Transcript Losing the Information War

On Losing the Information
War
Greg Wilcox
LTC USA (Ret.)
July 2005
7/8/2005
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Sun Tsu
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Four operational factors in war:
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Moral
Mental
Physical
Circumstantial
The primary target is the mind of
the enemy commander
Sun Tzu “the first Psychological
Warrior”
Source: Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, pp. 40-41.
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T.E. Lawrence
“We had to arrange (our soldiers) minds in order of
battle just as carefully and as formally as other
officers would arrange their bodies. And not only
our own men’s minds, though naturally they came
first. We must also arrange the minds of the
enemy so far as we could reach them; then those
other minds of the nation supporting us b behind
the firing line, since more than half the battle
passed there in the back; then the minds of the
enemy nation waiting the verdict; and of the
neutrals looking on; circle beyond circle.”
Source: T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom
“I am not in favor of giving battle,
especially at the outset of a war.
I am even convinced that an able general
can wage war his whole life
without being compelled to do so.”
7/8/2005
Source: B.H. Liddell Hart, Lawrence of Arabia
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Col. John Boyd: Three Aspects of War
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Moral
Mental
Physical
3:1
Focus of American forces
Focus of Attrition Warfare
MORAL LEVERAGE
• Find ways to overcome flaws/contradictions that
generate mistrust and discord
• Emphasize traditions/experiences that build trust and harmony
• Reveal harsh statements of adversaries about us
• Reveal adversary shortcomings/deficiencies
• Acquaint adversaries with our way of life
• Respect the culture of others, provide aid
• Demonstrate we do not tolerate ideas that undermine
our own culture and interests
7/8/2005
Sources: Col John Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict” Dec 86,
and “The Strategic Game”, Jun 87
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GEN Charles Krulak: The Strategic
Corporal
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Concept of the Strategic Corporal in the 21st Century
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Maybe the strategic Private?
Al Qaeda reveres their strategic corporals
The U.S. fears their strategic corporals
Bottom-up initiative based on guidance
This is a company-level war
7/8/2005
Source: Gen. Charles C. Krulak, USMC,
Marines Magazine, January 1999
“The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War”
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LTC John Poole, USMC (Ret.): on IW
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“There is ample evidence that both Hezbollah and
al-Qaeda are conducting a ‘4th Generation’ type of
war. In this endeavor, their principal tool is the
media. Through it, they readily point out any
excess, whether by force or exaggeration.”
“A politically sensitive foe might come to see the
media as his enemy and suppress any potentially
embarrassing detail. Unfortunately, there is a
price to be paid for this type of secrecy. An army
that never admits to error has no reason to
improve.”
To defeat a 4GW opponent, “…one must search for
‘ultimate truth,’ quickly admit any setback, and
then readily adapt to any unforeseen
circumstances. He must accomplish the latter
without sacrificing his ideals.”
7/8/2005
Source: Poole: Tactics of the Crescent Moon, pp. 223-224
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So Where Does Information Warfare Fit?
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Only one piece of a Holistic effort but CRITICAL
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(See Maj Isaiah Wilson, USA, “Thinking Beyond War”)
Depends on definition and context:
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American military focus is on EW (C2W)
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Focus should be on influencing people
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i.e., technology
Less shooting, more talking
Protect the civilians
Get out of the bunkers
Beyond Definitions:
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Our formal definitions, concepts, and even organizations have
little to do with the 4GW enemy we now face from Iraq to the
Philippines.
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There is need and use for signals intelligence and computer
security, but…
The information war is the most important aspect of this war:
the transmission of effective messages to the undecided, to our
friends, to the enemy, and most important, to our own people.
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What About Al Qaeda/Hezbollah IO?
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Past Masters (Culturally attuned to the use of
language to influence outcomes). Examples:
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Bombings in Spain
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Free access to Moslem press
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May have influenced national elections in Spain
Al Qaeda followed bombings by unilateral offers
of truce to Europe
Threats followed by bombings in England
Manipulate American/European press
Creative Blog sites
Al Qaeda Training Manual instructions:
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PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS section
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“IF AN INDICTMENT IS ISSUED AND THE TRIAL BEGINS, THE
BROTHER HAS TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING:”
 “At the beginning of the trial, once more the brothers must
insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by
State Security [investigators] before the judge.”
 “Complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison.”
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Sophisticated Use of the Media
Mullah Omar condemning the United States and
encouraging jihad by all Muslims against America
via video-tape run by Al Jaazera and Al Arabia
- A routine PSYWAR and Directive practice
7/8/2005
Blog site showing video
of captured American soldier.
Use of Blog sites New!
DVD of beheading murder of Nick Berg
by Zarqawi Is the hottest selling DVD in Iraq
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America’s 2d Television War
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Vietnam
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Ho Chi Minh determined US center of
gravity the American Public
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War in press more important than
bullets
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Objective was to get US to withdraw
Ho willing to accept attrition casualties
US media an unwitting supporter by
broadcasting nightly grizzly imagery
Iraq/Afghanistan
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Jihaadists (Osama Bin Laden) learned
lessons of Vietnam
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US center of gravity is American public
Objective is to get US to withdraw
War in media more important than
bullets
This time, Muslim multi-media
available and supportive of jihaadists
US media still providing nightly images
of casualties and war
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Source: T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: War in the 21 st Century
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Other Means of IW
Messages of the Imams and Madras
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RUMOR:
The greatest
source of
misinformation in the
Middle East
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Other Means of IW (Cont.)
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Polls
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Questionable results if we
don’t understand culture
Self-fulfilling prophesies?
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Billboards, Signs, Graffiti
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Unspoken Messages
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Purple Fingers from voting
(Positive Impact Lost)
Assassinations/Kidnappings
Disruption/Destruction (e.g.,
Long lines for gas stations)
Absence of Services
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Who’s Responsible for U.S. Information
Warfare?
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The Commander-in-Chief sets the objectives of war
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The NSC is the main counsel on the use of all aspects
of the Government to prosecute the war
The SECDEF and the CJCS are the president’s
principal military advisors
The State Dept is responsible for the message
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No coordinated message from top to bottom.
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No coherent organization
No USIS (Note that it is strange that Zinni, Armitage,
and Powell let this one go)
VOA under USAID
Richard Pearle
(Source: DSB Summer Study: Strategic Communications, 2004)
Military does its own thing (PSYOPS, CA, Training Iraqi Forces, Training
own forces
Evidently, no one is responsible for a coordinated US IW Program
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NSC has done nothing about DSB Summer Study “Strategic
Communications 2004.
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(Source: White House Staffer at CAMEL Conf, Arlington, VA, Nov 04)
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Who Are the Target Audiences for US
Policymakers?
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Enemy
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Selves
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Leaders
Army
Population
Armed Forces
Population
Coalition Partners
Difficult to address separate
audiences in the information age
Rest of World
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Potential enemies
Neutrals
Friends and potential allies
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US Information to the American Public
Administration
Statements
In-Theater Press Events
Free Press
Media
Correspondents
Embedded Reporters
Pentagon Press Events
Presidential Events
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Authors and Analysts
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What About Military IO?
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Communist Armies have a Political Officer down to
company level responsible for IO
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One consistent message from top to bottom
Focus on troop information and dealing with the
population
American military efforts disjointed and uneven
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PSYOP seen as incompetent/focused on equipment
HUMINT disregarded for decades
Soldiers in Vietnam called all Viets “Gooks”
Soldiers in Iraq/Afghanistan call natives “Ragheads”
Little or no cultural training
Little or no language training
Attitude: “Leave it to Beaver” (CA, PSYOPS, SF, MI)
Do we need a “Political Officer” in each company???
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US Military Relations with the Media
Trust is absent: No mutual respect
Some success with embedded reporters:
• Soldiers tell the truth
• Reporters get socialized
Jihaadists have threatened and killed journalists
US forces have accidentally killed journalists/photographers
At 50 meters would you think
this guy an enemy with an
RPG or a photographer?
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How about
this guy?
2 seconds to decide
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U.S. IW Not Done Well To Date
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No policy guidance or direction
Absent cultural understanding
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“Evil Eye” Leaflets in Falluja one day before killing of contractors
False Starts with al-Iraqya TV, Radio Sawa, & al-Sabah
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Confession Video having some success in Iraq
PSYOP Focus on Equipment and Things rather than people
Command Information is inadequate
Spotty Integration of Information/Intel/PSYOP/PAO and Actions
Limited Understanding of IO Function commonplace
Makes it difficult to separate the fish from the sea with
inadequate Information Program
Makes it impossible to protect the rear with no
coordinated IW program
Source: Wilcox Presentation to IO Quarterly Conf 5 May 05:
“IO and Cultural Knowledge”
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Integrated IW
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Required:
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Focus on people, not technology
Combined interagency/coalition
effort
Long term establishment
Information driven
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Independent Information
Leadership by talent, not
bureaucracy
Regional Fusion Centers
Similar in concept to
Provisional Reconstruction
Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan
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Multiply with security
Independent and networked
Source: Wilson, Richards, Wilcox Briefing:
4GW & OODA Loop Implications of Iraqi Insurgency
www.d-n-i.net
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How to “Get Well”
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Continue Focus on HUMINT
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Get the Intel Specialists out with
small units to provide actionable
intelligence
Build reliable infrastructure
Regional Fusion Centers
CDR
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Tell the truth & tell it often
Admin Log
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Restructure Info/Intel Function
Cultural Knowledge Training and
Education
7/8/2005
Intel
Civil Affairs
Info Ops
PSYOP
Action Ops
PAO
Chaplain
FUNDAMENTAL
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Prognosis
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IW efforts so far have limited success
No clear direction from White House
likely
Polls show decline in support both in
Iraq and U.S.
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Generals perceived as less than candid
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Organizational change unlikely
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Moral High Ground Lost in Abu Ghraib
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Thumbs Down
Impossible to recover despite
localization
Lasting images fired jihaad
What price for the destruction of Falluja?
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BACKUP SLIDES
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LTC John Poole, USMC (Ret.): on Training
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“…the U.S. infantryman lives in a doctrinally driven, ‘topdown’ training environment. Such an environment
cannot match the learning dynamics of its experimentally
driven ‘bottom-up’ antithesis. Unfortunately, most
Eastern armies, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda follow the
latter. One produces standardized procedures that are
painfully dismissive, painfully predictable, and
technologically dated. The other produces current
guidelines that are circumstantially unique, surprise
oriented, and threat compensating.” (Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon, p.
234)
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Our soldiers ought to be trained by our own U.S. Special
Forces instead of frittering away this precious resource in
too many missions in too many places. (Poole, The Tiger’s Way)
We need to shoot less, not more.
7/8/2005
(Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon)
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Kinetics vice Sophistication
What price for the destruction of Falluja?
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US Information to our Soldiers
http://Companycommand.net
http://Platoonleader.net
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The Pen Is Mightier than the Sword
RUMOR is the Coin of the Realm
Multi-media is Priceless
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