Transcript How will HSE use safety cases?

International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Steven Bliss
HM Assistant Chief Inspector of Railways
(Safety Case Manager)
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
SUMMARY OF TALK
•Outline of basic concepts
•Three phases of RSC development
•What makes a good RSC
•HMRI’s approach to assessment
•Where the lessons lead us
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
HSC/E Organisation Chart
Parliament
& Ministers
HSC
HSC IACs
HSE
Policy
Research
Legal and
other Support
TD
Operational Divisions
HMRI
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
HMRI Organisation Chart
D of R
RI1
RI3
RI2
SCT
Sector
10 Field
Teams
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
A Railway Safety Case provides within a single document a
demonstration by a Railway Operator that:
•Risks have been analysed and assessed , and controlling
processes, procedures, methods and equipment put in place;
•A management system has been put in place to ensure that the
controls are effectively and consistently applied, and where
possible improved;
•There is the ability, commitment and resources to ensure that
the management system is effectively deployed.
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Key events in development of UK RSCs
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
The Cascade under 1994 Regulations
HSE
IC
SO
TOC
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Key events in development of UK RSCs (2)
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Acceptance under the 2000 Regulations
HSE
IC
TOC
RS
TOC
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
What does “acceptance” mean?
•HSE is satisfied with the case for health and safety
made out in the safety case
•In practice, HSE believes the operations described in
the safety case are capable of being conducted within
requirements of the relevant health and safety
legislation
• Provided the risk control measures are effectively
applied and managed as described
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Safety Cases in UK
• Phase 1 - A rush for acceptance
• Phase 2 - Consolidation and development
• Phase 3 – Restructuring and the beginning of
understanding
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Cullen Report Part 2
‘The application of the
safety case to Great
Britain's railways is
endorsed’
Recommendation 18
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
The benefits from a Railway Safety Case ?
•Provides sufficient detail of the framework for those who must
manage safety;
•Provides an explanation and performance standards to those
who must live with the risks, showing what is expected of them;
•Links the core management framework to other underpinning
documentation; and,
•Provides a framework for assessment and verification of intent to
be undertaken
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
A clear
process
linking risk
assessment,
to risk
control to
management
systems is
needed
Identify
Activities
Recovery
Systems
Develop
Risk
Controls
Determine
Associated
Risks
Understand
Likely
Failure Modes
Health and
Safety
Management
System
Outcomes
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Key Defects of RAs in RSCs – Cullen
•Too superficial;
•Too restrictive or poorly scoped;
•Too generic;
•Overly mechanistic;
•Insufficient appreciation of human factors;
•Been carried out by managers who lack key competences;
•Been applied by managers who lack understanding;
•Failed to consider interactions betweens people, components and
systems.
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
This sets out a
standard safety
management
system, from the
well known HSE
guidance
document
‘effective health
and safety
management’
(HS(G) 65)
From HS(G)65
Policy
Organisation
Review
Planning
Measuring
Audit
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
A useful focus can
be placed on three
areas : roles and
responsibilities;
methods and
processes; and
attitudes and
behaviours. It is the
latter which most
often fails.
Roles
Methods
Attitudes and
behaviours
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
There are
many
interfaces
between
Railway
Operators.
The RSC
focuses on
these
interfaces.
TOC 2
IC2
TOC 1
IC
TOC 4
TOC 3
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
The RSC needs to be
written by the full
range of staff at all
levels in the
organisation to
promote ownership
and change
behaviour.
RSC should be a
living document.
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
The gap between
what is aspired to
and what exists
should be clearly
set out. How the
gap is bridged is
set out in the
development
plan.
Aspiration
As Is
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Assessment principles
•All safety cases are assessed to the extent necessary to form a
judgement as to whether the case should be accepted
•Selected elements may be scrutinised in more detail
•Selection based on the Assessment Criteria, knowledge of the duty
holder’s existing operations and Inspectors’ professional judgement
•HMRI will draw on specialists with a range of expertise to assist the
assessment process
•HMRI will alert the duty holder to issues of major concern as early
as practicable in the assessment process
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Main Changes from Cullen
•HSE take sole charge for acceptance, checking that the system
as described is actually in place
•HSE will no longer rely on the view of the IC, but may seek it
•Audit procedures to be improved, with more cross auditing
•Safety cases to demonstrate where joint risk controls apply
•Legal duty to comply with Railway Group Standards
•Safety Cases have to demonstrate ALARP
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
What HSE see as the emerging issues (1)
•Maintaining consistency of assessment;
•Managing the assessment comments from stakeholders;
•Managing the timetable of submissions, including
exemptions;
•Maintaining assessment approaches when there is rapid
organisational changes;
•Determining the appropriate level of detail;
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
What HSE see as the emerging issues (2)
•Handling development plans;
•Handling the audit programme;
•Maintaining effective contact with senior managers in
Railway Operators;
•Consultation with stakeholders, especially
employees/Trade Unions;
•Unsatisfactory referencing of additional
documentation
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
What HSE see as the emerging issues (3)
•Absence of meaningful performance standards
suggested by the use of terms such as “inspected
regularly”, “continuously kept under review” and
“frequently checked”;
•Lack of clarity and consistency when using quasitechnical terms such as audit, monitoring, review,
assurance and checking; terms which are often used
inter-changeably;
•Maintaining TOC ownership.
International Rail Safety Conference Tokyo 2002
Making Safety Cases Work : The UK Experience
Contact
e-Mail: [email protected] OR
[email protected]
Phone : 0044 91 202 6218 or 0044 20 7717 6960
Post : Rose Court, 2 Southwark Bridge, London
SE1 9HS