-tax rates of
return faced by each investor will be the same.
The distinction between these two notions of neutrality has led to some debate as
to which is the more important (see, for example, Keen, 1993). The economic
literature has generally favoured CEN, on the grounds that it generates
production efficiency (discussed further below), though this has not always
met with approval. Thus, for example, McLure (1992) has claimed that:
‘economists have generally favoured CEN because it maximizes global
welfare . . . but businessmen generally favor the “level playing field” provided
by CIN’. However, through a number of contributions discussed below, the
question of the optimal tax structure has now progressed well beyond a simple
analysis of CEN and CIN. (Devereux 2010)
10
Principi di tassazione internazionale dei
redditi di capitale: la realtà (1)
Nella realtà solitamente:
 Si applicano sistemi misti. Esempio:
 tassazione nel paese fonte,
 tassazione nel paese di residenza,
 credito per le imposte pagate all’estero
 il credito è solitamente limitato alle imposte interne
dovute su quel reddito estero (per evitare di dare un
rimborso per imposte pagate all’estero).
 Se l’aliquota interna è superiore a quella estera, il
risultato è uguale a quello che si avrebbe con principio puro
di residenza (senza alcuna tassazione alla fonte). E’ però
diversa la ripartizione del gettito fra gli stati
 Se l’aliquota interna è inferiore a quella estera, non si dà
rimborso e l’aliquota rilevante resta quella estera, come nel
caso di applicazione del principio di fonte.
11
Principi di tassazione internazionale dei
redditi di capitale: la realtà (2)
Nella realtà solitamente:
 Si applicano sistemi diversi per redditi attività
finanziarie e di impresa (investimenti di portafoglio e
diretti)
 Tendenze:
 Tassazione in base al principio di residenza dei redditi
derivanti da investimenti di portafoglio esteri (i frutti del
risparmio allocato all’estero da parte di un investitore-persona
fisica). Soprattutto non si tassano i redditi dei non residenti. La
capacità di tassare i redditi esteri dei residenti dipende dalle
possibilità di accertamento.
 Tassazione con il principio di fonte dei redditi derivanti da
investimenti diretti (una sussidiaria estera di una madre
residente è tassata nel paese estero e i redditi sono esenti nel
paese di residenza della madre; Direttiva UE madri-figlie
435/90/CE lascia in realtà opzione fra credito ed esenzione…)
12
Tassazione del risparmio in economia (piccola) aperta
Paese importatore di capitali:
tassazione del risparmio in base al principio di residenza
r
S’
S
Importazioni di
capitali
r*
I
S1
S0
I0
S, I
13
Tassazione del risparmio in economia (piccola) aperta
 Il risparmio interno si riduce (vi è distorsione nelle scelte di
risparmio, legata alla tassazione dei redditi di capitale)
 Gli investimenti non si riducono
 Aumentano infatti le importazioni di capitali dall’estero
 HP restrittive:
 Capitali perfettamente mobili
 Possibilità di accertare i redditi da capitale (interni ed
esteri): piena applicazione del principio di residenza
 Se invece di tassare il risparmio (in base al principio di
residenza), si tassassero gli investimenti (in base al
principio di fonte) l’effetto sarebbe molto diverso
(diminuirebbero gli investimenti e le importazioni di capitale).
 A differenza economia chiusa, in economia aperta non è la
stessa cosa tassare il risparmio o gli investimenti.
14
Tassazione degli investimenti in economia
(piccola) aperta (principio di fonte)
r
S
Importazioni di
capitali
rl
r*
I
I’
S0
I1
I0
S, I
15
Tassazione degli investimenti in economia
(piccola) aperta
Il risparmio interno non si riduce, ma si
riducono gli investimenti
La tassazione alla fonte con aliquote
diverse dei profitti può provocare.
 Inefficiente allocazione del capitale (il capitale va
dove è meno tassato invece di dove è più produttivo)
 Concorrenza fiscale per attrarre investimenti esteri
 Un indicatore di questa concorrenza fiscale è l’aliquota
legale
 L’aliquota legale di imposizione societaria è calata
notevolmente e la tendenza (come abbiamo visto)
non sembra arrestarsi…
16
Sorensen, 2007
“Under the source principle (the return to) capital is taxed only
in the country where it is invested. Source-based taxes may
therefore be termed taxes on investment. Under the residence
principle the tax is levied only on (the return to) the wealth
owned by domestic residents, regardless of whether the
wealth is invested at home or abroad. Since wealth is
accumulated saving, residence-based taxes may also be
termed taxes on saving.
The most important example of a source-based capital tax is the
corporate income tax, since most countries only tax corporate
income generated within their borders.In contrast, the
personal income tax as well as the personal wealth tax are
based on the residence principle, since domestic residents
are liable to tax on their worldwide capital income and on
wealth invested abroad as well as at home. As a rough
approximation, we may therefore say that the corporation tax
is a tax on investment,whereas the personal taxes on capital
income and wealth are taxes on saving…..
….ma attenzione alle difficoltà di accertamento… (nota 6)
17
18
Sorensen, 2007
•
•
In an open economy with free international mobility of capital, the two
types of taxes have very different effects on the domestic economy and
on international capital flows. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where the
horizontal axis measures the volumes of domestic saving and
investment, while the vertical axis measures the real rates of return on
saving and investment. The downward-sloping curve labelled ‘I’
indicates how the level of domestic investment varies with the required
pre-tax rate of return. The lower is the required return, the greater is the
volume of investment which will be deemed profitable. The upwardsloping curve denoted by ‘S’ shows how the level of domestic saving
varies with the after-tax rate of return. The positive slope of this curve
reflects the common assumption that a higher after-tax return will
induce a higher volume of saving…
…… In Figure 1 a rise in the savings tax tS implies a movement down
along the S-curve, leading to a lower volume of domestic saving
and a higher level of capital imports without affecting domestic
investment. By contrast, a rise in the investment tax tI reduces the
level of domestic investment and leads to lower capital imports
but does not affect domestic saving..
19
Sorensen, 2007
 This analysis has important implications for tax policy. In
particular, it shows that if the government of a small open
economy wishes to stimulate domestic real investment
through lower taxes on capital, it should concentrate on
lowering source-based taxes on investment such as the
corporation tax. According to Figure 1, a lowering of
savings taxes such as the personal taxes on dividends and
capital gains on shares will not stimulate domestic
investment. Rather, it will stimulate domestic saving and
will most likely imply that some shares in domestic
companies that were previously owned by foreign investors
will be taken over by domestic investors, thus increasing
the share of the domestic business sector controlled by
domestic owners.
 E’ preferibile (per un’economia piccola e aperta) ridurre
l’imposta sulle società (alla fonte), piuttosto che quella sul
socio (residenza).
20
Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di
capitale e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (1)
Principio di fonte: CIN
Principio di residenza : CEN
rH (1-tH) =rF (1-tF)
Solo se le aliquote di imposta sono uguali
(tH = tF) sono contemporaneamente
rispettate la CEN e la CIN
21
Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di
capitale e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (2)
 In assenza di armonizzazione delle aliquote fra
paesi:
 il rispetto della CEN è ritenuto preferibile al rispetto
della CIN per i redditi delle attività finanziarie:
 le distorsioni nell’allocazione del flusso di risparmio
internazionale (che si ha quando si applica il principio di
residenza e sono diversi i rendimenti netti nei diversi paesi)
sono ritenute meno importanti (meno penalizzanti in termini
di benessere) delle distorsioni nell’allocazione dello stock di
capitale;
 l’applicazione del principio di residenza (CEN) è coerente
con il principio di equità orizzontale;
 deve però essere possibile accertare i redditi derivanti da
investimenti di portafoglio esteri!
22
Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale
e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (3)
 Per la tassazione degli investimenti sono
importanti sia la CIN sia la CEN.
 La CIN garantisce che imprese di nazionalità
diversa siano tassate in modo uguale quando
operano su uno stesso mercato;
 la CEN garantisce che la tassazione sia la
medesima su un investimento di fonte interna e su
uno di fonte estera.
 Da qui, altro concetto di neutralità: Capital
Ownership neutrality (CON)
 Worldwide taxation (con credito pieno)
 Esenzione
 Occorrerebbe armonizzazione….
23
 “The distinction between these two notions of
neutrality has led to some debate as to which is the
more important (see, for example, Keen, 1993). The
economic literature has generally favoured CEN, on
the grounds that it generates production efficiency…,
though this has not always met with approval. Thus,
for example, McLure (1992) has claimed that:
“economists have generally favoured CEN because it
maximises global welfare ... but businessmen
generally favor the ‘level playing field’ provided by
CIN”.
 However, through a number of contributions
discussed below, the question of the optimal tax
structure has now progressed well beyond a simple
analysis of CEN and CIN.”
(Devereux, 2008)
24
Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale
e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (4)
 Da qui, altro concetto di neutralità: Capital Ownership
neutrality (CON), che tiene presente la proprietà (la
produttività di un asset dipende da chi detiene la
proprietà):
 Worldwide taxation (con credito pieno)
 Esenzione (soddisfa NON: vedi dopo)
 Anche CON si presta a diverse interpretazioni:
 “A broader interpretation of CON is therefore that one
company has no competitive advantage over another as a
result of differential effective tax rates depending on
ownership” (Devereux, 2008)
25
Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale
e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (5)
 Concetto ancora più generale (che tiene conto del
commercio internazionale): Market neutrality
 “It is perhaps useful to define a new term - market
neutrality – which holds if taxes do not distort
competition between companies; that is, one company
does not derive a tax-induced competitive advantage
over another. It is clear from this analysis that market
neutrality would require full harmonisation of sourceand residence corporation” (Devereux, 2008)
 Occorrerebbe armonizzazione….
26
“ …. in a real-world situation in which there
are cross-border flows of portfolio and
direct investment, and also international
trade, then all traditional forms of taxation
would be distorting unless they were
completely harmonised”.
Michael P. Devereux (Oxford University Centre for Business
Taxation), Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic
Principles and Tax Policy Considerations, Paper WP08/24,
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/Tax/publications/working+papers/WP0
824.htm
27
“ If effective capital income tax rates were completely
harmonised across countries, both CEN and CIN would prevail.
When tax rates are not harmonised, so that a choice between the
two forms of neutrality has to be made, it has usually been
argued that, from a global perspective, CEN should take
precedence over CIN, implying a preference for the credit method
of international double tax relief. The reasoning is that when
investors face the same effective tax rate on foreign and
domestic investment, the cross-country equalisation of after-tax
rates of return enforced by capital mobility is achieved when the
pre-tax rates of return are brought into line. In this way a regime
of CEN will tend to equalise the marginal productivities of capital
across countries, as required for maximisation of world income.
The time-honoured concepts of CEN and CIN were developed by
Richman (1963). She also pointed out that from a national as
opposed to a global perspective, neither the credit method nor
the exemption method of international double tax relief seems
optimal……
28
Principi di tassazione internazionale: da NN a NON,
passando per CON
 In assenza di coordinamento, il singolo
paese che agisce individualmente ha come
obiettivo la massimizzazione del reddito
netto generato dall’investimento estero:
 Principio di National Neutrality, che
implicherebbe solo la deduzione delle imposte
pagate all’estero…
Nella realtà si va invece diffondendo
sistema di esenzione…(territoriale)
 più coerente con National Ownership
Neutrality…
29
….. From the viewpoint of the individual country, the addition to
national income generated by investment abroad is the rate of
return after deduction for the foreign source country tax. To
maximise national income foreign investment should only be
carried to the point where its marginal return after payment of
foreign tax equals the pre-tax marginal return to domestic
investment. Since capital mobility tends to equalize after-tax
rates of return, this national optimum is attained when
international double taxation is (partially) relieved through the
deduction method. Under this method the residence country
taxes foreign income net of foreign taxes at the same rate as
domestic income. Such a tax system is sometimes said to imply
National Neutrality (NN), by making foreign and domestic
investment equally attractive from a national perspective.
rH (1-tH) = rF (1-tF) (1-tH)
30
National Neutrality
(optimal policy for an individual government)
 Supported by more the formal analysis of Feldstein and Hartman
(1979), the key policy prescription is that a government should tax
the worldwide income of its residents, treating foreign taxes as a
cost (and hence allowing them to be deducted, but not allowing a
credit).
 The rationale behind this is as follows. Suppose there is a fixed
supply of saving, to be allocated between domestic and outbound
investment. For the country as a whole, the optimal allocation of
investment would equate the ‘social’ rates of return from the two.
In a simple framework, the social rate of return to the home
country is the return net of foreign taxes but before domestic taxes
(since domestic taxes are used to benefit domestic residents).
 Hence the post-foreign-tax rate of return on outbound investment
should be set equal to the pre-tax rate of return on domestic
investment. Private investors, however, will allocate investment to
equalize post-tax rates of return. These two allocations are only
the same under a worldwide tax system where foreign taxes are
deductible from the home-country tax base.
(Devereux, 2008)
31
…. In a world with little explicit tax coordination it may seem
surprising that national governments hardly ever use the
deduction method of international double tax relief in the area of
foreign direct investment (FDI). Indeed, the trend in developed
countries has been towards increased reliance on the exemption
method for corporate taxpayers (see Mullins (2006)). However, as
argued by Desai and Hines (2003), this trend may be easier to
grasp once one recognizes the importance of ownership of the
assets utilized in FDI. Desai and Hines point out that the assets
developed by multinationals through R&D, marketing etc. are
often highly specific, so the productivity of these assets may
depend critically on who owns and controls them. From this
perspective it is important that the tax system does not distort
the pattern of ownership. Building on earlier work by Devereux
(1990), Desai and Hines (op.cit.) therefore suggest that the
concept of “ownership neutrality” should carry at least as much
weight in the evaluation of the international tax system as the
traditional concepts of CEN and CIN….
32
…. A tax system satisfies Capital Ownership Neutrality (CON) if it does
not distort cross-country ownership patterns.
 CON may be attained if all countries in the world practice worldwide
income taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits and if they all apply
the same definition of the tax base. Under such a regime of worldwide
income taxation multinationals will acquire the assets that maximise
their pretax returns in the different countries, since this acquisition
policy will also maximise their after-tax returns. Hence assets will be
held by those companies that would be willing to pay the highest
reservation prices for them in the absence of tax, i.e. by those
companies that can utilize the assets most productively (è come CEN a
livello di impresa)
 However, the same result may be obtained if all residence countries
exempt foreign income from domestic tax and if they apply the same
rules regarding the deductibility of financing costs or writing-off of
cross-border acquisitions. In that case companies from all over the
world face the same effective tax rate in each individual country, so
again the assets invested in each country will be held by those
companies that can earn the highest pre-tax (and hence the highest
after-tax) return on them… (è come CIN a livello di impresa)
33
CON : RP and SP (new slide)
“Desai and Hines also look at what sorts
of tax systems will or will not distort the
ownership of capital. They conclude
that global adoption of either territorial
or worldwide taxation will not distort
ownership patterns even if tax rates
vary across countries.
34
“…In order to understand the circumstances under which
ownership neutrality occurs, the example needs more
structure. Recall that the before-tax rate of return for
investments in the United States is 10 percent a year.
Assume that there is an investment available (the
“candidate investment”) through which a $1000 investment
will yield $1100 in one year when that investment is
liquidated. If the candidate investment in made by a US
investor in the United States, the US investor will report
$100 income to the US treasury, pay $40 tax, and be left
with an after-tax cash flow of $1060. The candidate
investment is, thus, worth $1000 to a US investor.48 That is
because at that price the investment generates an after-tax
return of 6 percent, the same rate as other readily available
investments.
35
“…Assume that the United States and the European
Union both adopt worldwide tax systems. The
before-tax rate of return in the European Union,
then, will be 10 percent as well. However, on their
alternative investments EU investors will earn 7
percent after tax, not the 6 percent after tax as do
US investors. The reason why EU investors earn
more after tax than do US investors is they are
taxed at 30 percent instead of 40 percent.
36
“…If an EU investor acquires the candidate investment in the
United States, then that investor will report $100 of US source
income to the US government. The US government will assess
the taxpayer a tax liability of $40 on that amount. That will allow
the EU investor to repatriate $1060. The EU investor will also
report $100 income to EU tax authorities and be assessed a
tentative tax liability of $30. That investor will also receive a
foreign tax credit of $40 for the $40 paid to the US treasury on
that same income. Because the EU tax liability on that income is
only $30, the EU investor is entitled to a rebate from the EU
treasury of $10. That will leave the EU investor with a net total
tax liability of $30 and hence with a cash flow of $1070 after tax.
The EU investor will, thus, value the candidate investment at
$1000, the same as a US investor. Because the EU and US
investor both value the candidate investment at $1000, CIN is
satisfied with respect to the US market.” (M. Knoll, Reconsidering
International Tax Neutrality, 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law
school, http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/277/)
37
…. The point is that if global ownership neutrality is the policy
goal, the exemption system (also referred to as a territorial tax
system) is just as attractive as a system of worldwide taxation
with foreign tax credits. Moreover, if optimisation of the
ownership pattern is the overriding goal, the territorial system is
actually the preferred policy from the national viewpoint of an
individual country, as argued by Desai and Hines (2003). If a
country practices worldwide income taxation, its multinationals
will tend to earn a lower after-tax return on operations in a foreign
low-tax country than will multinationals headquartered in
countries that exempt foreign income. Assets invested in low-tax
countries will therefore tend to be taken over by companies
based in territorial countries, even if those assets could be used
more productively by companies based in countries with a
worldwide system. By giving up the worldwide system and
switching to territoriality, a country will increase the reservation
prices that its multinationals are willing to pay for assets located
in foreign low-tax countries, enabling domestic companies to
take over assets that they can use more efficiently than
companies based in other countries.…
38
…. Thus a policy of exemption will maximise the after-tax profitability of
domestic multinationals. A country seeking to maximise the sum of its
tax revenue and the after-tax profits of its companies will therefore opt
for the exemption system if such a system does not reduce domestic tax
revenue raised from domestic economic activity. This condition will be
met if any increase in outbound investment triggered by the switch to
territoriality is offset by an equally productive amount of new inbound
investment from foreign firms. Desai and Hines (op.cit.) argue that
increased outbound FDI will indeed typically be offset to a very large
extent by additional inbound investment. They point out that the bulk of
global FDI takes the form of acquisitions of existing firms rather than
new greenfield investment. Thus most cross-border FDI seems to
involve a reshuffling of global ownership patterns rather than involving a
net transfer of saving from one country to another. The active market for
corporate control also suggests that asset ownership may have
important consequences for business productivity. In these
circumstances a policy of territoriality may come close to maximising
national welfare. In the terminology of Desai and Hines, a tax system that
exempts foreign income from domestic tax may be said to satisfy
National Ownership Neutrality (NON).
39
The focus on the importance of ownership and
the concept of NON may help to explain the
trend in the OECD towards greater reliance on
the exemption system in recent decades where
FDI has tended to grow relative to total
economic activity. Apparently governments feel
that the exemption system is better suited than
the worldwide system to promote the global
competitiveness of domestic multinationals…..
(Griffith at al. 2010)
40
Ancora su CON , CIN e CEN (new slide)
CON si focalizza sulla neutralità
relativamente alla proprietà degli asset
(ownership neutrality)
CEN si focalizza sulla neutralità rispetto
alla localizzazione degli asset
(locational neutrality)
 Quale sia più importante è una
questione empirica
41
Difficoltà ad applicare il principio di fonte per
l’imposta societaria (1)
 Unfortunately, identifying that there is no clear rationale for
taxing the returns to outbound investment, and hence
exempting income earned by foreign affiliates from
domestic tax, is relatively straightforward compared to the
problems of implementing a pure source-based tax system.
 A number of difficult problems arise as income and costs
need in principle be allocated between jurisdictions.
 Yet not only is that difficult to achieve in practice, in many
cases there is simply no conceptual basis to support any
particular approach.
(Devereux, 2010)
42
Difficoltà ad applicare il principio di fonte per
l’imposta societaria (2)
 In a simple case, we can consider for example a British
resident company that wholly owns a subsidiary which is
registered, and which carries out all its activities –
employment, production, sales – in, say, France. Then
France would typically be considered to be the source of
the corporate profit. Conventionally, we can also drop
sales from the list of activities: if the subsidiary exported
all its product to Germany, France would still
conventionally be regarded as the source of the profit
(although in economic terms it is less clear why this
would be the case).
43
Difficoltà ad applicare il principio di fonte per
l’imposta societaria (3)
 Things are less clear, however, if the British holding company
owns several subsidiaries in different countries, which undertake
different aspects of the multinational’s activities: for example,
finance, marketing, R&D, production, sales.
 The existing system of separate accounting requires all
transactions between these different parts of the group to be
valued, in order to divide total profit between the countries
involved. The contribution made by each would be determined
using “arm’s length pricing” – in principle, the price that would be
charged by each subsidiary for its services as if it were dealing
with an unrelated party. Of course, such a procedure is difficult in
practice since in many cases no such arm’s length price can be
observed; transactions between subsidiaries of the same
corporation may not be replicated between third parties. But in
many cases, not only is this difficult to administer, it has no
conceptual foundation.
44
Difficoltà ad applicare il principio di fonte per
l’imposta societaria (4)
 The treatment of different forms of income creates another
problem: for example, interest payments are typically taxed in
the country where they are received, rather than the country
from which they are paid; yet this is in contradiction to the
general principle that tax should be levied only where the
income-generating activity took place.
 It is not clear why the form of financing of a foreign affiliate by
its parent should turn the international tax system from one
based on source (for equity-financed investment) to one based
on residence (for debt-financed investment).
 … The basic structure of the international tax system for
multinational companies is close to a source-based tax for
equity-financed investment, but a corporate-residence based
tax for debt financed investment. It is hard to think of a sensible
economic rationale for this practice, especially when the
finance provided is internal to the multinational company.
(Devereux, 2008)
45
Race to the bottom?
 Prevalenza tassazione alla fonte, per l’imposta societaria
 Concorrenza fiscale: tendenza al ribasso delle aliquote (più
marcata nei paesi più piccoli)
 Modello base di concorrenza fiscale: prevede che un’imposta
alla fonte su un fattore mobile come il capitale sia destinata a
scomparire. Anzi sarebbe meglio non tassarlo, il capitale,
perchè in ultima istanza l’incidenza sarebbe sul fattore
immobile (tipicamente il lavoro)
 Ma abbiamo visto che il “race to the bottom” non si è verificato:
le aliquote (legali e un po’ meno METR e AETR) sono calate, ma
CIT/Pil no, è anche aumentato soprattutto nei paesi medi e
piccoli……
 Cosa possiamo aspettarci nel futuro?
 Un’ulteriore riduzione delle aliquote legali ed effettive?
 Una progressiva scomparsa della CIT (e più in generale delle
imposte sui fattori mobili…)
46
Race to the bottom: il futuro
 Abbiamo visto fattori che concorrono a
determinare CIT/Pil, e abbiamo visto che vi
sono motivi per essere meno ottimisti nel
futuro (BI non può crescere all’infinito, anche
se vi sono ancora spazi per una
indeducibilità IP; i profitti del settore
finanziario, che sono stati una importante
spiegazione, hanno subito forti riduzioni …)
 Vediamo adesso se vi sono fattori che
contrastano la tendenza alla riduzione delle
aliquote…. ossia al race to the bottom
previsto dai modelli di concorrenza fiscale.
47
Motivi che contrastano le predizioni di una
“race to the bottom”…
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Rendite specifiche di localizzazione, incluse alcune
infrastrutture materiali e immateriali che possono
essere finanziate con l’imposta
Non perfetta mobilità dei capitali
Presenza di un credito di imposta per le imposte
pagate all’estero
Ruolo dell’imposta societaria come backstop per
l’imposta personale
Vincoli politici all’abolizione dell’imposta societaria
L’imposta societaria permane solo per le imprese
interne (fattori non mobili); le altre possono sempre
eludere o evadere……
48
Testi di riferimento





P.B.Sorensen, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And
Should They? CESifo Economic Studies, vol.53, 2/2007
A. J. Auerbach, M.P. Devereux e H Simpson, Taxing
corporate income, DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN, The
Mirrlees Review, Chair SIR JAMES MIRRLEES, IFS, 2010,
http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/dimensions/ch9.pdf
R. Griffith, J. Hines e P.B.Sorensen, International capital
taxation, DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN, The Mirrlees
Review, Chair SIR JAMES MIRRLEES, IFS, 2010,,
http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/dimensions/ch10.pdf
OECD, Fundamental reform of corporate income tax,
OECD Tax policy studies, n.16, 2007
M.C.Guerra, Neutralità della tassazione degli interessi in
economia aperta, Lettura n. 7
49

Altre letture citate o utili:





Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership
Distortions, and International Tax Welfare Benchmarks, 2008,
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/Kane.pdf
Michael P. Devereux, Business taxation in a globalized
world, Oxf Rev Econ Policy (2008) 24(4): 625-638
Devereux, M.P., 2008. ‘Taxation of outbound direct
investment: economic principles and tax policy
considerations.’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24 (4),
698–719; reprinted in Head, J & Krever, R (eds) 2009, Tax
reform in the 21st century, Kluwer.
M. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 2009,
University of Pennsylvania Law school,
http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/277/
M. Ruf, Determining Taxable Income to Ensure Capital
Ownership Neutrality, WP Mannheim Univ. 2009
50