Current Politics in Iran

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Transcript Current Politics in Iran

Current Politics in Iran

3/17/15 Sean Foley

Religion: Ordinary Iranians are losing interest in the mosque

 Iranian law requires all public buildings in Iran to have prayer rooms  Very few people make use of these prayer rooms   One office manager is quoted saying “we nap in ours after lunch” State broadcasters used to interrupt soccer games with live sermons at prayer time, now only a small prayer symbol is placed in the corner of the screen

Religion In Iran

   Iran is the modern world’s first and only constitutional theocracy and also one of the least religious countries in the Middle East Islam plays a minimal role in public life, daughter of a high cleric quoted saying “religious belief is mostly gone. Faith has been replaced by disgust” Transformation of Shia Islam into an Ideology subverted both state and mosque   Islamic revolution did more to secularize the country than the Shah who persecuted clerics Forcing religion on the people of Iran ruined it for many

Religion in Iran

    Some Iranian people have turned to materialism Clerics’ power is now mostly Indirect and many have little say in economic and foreign affairs Although there has been a movement away from institutionalized religion, many customs are still followed Change is very apparent in Qom, the religious capital   Pilgrims visit shrines to listen to anti-western sermons, but this is mostly a cover up Religious offices and seminaries are diminished by the multi-story Pearl shopping mall

Current Politics: Iran’s political elite maintains a delicate balance      Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, quickly realized that the gains of the revolution could only be sealed by permanent institutions Khomeini built these institutions while also creating a system of checks and balances 35 years later, Iran is neither a free flowing democracy nor a dictatorship The size of the elite is remarkable; thousands of politicians, clerics, generals etc. participate in political decisions Iran resembles a democratic oligarchy; no one group within the elite holds more than a sliver of power, big decisions require consensus

Ali Khamenei

   Ali Khamenei operates by waiting for consensus to form in debates and intervene only to break a deadlock; sees himself as more of a referee than a decider the successor of Khamenei is the subject of much speculation and no apparent heir has emerged Some feel that a power struggle will likely ensue while other’s feel that the current Islamic Republic’s system of governance is capable of finding a successor

A semi-democratic legitimacy

   In a 2013 election, Iran reverted to its old ways Rohani won the election partly due to the fact that Mohammad Reza Aref’s supporters persuaded him to stand aside in favor of Rohani Rohani most likely would’ve won anyway but he benefited from the conservatives’ failures to agree on a candidate

Pick your battles

     Many reformists remain broken by the protests in 2009 Many of these protestors withdrew from society/ left the country/ or pursued non-political careers Those who remain in the public have become more cautious, advocating patience Conservative camp has changed as well since the protests Supreme leader made clear that he supported the new president, allowing for Rohani to engage the West in nuclear talks

The Hardliners

     The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a shadowy organization responsible for defending the ideals of the revolution, directly controlled by Khamenei Many guards end up in senior government posts but they exercise political force long before then The guards are dedicated to a strong Iran at home and abroad  Pursue their goals in unconventional ways: funding of terror groups all in the name of revolutionary change The guards real aim is to ensure stability at home and win greater influence in America and its allies They oversee the nuclear weapons program

Money Talks

     Guards preside over a large business empire that generates massive income President Rohani does not have a good relationship with the guards and has tried to reduce their influence in the government Since his election Rohani has given few jobs to reformists Rohani continues to tinker at the margins but these hardliners will not let him move far away from traditional policies These hardliners need external enemies to justify their restrictive viewpoints

Nuclear talks

 Iran is negotiating in bad faith, hiding nuclear materials at secret facilities even as talks are in progress in order to drag out negotiations  The sanctions in place may benefit the guards economic interests, since they control the smuggling networks  This could spell more economic problems for the guards however, as more US sanctions may hurt some guards linked to big businesses

State Within a State

   The hardliners are a diverse and a divided group For the most part, guard commanders have not criticized the nuclear talks According to an academic close to the guards, “There is very little opposition in principle to a nuclear deal. General Suleimani is prepared to accept a decent deal. Iran does not want to confront America and lose. That’s not useful in terms of grand strategy. The revolutionary guards’ role after all is to stop America from feeling comfortable here.”