Transcript Solar Superstorm Threat to Infrastructure

The Solar Superstorm (SS)
Threat to Infrastructure
7/28/2008
Purpose: summarize key findings from …
– Workshop on the Societal and Economic Impacts of Severe Space Weather
Events, sponsored by the National Academies, 22-23 May 2008 [Reference 1, denoted
as R1]
– Recent FEMA studies related to Solar Superstorms
•
•
•
“An Assessment of the Threat Potential to the US Electric Power Grids from Extreme Space Weather
Storms – Analysis of US Power System Impacts from Large Geomagnetic Storm Events” by John
Kappenman and Peter Warner, Metatech Corporation, in support of a FEMA sponsored contract with
Cubic Applications, Inc., 1 Oct 2007 (Meta-R-295) [R2]
“The Threat of a 100-Year Geomagnetic Superstorm to the U.S. Power Infrastructure” by Dr. William
Radasky, Ph.D., P.E. and Mr. John Kappenman, P.E., Metatech Corporation, in support of a FEMA
sponsored contract with Cubic Applications, Inc., 20 January 2008 (Meta-R-280) [R3]
“Economic Analysis of a Major Geomagnetic Storm on the United States” – Briefing provided by Cubic
Applications, Inc., 8 February 2008 [R4]
– NASA websites
•
•
•
http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/06may_carringtonflare.htm (accessed 6/5/2008) [R5]
http://helios.gsfc.nasa.gov/cme.html#cmenews (accessed 6/5/2008) [R6]
http://www.nasa.gov/vision/universe/solarsystem/perfect_space_storm.html (accessed 6/5/08) [R7]
– Email from J. Kappenman to K. Briggs, 6/5/08, “Subject: Follow-up” [R8]
– Historical news articles: www.solarstorms.org [R9]
– “Solar Tsunamis”, briefing by John Greenhill, Department of Energy representative
to the National Communications System, 11/12/2007 [R10]
– “Bracing for a Solar SuperStorm” by Sten F. Odenwald and James L. Green,
Scientific American, August 2008 [R11]
– NOAA websites
• http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/info/SolarEffects.html (accessed 7/22/2008) [R12]
• http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/primer/primer.html (and other primer pages – accessed 7/22/2008) [R13]
• http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/NOAAscales/index.html#GeomagneticStorms (accessed 7/22/2008) [R14]
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
2
Why should we be concerned?
• Note: This briefing does not present a DHS or NCS position regarding
Solar Superstorms. It does consolidate some subject matter expert
opinions from government and industry regarding this threat.
• Some reasons for concern (as explained later in the brief):
– A Solar Superstorm (SS) could strike the United States (US) in the near future
• Last US SS occurred in 1972 … SSs historically occur about every 30 years over the US
• Our power infrastructure is far more vulnerable to SSs today than back in 1972
– SSs could cause long term power outages (from weeks to years)
– A long term outage (LTO) over large regions would lead to severe communications
disruptions that would hinder restoration efforts
– LTOs could cover large portions of our country; LTOs could also occur in other nations
– Without power/communications, all other infrastructures are disrupted/eventually fail
– A black start of large portions of the US power grids may be required
– Without communications for the operators and SCADA* nets, restarting grid regions may
be impossible; all infrastructures would need resilient communications to limit losses
– Some of the necessary equipment required to fix the problem, such as large generator
step-up (GSU) transformers, are in short supply, require a long time to install, and may
require years to be delivered from overseas
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
* SCADA = Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
3
What are Solar Superstorms?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
A Solar Superstorm (also called a Solar Tsunami) is “a huge destructive geomagnetic disturbance
in the earth caused by a coronal mass ejection (CME)” [R10, p. 12]
“Solar flares and CMEs are currently the biggest "explosions" in our solar system, roughly
approaching the power in ONE BILLION hydrogen bombs!” [R6]
“There are about 5,000 solar CMEs per year but only few hit the earth” [R10, page 7]
Solar Superstorms strike the earth about once every 11 years. They have an intensity of over 200
on the “Ap” storm intensity index. [R3, page 4 ]
– SSs often focus their energy on continental sized regions of the earth [R10, page 4]
– SSs are likely to occur over the USA about once every 30 years [R2, p. 3-13]
“Fast CMEs occur more often near the peak of the 11-year solar cycle, and can trigger major
disturbances in Earth's magnetosphere, known as space weather.” [R6]
– Fastest CME plasma reached earth in 14.6 hours [R1(ww7.nationalacademies.org/ssb/spaceweather08_green.pdf)]
CMEs ≠ Solar Flares; “large non-recurrent geomagnetic storms are produced by coronal mass
ejections (CMEs), not by solar flares.” (http://lheawww.gsfc.nasa.gov/~reames/DARK7.HTML)
“Geomagnetic storms are created when the Earth's magnetic field captures ionized particles
carried by the solar wind due to coronal mass ejections or coronal holes at the Sun. Although there
are different types of disturbances noted at the Earth surface, the disturbances can be
characterized as a very slowly varying magnetic field with rise times as fast as a few seconds, and
pulse widths of up to an hour. The rate of change of the magnetic field is a major factor in creating
electric fields in the Earth and thereby inducing quasi-dc current flow in the power transmission
network.” [R2, page 1-1]
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
Note: Red text highlights are not in the original texts quoted in this briefing
4
Historical “1 in 100 year +”
Solar Superstorms over the USA
• 1859 “Carrington” Superstorm (a 5,000+ nanoTesla (nT)/min. level event [R2, p.3-13] )
– “At 11:18 AM on … September 1, 1859, 33-year-old Richard Carrington … was capturing the
likeness of an enormous group of sunspots. Suddenly, before his eyes, two brilliant beads of
blinding white light appeared over the sunspots, intensified rapidly, and became kidneyshaped. … Just before dawn the next day, skies all over planet Earth erupted in red, green,
and purple auroras so brilliant that newspapers could be read as easily as in daylight. Indeed,
stunning auroras pulsated even at near tropical latitudes over Cuba, the Bahamas, Jamaica,
El Salvador, and Hawaii.” (http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/06may_carringtonflare.htm)
– “Within hours, telegraph wires in both the United States and Europe spontaneously shorted
out, causing numerous fires, while the Northern Lights, solar-induced phenomena more
closely associated with regions near Earth's North Pole, were documented as far south as
Rome, Havana and Hawaii, with similar effects at the South Pole.” [R7]
– Unseen by Carrington, the largest “earth-directed” CME in the past 500 years occurred
• 1921 “NY Railroad” Superstorm (a ~5,000 nT/min. level event [R2, p.3-13] )
– “… induced currents caused fires in telegraph equipment in Sweden” [R2, page 3-8]
– “At 7:04 AM on May 15, the entire signal and switching system of the New York Central
Railroad below 125th street was put out of operation, followed by a fire in the control tower at
57th Street and Park Avenue. … Telegraph Operator Hatch said that he was actually driven
away from his telegraph instrument by a flame that enveloped his switchboard and ignited the
entire building at a loss of $6,000.” [R9, http://www.solarstorms.org/SS1921.html]
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
5
Other more recent
Solar Superstorms over the USA
• 1940 “Easter Sunday” Solar Superstorm
– “On Easter Sunday calls to grandma by millions of people were halted between 10:00
AM and 4:00 PM creating pandemonium at nearly all Western Union offices. [New York
Times, March 25, 1940, p. 1]. A telephone cable between Fargo North Dakota and
Winnipeg was found with its wires fused together, presumably from the voltage surges.
… In Bangor Maine, lightning arresters were burned out as well. The New York Times
noted that United Press reported earth currents at 400 Volts in Boston, 450 in
Milwaukee, and more than 750 Volts near St. Louis. All tolled, the Associated Press's
entire investment of 185,000 miles of leased wires were put out of service. Practically
every long-distance telegraph or telephone office in the country was doing repair work
.... AT&T land lines had been badly disrupted by 600 volt surges on wires designed for
48 volts. In the Atlantic Cable between Scotland and Newfoundland, voltages up to
2,600 volts were recorded during the storm.” [R9]*
– “… first reported power system problems” [R2, page 3-6]
• 1972 “Space Age” Solar Superstorm (~2,200 nT/min. level event [R2, p.3-13] )
– “knocked out long-distance telephone communication across Illinois … event … caused
AT&T to redesign its power system for transatlantic cables.”
[http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/06may_carringtonflare.htm]
– “At 22:30 UT AT&T reported a voltage surge of 60 volts on their coaxial telephone cable
between Chicago and Nebraska. Another 30 minute shutdown of phone service on Bell's
cable link between Plano, Illinois and Cascade, Iowa was also attributed to the storm.
* [R9, http://www.solarstorms.org/SRefStorms.html]
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
6
1989 “Hydro Quebec” Solar Storm caused a
collapse of Quebec’s grid within 92 seconds
This ~400 nT/min
storm caused
Quebec’s grid to
go down. The most
noteworthy event
(within the US
during this storm)
was the complete
loss of a large
generator step-up
(GSU) transformer
connected to the
500kV grid at the
Salem Nuclear
Power Plant.
[R2, pages 2-1 22, and 2-29]
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
7
Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs)
Space Perspectives
Below: A CME from
SOHO/LASCO of an April
7, 1997 halo event. A "halo"
event is one where the
CME is headed in the
direction of Earth. The dark
disk in the center is not the
Sun, but the occulting, or
Sun-blocking, disk of the
LASCO coronagraph [R6]
Above: Graphic of a CME interacting with the earth’s
magnetosphere
Credit: www-istp.gsfc.nasa.gov/istp/outreach/images/Gusts/cme-earth.jpg
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
8
Coronal Mass Ejections and the Earth
Image from the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory
(SOHO) satellite shows an erupting coronal mass ejection,
with an Earth inset at the approximate scale of the image.
R7 Credit: NASA
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
9
•
Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs)
As seen on the earth as auroras
“Auroras are much more than just pretty lights in the sky. Underlying each display is a
potent geomagnetic storm with possible side-effects ranging from satellite malfunctions in
orbit to power outages on terra firma. Telecommunications, air traffic, power grids and GPS
systems are all vulnerable. In a society that relies increasingly on space technology,
understanding these storms is vital.” – Tony Phillips, NASA
(from: www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/topstory/2008/aurora_live.html ; accessed June 2008)
An aurora in Alaska
Credit: Jan Curtis of the Geophysical Institute at
the University of Alaska
An aurora in Plymouth, OH.
Credit: Terry Lutz
from: www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/topstory/2008/aurora_live.html
from www.nasa.gov/images/content/119657main_aurora_lg.jpg
(web page accessed in June 2008)
(web page accessed in June 2008)
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
10
Systems that can be impacted by
Solar Storms
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
Credit: NASA and Bell laboratories, Lucent Technologies
www-istp.gsfc.nasa.gov/istp/outreach/images/Gusts/effects.gif [June 2008]
11
Activities disrupted by solar storm events
Solar Radiation
Hazards (caused
by solar proton
events, etc.)
Geomagnetic
Activity
(caused by
CME plasma)
Solar Radio
Interference
(caused by
solar X-rays)
Satellite operations
X
Monitoring orbital variation
Monitoring command & control anomalies
X
Ground-to-spacecraft communications
X
X
X
X
Aviation
X
Middle-latitude communication (VHF)
Polar-cap communication (HF)
X
X
Navigation (VLF)
X
X
High-altitude polar flights
X
Electric Power Distribution
X
Long-line telephone communications
X
HF communication
X
Pipeline operations
X
Geophysical exploration
X
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
Derived from: http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/info/SolarEffects.html [R12]
12
NOAA Space Weather Scale for
Geomagnetic Storms
G5
Extreme
G4
Severe
Power systems: widespread voltage control problems and protective system problems can occur, some grid systems may
experience complete collapse or blackouts. Transformers may experience damage.
Satellites: may experience extensive surface charging, problems with orientation, up/downlink and tracking.
Other systems: pipeline currents can reach hundreds of amps, HF (high frequency) radio propagation may be impossible in
many areas for one to two days, satellite navigation may be degraded for days, low-frequency radio navigation can be out for
hours. Aurora has been seen as low as Florida and southern Texas (typically 40° geomagnetic lat.).
Power systems: possible widespread voltage control problems and some protective systems will mistakenly trip out key
assets from the grid.
Satellites: may experience surface charging and tracking problems, corrections may be needed for orientation.
Other systems: induced pipeline currents affect preventive measures, HF radio propagation sporadic, satellite navigation
degraded for hours, low-frequency radio navigation disrupted.
Aurora has been seen as low as Alabama and northern California (typically 45° geomagnetic lat.).
G3
Strong
Power systems: voltage corrections may be required, false alarms triggered on some protection devices.
Spacecraft operations: surface charging may occur on satellite components, drag may increase on low-Earth-orbit satellites,
and corrections may be needed for orientation problems.
Other systems: intermittent satellite navigation and HF radio; low-frequency radio navigation problems may occur.
Aurora has been seen as low as Illinois and Oregon (typically 50° geomagnetic lat.).
G2
Moderate
Power systems: high-latitude systems may experience voltage alarms, long-duration storms may cause transformer damage.
Satellites: corrective actions to orientation may be required; possible changes in drag affect orbit predictions.
Other systems: HF radio propagation can fade at higher latitudes.
Aurora has been seen as low as New York and Idaho (typically 55° geomagnetic lat.).
G1
Minor
Power systems: weak power grid fluctuations can occur.
Spacecraft operations: minor impact on satellite operations possible.
Other systems: migratory animals are affected at this and higher levels
Aurora is commonly visible at high latitudes (northern Michigan and Maine).
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
Derived from: http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/NOAAscales/index.html#GeomagneticStorms
[R14]
13
Examples of historical Solar Storm
damage to infrastructure
Solar Storms have damaged critical infrastructures
– Satellites (upset and damage) [R1]
• 1994: Anik E1 & E2 damaged (TV and data services lost to 1600 communities)
• 1998: PanAmSat's Galaxy IV satellite (disrupted pager service across USA)
• 2003: Extensive satellite upsets and damage due to a solar storm
– Power grid (especially Extra High Voltage (EHV) transformers) (damage) [R1/2/9]
• 1958 & 1972: Transformer failures at British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority
• 1989: Hydro Quebec power interrupted/damaged; Salem NJ nuclear plant transformers failed
• 2003: 14 transformers damaged in South Africa [R1 and R2, page 3-25]
– Long communications lines (disruption and damage) [R1/2/5/9]
• 1859, 1882, 1909, 1921, 1926: Telegraph lines disrupted, operators shocked, fires started
• 1940 and 1958: Landline and undersea lines disrupted and/or damaged
• 1972: US and Canada’s telephone system damaged/disrupted
– HF radio paths (disruption) [R1/9]
• 1991 upset of HF radio support Gulf War
– Global Positioning System (GPS) (disruption) [R1]
Damaged Salem NJ nuclear plant
transformer
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/06may_carringtonflare.htm
14
Potential impacts to satellites
•
“Experts who have studied the question say there is little to be done to protect satellites
from a Carrington-class flare. In fact, a recent paper estimates potential damage to the
900-plus satellites currently in orbit could cost between $30 billion and $70 billion. The
best solution, they say: have a pipeline of comsats ready for launch.”
- Source: http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/06may_carringtonflare.htm
Source for table at right: [R1]
www7.nationalacademies.org/ssb/
spaceweather08_green.pdf
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
15
Solar Superstorms can occur at any time
SSs denoted by red peaks
Sunspots shown in blue
From R3,
page 4.
SSs are more frequent during peaks of
sunspot cycle (2011/12 is Cycle 24 peak)
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
SSs do not always follow the
sunspot cycle
16
Damaging Solar Superstorm Probabilities
• One in 100 year storms (of ~4,800+ nT/min level over the USA)*:
– In the last 150 years, only the 1859 and 1921 SSs reached this level
– 62 years between these storms … 87 years have passed since (1921 – 2008)
– Later slides show the potential impact on the E. Coast for a 4800 nT/min storm
• One in 30 year storms (of ~2,400+ nT/min level over the USA)*:
– 1972 (and perhaps in 1940 and 1958) solar storm(s) approached this level over
the USA (none have reached this level over the last 36 years in the USA)
– 1989 Hydro Quebec storm was at a lower level (max ~900 nT/min in N. America)
• This storm caused transformer damage at one nuclear power plant site in NJ
• Caused complete collapse of Quebec’s power grid
• The US power grid is generally more vulnerable to these effects today
– Later slides show the potential impact on the W. Coast for a 2,400 nT/min storm
• The next solar sunspot maximum will occur in 2011-2012
– Likelihood of a Solar Superstorm increases during solar max periods
Bottom line: Some experts believe we are due for a damaging,
possibly catastrophic storm. The next “high risk” period is 2011-2012.
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
* From R2, page 3-13
17
CONUS High-Voltage Transmission Network
US has the world’s most extensive grid at
345kV & above
Today’s US power grid
is far more vulnerable
to SSs than during the
last major storm in
1972.
From R2 (Metatech: Meta-R-295), p. 1-13
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
The higher the voltage,
the higher the risk.
18
Continental US High Voltage Transformers
From R2, page 1-13
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
19
Metatech SS Scenario Results (part 1)
presented at National Academies Workshop, 23 May 08
Areas of probable
immediate power
system collapse
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
Cascading effects
could potentially
cause outages
across major
portions of the US
power grid and
could necessitate a
Black Start of the
grid.
20
Metatech SS Scenario Results (part 2)
presented at National Academies Workshop, 23 May 08
Percentage of at-risk transformer capacity in Mega VoltAmpere (MVA) (for the 50° N scenario) for each State




 








 
40%









39%

72%








12%
26%




6%


24%


7%












1%
27%






6%



17%



7%

32
%
55%
33%
15%
19% 18%

30%


9%

11%


97
% 24%








  



 





 



 






























 

 




  
  



 





 



 

















 






 

 

 

 
 

36%




23%
47%

30%
7%

19%
17%
38%



8%



47%



37%
75%
21%








 



34%
35%
82%
55%
Metatech reported that approximately 365
large EHV transformers would be at-risk of
permanent damage in this scenario [R1 and R8]
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
21
Metatech SS Scenario Results (part 3)
presented at National Academies Workshop, 23 May 08
•
“Present US Grid Operational Procedures are based largely on limited
experience, generally do not reduce GIC* flows and are unlikely to be
adequate for historically large disturbance events”
•
“Historically large storms have potential to create Power Grid Blackouts and
Transformer Damage of unprecedented proportions, long term blackout,
lengthy restoration times, and chronic shortages (multiple years) are possible”
•
“Economic and societal costs could be also of unprecedented levels;
– August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout Cost Estimate $4 - $10 Billion
– Hurricane Katrina Cost Estimate $150 - $300 Billion
– Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario ~$1 - $2 Trillion (in 1st Year)
•
“Depending on Damage, Full Recovery could take 4 – 10 Years”
•
“Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is
readily available, Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead
of ambiguous K/G Indices”
•
“Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm-Related
Catastrophic Failure - Remedial Design measures (transformer neutral
resistors) are readily feasible and cost effective (~$100M) and have potential
to reduce GIC 60-70%.”
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
* GIC = Geomagnetically-Induced Current
22
FEMA Solar Superstorm
Scenario Background
Disturbance Centered at 45° N Latitude Disturbance Centered at 50° N Latitude
For the analysis done for FEMA by Metatech, the eastern US is exposed to a 4800 nT/min
disturbance intensity, while west of the Mississippi, the disturbance intensity decreases to only 2400
nT/min. This simulation was also performed for the two highest impact and likeliest latitude
locations, the 45° N and 50° N locations. Using the impact criteria described in Appendix 1 (from
reference R2) and using a 2-minute time window during the disturbance peak, the regions of
expected power system collapse can be estimated.
[Derived from “An Assessment of the Threat Potential to the US Electric Power Grids from Extreme Space Weather Storms – Analysis of
US Power System Impacts from Large Geomagnetic Storm Events” by John Kappenman and Peter Warner, Metatech Corporation, in
support of a FEMA sponsored contract with Cubic Applications, Inc., 1 Oct 2007 (Meta-R-295) [R2]]
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
23
FEMA Solar Superstorm Study Results
Grid Transformer Damage (45°N scenario)
Areas of probable
immediate power
system collapse
Cascading effects
could potentially
cause outages
across major
portions of the US
power grid and
could necessitate a
Black Start of the
grid.
From: “An Assessment of the Threat Potential to the US Electric Power Grids from Extreme Space Weather Storms – Analysis of
US Power System Impacts from Large Geomagnetic Storm Events” by John Kappenman and Peter Warner, Metatech Corporation,
in support of a FEMA sponsored contract with Cubic Applications, Inc., 1 Oct 2007 (Meta-R-295) [R2]
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
24
FEMA Solar Superstorm Study Results
for Grid Transformer Damage (50°N scenarios)
If transformers fail at GIC over 90A:
~640 Transformers Damaged
If transformers fail at GIC over 30A:
~1000 Transformers Damaged
US Grid Map with Effective GIC Over 90A
US Grid Map with Effective GIC Over 30A
4800nT Scenario Centered at 50N





 W
A


 



MT
ND




SD

 

CA

 UT
 


IA




CO

KS  




AZ


NE




OK








MI



 A



NY   

M

  

 
 






 
 















  

PA  
J
N

 
 


 



 
  


OH   
MD DE


 IL 



IN 




WV

 
 






VA  



 


KY
 

 

 
 

NC


TN







MO

AR
NM
SC


MS
AL
 

 GA

MT


ID








 

NV
WY
 

 UT

 




AZ




CO











 


NM





TX
LA

 
ME
ND






MN















VT NH 

 

 MI



 
 A






NY   





M






 
 
 
 







 





 

































 
 



IA

PA  




J




N











 
NE
 







  


  





OH   
 



 

MD
  
 
DE












IL
IN


  
 





  



 WV  

 

 
   
 




  

  


  








 

VA  
KS  
 
MO  





  KY


 
 








 







 

 

NC



TN
 







  

 


OK







 
AR


SC





 

 


 
GA


AL

 
MS




SD

 




CA





R





VT NH 
WI


WY

NV

MN
ID



ME

R






 W
A







    



 


O



 




O

4800nT Scenario Centered at 50N







WI

TX
LA
FL
FL
At Present, 3+ Years Delivery Time for a Single Replacement Transformer in World Market
No Domestic Manufacturing Facilities Exist in the USA for EHV Transformers
Even the Medium Damage Scenario May Take ~10 Years to Replace All Damaged Transformers
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
From: “Economic Analysis of a Major Geomagnetic Storm on the United
States” – Briefing provided by Cubic Applications, Inc., 8 February 2008 [R4]
25
Some Blackstart Issues
•
“… Nuclear would not be available for blackstart and may not be able to be reestablished at all due to transformer loss. Large coal plants (the largest
source of electric energy in the US) would also be at-risk long term due to
transformer loss. Natural Gas fueled electric generation (also a significant
share of elec gen capacity) may not be able to operate at all due to concerns
about interdependencies and loss of gas supply either immediately or within
very short time period following power grid collapse (i.e. there is no ability to
do gas storage at the generator unlike other plants, they run off of pipeline
pressure which is constantly adjusted by pipeline companies through use of
pressurization pump facilities, many of which can be dependent on electric
grid availability). Next major generation resources are hydro which is
generally remote from all population areas and may not be accessible due to
loss of EHV grid (due to multiple transformer failures). This leaves some
small pockets of distillate fueled generation in major metropolitan areas as
last resort, and fuel inventories for these plants according to DOE data is
generally less than 10 days and capacity is very small relative to normal
energy demand anyway.”
(from R8: Quote of J. Kappenman’s 5 June 08 email to K. Briggs)
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
26
Summary of key findings
related to the Solar Superstorm threat
•
A Solar Superstorm can seriously disrupt our power and communications
infrastructures (and as a result, all other key infrastructures)
– Significant portions of the USA (especially the East & West Coasts and Texas) are at risk
– Cascading effects could cause blackouts over most of the USA
•
We are heading into a solar max period (2011 – 2012) with increased risk
– However, we could be struck by a Solar Superstorm at any time
•
•
•
•
Since communications are dependent on power and the power grids are
dependent on comms, we need to protect both to avoid long-term power outages
Long-term outages (LTOs) are possible over large regions (perhaps for years)
Resilient capabilities need to be in-place to enable blackstart(s)
Additional mitigation efforts proposed include:
– Protect EHV transformers by installing large resistors on the transformer neutrals
– Develop resilient communications infrastructures that can operate through LTOs
– Improve our national capabilities to provide warnings to industry, etc. regarding SSs
•
•
•
•
Ensure we have SS warning satellites and ground sensors to provide timely SS alerts
Utilize near-real-time analysis capabilities to predict GIC levels and provide informed alerts
Develop a precise measure/index for SSs … the Kp index is viewed as inadequate
Stockpile large GSU transformers as well as other EHV transformers and critical parts
Kevin Briggs 7/28/2008
27