Transcript 投影片 1

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Chapter 12 Uncertainty
Consider two lotteries
L1: 500,000 (1)
L1’: 2,500,000 (0.1), 500,000 (0.89), 0 (0.01)
Which one would you choose?
Another two lotteries
L2: 500,000 (0.11), 0 (0.89)
L2’: 2,500,000 (0.1), 0 (0.9)
Again, which one would you choose?
• Risk is a fact of life. In addition to
lotteries, we face risks when walking
across the streets (especially in Taipei),
making an investment or even getting
married.
• Since there exist risks, outcomes are not
deterministic and assume they can be
described by a probability distribution.
• Think about states of nature (s1,s2, …,sn)
with probability (1, 2, …,n). On state i,
the consumption is ci.
• Hence, we can think of a contingent
consumption plan (c1,c2, …,cn). And draw
a consumer’s preference on the
consumption plane. Notice that the
contingent consumption plan is a
specification of what will be consumed in
different states of nature. And the
preference on consumption plans
certainly may depend on the probabilities
of states, (1, 2, …,n).
• An example: A lottery ticket costs 1 dollar.
The rule is there will be a winning number
drawn from 1-100, each with equal
probability. When you buy a ticket, you
can choose a number. If the number you
choose matches the winning number, you
get 100 dollars, otherwise, you get nothing.
Your initial wealth is 200 dollars.
• Each state si could be the event that
number i is the winning number. So (1,
2, …,n)=(0.01,0.01, …,0.01).
• If you do not buy any lottery ticket, then
your consumption does not depend on the
state. Hence
(c1,c2, …,cn)=(200,200, …,200).
• If you buy one ticket and choose number
1, then (c1,c2, …,cn)=(299,199, …,199).
• If you buy one ticket of number 1,
another of number 2, then
(c1,c2, …,cn)=(298,298,198, …,198).
• Another example: Suppose there is a prob
of 1-p that some loss D occurs. Suppose
there is an insurance contract which pays
the person 1 dollar in exchange for r<1
dollar of premium. The initial wealth of
the person is W. Then we can model the
situation as there are two states, (s1,s2)
where state 1 is that there is no loss and
state is that there is a loss. Hence (1,
2)=(p,1-p).
• If the consumer does not buy any
insurance, then his consumption would be
(W,W-D).
• If he buys K dollars of insurance, then he
has to pay Kr dollars no matter what the
state of nature is and will get paid K
dollars when there is a loss. Hence his
consumption becomes (W-Kr, W-D+KKr). So if we plot c1 on the x, c2 on the y,
then his budget line will have the slope of
-(1-r)/r.
• Given we have the budget line and the
consumer must have some preference
over (c1,c2), so we can derive his optimal
consumption plan and therefore
determines how much insurance will he
buy.
• Now what does a “fair” insurance policy
mean? This means on average the
insurance company breaks even. Hence,
(1-p)K=Kr or r=1-p. intuitive, since the
premium charged is simply the
probability that the loss will occur.
• We now turn to discuss the preference
over the consumption plans (c1,c2). As
before, MRSc1,c2 =∆c2/∆c1, meaning if
you give me one more unit of c1, how
many units of c2 would I be willing to
give up to stay indifferent. Intuitively,
this certainly depends on how likely I
think the two states (s1,s2) are likely to be.
For instance, if I think the state s1 is quite
impossible, then I would not be willing to
give up many units of c2.
• This suggests that the preference over the
consumption plans (c1,c2) depends also on
(1, 2).
• Hence in general, we write the utility
function representing the preference over
the consumption plans (c1,c2) as u(c1,c2,1,
2).
• Some examples:
• u(c1,c2,1, 2)= 1c1+2c2 (Take the
expected value of the consumption.)
• u(c1,c2,1, 2)= c1 c2
• u(c1,c2,1, 2)= 1ln(c1)+2ln(c2) (Take the
expected value of ln of the consumption.)
• The utility forms of the first and the third
are quite special that we call them having
the form of expected utility.
• In general, the utility having the form of
u(c1,c2,1, 2)= 1v(c1)+2v(c2) is a
expected utility function. I.e., the utility is
the expected value of some utility
function v() of consumption.
1
2
• Let us examine whether your utility has the
form of expected utility. Suppose you do,
then there exists a v() so that:
• L1: v(500,000)
• L2:
0.1v(2,500,000)+0.89v(500,000)+0.01v(0)
• L3: 0.11v(500,000)+0.89v(0)
• L4: 0.1v(2,500,000)+0.9v(0)
• Hence, L1wL2 0.1v(2,500,000)+0.11v(500,000)0.01v(0)≥0
• Similarly, L3wL4 0.1v(2,500,000)+0.11v(500,000)0.01v(0)≥0 (the Allais paradox)
• So if you choose 1 over 2 but 4 over 3
(this happens to a lot of lab subjects) or
you choose 2 over 1 but 3 over 4, then
your preference cannot be represented by
the expected utility function. There is
nothing wrong about it, it just shows that
the expected utility function cannot
accurately represent your preference.
• u(c1,c2,1,2)= 1c1+2c2= 1v(c1)+2v(c2)
where v(c)=c
• u(c1,c2,1,2)= 1ln(c1)+2ln(c2)=
1v(c1)+2v(c2) where v(c)=lnc
• We can think of v(c) as the utility of
certain consumption. In this sense, then
u() is the expected utility of consumption
(c1, c2).
• Utility function u() of this particular form
is called a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function or an expected utility
function.
• The function v() is called the Bernoulli
function by some.
• If we have an expected utility function u
and we multiply it by some positive
constant a and add a constant b so
f(u)=au+b, then F≡f(u) is also an
expected utility function.
• F(c1,c2,1,2)=f(u(c1,c2,1,2))=au(c1,c2,1,
2)+b=a(1v(c1)+2v(c2))+b=1(av(c1)+b)+
2(av(c2)+b)=1f(v(c1))+2f(v(c2)), so F is
also an expected utility function.
• This kind of transformation (multiplying
a positive constant and adding a constant)
is called a positive affine transformation.
Turns out that given an expected utility
function, if you apply a positive affine
transformation, then you get another
expected utility function. Moreover, any
other kind of transformation will destroy
the expected utility property.
• The most important property
characterizing the expected utility is the
independence assumption.
• For instance, if
u(c1,c2,c3,1,2 ,3)≥u(c1’,c2’,c3,1,2 ,3)
then u(c1,c2,d3,1,2 ,3)
≥u(c1’,c2’,d3,1,2 ,3). We can think of this
as with prob 3, state 3 occurs. In the first
case, c3 is the outcome while in the
second d3. However, it does not matter
what the outcome in state 3 is.
• In state 3, some common outcome will
occur. Since it is common, it will not affect
our preference. Hence our preference is
determined solely by the fact that
1v(c1)+2v(c2) ≥1v(c1’)+2v(c2’). This has
some flavor of independence.
• Notice that before, (c1,c2,c3) is consumed at
the same time. So it may be the case that
when consuming c3,we prefer (c1,c2) to
(c1’,c2’) while when consuming d3, our
preference is reversed.
• It is different now because if state 3 occurs,
states 1 or 2 will not occur.
• Notice that with u(c1,c2,c3,1,2,3)=
1v(c1)+2v(c2)+3v(c3),
MRS12=MU1/MU2=1v’(c1)/2v’(c2) which does
not depend on c3.
• Is it reasonable? Consider going to Venice (V),
watching a movie (M) about Venice and
staying home (H). However, I may prefer
V(0.99)+H(0.01) to V(0.99)+M(0.01) because
the latter entails disappointment. (another
outcome of the lottery)
• Moreover, comparing L1 (500,000, 1) to
L2 (2,500,000, 0.1; 500,000, 0.89; 0, 0.01)
I may choose L1 because there is a
possibility that I will regret that I should
have chosen otherwise if I have chosen L2
and 0 is realized. On the other hand, there
is no such clear-cut regret potential exists
between L3 (500,000, 0.11; 0, 0.89) to L4
(2,500,000, 0.1; 0, 0.9) (a choice not
made).
• A person who prefers a certain given
outcome to a risky outcome with the
same expected income is a risk averter.
When a person is indifferent, he is risk
neutral. Finally, if a person prefers a risky
outcome to the certain outcome, then he
is risk loving.
• Draw a figure with v() concave, linear,
convex to illustrate.
• Go back to the insurance example.
Assume a risk averse expected utility
maximizer. Then 1) on an indifference
curve, when c1 is greater, c2 has to lower.
2) |MRS12|=MU1/MU2=1v’(c1)/2v’(c2),
since v() is concave, when c1 is greater
and c2 is lower, then v’(c1)/v’(c2) is lower
and hence |MRS12| is smaller. So we have
the usual (convex to the origin)
indifference curves. (average vs extreme)
• If insurance is fair, i.e. r=1-p, then at
optimum, it must be |MRS12|=pv’(c1)/[(1p)v’(c2)]=(1-r)/r. So v’(c1)=v’(c2) or c1=c2.
This means, in words, facing a fair
insurance, a risk averse, expected utility
maximizer will choose to fully insure.
• On the other hand, if the insurance
company makes some profit, then r>1-p
and p>1-r. So v’(c1)/v’(c2)=(1-r)(1-p)/pr<1.
Since v’’<0, c2< c1, in words, wealth when
the loss occurs is not as high. Not fully
insured.
• At the 45 degree line, since c1=c2, with an
expected utility function, |MRS12|=p/(1-p)
the relative likelihood ratio of state 1 to
state 2.
• Look at another example. Suppose a
consumer has wealth w and is
considering to invest some amount x in a
risky asset. The asset has a return rate of
rg in the good state and -rb in the bad state.
Good state occurs with probability p and
bad with 1-p.
• If we plot outcomes in the good state on
the X and those in the bad state on the Y.
When the consumer invests x dollars,
then the outcomes are (w-x+(1+rg)x, wx+(1-rb)x)=(w+rgx, w-rbx). Investing one
dollar would decrease wealth at the bad
state by rb and increase wealth at the good
state by rg. Hence, the slope of the budget
line is -rb/rg. If the asset has a strictly
positive return, then prg-(1-p) rb>0 or
p/(1-p)> rb/rg.
• The expected utility maximizer has
|MRSgb|=p/(1-p) when he does not invest
anything in this risky asset and has
wealth (w,w). This implies |MRSgb| is
greater than the slope of the budget line.
Hence when facing a better than fair
gamble, a risk averter will invest a bit in
the risky asset, no matter how risk averse
he is.
• This is the same logic that we saw before.
When the insurance company is making a
profit, selling insurance is like a positive
risky asset. Hence a risk averter will not
be fully insured, just like selling some
insurance.
• Turn to the benefits of diversification.
This summer there is a half of chance to
be rainy and another half sunny. If it is
rainy, then every one dollar you invest in
a raincoat company becomes 2 dollars.
• And every dollar invested in a sunglasses
company becomes 0.5 dollar. Likewise, if
the summer is sunny, every dollar you
invest in the raincoat (sunglasses)
company becomes 0.5 (2) dollar.
• Call state 1 the rainy state and 2 the
sunny state.
• If you invest 100 dollars on the raincoat
company, you get (200, 50) and your
utility is 0.5v(200)+0.5v(50). If you
invest 50 on the raincoat and 50 on the
• Sunglasses, then you get (125, 125) and
the utility is v(125). A risk averter would
have v(125)>0.5v(200)+0.5v(50). So
diversification pays off. Assets moving in
the opposite direction is like providing an
insurance, which will be valuable to
someone who dislikes risks. Likewise,
the value of an asset depends on how
much this asset moves in the opposite
direction with the rest of your assets.
• Risk spreading: each individual has 35,000
and face a 0.01 probability of 10,000 loss.
Suppose there are 1,000 individuals and
their probabilities of the loss are
independent. Then there is room to spread
the risk. Suppose the 1,000 individuals
decide that if anyone incurs the 10,000
loss, each of the 1,000 individuals will
give the person 10 dollars. Then on
average, there are 10 houses burnt down
and so in most of the time, each has
35,000-10*10=34,900.
• If they do not insure each other, then with
probability 0.99, each has wealth 35,000
and with probability 0.01, each has
wealth 25,000. The expected wealth is
34,900. Since a risk averter likes the sure
outcome then the risky outcome with the
same expected value, this explains why
insurance company can make a profit.
• In fact, you can self insure by saving over
time.