Transcript Nuclear Safety Program - MIT - Massachusetts Institute of

The Future of Nuclear Power:
Renewal or Re-run?
David Lochbaum
Director, Nuclear Safety Project
February 25, 2008
Agenda
(Not Hidden)
Reactor design issues:
Undetected design errors
21st century threats
New design problems
New design solutions
New reactor licensing
Nuclear’s past (really passed or just paused?)
Slide 2
Background:
Nuclear Safety Limbo
UCS’s recent report concluded that
NRC’s regulations are generally
adequate. The safety bar is okay –
too many reactors too often are
doing the limbo below it.
NRC’s
Double Standard
Examples (very abridged list): PWR containment sumps
(GSI-191), Thermo-Lag and Hemyc fire barriers,
uncontrolled and unmonitored leaks of contaminated water
Old Reactor Designs,
Bad Reactor Designs
In May 1996, the NRC
reported that the Millstone
nuclear plant had long been
operating outside of their
design bases.
Follow-up NRC inspections
and efforts documented that
Millstone was not alone.
Old Reactor Designs,
Bad Reactor Designs
The NRC documented that
hundreds of design errors in
“new plants” were not detected
until after the reactors had
operated for years and years.
Why did the design reviews,
pre-operational testing, and
subsequent surveillance tests
and inspections ALL fail to
detect these hundreds of design
errors?
Old Reactor Designs,
Bad Reactor Designs
How were they
detected?
Fewer than half
were reported
found due to
intentional, active
looking. Luck
seems to play a
big role.
Old Reactor Designs,
Bad Reactor Designs
Lest anyone think that
the “design errors”
merely involved green
paint vice red paint,
Licensee Event
Reports (LERs) are
submitted for issues
above a safety
significance threshold
and accident sequence
precursors are an even
higher threshold.
Old Reactor Designs,
Bad Reactor Designs
Old Reactor Designs,
Bad Reactor Designs
If new nuclear power reactors are built and operated in the
US, the design review, pre-operational testing, and postlicensing surveillance testing and inspection processes must
produce the following outcomes:
1) Significantly fewer design errors detected AFTER the
reactors commence operation
2) Significantly shorter residence periods for undetected
design errors.
Fewer undetected design errors and shorter “hiding” times
translate into safer, more economical nuclear energy.
21st Century Threats,
18th Century Defenses
Following the 9/11 tragedy, the NRC undertook what it
termed a “top to bottom” review of security for nuclear
power reactors. Shortfalls identified by that review
were addressed by Order and revised regulations.
Curiously, a review triggered by terrorists using suicide
aircraft attacks resulted in Orders and regulations which
assume a zero percent chance of aircraft attack. Like
Paul Revere and the Minute Men, nuclear power
reactors only defend against attacks by land and by sea.
21st Century Threats,
18th Century Defenses
21st Century Threats,
18th Century Defenses
Nearly 25 years ago, the NRC chartered an industry panel
to examine design changes that would make nuclear
power reactors less vulnerable to sabotage.
The panel identified many feasible design changes – none
of which have been incorporated into “advanced” reactor
designs like the AP-600, AP-1000, ABWR, etc.
To the extent practical and feasible, nuclear power
reactors built in the 21st century must be designed against
21st century, not 18th century, threats.
New Reactor Designs,
Bad Reactor Designs?
AP-1000: To save money, vendor cut way back on concrete
and steel. The result is a ratio of containment volume to
thermal power below that of today’s PWRs, thereby
increasing the risk of containment over-pressurization and
failure in event of a severe accident.
PBMR: To save even more money, vendor replaced
containment structure with less-robust “confinement”
structure that will protect the public from an accident unless
there is an accident.
New Reactor Designs,
Bad Reactor Designs?
Generation IV: While the Gen IV reactor designs remain
largely conceptual, these concepts rely on two shaky
foundation supports – (1) need for uninvented, superresistance materials, and (2) fuel reprocessing and fast
breeder reactors.
New Reactor Designs,
Good Reactor Designs?
The EPR
design
appears to be
the safest and
most secure
design among
the new
reactor
designs.
New Reactor Designs,
Good Reactor Designs?
The EPR
design is
resistant to
aircraft
hazards.
New Reactor Designs,
Good Reactor Designs?
Even the
spent fuel
pool is
resistant to
aircraft
hazards.
New Reactor Designs,
Good Reactor Designs
If another nuclear power reactor is built in the US, it must be
protected from aircraft hazards to the maximum extent by
design features and to the minimum extent by compensatory
measures by workers (i.e., fire hose brigades).
New Reactor Licensing
The “old” reactor licensing process featured two steps:
1) NRC issuance of a construction permit based upon
review of preliminary design information
2) NRC issuance of an operating license based upon review
of final design information
The “new” reactor licensing process features a single
step – NRC’s authorization to build and then operate the
reactor.
Slide 20
New Reactor Licensing
The “old” reactor licensing process featured information
on a specific reactor design to be constructed at a
specific site.
The “new” reactor licensing process is bifurcated:
•
The NRC certifies a new reactor design without any clue
where that reactor might be constructed and operated.
•
The NRC approves a site for a nuclear reactor without
any clue of which specific design might be constructed.
Slide 21
New Reactor Licensing
“One-step” reactor licensing is at best misleading and at
worst an outright lie.
By splitting the new reactor licensing process into two
separate and distinct parts, the NRC essentially – and we
believe intentionally – eliminated meaningful public
participation. Who is going to intervene in the certification
process for a reactor that may or may not be built in their
backyard? Who can intervene in the site permitting process
for an unspecified reactor? No one. By design.
Slide 22
Public Participation
“No evidence has been found to support industry
statements that citizen opposition and regulatory
changes have been the primary causes for rising
costs, and construction delays.”
US House Committee on Government Operations
Nuclear Numbers
Nuclear reactors ordered
253
Construction permits issued 175
Operating licenses issued
130
Operating licenses ended
26
Sources: NEI & NRC
Nuclear Numbers
45 of the reactors
issued construction
permits by the NRC
(AEC) were not
completed.
At least not as nuclear
reactors. The Midland
and Zimmer plants
were completed as
fossil-fueled
generators.
Walking a Nuclear Tightrope
Walking a Nuclear Tightrope:
Unlearned Lessons from Year-plus
Reactor Outages released by UCS on
September 18, 2006.
Full report and the 51 year-plus reactor outage
case studies available at:
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/nuclear_safety/unlearned-lessons-from.html
41 of the nuclear power reactors licensed by the NRC
(AEC) experienced year-plus outages to restore safety
levels – 10 reactors did it twice!
Slide 26
Industry
Participation
“To the contrary, FPC [Federal Power
Corporation] statistics show that mismanagement
is more of a determinant than regulatory changes
and citizen opposition.”
US House Committee on Government Operations
Mismanagement was a problem during construction.
Mismanagement was a problem during operation.
Mismanagement will be a challenge during construction and
operation of new reactors – time will tell whether that
challenge will be successfully met.