Transcript Deterrence – or Destruction?

Deterrence – or Destruction?
Comparative Nuclear Doctrine
I. Modern Deterrence Theory
A. The cult of the bomber, 1919-1939:
1. Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major
war  destruction of cities with explosives,
gas, incendiaries  panic and social collapse
2. 1922, 1932-4: Attempts to ban bombers
3. Deterrence failed: Britain actually initiated city
warfare in World War II (disproportionate
response to German error)
4. Mass killing / city destruction generally didn’t
have the expected effect on civilian morale
5. Britain actually preferred German
countervalue targeting (cities) to
counterforce targeting (military forces)
B. Types of Deterrence
1. General vs. Specific/Immediate
Deterrence: Distinction between
overall strength (10,000 warheads)
and threat in particular situation
(willing to go to war over Cuban
missiles)
B. Types of Deterrence
1.
2.
3.
General vs. Specific/Immediate
Deterrence: Distinction between overall
strength (10,000 warheads) and threat in
particular situation (willing to go to war over
Cuban missiles)
Direct vs. Extended Deterrence: Attempting
to deter attacks on self vs. others (i.e. South
Korea, West Germany)
Existential Deterrence: Capability exists to
become a threat (i.e. Japan’s nuclear
program)
C. Rational Deterrence Theory (RDT)
1. Foundations =
bargaining theory,
especially game
theory at RAND and
other “think tanks”
2. Focuses on
manipulating
information, costs,
and probability of
victory to prevent
rational opponents
from engaging in
some behavior
3. Requirements of Success under RDT
a.
Clarity: Threat must be understood
Failures: The “Doomsday Device,” tactical nukes in Cuba
b.
Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried
out if line is crossed
Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam
c.
Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits
of crossing the line
Failure: Sanctions on USSR over Afghanistan invasion
d.
Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be
carried out if line is NOT crossed
Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler
declares war on America
e.
Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits
Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination?
D. Dilemmas of Deterrence
1.
2.
3.
Security Dilemma: Increased costs and credibility
also mean decreased restraint (increased
incentives to initiate conflict)
Vulnerability Dilemma: If you don’t attempt to
counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to
strike first… (US urges Soviets to harden silos)
Rationality Dilemma: Known rationality can be
exploited by opponent (as in our bargaining
game, or counterforce first strike). Solution =
“threat that leaves something to chance” – but
this decreases restraint, increasing incentives for
enemy to pre-empt
Exercise: By Dawn’s Early Light
• Threats to deterrence?
• Causes of escalation?
• How to terminate a nuclear war?
E. Does deterrence work?
1. Inherent uncertainty: If opponent
does nothing, is deterrence working?
2. General deterrence creates bias:
Perhaps having to state a threat
means it is unlikely to succeed…
3. Quantitative studies: US-USSR crises
accurately described by RDT
(responses consistently calibrated to
threats, not randomly over time as
predicted by political psychology)
4. Results from Case Studies (Morgan 2003)
a. Success more likely when challenger
motivated by prospective gains than
fear of domestic or international loss
b. Deterrence successes occur early,
before crises develop
c. Military superiority unnecessary for
deterrence (consistent with RDT – and
French nuclear doctrine…)
5. Nuclear weapons possession suppresses
conventional conflict spiral
6. Deterring Terrorists: Unexpectedly
Violent Retaliation is Key
II. Game Theory: Formalizing Deterrence
A. Assumptions
1. Rational choice (Transitive and
Connected Preferences) – Note that
preferences do not need to be
“reasonable” or “sensible,” just
consistent
2. Strategic interaction – My choices affect
which choices are best for you
B. Elements
1.
2.
3.
4.
Players – Two or more (Nuclear: Usually two)
Strategies – The choices players have
Outcomes – The results of the players’ choices
(what the world looks like afterwards)
Payoffs (Preferences) – How much each player
values each Outcome (since the same outcome
can be valued differently by different people)
C. Games in Normal (aka
Strategic) Form: The Matrix

This form is used to represent
simultaneous choice
Player 2
Player Strategy
A
1
Strategy
B
Strategy A
Strategy B
Outcome 1
Player 1 Payoff,
Player 2 Payoff
Outcome 2
Player 1 Payoff,
Player 2 Payoff
Outcome 3
Player 1 Payoff,
Player 2 Payoff
Outcome 4
Player 1 Payoff,
Player 2 Payoff
1. Solving a Normal/StrategicForm Game Without Math
a.
b.
c.
Where do the numbers come from? PREFERENCES. First step is
always rank-ordering outcomes for each player.
Nash Equilibrium  Neither player could do any better by unilaterally
changing its strategy choice
To Solve: Examine each cell to see if either player could do better by
unilaterally choosing a different Strategy, given that its opponent does
nothing different.
Player 2
Example:
Player Strategy
A
1
Strategy
B
Strategy A
Strategy B
2,3
3,4
0,0
4,2
Solving a Game Without Math
c. Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium (prediction =
instability / switching between strategies)
 Example:
Player 2
Player Strategy
A
1
Strategy
B
Strategy A
Strategy B
2,3
3,4
0,5
4,2
Solving a Game Without Math
d. Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria
(prediction = one of the following outcomes…)
 Example:
Player 2
Player Strategy
A
1
Strategy
B
Strategy A
Strategy B
2,5
3,4
0,0
4,1
C. Common Strategic-Form
Games
Prisoners’ Dilemma
1.
a.
Both players end up worse, even though
each plays rationally!
Player 2
Remain Silent
Confess
Misdemeanor,
Misdemeanor
Life, Walk Free
Confess Walk Free, Life
Felony, Felony
Player Remain
Silent
1
b. Using PD to model Arms
Races (The Security Dilemma)
Note that payoff structure is just like a PD
Player 2
Player
1
Don’t
Arm
Arm
Don’t Arm
Arm
Status Quo,
Status Quo
Conquered,
Victorious
Victorious,
Conquered
Status Quo –
Weapon Costs,
Status Quo –
Weapon Costs
2. Chicken: Who will swerve?
2. Chicken: Who will swerve?
What If: You could throw your
steering wheel out the window?
Player 2
Player Swerve
1
Drive
Straight
Swerve
Drive Straight
Status Quo,
Status Quo
Wimp, Cool
Cool, Wimp
DEAD, DEAD
Nuclear Crises and Chicken:
The Cuban Missile Crisis
Key distinction: In Chicken, each player
would rather be the (nice) sucker than
have both players be nasty  Not so in PD
USSR
US
Do
Nothing
Don’t Install
Missiles
Install
Missiles
Status Quo,
Status Quo
Defeat, Victory
Blockade Victory, Defeat
WW III, WW III
Problem 1: An India-Pakistan
Nuclear Crisis
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Determine preferences for each side (discussion)
If Pakistan assembles, what does India want to do?
If Pakistan doesn’t assemble, what does India want to do?
If India assembles, what does Pakistan want to do?
If India doesn’t assemble, what does Pakistan want to do?
Identify any Nash equilibria
Translate this into the real world – what does game theory predict?
Pakistan
India
Assemble
Weapons
Don’t
Assemble
Assemble
Weapons
Hair Trigger
India can firststrike
Don’t
Assemble
Pakistan can
first-strike
Status Quo
Problem 2: An India-Pakistan
Nuclear Crisis, Phase Two
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Determine preferences for each side (discussion)
If Pakistan doesn’t strike, what does India want to do?
If Pakistan strikes, what does India want to do?
If India doesn’t strike, what does Pakistan want to do?
If India strikes, what does Pakistan want to do?
Identify any Nash equilibria
Translate this into the real world – what does game theory predict?
Pakistan
India
Don’t Strike
Strike
Don’t
Strike
SQ: 0 dead, SQ: 0 dead
Lose: 10 Million dead, Win:
1 Million dead
Strike
Win: 100,000 dead,
Lose: 20 Million dead
Stalemate: 5 Million dead,
Stalemate: 10 Million dead
D. Games in Extensive Form:
The Tree
Extensive form adds information:
1.
a.
b.
What is the order of moves? Example: “If you do
this, then I will do that.”
What prior information does each player have when
it makes its decision?
Elements
2.
a.
b.
c.
d.
Nodes – Points at which a player faces a choice
Branches – Decision paths connecting a player’s
choices to the outcomes
Information Sets – When a player doesn’t know
which node it is at
Outcomes – Terminal nodes
3. Solving an Extensive Form
Game
a.
b.
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium – Eliminates “noncredible” threats from consideration
Process = Backwards induction – “If they think that
we think…”
E. Games of Deterrence:
Credible Threat and Restraint
Nuke
War
Preferences
A:
CapB
SQ
Attack
Don’t
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
FSB
FSB
Attack
B:
Subgame
Perfect
Equilibrium
Don’t
Nuke
War
CapB
SQ
SQ
FSB
War
CapB
Deterrence Success!!!
E. Games of Deterrence:
Credible Threat But No Restraint
Nuke
War
Preferences
A:
Attack
Don’t
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
CapB
Subgame
Perfect
Equilibrium
CapB
SQ
War
FSB
FSB
Attack
B:
FSB
SQ
War
Don’t
Nuke
SQ
CapB
Deterrence Fails!!!
E. Games of Deterrence:
Restraint, But No Credible Threat
Nuke
War
Preferences
A:
CapB
SQ
Attack
Don’t
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
CapB
FSB
Attack
Subgame
Perfect
Equilibrium
B:
War
FSB
SQ
FSB
CapB
Don’t
Nuke
SQ
War
Deterrence Fails!!!
Problem Three: Deterring the
USSR Given USSR NFU Doctrine
Nuke
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
Invade
Europe
Don’t
Invade
Don’t
Nuke
NWarEUR
CWinUS
WinUSSR
Nuke
NWarCON
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
SQ
NWinUS
Problem Three: If the US is willing
to trade New York for Bonn
Nuke
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
Invade
Europe
Don’t
Invade
Don’t
Nuke
NWarEUR
Preferences
CWinUS
WinUSSR
Nuke
NWarCON
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
SQ
US
USSR
NWinUS
WinUSSR
SQ
SQ
CWinUS
NWarEUR
NWarEUR NWarCON
NWinUS
NWarCON
CWinUS
WinUSSR
NWinUS
Problem Three: If the US is NOT
willing to trade New York for Bonn
Nuke
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
Invade
Europe
Don’t
Invade
Don’t
Nuke
NWarEUR
Preferences
CWinUS
WinUSSR
Nuke
NWarCON
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
Don’t
Nuke
SQ
NWinUS
US
USSR
NWinUS
WinUSSR
SQ
SQ
CWinUS
NWarEUR
WinUSSR
NWarCON
NWarEUR
CWinUS
NWarCON
NWinUS
F. Problems of Game Theory
Simple two-player games assume:
1.
a.
b.
c.
2.
3.
4.
Common knowledge of preferences – I know exactly what you
want, so I can predict your behavior
Terminal nodes – the game actually ends “for good”
Both players ignore third-party decisions (i.e. other nuclear
powers, or potential proliferators)
Real world violates these conditions (in many if not most
cases)
Adding concealed preferences, N players, and infinite
play is mathematically possible – but the result is infinitely
many equilibria (the “folk theorem”)
Lesson: Games constrain the strategies of rational
players (some are better than others), but can not prove a
single strategy is “best” under real-world conditions
III. Elements of Nuclear Doctrine
A. Goals
1. Deterrence – Make it
irrational for enemies to
attack
2. Compellence – Allow
leaders to force changes
in others’ behavior
3. Warfighting – Increase
odds of victory in war
B. Key dimensions
1. Size of force – Minimal to dominant
2. Command and control – Hierarchy to
delegation
3. Employment – First strike to last resort
4. Force composition – Land, Sea, Air
5. Missions – Demonstrations to all-out
war
6. Targeting – Counterforce vs.
Countervalue
IV. How do doctrines emerge?
A. Realism – External threats
1. All states pursue national interest. Keys:
preventing national destruction or defeat,
bargaining from a position of strength
2. Implications:
a. Deterrence theory: If you want peace,
prepare for war
b. Public declarations are “cheap talk” – states
at war abandon scruples and treaties
c. States try to prevent rivals from gaining
superiority
3. Realist Nuclear Policies
a. Escalation dominance: Be able to
beat any rival at any level of
escalation (conventional, tactical
nuclear, strategic nuclear)
b. Preserve autonomy: Do not bargain
away decision-making power over
weapons
c. Preserve security: Defend the state
with alliances, civil defense, military
defense
B. Strategic Culture Theory
1. Domestic politics determines policy
2. Implications
a. Dominant ideology (historical analogies,
Marxism, Maoism, etc) shapes war plans
b. Doctrines have symbolic importance 
prestige, shame, pride matter for policy
c. Civilians target military doctrines which
threaten domestic popularity
C. Organizational Politics
A. Military organizations develop
doctrines in unique ways
1. Militaries focus on military missions,
neglecting politics
2. Militaries pursue parochial interests
2. Implications
a. Military control  offensive doctrines
(e.g. preventive war, inevitable
escalation, counterforce targeting)
b. Follow-on imperative  new
weapons establish vested interests,
perpetuate the organization after its
initial purpose
D. Technological change
1. All theories agree that technological
change (new weapons available)
can change doctrines
2. Key inventions: Nuclear weapons
(1945), thermonuclear weapons
(1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and
SLBMs (late 1950s),
ICBMs and SLBMs: Speed, Reach, and Penetration
D. Technological change
1. All theories agree that technological
change (new weapons available)
can change doctrines
2. Key inventions: Nuclear weapons
(1945), thermonuclear weapons
(1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and
SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs,
A MIRVed ICBM: The Minuteman III
MIRV Test: Time-Lapse Photo
D. Technological change
1. All theories agree that technological
change (new weapons available)
can change doctrines
2. Key inventions: Nuclear weapons
(1945), thermonuclear weapons
(1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and
SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and
guided cruise missiles (1980s),
PGMs and Guided Cruise Missiles
D. Technological change
1. All theories agree that technological
change (new weapons available)
can change doctrines
2. Key inventions: Nuclear weapons
(1945), thermonuclear weapons
(1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and
SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and
guided cruise missiles (1980s),
ABM/BMD,
Defense: ABM, BMD, SDI, etc.
D. Technological change
1. All theories agree that technological
change (new weapons available)
can change doctrines
2. Key inventions: Nuclear weapons
(1945), thermonuclear weapons
(1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and
SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and
guided cruise missiles (1980s),
ABM/BMD, ASAT
ASAT: A threat to early-warning satellites
D. Technological change
1. All theories agree that technological
change (new weapons available)
can change doctrines
2. Key inventions: Nuclear weapons
(1945), thermonuclear weapons
(1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and
SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and
guided cruise missiles (1980s),
ABM/BMD, ASAT, stealth
Stealth technology
V. History: The Major Powers
A. The United States
1. The Monopoly
a. US immediately uses weapons against cities
(countervalue targeting)
b. US reserves future weapons for invasion of
Japan (counterforce targeting of beaches)
c. End of World War II  Iran crisis. US threatens
USSR. Truman: “We're going to drop it on
you.”
d. US believes A-Bomb gives it power of
compellence, not merely deterrence
• “The bombing of Hiroshima was the greatest
event in world history since the birth of Jesus
Christ.” - Senator Brien "Mr. Atom" McMahon, 1952
2. Massive Retaliation
a.
US adopts policy of containment (NSC-68) –
prevent Soviet expansion
b. Massive retaliation promised disproportionate
response to USSR transgressions
c. Massive retaliation failed
i. Not credible – US failed to respond to Chinese
intervention in Korea, East German riots of 1953,
Hungary 1956, etc.
ii. Increased Soviet vulnerability – USSR believed
US might strike first in crisis, so USSR needed to
pre-empt
iii. End of US dominance threatened to “decouple” US from European war (US unwilling to
trade New York for Bonn)
3. Flexible Response
a. Problem: US threat to escalate
immediately to global thermonuclear
war is not credible
b. Solution: Prepare for each step on
“ladder of escalation.” Goal =
“escalation dominance”
• Ladder of
escalation.
From
Herman
Kahn, On
Escalation,
1965
c. Implementing flexible response
i.
The Triad: Bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs for
different purposes (bombers can be
recalled, ICBMs are fast and accurate,
SLBMs are survivable but inaccurate)
ii. Preparation for both countervalue and
counterforce strategies (deter – and limit
damage if deterrence fails)
iii. Conventional build-up in Europe,
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons
iv. US acts to restrain unauthorized weapon
use (locks and codes)
v. Acceptance of MAD – Limits on ABMs
negotiated
4. Military influence over US policy
a. Strong military has become interest
group vying for government funds
b. “Predelegation” –
i.
Begins in 1957, continues through end of
Cold War (and beyond?)
ii. US Commanders given authority to
order retaliatory nuclear attacks if
President unreachable (also given the
unlock codes)
c. Military resistance to nuclear warfighting: LNOs
i.
Problem for civilian strategists: US nuclear
war plan (SIOP) had no contingency
calling for less than a few hundred nuclear
weapons
ii. Eisenhower demands revisions to allow use
of single weapons for political purposes
(limited retaliation, response to
conventional war)
iii. So does Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter,
Reagan….yet SIOP never updated to
include LNOs!
d. Circumvention of civilian control
• Air Force forced to install locks (PALs) on
nuclear weapons during 1960s.
– PALs require secret code to physically enable
weapon. Even if missile launched, warhead
won’t detonate without code. Prevents
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
• Air Force quietly sets code to 00000000 –
and tells just about everyone involved in the
launch process!
• 1977: Congressional hearings lead Air Force
to finally pick new codes
e. “Team B” and worst case scenarios
• CIA issues report on Soviet intentions – White House
Chief of Staff Rumsfeld and others accuse it of
being too optimistic
• CIA director Colby stands by the results. President
Ford fires him, appoints Rumsfeld as Sec. Defense,
and replaces Colby with future President George
H.W. Bush, who (reluctantly) agrees to allow the
“competitive analysis” by an outside panel chosen
by Rumsfeld
• Richard Pipes (hard-line Sovietologist) selected to
head “Team B” to re-examine the findings -- hires
other hardliners (e.g. neo-conservative Wolfowitz)
as members and advisers
f. Effects of Team B Report
i.
ii.
Wrong in nearly every factual respect –
argues that Soviet economic chaos is an
illusion, that defense budget is twice
actual size, that Soviets have advanced
weapons US experts consider impossible
(research funds are the evidence), etc.
Core notion is that USSR becomes more
aggressive as power increases – suggests
that MAD is insufficient for deterrence and
US buildup is needed
iii. Worst-case projections
• Example:
Actual US
survivability
vs. Team B
estimates
iv. Increased support for buildup
• Public support
was never high,
but did increase
in the late 1970s,
pressuring
Carter
• 1980s: DoD puts
out “Soviet
Military Power”
each year,
similar to Team B
analysis
• From 1983 
6. Hints of a new warfighting doctrine
a. AirLand Battle – 1980s
doctrine envisions
tactical nuclear strikes
as part of conventional
operations, not last
resort when
conventional war fails
b. SDI – US plans to move
away from MAD by
eliminating USSR ability
to destroy US (proves
impossible with 1980s
technology)
c. Renewed Civil Defense Efforts
• “Everybody's going to make it if there
are enough shovels to go around. Dig
a hole, cover it with a couple of doors,
and then throw three feet of dirt on
top. It's the dirt that does it!”
– T.K. Jones, Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Strategic and Nuclear Forces,
1982.
7. Reagan’s Dream
a. Soviet leader Gorbachev
seeks rapprochement with West
b. Gorbachev proposes universal, total
nuclear disarmament (1986) – Reagan
accepts proposal immediately
c. US and USSR begin rapid series of arms
control treaties
i.
ii.
iii.
INF: Bans IRBMs from Europe
Start I: Huge cuts in warheads and launchers
Start II: Abolished MIRVs (Never implemented)
8. After the Cold War: Warfighting Resurgent?
a.
Interest groups fight cancellation of Cold War
weapons systems (B-2 bomber, Seawolf submarine,
etc.)
b. New threats, new weapons?
i. US reaffirms policy of nuclear deterrence against
non-nuclear countries under Bush
ii. Nuclear labs push for development of “third
generation” nuclear weapons: Congress cuts
funds in mid-1990s
iii. US withdraws from ABM treaty to pursue BMD
(2002); Russia responds by withdrawing from
START II
c. Hawks’ Goal = prevent US from being
deterred by others or self-deterred by
overly-large weapons
B. The Soviet Union and Russia
1. Stalinism
a. Stalin demands “the bomb” to deter US
nuclear attack
b. Stalin also forbids development of
military doctrine for use of weapon
(weapon is entirely political)
c. USSR doesn’t deploy usable weapons for
years after first test
Public Bluster, Private Fears?
• "I do not consider the atomic bomb as
such a serious force. Atomic bombs
are intended to frighten people with
weak nerves."
– - Joseph Stalin
• "Only the imperialists will perish in an
Atomic war."
– - V. Molotov, 1949
2. The development of a doctrine
a. Khrushchev adopts warfighting strategy –
use nuclear weapons to open gaps for
exploitation by armor
b. Goal = eventual Soviet superiority (already
enjoyed over China)
c. Strict civilian control maintained
i.
ii.
iii.
Communist Party fear of “Bonapartism”
Justified by argument that long crisis will
precede nuclear war (so no need for quick
response)
Kruschev publicly claims “If you start a war, we
may die but the rockets will fly automatically” –
but never builds an automatic system
3. 1960s: Implementing Warfighting Doctrine
a. USSR assumes European war will rapidly
escalate to global thermonuclear war
b. Pre-emptive counterforce strategy prepared
(but even internal documents always
describe attacks as responses to invasion or
attack) – never fully adopted
c. Civil Defense
3. 1960s: Implementing Warfighting Doctrine
a. USSR assumes European war will rapidly
escalate to global thermonuclear war
b. Pre-emptive counterforce strategy prepared
(but even internal documents always
describe attacks as responses to invasion or
attack) – never fully adopted
c. Civil defense – limit damage in event of war,
create hardened shelters for leaders (retain
civilian control during wartime)
4. Détente: Did it make a difference?
a.
b.
Late 1960s – Soviets privately shift to second-strike
plans, harden missile silos
Strategic parity: US acknowledges USSR as equal
and gives up compellence BUT Soviets keep
building ICBMs because of
i. Cost (cheap) and geography (limited ports)
ii. Pressure from Soviet defense industry, just like the US
c.
d.
Soviet planners de-emphasize tactical nuclear use
(conventional offensive believed to be quicker
and tactical nukes would render military
operations impossible due to contamination)
By mid-1970s, warfighting evolved into a “no first
use” flexible response doctrine, quite similar to US
5. Soviet Nuclear Paranoia?
a. Soviet leaders privately feared
nuclear war. Post-Cold War evidence
of nuclear fear by Brezhnev…
From 1995 study (declassified in 2009)
• “During a 1972 command post exercise, leaders of
the Kremlin listened to a briefing on the results of a
hypothetical war with the United States. A U.S.
attack would kill 80 million Soviet citizens and
destroy 85 percent of the country's industrial
capacity. According to the recollections of a Soviet
general who was present, General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev ‘trembled’ when he was asked to push a
button, asking Soviet defense minister Grechko ‘this
is definitely an exercise?’”
• “Virtually all interview subjects stressed that they
perceived the U.S. to be preparing for a first strike.”
Same study:
• 1968 and 1981 Soviet studies: USSR could not win
nuclear war even with a first strike
• In a European war, if NATO forces were about to
overrun Soviet nuclear weapons sites, the Soviets
would “destroy them” with special devices and
mines “rather than use them.”
• Soviets studied “nuclear winter” (without using the
phrase) before US scientists
• Early 1980s: Castro suggested the possibility of
nuclear strikes against the US. The pressure stopped
after Soviet officials gave Castro a briefing on the
ecological impact on Cuba of nuclear strikes on the
United States
5. Soviet Nuclear Paranoia
a. Soviet leaders privately feared
nuclear war. Post-Cold War evidence
of nuclear fear by Brezhnev…
b. …and Andropov. (Able Archer “crisis”
of 1983 – did US rhetoric nearly cause
a Soviet strike?)
c. Dominant belief was that US would
strike first, despite preparations for
pre-emption.
6. The last years of the Cold War
a. Soviet leaders come to believe
(and proclaim to subordinates)
that nuclear war is unwinnable
b. Gorbachev seeks disarmament –
surprisingly little opposition
(consensus in favor of some type
of arms control among
leadership)
c. Key decision = abandon pursuit
of parity with US (arms race)
d. Irony: Warfighting plans persisted
No [adequate] attention has been paid to a
proposal, extremely important from the
military and political point of view, to create a
fully automated retaliatory strike system that
would be activated from the top command
levels in a moment of a crisis.
-- Soviet Central Committee, 1985
The “Dead Hand” System:
• Underground command post
• If communications fail AND nuclear
explosions detected by sensors…
• Rocket is launched with internal radio
• Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to
Soviet ICBMs
• Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and
communications disrupted, Soviet missiles
will annihilate the USA
• Problem: They didn’t TELL us about it!
7. Russian nuclear doctrine
a.
b.
c.
d.
Conventional force reduction 
renunciation of NFU policy
New emphasis on Russia as regional
hegemon (security umbrella for CIS)
Putin’s shift: Nuclear weapons not
restricted to defense of Russian
independence  now to be used if crisis
threatens “military security” or
“international stability and peace” (not
renounced by figurehead Medvedev)
“De-Escalation” – Use a few nuclear
weapons in limited conventional wars to
raise costs of war for opponent, inducing
peace (remember our game? C)
C. The United Kingdom
1. Initial impetus
a. US terminates nuclear cooperation in
1946 and withdraws troops from Europe.
British fear of USSR  decision to
proliferate in 1947.
b. Goal = influence US policy by becoming
capable of joint operations to defend
Europe -- or independent escalation of
conventional European war to nuclear
war
c. 1949 – USSR proliferation shocks UK,
prompts crash program to proliferate
2. British force as complement to US power
a. Britain designs “V-bomber” force around
assumption of US fighter support
b. Britain adopts counterforce targeting
when US focuses on countervalue (fears
USSR could still attack Europe even after
loss of cities) – WW II example of USAAF
refusal to attack V-weapon sites
3. Modernization and deterrence
a. US-UK Defense Agreement of 1958 –
US supplies H-Bomb designs, Tritium,
U-235, Nevada Test Site to UK in
exchange for Plutonium.
b. UK diversifies arsenal because
bombers are vulnerable  shifts to
SLBMs
c. UK now owns Trident SLBMs in
common pool with US
D. France
1. The Fourth Republic (1945-1958):
a. Initial scientific phase ends with purge of
Communists from nuclear program in 1952
b. Decision to build weapons – contingency
program begun after Dien Bien Phu,
accelerated after “Nautilus affair,”
commitment made after Suez Crisis
c. Decision to test – based on declining
influence in NATO (goal = increase
influence)
US Opposes French Nuclear Ambitions
• Harold Stassen (special Assistant on
Disarmament): “If France makes this
decision, the Federal Republic will
decide to do so..., then many
additional states will make the same
decision; and the Soviet Union will
consider itself forced to provide such
weapons also to other Communist
states...”
2. De Gaulle and the “Force de Frappe”
a. Gaullist Foreign policy
i.
Superpower balance is
inherently unstable,
requiring strong Europe as
“Third Force”
ii. France is a Great Power
with a global role and a
leadership role in Europe
b. Gaullist nuclear doctrine
i.
“Proportional deterrence” – France need
not destroy an attacker, only punish it
ii. “Multilateral deterrence” – third force
needed to inject uncertainty into
superpower calculations, to prevent
conventional war in Europe
iii. Triggering – Unstated belief that France
could force US defense of Europe by
threatening USSR cities if USSR invaded
West Europe
c. Gaullism and “Flexible Response”
i.
France rejected idea of “firebreak”
between war types in Europe BUT
ii. France DID reserve nuclear weapons
for after the battle for West Germany
was decided, but before war
entered French soil
iii. French force structure was offensive –
credible first-strike force
3. The Giscard Shift in the 1970s
a. Revised foreign policy: European,
Atlantic, non-nuclear security
b. Adoption of flexible response
i. Tactical nuclear weapons (1972)
ii. Conventional force build-up and
modernization
iii. Secret co-operation with US on MIRV
and tactical weapons (1974) – Giscard
claims to have “reached the same
conclusions as General de Gaulle” in
public
4. The Elections of 1981
a. Both left (Socialists) and right (Gaullists)
attack Giscard for “abandoning” the force
de frappe
b. Socialist victory = nuclear build-up (new
delivery systems, no disarmament while
superpowers have more than France)
c. Tactical weapons  “prestrategic”
weapons (shift away from flexible response)
c. Reactions to US Foreign Policy
i.
French fear of US SDI program (which
might leave US free to fight tactical
nuclear war in Europe) 
cooperation with NATO on nuclear
matters
ii. US-USSR proposals to eliminate
nuclear weapons (esp. INF in 1987) 
French build-up in NATO (seeks
alternatives to reliance on US)
5. After the Cold War
a. Program reoriented to non-specific
deterrence (“dissuasion”) -- Russia not
presumed as enemy, nuclear response to
chemical attack ruled out, force reduction
to minimal survivable deterrent
b. Adherence to test ban before low-yield
weapon development completed in 1995
(rejection of warfighting doctrines)
E. China
1. Before the bomb (1949-1963)
a. Korean War: US threatens use of nuclear
weapons; China makes concessions
b. China emphasizes nuclear disarmament, seeks
no-first-use pledge from US
c. Sino-Soviet Cooperation: China seeks aid from
USSR for nuclear weapons.
d. The Sino-Soviet Split: USSR rejects Chinese
attempt to lead world revolution, sides with ally
India in border dispute, refuses to give China
nuclear weapons
2. The early program
a. Initial goal = minimum deterrence
and international prestige. Mao:
“six bombs will do”
b. China decides against opposing
proliferation by rival India (hopes for
divisions in Indian politics, diversion
of resources from other military
projects)
c. Policy focus = avoiding pre-emption
i.
Develops civil relocation for most of South
China
ii. Some evidence suggests early strategy
was to dismantle own nuclear facilities to
avoid pre-emptive strike if one appears
imminent!
iii. China continues to call for total nuclear
disarmament and NWFZs (favors large
conventional forces like China’s PLA)
Current NWFZs
c. Policy focus = avoiding pre-emption
i.
Develops civil relocation for most of South
China
ii. Some evidence suggests early strategy
was to dismantle own nuclear facilities to
avoid pre-emptive strike if one appears
imminent!
iii. China continues to call for total nuclear
disarmament and NWFZs (favors large
conventional forces like China’s PLA)
iv. China delays ICBM research, focuses on
IRBMs for use against USSR if it invades
v. China adopts NFU pledge
3. Chinese Pragmatism
a. China-US rapprochement and end of
Mao’s reign  debate
i.
Shanghai group: Isolationists (need to
focus on domestic development)
ii. Moderates: Focus on foreign affairs,
aligning with US against USSR
b. Moderates prevail
i.
China deploys CSS-3 ICBM. Can reach
Alaska – and nearly all of USSR
Current Chinese Forces
ii. China focuses on survivability
• China disperses weapons, even though
it lacks advanced command and
control capability
• Some weapons deployed in caves (no
hardened silos available)
• Bombers sent to different airfields at
random
• China mass produces nuclear
weapons, becoming third-largest
nuclear power
iii. China rejects warfighting
• No tactical nukes until at least 1978
• No short-range nuclear-capable
missiles! China must target cities or
nothing.
• Deterring conventional attack
unnecessary – China believes it can
repel invaders
4. China diversifies from the 1980s
a. China develops diverse weapon
systems: CSS-4 ICBM (token numbers),
SLBMs, even ADMs for tactical use
b. Doctrine of countervalue retaliation is
retained
c. China seeks global NFU agreement
and establishment of NWFZs
V. Conclusions: What determines doctrines? Applying
Sagan’s theories to the evidence…
A. Evidence supporting realism
1. Every country changed doctrines in
response to threats
2. Smaller countries adopted proportional
deterrence or allied with larger power
3. US, China, USSR all adopted some version
of flexible response as they reached MAD
4. Conventionally-superior forces (USSR and
China) adopt NFU while others (US, UK,
France) preserve right to strike first
B. Evidence for Strategic Culture
1. Chinese focus on “people’s war” delays
tactical nuclear development
2. French nuclear program partly motivated
by prestige concerns, critical to politicians
across spectrum
3. USSR internal war plans “assume”
capitalists attack first – triggering
disproportionate response
4. USSR “dead hand” system assumes evil
capitalists who will strike without warning
C. Evidence for Organizational Politics
1. French coup attempt triggers
premature nuclear test by civilians
2. US labs find new nuclear threats after
Cold War (see RNEP)
3. Russia adopts more offensive
doctrine as military / security
apparatus gains control (Putin)
4. US retains Triad after Cold War
(follow-on imperative)