Transcript Folie 1

Workshop Swedish Delegation
10 Oct 2013, Vienna
Measures for the Labour Market
Integration of Persons with
Disabilities
Michael Fuchs & Eszter Zolyomi
Background
Study commissioned by the Austrian Social Ministry
•
To provide a cross-national analysis of employment
quota systems for disabled workers
•
To evaluate three main blocks of policy measures
1. anti discrimination legislation,
2. active labour market programs
3. employment protection
in 4 country case studies (DK, NL, SE and UK)
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Introduction
• Integration of disabled people in labour market is challenge
for social and labour market policy
• Health impaired persons face a range of employment
barriers
• Non-integration of disabled people in the labour market
causes both social disadvantages for persons concerned
and costs for the economy
• However, disability expenditure still distorted toward passive
transfers
•
In OECD-countries at most 5% of the total budget are spent for
occupational and rehabilitation programs
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Disabled people: LM overview
• Disabled persons are employed to a lesser extent (minus 3040%) and are unemployed more often (up to +100% and more)
• When employed, disabled people more often in jobs which
require low qualifications
• Due to lower employment rates and frequent dependency on
social transfers, persons with disabilities are more often at risk
of poverty
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1. Quota systems
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Quota systems: occurence and use
• Determined by cultural differences, attitudes and experiences
• Quota systems for private and/or public enterprises/ institutions
are to be found in the majority of EU-countries
• In Nordic countries (DK, FI, IS, NO, SE) quota systems regarded
as not appropriate
• Further EU-countries without quota systems: EE, LV, NL, UK
• In BE and IE quotas only in public sector
• In CY, MT, PT de facto not implemented
• In recent years both introductions (e.g., CY) and abolishments
(e.g., UK)
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Quota systems: basic parameters
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Target: stimulate labour demand by committing employers to employ a
certain share of employees with disabilities
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Typically, stipulated share ranges between 2% and 7% of the workforce
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Generally, quotas are only valid above a certain threshold, which
ranges between 15 and 50 employees
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Fee to special funds, which distribute resources to disabled employees,
provider of special activities and employers with disabled employees
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Spectrum of sanctions ranges from almost completely lacking fines, via
small sanctions in most countries (additional payroll tax of approx.
0.5%) up to relatively high sanctions (1 to 4% of payroll)
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In principle, the lack of sanctions or lacking instruments for its
enforcement represent a problem of quota systems
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Quota vs anti-discrimination
• Although in many countries co-existing, quota
systems and anti-discrimination legislation are
contrary approaches for the labour market
integration of disabled persons
• Quotas implicitly act on the assumption that
disabled people are unable to compete for
employment on the open labour market. Thus,
certain share of working places are to be reserved.
• Quotas coincide only to a limited extent with the
principle of equal access for all or the social model
of disability
• However, a solely anti-discrimination approach
could be insufficiently directed towards clearly
defined policy targets
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Quota: perspective of employers
• Extent of sanctions/incentives often low; sanctions are partly
considered as addtional non-wage labour costs
• According to company polls the exclusive costs of fees are not
central for the decision pro or contra the employment of disabled
persons
• Costs due to modification measures, working place adaptations
or other special arrangements are by far more significant
• Economically profitable employment of disabled persons as
central decisive factor implies work capability and adequate
qualification
• Potential supportive measure play a decisive role; as a rule
cooperative collaboration with supporting institutions is a precondition for successful integration
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Quota: perspective of institutions
• For governments employment quotas are
relatively low priced programms, which are easy
to finance
• The employment of disabled persons is either
supported by the fulfillment of quotas or by
programs financed via the fees
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Quota: demographic change
• A differentiated judgement of employment quotas arise in the light
of demographic change
• The own workforce is ageing and increases the number of already
employed disabled employees, whereby companies rather fulfil an
employment quota without own efforts
• In case support is offered for employed disabled persons via the
fee, windfall gains are caused, if these persons would not have
been dismissed anyway
• This points to the „inherent ambivalence of the quota system “
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If employees increasingly reach the disability status due to their
age, employers have to pay less fees. As a consequence less
money is available for the creation of new jobs for disabled people
while expenditure for permanent wage subsidies increase
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Quota: general evidence I
• In most countries the degree of fulfillment ranges
between 30% and 70%
• The employment effectivity is analysed only to a
little extent; in no case the relative effects can be
compared with those of other measures
• In a cross-country perspective higher
employment rates of persons with disabilities are
not systematically correlated with quotas
• It can be assumed that quotas (as employment
subsidies in general) cause windfall gains,
squeeze out- and substitutional effects
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Quota: general evidence II
• According to available empirical data quota
systems only lead to small net employment gains
and at times can only be justified for equity
reasons
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However, in the case of disabled persons this argument
seems to be of special importance
• Already employed persons who become disabled
and can be included, are more likely to be
employed continouosly
• However, quotas only provide small incentives to
hire disabled people (this is also the case with
measures directly targeted at employers)
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Interaction of groups of measures
• For the successful labour market integration of disabled
persons, strategies have to be developed, which enable a
better coordination between the behaviour of employers,
employees, involved institutions and political targets
• For all stakeholders more incentives and support have to be
created, to keep disabled persons in employment, to enable
new employment and to increase employment efforts
• Governments must provide a balanced setting of sanctions,
incentives and support, which complement each other
• To prevent possible negative outcomes for the labour market
and the social security system, a coordinated package of
employment and other measures is required
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2. Country case studies
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Disability and employment
Self-assessed disability prevalence, %
Employment rates by disability status, %
DK
SE
SE
DK
UK
UK
NL
NL
OECD
OECD
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
Note: Population aged 20-64, Data refer to late 2000s
Source: OECD Sickness, Disability and Work
Without disability
With disability
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
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Turning to public spending
Public expenditure on disability and sickness (left) and ALMPs (right) , in % of GDP
6.0
6.0
5.0
5.0
DK
4.0
4.0
NL
3.0
SE
UK
2.0
3.0
2.0
OECD
1.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
2000
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
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Denmark
Nordic approach to labour market policy for the disabled
based on the concept of general social rights
The 4 principles of disability policy:
1.
Equal treatment
2.
Compensation
3.
Solidarity
4.
Sectoral responsibility
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Denmark
Anti-discrimination
• Definition of disability:
social/environmentalbased approach
• Requirements for
reasonable accomodation
• Preferential access
ALMPs
Empl protection
• Mostly wage subsidised
schemes (largest: Flexjobs)
• Small role of sheltered
employment
• Increased focus on
supported measures
(mentoring, workplace
adaptations)
• Relatively weak empl
protection (blue vs
white collar workers)
• Flexible rules to
dismissal (flexibility
element), but generous
unempl. benefits
(security element)
Relevant institutions
• Local job centres
(administering role)
• Special unit fo job and
handicap support
Local municipalities
(financing role)
• higher reimbursement of active
than passive measures from State
Employers
Disabled job
seekers/employees
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Interaction with policy measures
outside employment
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Disability pension - removing elements of policies to
encourage take-up of employment (the so–called dormant
sickness compensation is SE, disability reform in NL)
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Rehabilitation - early intervention/prevention (rehabilitation
chain in SE, gatekeeper protocol in NL)
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Enhanced inter-agency cooperation – institutional reform of
PES and SIA in SE (2005), structural reform of municipalities
in DK (2007)
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From flexicurity to mobication ?
Denmark:
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Increasing focus on workforce mobility and need to enhance
education (Report commissioned by the Nordic Council, 2011)
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Seen as an attempt to further develop the flexicurity model
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Individual responsibility is important, but commitment to the principle
of compensation and solidarity remains strong
Netherlands, UK:
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Increased focus on mainstream measures (i.e. Work Programme, and
reducing number and scope of special schemes for disabled i.e.
Remploy in the UK)
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Principle of compensation (disability benefit cuts, UK) and solidarity
(more emphasis on individual responsibility both NL, UK) weakened
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