Transcript Making and breaking government

Positive Political Theory
Prof. Francesco Zucchini
Making and breaking
government
The Veto Player perspective
Camilla Mariotto
5th November 2009
On stability (1)
Up to now we have discussed about policy
stability and how it is affected by different
institutional structures.
What consequences?
•
•
•
On the regime
On the government stability
On the independence of bureaucracies and
the judiciary
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On stability (2)
Government instability
(Parliamentarism)
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Government stability (1)
Formation of government coalition
+
Duration of corresponding government
Most prolific branches in the literature of politics
 Lijphart (1999: 129):
“Cabinet durability is an indicator not just of the cabinet’s strength
compared with that of the legislature but also of regime stability”
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Government stability (2)
No agreement on the conditions for what a government
replacement is.
4 different criteria:
• Change in the party composition of the government;
• Election;
• Formal government resignation;
• Change in prime minister.
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 Different relations:
 Government duration:
 VPs and Government duration

Agenda setting and executive dominance
 Executive dominance
 Agenda setting
 Agenda setting and executive dominance
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Government duration (1)
A) Parliamentary features
Theory of coalition – blindness of policy
1.
Policy blind models  MWC
2.
Policy models  MCWC
Von
Neumann
Morgenstern, Riker
and
Axelrod, de Swaan
Under MCWC perspective, in 1-D space a connected
coalition would not exclude a party located between
coalition parties.
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Government duration (2)
A) Parliamentary features
• Size party
• Party position
• Other parties position
Party government
• N° of parties
• Effective n°
• Extreme or anti-system party
Government duration
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Government duration (3)
1. The deterministic approach (Laver&Schofield)
introduced
the
“bargaining
environment”.
 On an 1-D policy space (LR) different political
systems are characterized as:




unipolar centrist
unipolar off center
bipolar
multipolar
2. The events approach (Browne, Gleiber, Mashoba)
did not focus on cause but on “randomness”.
 Conditional rate of termination – hazard rate
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Government duration (4)
3.
King, Alt, Burns and Laver combined the 2
approaches:
“[…] governments fall as a result of random events, but the
capacity of different governments to survive was a function of
different characteristics prevailing in the party system of the
country. The results of this unified model indicate that
fragmentation of the party system and polarization of the
opposition are the regime attributes most strongly associated
with cabinet duration.” (Tsebelis)

The probability of a party to be included in the new
government depends on the characteristics of the
party system.
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Government duration (5)
B) Government features
Warwick gave a different definition of:
 Polarization measures the proportion of parliamentary
seats held
by extremist parties (anti-system parties)  noncoalitionable parties.
High vulnerability to early collapse or termination.

Fractionalization variable should be measured regarding to the
government  Ideological heterogeneity or distance (more in minority
governments).
 The government survival
bargaining within government
depends
on
the
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VPs and government duration (1)
 Focus on the status quo as essential element of
multidimensional policy models.
 Models assume 1) policy space,
2) complete information, and
3) stability of the status quo.
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VPs and government duration (2)
In order to understand mechanisms of government
selection and duration, two uncertainties:
1.
2.
Uncertainty between policies and outcomes
Uncertainty between current and future outcomes
Taking into account both uncertainties, how are parties
going to address the situation when forming a
government?
 Reduction of distance between coalition parties enables
governments to produce a policy program before they
form and respond to subsequent exogenous shocks.
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VPs and government duration (3)
 3 VPs: A1, A2 and A3
 If
SQ
then
W(SQ),
if SQ1 then W(SQ1)
 The
further away the
status quo is and the
closer they are to each
other, the more items are
included by the VPs in
the gov program.
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VPs and government duration (4)
 What happens in case of
an exogenous shock?
 Replacement
of
an
existing outcome, but for
a government this can be:
o Manageable
o Non-manageable
 No direct correspondence
between the size of the
shock
and
the
government termination.
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VPs and government duration (5)
o Implications on government formation
o Majority government with close parties
o Ideologically heterogeneous government
o Minority government
o Implication on government duration
o Ideological distances
o Fractionalization and polarization only in minority
government.
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VPs and government duration (6)
Government duration is proportional to the
government’s ability to respond to unexpected shocks.
 the size of the unanimity core of the veto players.
 the closer the VPs, the more they are able to
manage policy shocks, and consequently the longer
the duration of the government.
Moreover, the closer different VPs the
probability that they will form a government
higher
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Agenda setting and executive
dominance
 Why do party positions matter?
 A government has 2 distinct advantages (Tsebelis):
 positional advantages  the centrality of its location
inside parliament, generated with the coalition formation
process
 institutional advantages  the agenda setting rules, preexisting the game
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 Executive dominance
 Lijphart:


Executive dominance measures the relative power
of the executive and legislative branches of
government, therefore its best indicator is cabinet
durability.
Government duration – executive dominance 
self evident
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Lijphart: Government duration and executive dominance
COUNTRY
Average
cabinet life I
Average cabinet
life II
Gov Duration
Executive
Dominance
Austria
8.42
2.53
5.47
5.47
Belgium
2.29
1.68
1.98
1.98
Denmark
2.81
1.75
2.28
2.28
Finland
1.31
1.18
1.24
1.24
France
2.88
2.08
2.48*
5.52*
Germany
3.60
2.03
2.82
2.82
Greece
3.60
2.16
2.88
2.88
Iceland
2.78
2.17
2.48
2.48
Ireland
3.72
2.42
3.07
3.07
Italy
1.28
0.99
1.14
1.14
Luxembourg
5.62
3.16
4.39
4.39
Netherlands
2.94
2.50
2.72
2.72
Norway
4.22
2.11
3.17
3.17
Portugal
2.32
1.86
2.09
2.09
Spain
6.35
2.38
4.36
4.36
Sweden
4.77
2.07
3.42
3.42
Switzerland
16.19
0.99
8.59*
1*
U. Kingdom
8.49
2.55
5.52
5.52
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 Agenda setting

Doering:
 Government
dominates the policy-making
process because it holds the power of agenda
setting  7 variables:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Authority to determine the Plenary Agenda of Parliament
Money Bills as Government Prerogative
Is the Committee Stage of a Bill Restricted by a Preceding
Plenary Decision?
Authority of Committees to Rewrite Government Bills
Control of the Timetable in Legislative Committees
Curtailing Debate before the Final Vote of a Bill in the
Plenary
Maximum Lifespan of a Bill Pending Approval After Which
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It Lapses if not Adopted
Doering: Government Agenda Control
Plenary
agenda
Financial
Initiative
Committee
Re-write
Financial
Voting
Lapse
Bill
Austria
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
-0.044
Belgium
4
3
3
4
3
2
3
-0.170
Denmark
5
3
2
1
4
2
1
-0.106
Finland
5
3
3
4
1
3
2
-0.148
France
2
1
3
1
2
1
3
0.333
Germany
4
3
3
4
3
2
2
-0.126
Greece
2
2
3
2
2
1
2
0.280
Iceland
5
3
3
1
4
2
1
-0.170
Ireland
1
1
1
4
1
2
2
0.519
Italy
6
3
3
4
2
2
2
-0.219
Luxembourg
3
3
3
3
2
2
4
-0.053
Netherlands
7
3
3
1
4
3
4
-0.527
Norway
4
3
3
4
2
2
2
-0.063
Portugal
3
1
3
3
2
2
3
0.147
Spain
4
1
1
4
2
2
2
0.221
Sweden
5
3
3
4
4
3
4
-0.427
Switzerland
3
3
3
4
3
2
4
-0.135
U. Kingdom
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.690
COUNTRY
Time
Table
Agenda
Control
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 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (1)
 Tsebelis:

The relevance of agenda setting for coalition formation.

Government formateurs are parties centrally located

The closer different potential veto players the higher
probability that they will form a government  proximity of
other parties to the formateurs
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 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (2)
W (AB1C1)
A
SQ
W (ABC)
C1
B1
C
B
Party “A” can form 2 potential coalition: ABC and AB1C1.
“A” chooses AB1C1 on the basis of both ideological (to implement more plans)
and pragmatic (to respond to more shocks) criteria.
“Minimizing the distances between the coalition partners is the dominant
solution in all cases […], the formateur should select parties closer to his
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preferences”.
 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (3)
A
Issue 2
5 parties  equal
seats, 3 parties to
form a majority

D
G'
X
3 exclusive and
exhaustive subsets
of the policy space:
1.
the
points
preferred to G by
majority  GG’ and
GG”,
2. the points for
which a majority is
indifferent to G  the
boarder of GG’ and
GG”,
3. the points that are
defeated by G by a
majority.

SQ
X’
G X'
E
G''
B
C
Issue 1
G is a very expensive partner, but a coalition
without it has very little chance of policy success.
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 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (4)
A
Issue 2
D
G'
X
SQ
•Under closed rule:
X’
G X'
G can have its own
preference voted by
a
majority
in
Parliament
since
the SQ is not inside
the lenses GG’ or
GG’’ .
E
G''
B
Institutional
advantages
C
Issue 1
 If the SQ is inside the shaded area of the lenses, the government leaves the
SQ as is.
 If the SQ is in the non-shaded area of the lenses, the government can propose
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something inside the shaded area that will prevail.
 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (5)
A
Issue 2
D
G'
X
SQ
•Under open rule:
X’
G X'
When
the
government
proposes its own
ideal point, anything
inside the lenses
GG’ and GG” can
be proposed on the
floor, and it will
defeat G.
E
G''
B
Institutional
advantages
C
Issue 1
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 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (6)
A
Issue 2
D
G'
X
SQ
•Under fire by fire
rule:
X’
G X'
E
The amendment is
proposed in X, the
G is able to propose
another one in X’.
G''
B
Institutional
advantages
C
Issue 1
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 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (7)
Impact on agenda control and executive dominance on formateur parties
– EMP policy space
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 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (8)
Impact on agenda control and executive dominance on formateur parties
– EMP policy space
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 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (9)
Impact on agenda
control and executive
dominance on
Government
membership – EMP
policy space
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 Agenda setting and executive
dominance (10)
Impact on agenda
control and executive
dominance on
Government
membership – LR
policy space
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Conclusions (1)
 Governments with lots of agenda setting powers will
not care very much about positional advantages,
 governments with low agenda setting powers will
focus on achieving positional advantages (central
location of formateur, small number of parties in
government, small ideological distance among parties).
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Conclusion (2)
 Politics will be more centrist in countries with low
agenda setting powers, and there will be low levels of
alternation.
 Whether the centrist formateur parties will find other
parties close to them in order to form coalitions or not,
depends on the polarization of the country, not on the
number of parties (extreme pluralism – Sartori) or
consociationalism (Lijphart).
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