Transcript Des outils pour comprendre et analyser l’Afrique Sandrine

Humanitarian action and
peace operations in Africa
David Ambrosetti
(CNRS – Université Paris Ouest Nanterre)
I – Africa, a cradle of the humanitarian
action and peace operations
II – Effects and stakes of this international
interventionism
I – Africa, a cradle of the
humanitarian action and peace
operations
A) Two founding « episodes » in current
humanitarian action: Biafra and Ethiopia
B) UN peace operations and Africa
A) 1. Biafra (1967-1970)
Nigeria
Abuja
Ibo
Lieutenant-colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu
Joint Church Aid – 55 000 tons of supplies
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – 22 000 tons
Bernard Kouchner
Médecins sans frontières (1971)
Jacques Foccart
Nuclear test in Reggane (déc. 1960)
Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Léopold Sédar Senghor (Sénégal)
Markpress (Genève)
2. Ethiopia (1984-1985)
Wollo (nord)
charity business
Band Aid (nov. 1984)
Bob Geldof
Live Aid (juil. 1985)
1 200 000 tons of aid
The Derg
Mengistu Haïle-Mariam
Tigrean People’s Liberation Front
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
Forced displacements of 600 000 persons, 200 000 died
B) UN peace operations and Africa
1. ONUC: a turn
2. The post Cold War renewal (1988-1993)
3. Blazing failures and withdrawal (1993-1999)
4. The current unprecedented rise of UN peace
operations (2000 decade, till now)
1. The ONUC (1960-1964)
Congo-Léopoldville / République démocratique du Congo
(RDC) / Zaïre (Congo-Kinshasa)
Patrice Lumumba
Katanga
Moïse Tshombé
Dag Hammarskjöld († en sept. 1961)
Resolution 143 of the UNSC  withdrawal of Belgian forces
19 500 personals
30 contributor states (Africa and Asia)
2. The end of the Cold War and the renewal of peace
operations (1988-1993)
Perestroïka
Namibia
Angola
Mozambique
Somalia : Restore Hope (UNITAF / Dec. 92- March 93) et ONUSOM II
(ONU / March 93 – March 95)
28 000 personals
Mohamed Farah Aideed
June 1993 (24 Pakistani blue helmets)
3 October 1993 (18 US Marines and one UN Malaysian)
US Congress (Jesse Helms)
Boutros Boutros-Ghali UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan Deputy-UNSG Chief of the DPKO
3. Blazing failures and withdrawal (1993-1999)
MINUAR in Rwanda (5 October 1993)
General R. Dallaire
Michael Barnett – US delegation to the UN
President J. Habyarimana († 6 April 1994)
Rwandan Patriotic Front (P. Kagamé)
Hutu Power
Col. Théoneste Bagosora
Resolution 925 – withdrawal of 2 000 Blue Helmets in the heart of the
genocide (« g »-word)
500 000 to one million died
Then Bosnia - Zaïre 1996-1997
Withdrawal: 70 000 UN personals in 1993, 13 000 in February 1998.
Budget decline (from 3,6 billion $ to 1 billion $)
4. The current unprecedented rise (decade 2000)
Lakhdar Brahimi report (July 2000)
Peace building, even state building
Security Sector Reform
Regionalization (African ownership)
UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (1999-2005)
UK leader, rescuing the UN in May 2000
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah
African dossiers = some 70-75 % of the UNSC agenda
In 2010, Africa
= half of the UN operations deployed around the world (8 out of 16)
= three-quarters (73 500) out of the 100 000 personals in uniform
deployed around the world
Sudan alone = a third (30 000, 20 000 for Darfur and 10 000 for South
Sudan)
DRC = 20 000
Liberia = 11 000
Côte-d’Ivoire = 8500
Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (3 major troop contributors) = 28% of
the total
9 African states among the 20 major contributors
Negligible financial contributions: Zambia and Somalia = 0,001% of the
UN budget each ; South Africa = 0,29%
II – Effects and stakes of this
international interventionism
A)
Some figures: a call for modesty
B)
Strategic learning from African actors
C)
The « Africanization » of peace and security
matters in Africa: towards a new peace and
security architecture in Africa
A) Some figures: a call for modesty
1. The decrease of death tolls due to armed violence in
Africa
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Human Security Center: Death tolls related to armed
conflicts regularly increased from 1960 to 1990.
Decreasing since then.
In 1960, Africa = 68 % of the total of people killed in
armed conflicts around the world ;
13 % in 2005 (African bank for development).
Proposed causes : transformations of the forms of
violence and improvement of sanitary conditions and
humanitarian relief.
2. Engaged means remain modest
Multidimensional operations, very intrusive
 Security Sector Reform (Sierra Leone, RDC, Liberia, Côte-d’Ivoire)
But limited means:
 UN peace operations = 7,7 billion $ per year around the world;
UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (750 million $ per year in 2002 for 17
500 personals in uniform)
 Comparison : arms trade around the world = 30 billion $ per
year; and the total of state military budgets around the world =
800 billion $ per year.
 20 000 personals in uniform to cover the whole Darfur (size of
France, very divided habitat, rudimentary or inexistent
infrastructures)
Weak strategic commitment, short-term objectives, improvisation,
personal professionalization improved but still insufficient
 scandal of sexual abuses (Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC)
B) Strategic learning from African actors
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Commitment of African states in peace operations
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Sidelining and direct opposition strategies
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Access to foreign currencies, opportunities for training (Burundi),
“risky” military kept away, multilateral visibility as a regional
power
Political weakness of international forces rapidly analyzed and
exploited (Somalia 93, Rwanda 94, Sierra Leone 2000, UA au
Darfur 2004-2007)
Obstacles, UN (Western) personal expelled (Eritrea and the
border commission for Badme 2005 ; Sudan and Jan Pronk 2006
; Chad et MINURCAT 2010)
Medias, humanitarian action and military strategies

Kamajors and LURD (Danny Hoffman)
C) The « Africanisation » of peace and
security in Africa
1. Context

Pan-African Movement  Organization of the African Unity (OAU, May
1963)

Bilateral interferences from ex colonial powers  20 French armed
operations from 1963 to 1983.

First OAU peace operation in Chad in 1981. Withdrawn in June 1982 on
a failure.

OAU Mechanism for prevention, management and resolution of conflict
in 1990 (military observation missions in Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros)

Continental integration weakened by a rapid process of sub-regional
cooperation  seven regional organizations in Africa today
 ECOMOG by ECOWAS in Liberia (1990-1997) and Sierra Leone
(1991-1999)
2. The African Union (AU) in 2002
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Innovations
 Inspired by the European Union (Commission) and
the UN (PSC)
 Article 4 of the constitutive Act
 Department of Peace and Security
Operations in Burundi, Darfur and Comoros
The African Stand By Force and the Continental Early
Warning System (AU and the five Regional Economic
Communities): in progress
3. Limits
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External:
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Internal:
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Strong commitment of foreign partners:
Peace Facility of the EU, then the Europe / Africa Partnership in Lisbon,
financial support from the G8  « a rush among donors » in the
context of a “new scramble for African mineral resources”
Donor conditionality: strong presence of foreign (Western) experts in
Addis Ababa surrounding these projects
AU used in a ad hoc way, selectivity according to the interests of the
foreign powers with important projection forces in Africa (US, France,
UK)
Reluctance to provide the African forces with better military equipment
Weak political commitment of the African states  only when
competition for regional hegemony
Military contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda
Financial contributors: Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya
Difference to make between « Africanization » and « ownership » (Benedikt
Franke)