Transcript Does transparency make local governments more responsive

Does transparency make local
governments more responsive?
Evidence from the Philippines using
difference-in-difference approach
Joseph Capuno
(University of the Philippines)
Maria Melody Garcia
(University of Rome – Tor Vergata)
Objective
• The paper tests the proposition that
transparency make local governments more
responsive using data from a local governance
project piloted in 12 municipalities/cities
• Specifically, we test if public information on
local government performance would have a
positive impact on public service delivery and
assessed responsiveness of officials to the
needs of their constituents
Related Literature
• The evidence is mixed regarding the
responsiveness of local governments (LG) to
local needs under decentralization
• Faguet (2004) found supporting evidence in
Bolivia
• Lewis (2005) found in Indonesia that LGs are
only partly responsive to local needs, and also
partly captured by local elites
• Ahmad et al (2005) found mixed results
The Philippine experience
under decentralization
• There have been proliferation of innovative
local public services since 1991 when the
Local Government Code was adopted
(Capuno, 2007).
• There are also cases where middling leaders
or corrupt ones further entrenched their hold
to political power (Lacaba, 1995)
• Azfar et al (2001) found that local officials do
not necessarily make use of their superior
information in making fiscal decisions
The Good Governance and Local
Development Project
• Aimed to develop and advocate the
institutionalization of a set of indicators of good
governance - the Governance for Local
Development Index (GI)
• GI was piloted for two years (2001-2002) in 12
municipalities/cities of the provinces of Bulacan
and Davao del Norte
• The pilot test was conducted to investigated the
impact of public dissemination of local
government performance on the citizens’
perceived responsiveness of local officials
Pilot Areas and Local Partners
Relative
Levels of
Development
High
Low
Bulacan
Treatment Areas
Control Areas
Civil Society
Partner
Civil
LGU Partner
Society
Partner
San Jose del Baliwag
Plaridel
Monte City (Soropti-mist (Bulacan State
(City
Internatio-nal UniversityPlanning and of Baliwag)
Bustos
Development
Campus*,
Office)
Rotary Club
of Bustos**)
Guiguinto
Angat
(Municipal
(Rotary Club
Planning and of Angat)
Development
Office)
Bustos
(Bulacan State
UniversityBustos
Campus*,
Rotary Club
of Bustos**)
Davao del Norte
Treatment Areas
Control Areas
LGU Partner
Panabo City
(City Planning
and Development Office)
Braulio E.
Dujali
(Municipal
Planning and
Development
Office)
Civil Society
Partner
Civil
Society
Partner
Sto. Tomas
Tagum City
(Davao
(St. Mary’s
Provinces Rural College-Tagum
Develop-ment
City*,
Institute, Inc.)
University of
Southeastern
Philippines**)
Island Garden
City of Samal
(LAWIG
Foundation)
Asuncion
(PhilNet-Rural
Development
Institute*,
University of
Southeastern
Philippines**)
The Governance for Local
Development Index (GI)
Public Service Needs
Expenditure Prioritization
Participatory Development
The GI Scores
• Ranges from 0 to 100
• The scores were not announced in the control sites
• The scores were announced in the treatment sites
through posters, stickers, magazines
• The scores were also presented by the local
partners in public forums for at least three times
and an extra forum was held exclusively for local
officials
• The public dissemination of the assessed
performance of LGs is expected to influence the
behavior of the local officials and their constituents
The Data
•
•
•
•
Three rounds of random household surveys
Same sampling design and instrument
100 household respondents per municipality
Sampling weights were used
First round of GI scores
Jun-Aug 2001
Baseline survey
Apr-May 2001
Pilot period 1
Feb-Mar 2002
Second round of GI scores
Mar-Sep 2002
Pilot period 2
Feb-Mar 2003
Demographic characteristics
Baseline
Pilot period 1
Mean
Control
Mean
Treatme
nt
pvalue
Other index
0.446
0.500
Age
40.390
Income(ln)
Pilot period 2
Mean
Control
Mean
Treatme
nt
Mean
Control
Mean
Treatme
nt
pvalue
p-value
0.081
0.455
0.344
0.000
0.256
0.199
0.026
0.360
41.361
0.226
41.751
41.949
0.836
43.315
42.492
0.382
41.895
8.657
8.696
0.486
8.712
8.587
0.049
8.710
8.502
0.000
8.628
College
0.302
0.292
0.711
0.221
0.248
0.302
0.238
0.248
0.703
0.260
Electric bill
488.39
458.11
0.404
411.24
478.23
0.185
452.43
467.70
0.653
462.29
Regular job
0.526
0.512
0.640
0.616
0.629
0.648
0.601
0.532
0.026
0.566
Government
employee
0.063
0.064
0.964
0.062
0.064
0.893
0.069
0.061
0.598
0.064
Owner
0.753
0.745
0.773
0.551
0.601
0.106
0.711
0.678
0.250
0.674
Married
0.834
0.801
0.177
0.795
0.778
0.513
0.790
0.800
0.698
0.798
Household head
0.335
0.354
0.547
0.468
0.419
0.119
0.409
0.360
0.100
0.386
Spouse
0.542
0.509
0.298
0.382
0.398
0.593
0.455
0.481
0.415
0.462
Family size
5.307
5.200
0.462
5.042
5.127
0.534
5.197
5.342
0.293
5.210
Male
0.317
0.296
0.449
0.278
0.325
0.107
0.297
0.306
0.731
0.305
Re-elected
Mayor
0.501
0.870
0.000
0.494
0.886
0.000
0.501
0.886
0.000
0.751
High income
barangay
0.798
0.676
0.000
0.800
0.679
0.000
0.798
0.679
0.000
0.719
No. of
observations
397
754
385
761
391
770
Variables
Total
3458
Evaluation framework
• DiD – differences in responsiveness of LG
before and after the introduction of the index
in the control site is calculated, and then
subtracted from the differences in the
responsiveness of the LG officials before and
after the introduction of the index in the
treatment sites
Desirable changes in the delivery of
public service
Desirable changes
Coefficient
Z-statistic
Treatment x Pilot period 1
0.222***
4.341
Treatment x Pilot period 2
0.101**
2.392
0.148***
3.419
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
Desirable changes
CSO/NGO partners
LGU partners
Coefficient
Z-statistic
Coefficient
Z-statistic
Treatment x Pilot period 1
0.115**
2.108
0.285***
3.092
Treatment x Pilot period 2
0.056
1.157
0.133**
2.369
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
0.055
1.098
0.198***
3.74
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10
Mayor’s responsiveness to complaints
Mayor's responsiveness to complaints
Coefficient
Z-statistic
Treatment x Pilot period 1
0.111**
2.201
Treatment x Pilot period 2
-0.07
-1.424
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
0.029
0.67
Mayor's responsiveness to complaints
CSO/NGO partners
LGU partners
Coefficient
Z-statistic
Coefficient
Z-statistic
Treatment x Pilot period 1
0.002
0.033
0.182**
2.326
Treatment x Pilot period 2
-0.205***
-3.649
0.038
0.668
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
-0.089**
-1.902
0.115**
2.232
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10
Responsiveness of local officials
Responsiveness of local officials
Mayor
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
Vice Mayor
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
Municipal councilors
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
Barangay councilors
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
Barangay captain
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10
Coefficient
Z-statistic
0.033
-0.098**
-0.026
0.661
-2.067
-0.611
0.037
-0.002
0.014
0.859
-0.045
0.339
0.059
-0.046
0.008
1.298
-0.978
0.189
0.174***
0.07
0.129***
3.488
1.361
3.108
0.113**
-0.011
0.06
2.345
-0.303
1.532
Responsiveness of officials
Responsiveness of local officials
Mayor
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
Vice Mayor
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
Municipal councilors
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
Barangay councilors
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
Barangay captain
Treatment x Pilot period 1
Treatment x Pilot period 2
Treatment x Pilot period 1 & 2
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10
CSO/NGO partners
Coefficient Z-statistic
LGU partners
Coefficient Z-statistic
-0.066
-0.170***
-0.115**
-1.221
-3.018
-2.426
0.106*
-0.004
0.048
1.472
-0.1
0.915
-0.008
-0.05
-0.032
-0.147
-0.904
-0.664
0.08
0.066
0.046
1.263
1.195
0.912
-0.004
-0.071
-0.038
-0.08
-1.303
-0.787
0.126*
0.029
0.048
1.908
0.544
0.94
0.065
0.019
0.035
1.304
0.463
0.87
0.258***
0.198***
0.200***
2.969
3.444
3.827
0.009
-0.049
-0.017
0.175
-1.099
-0.434
0.171*
0.1
0.112**
1.847
1.956
2.333
Conclusion (1)
• Overall, the result shows that the index has
increased the probability of improving
delivery of public service.
• Mayor’s responsiveness to complaints
appeared short-lived
• The effect of the index on local officials’
probability of being responsive is mixed.
Municipal officials tend to be less responsive
than their village counterpart.
Conclusion (2)
• Impact of index on improved public service
delivery is strongest if disseminated by LGs
• Positive effect on responsiveness if the LGs
made the announcement and negative effects
if the announcement is made by CSO/NGOs.
• The effectiveness of the index may depend on
the characteristic of the local partner.
Implications in the design of
performance rating systems
• An effective accountability mechanism is a
performance benchmarking system
• Rating or assessment matters. Has to be simple to
be understood by an average resident
• Designating the announcement of scores to local
NGO/CSO should be proceeded with care
• The presence of a neutral body can help lend
credibility if scores are generated by LGs
• Perhaps the best solution in carrying out a local
scorecard would be a partnership between LG units
and CSO/NGO.
Thank you!