Transcript The Third Wave

Towards a
‘clash of civilizations’?
Paul Bacon
SILS, Waseda University
The ‘clash of civilizations’
• In this lecture I will summarize the main
points of Huntington’s clash of civilizations
thesis.
• Huntington’s main argument is that culture
and cultural identities are shaping the
patterns of cohesion, disintegration and
conflict in the post-Cold war world.
• Cultural identity, at the broadest level, is
civilizational identity.
• Your cultural identity is ultimately formed by
the civilization of which you are a member.
• Huntington makes five further arguments, and
devotes a section of the book to explaining
each argument in more detail.
Argument 1
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1. For the first time in history global politics is
both multipolar and multicivilizational.
Modernization and Westernization are not the
same thing.
It is possible to modernize without becoming a
Western society.
Modernization is not producing a universal
civilization.
Non-Western societies are not becoming Western.
Argument 2
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2. The balance of power amongst civilizations is
shifting.
There are four elements to this claim:
A. The West is declining in relative influence.
B. Asian civilizations are expanding their economic,
military and political strength.
C. Islam is exploding demographically, which will
cause problems for Muslim countries and their
neighbors.
D. Non-Western civilizations are re-affirming the
values of their own cultures.
Argument 3
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3. A civilization-based world order is
emerging.
A. Societies which share cultural affinities
are cooperating with each other.
B. Some countries have attempted to move
from one civilization to another, but these
attempts have been unsuccessful (Mexico,
Turkey, Australia).
C. Countries are grouping themselves
around the leading or core states of their
civilization.
Argument 4
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4. The West’s attempts to impose universalism
are increasingly bringing it into conflict with
other civilizations.
A. At the level of global politics, the most serious
problems are those between the West, on one
hand, and Islamic countries and China on the other.
B. At the local level, fault-line wars between states
from different civilizations provoke kin-country
rallying.
This increases the likelihood that core civilizational
states will become involved.
This increases the possibility that conflicts will
escalate.
Huntington argues that fault-line wars are largely
fought between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Argument 5
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5. The West is unique not universal.
The survival of the West depends on:
A. Americans re-affirming their Western
identity, and
B. Westerners uniting to renew and
preserve their civilization from the influence
of non-Western societies.
World leaders should acknowledge the
reality that the world is multi-civilizational,
and cooperate accordingly.
Western Civilization and empire
• For most of human history, contacts between
civilizations were either limited or non-existent. With
the beginning of the modern era, from roughly 1500
onwards, the politics of civilizations had two aspects.
• 1. Firstly, for roughly four hundred years, there was a
multipolar international system within Western
civilization. The nation-states of the West - most
importantly Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia,
Germany and the United States – interacted,
competed and fought with each other.
• 2. Secondly, during this period, the major Western
nations created substantial empires. In the process,
they expanded their influence across the world, and
conquered and colonized countries from all other
civilizations.
The Cold War
• During the Cold War global politics became bipolar,
and the world was divided into three camps.
• The first camp contained a group of mostly wealthy
and liberal-democratic capitalist societies led by the
United States.
• The second camp contained a group of somewhat
poorer communist countries led by the Soviet Union.
• The third camp contained mostly Third World
countries, which were often poor, lacked political
stability, were recently independent, and claimed that
they were non-aligned in the Cold war conflict.
• The communist and liberal-democratic camps were
engaged in ideological, political, economic and
occasionally military competition with each other.
• Much of this competition and conflict actually took
place in the Third World outside these two camps.
The end of the Cold War
• In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed.
• The Cold War ended, and the division of the
international system into competing communist and
capitalist camps also ended.
• People define their identities by referring to the things
that are the most important to them.
• During the Cold War, people and states defined their
identity in terms of ideology, politics and economics.
• In the post-Cold War world, Huntington argues that
people and nations will define their identities in terms
of culture.
Cultural identity
• People will define themselves in terms of
ancestry, religion, language, history, values,
customs and institutions.
• In the post-Cold war world, people will identify
with cultural groups.
• These cultural include: tribes, ethnic groups,
religious communities, nations, and, at the
broadest level, civilizations.
• During the Cold War, the question was
‘whose side are you on?’
• In the post-Cold War world, the question is
‘who are you?’
The continuing significance of states
• Importantly, Huntington argues clearly that nationstates will remain the principal actors in global politics.
• The behavior of states is always shaped to some
extent by the pursuit of power and wealth.
• However, in the post-Cold War world, state behavior
will also increasingly be shaped by cultural
preferences, commonalities, and differences.
• The most important groupings of states during the
Cold War were the blocs of communist, capitalist and
non-aligned states.
• In the post-Cold War world the most important factor
guiding the alignment of states will be their
civilizational identity.
Huntington’s nine civilizations
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Sinic
Japanese
Hindu
Islamic
Western
• African
• Buddhist
• Latin
American
• Orthodox
A civilization-based future world order
• Henry Kissinger has argued that in the 21st century
the international system will contain six major powers.
These six are: the United States, Europe, China,
Japan, Russia, and probably India.
• Kissinger’s six major powers belong to five different
civilizations.
• There are also many important medium-sized Islamic
states which have large populations, significant oil
resources, and strategic locations.
• These Islamic countries will also feature importantly
in the international politics of the 21st century, in
particular Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
• Huntington argues that Cold War superpower rivalry
has been replaced by a clash of civilizations.
• In this new world, local politics is the politics of
cultural identity, and global politics is the politics of
civilizations.
Kin-country rallying
• In the post-Cold war world the most important and
dangerous conflicts will be between people who
belong to different cultural groups.
• Tribal conflicts and ethnic wars will, of course, still
occur within civilizations.
• But the key point that Huntington is making is that
violence between states and groups from different
civilizations carries a more dangerous potential for
escalation.
• Huntington believes that states and cultural groups
which come from the same civilizations will support
their kin countries – kin country rallying.
Kin-country rallying
• Huntington cites Yugoslavia, the Caucusus, Kashmir
and Central Asia as areas where local clashes
between rival groups could escalate into wars
involving core or leading states from rival civilizations.
• Kin states do not become involved in such conflicts
because of ideology, power politics or economic
interests.
• They become involved because of shared cultural
kinship.
• As a result of this, the most dangerous cultural
conflicts are those which occur along the fault lines
between civilizations (see the map for an explanation
of fault-lines).
Culture can be a unifying force
• 1. During the Cold War the two Germanys,
the two Koreas and the many Chinas were
divided by ideology but united by culture. In
the post-Cold War world, Huntington argues
that countries and groups with such cultural
ties will increasingly come together.
• 2. Countries with cultural affinities cooperate
politically and economically.
• 3. International organizations which are
based on states which share a common
culture are more successful than those which
are not. Huntington cites the European Union
as an example of this.
Culture can be a divisive force
• 1. Some societies are formed due to shared ideology
or historical circumstance and contain groups from
different civilizations.
• Huntington argues that such states will either come
apart or be subject to great strain in the post-Cold
war world.
• The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia came apart, and
both were federations which contained ethnic groups
from different civilizations. Ukraine, Nigeria, Sri Lanka,
Sudan and India are all currently under great strain.
• 2. Philosophies, values, social relations, customs and
overall outlooks on life differ greatly amongst
civilizations. Religion has been revitalized in many
countries, and this has reinforced cultural differences.
Culture can be a divisive force
• 3. It is true that cultures can change, and that the
impact of culture on economics and politics can vary
over time within the same civilization.
• But Huntington believes that the major differences in
political and economic development between
different civilizations are clearly rooted in their cultural
differences.
• He provides the following examples:
– East Asian economic success has its roots in East
Asian culture.
– The difficulties that East Asian societies have had
in achieving stable democratic political systems
have their source in East Asian culture.
– Islamic culture explains in large part the failure of
democracy to emerge in the Muslim world.
Multicivilizational and multipolar
• Huntington has made the case that
international politics are multicivilizational and
multipolar. It is necessary to explain what he
means by this in a little more detail.
• He argues that the West is and will remain for
years to come the most powerful civilization.
• However, the long-term power of the West,
relative to other civilizations, is in decline.
• As the most powerful civilization, the West
continues to assert its values and protect its
interests.
• This presents non-Western civilizations with a
choice.
Multicivilizational and multipolar
• Some civilizations attempt to emulate the
West, to join the West, or to bandwagon with
the West.
• Other non-Western societies, particularly
Confucian and Islamic ones have attempted
to develop their own economic, military and
religious power in attempts to resist, or to
balance against the West.
• Huntington believes that one of the most
important features of contemporary
international politics is the relationship
between Western culture and power, and the
culture and power of non-Western
civilizations.
Summary
• The contemporary world is a world of nine major
civilizations.
• Shared culture and cultural difference shape the
interests, alliances and antagonisms of states.
• The most important countries in the world mostly
come from different civilizations.
• The local conflicts which are most likely to escalate
into broader wars are those between groups and
states from different civilizations.
• The predominant patterns of economic and political
development differ from civilization to civilization, and
can be explained by cultural difference.
• Relative power is shifting from Western civilization to
non-Western civilizations.
• Global politics has become multipolar and
muticivilizational.
Realism – basically correct
• Realist theory is a highly useful starting point
for analyzing international politics.
• Realism explains much state behavior.
• States are and will remain the dominant
actors in international politics.
• However, realist theory does have some clear
and important limitations.
• Realism assumes that all states understand
their own interests in the same way, and act
in the way.
• Realists claim that the behavior of states can
be explained by reference to their power.
Realism + culture?
• But power is only part of the explanation.
• States do define their interests in terms of
power, but they also define their interests in
terms of many other factors.
• Values, culture and institutions have a
substantial influence on how states define
their own interests.
• It is true that states prioritize their own
security.
• But different types of states define their
interests in different ways.
• In particular, states with similar cultures and
institutions believe themselves to have
common interests.
The culturally-informed behavior of states
• Since the end of the Cold war, Huntington
believes that states have increasingly defined
their interests in cultural or civilizational terms.
– States are more likely to cooperate with
states with a similar or common culture.
– States are more likely to form alliances
with other states which share a similar or
common culture.
– States are more often in conflict with
countries with which they do not share a
common culture.
The culturally-informed behavior of states
– States in the traditional security dilemma define
threats in terms of the intentions of other states.
– But those intentions and how they are perceived
are powerfully shaped by cultural considerations.
– People and governments are not as likely to feel
threatened by countries that they believe they can
trust, because of shared language, religion, values,
institutions and culture.
– People and governments are more likely to feel
threatened by countries which have different
cultures, which they find difficult to understand.
– As a result of this it is difficult to trust countries
which are culturally different as easily.
Culturally-informed realism?
• Huntington’s civilization-based approach is a kind of
culturally-informed realism.
• Huntington believes that many important
developments after the end of the Cold War can be
understood by using his civilizational approach or
paradigm, and could have been predicted by using it.
• These include:
• the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia;
• the wars which occurred in the former territories of
these federations;
• the rise of religious fundamentalism throughout the
world;
• the identity struggles which are taking places within
Russia, Turkey and Mexico;
• economic friction between the US and Japan;
Culturally-informed realism?
• …
• the opposition of Islamic states to Western
foreign policy in the Middle East;
• the emergence of China as a potential longterm threat to US hegemony;
• the efforts of Islamic and Confucian states to
acquire WMD;
• the consolidation of democratic regimes in
some countries but not in others;
• and the developing arms competition in East
Asia.
Reading the clash of civilizations fairly
• Huntington acknowledges that several civilizations
have INTRA-civilizational wars.
• The point is that such wars do not usually lead to
escalation. They do not lead to kin-country rallying.
• The COC is NOT a triumphalist argument.
• Huntington argues that “The West won the world not
by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but
rather by its superiority in applying organized
violence. Westerners often forget this fact, nonWesterners never do”.
• Huntington argues that there are three basic
responses to modernization and the West. It is
possible to embrace both, reject both, or embrace the
former but not the latter.
Modernization Westernization
Rejectionism
(Tokugawa
Japan)
No
No
Kemalism
(Turkey)
Yes
Yes
Reformism
(post-Meiji
Japan)
Yes
No
Reading the clash of civilizations fairly
• Huntington argues that it would be childish to think
that modernization would lead to the end of the rich
and varied historical cultures which make up the
world’s great civilizations.
• In the book, Huntington argues that “To preserve
Western civilization in the face of declining Western
power, it is in the interest of the United States and
European countries [most importantly] to recognize
that Western intervention in the affairs of other
civilizations is probably the single most dangerous
source of instability and potential global conflict in a
multicivilizational world” (pp. 311-2).
• Huntington is on record as saying that he did not
support the US invasion of Iraq.
Islam - bloody borders, bloody innards
• One of the most controversial sections of the book is
that in which Huntington suggests that Islam has
bloody borders and bloody innards.
• Huntington argues that there are two levels of
international politics with which we should be
concerned.
• At the level of global politics, the most serious
problems are those between the West, on one hand,
and Islamic countries and China on the other.
• At the local level, fault-line wars between states from
different civilizations provoke kin-country rallying.
• This increases the likelihood that core civilizational
states will become involved.
• This increases the possibility that conflicts will
escalate.
Islam - bloody borders, bloody innards
• When Huntington argues that Islam has
bloody borders, he is arguing that fault-line
wars (wars between two actors from different
civilizations) are largely fought between
Muslims and non-Muslims.
• Huntington provides quite detailed evidence
to back up his claim, from three different
sources (see photocopy of p. 257 of
Huntington’s book).
• But Huntington also argues that a significant
proportion of intra-civilizational wars are
fought between Muslim states.
• Again, detailed evidence is provided on the
handout.
Islam - bloody borders, bloody innards
• So, Islam has bloody borders because
Islamic states are involved in a far higher
proportion of intercivilizational conflicts.
• And Islam has bloody innards because
Muslim states are involved in a higher
proportion of intracivilizational wars than
states from all other civilizations apart from
African civilization.
Reasons for Muslim violence
• Huntington offer six reasons for what he refers to as
the late-20th century upsurge in fault-line wars, and
the central role of Muslims in fault-line conflicts.
• 1. Militarism. It is suggested that “Islam has from the
start been a religion of the sword and that it glorifies
military values”.
• 2. Proximity. Muslim and non-Muslim expansion by
land has resulted in Muslims and non-Muslims living
in close physical proximity throughout the whole of
Eurasia. There are more fault-line wars. It might
therefore be reasonable to expect that there will be
more fault-line wars.
• 3. Muslim culture is “indigestible”. Islam is an
absolutist faith that merges religion and politics, and
draws a sharp line between insiders and outsiders.
People from other civilizations find it easier to adapt
to and live with each other than they do in adopting to
and living with Muslims.
Reasons for Muslim violence
• 4. Victim status. Muslims are, according to this
argument, victims of a widespread anti-Muslim
prejudice. (Anti-Semitism, imperialism, subjection).
• 5. The absence of one or more core states in Islam.
Islam lacks a dominant central power. Potential core
states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and
Turkey compete with each other for influence. No one
state has the authority to mediate conflict within
Islamic civilization. No one state has the authority to
represent islam in its dealings with the non-Muslim
world.
• 6. There has been a demographic explosion in
Muslim societies. When this happens there are large
numbers of unemployed males between 15-30. this is
a natural source of instability and violence within
society.
• This discussion of Islam has attracted widespread
criticism.