Transcript A review of school hygiene, sanitation and water

Transparency International
Executive Education Series 2008:
An introduction to the Water
Integrity Network
John Butterworth
IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre
Contents
1. Key definitions and the
importance of this topic:
what do statistics tell us?
2. Frameworks for
understanding corruption
3. Case studies
4. Designing pro-poor
strategies to prevent
corruption
5. Links and further
information
1.1 Some key definitions
Transparency = sharing information and acting in
an open manner
Honesty/ Integrity = working and acting in ways
that reflect known best practices, and following
ethical principles
Accountability = objectively holding people and
agencies responsible for their performance
Corruption = the abuse of entrusted power for
private gain
1.2 Governance, poverty and WASH
indicators in 10 selected countries
Transparency
International CPI
Index (Rank of 163
countries: 1=best,
163=worst)
Population below
national poverty
line, total,
percentage
(Most recent year
with data 19972004)
Water supply
coverage %
(most recent
year e.g. 2004)
Sanitation
coverage %
(most recent
year e.g.
2004)
Children under
five mortality rate
(per 1,000 live
births, 2005)
Ghana
70
39.5
75
18
112
Burkina Faso
79
19.2
61
13
191
Uganda
105
37.7
60
43
136
Ethiopia
130
44.2
22
13
164
South Africa
51
Nd
88
65
68
Mozambique
99
69.4
43
32
145
India
70
24.7
86
33
74
Philippines
121
21.5
85
72
33
Honduras
121
29.5
87
69
40
Colombia
59
55.0
93
86
21
Sources: www.transparency.org; http://mdgs.un.org/; http://www.wssinfo.org/
1.3 Correlation or cause?
Source: Stalgren, 2006
1.4 Key questions
Are there causal linkages, as well as correlations,
between corruption, WASH sector performance and
poverty?
Will increased WASH sector investment (to meet MDGS)
have the desired impact without better governance?
What are the most important forms of corruption and
levels at which it occurs?
Why might the WASH sector be prone to corruption?
How much leakage should we expect to find?
What could be achieved with existing investments if we
tackled leakage?
Should corruption ever be tolerated?
2.1 Interaction framework
Public to public
Diversion of resources
Appointments and transfers
Embezzlement and fraud in
Corruption occurs between
public officials
planning and budgeting
Public
Actors
Public to private
Procurement collusion, fraud,
bribery
Construction fraud and bribery
Public to Citizen / consumer
Illegal connections
Falsifying bills and meters
Source: Janelle Plummer
Private
Public
Officials
Consumers
and 3 different sets of actors
2.2 Interaction framework
PUBLIC
PUBLIC
interactions
PUBLIC
PRIVATE
interactions
Policy-making and regulating
Planning/budgeting / transfers
Management
Tendering and Procurement
Construction/Operations
Payment Systems
PUBLIC
CONSUMER
interactions
PUBLIC
PUBLIC
interactions
PUBLIC
PRIVATE
interactions
• Distortions and
diversion of
national
budgets
• State Capture
of policy and
regulatory
frameworks
• Administrative
fraud
• Document
falsification
• Bribery, fraud,
collusion in
tenders
• Fraud/bribes in
construction
PUBLIC
CONSUMER
interactions
• Illegal
connections
• Speed bribes
• Billing/payment
bribes
• Bribery/fraud in
community
procurement
• Elite capture
PUBLIC to PUBLIC
interactions
Policy-making/Regulating
• Diversion of funds
• Distortions in decisionmaking, policy-making
Planning and budgeting
• Corruption in planning
and management
• Bribery and kickbacks in
fiscal transfers
Management and
Program Design
• Appointments, transfers
• Preferred candidates
• Selection of projects
Early warning
indicators
Anti-corruption
Measures
• Monopolies/tariff
abnormalities
• Lack of clarity of
regulator/provider roles
• Policy and tariff reform
• Separation
• Transparent minimum
standards
• Independent auditing
• Embezzlement in
budgeting, planning,
fiscal transfers
• Speed/complexity of
budget processes
• No. of signatures
• % spending on capital
intensive spending
• Citizen oversight and
monitoring
• Technical auditing
• Participatory planning
and budgeting
• Unqualified senior staff
• Low salaries, high
perks, cf. HH assets
• Increase in price of
informal water
• Performance based staff
reforms
• Transparent, competitive
appointments
PUBLIC to
PRIVATE
interactions
Procurement
• Bribery, fraud,
collusion in tenders
Construction
• Fraud/bribes in
construction
Early warning
indicators
• Same tender lists
• Bidders drop out
• Higher unit costs
• Variation orders
• Low worker
payments
Operations
• Fraud/bribes in
construction
• Single source
supply
• Change in quality
and coverage
Anti-corruption
Measures
• Simplify tender
documents
• Bidding
transparency
• Independent tender
evaluation
• Integrity pacts
• Citizen oversight
and monitoring
• Technical auditing
• Citizen auditing,
public hearings
• Benchmarking
• SSIP support
mechanisms
PUBLIC to
CONSUMER
interactions
Anti-corruption
Measures
Early warning
indicators
Construction
• Community based WSS –
theft of materials
• Fraudulent documents
Operations
• Admin corruption
(access, service, speed)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Loss of materials
Infrastructure
failure
Low rate of faults
Lack of interest in
connection
campaigns
Night time tanking
Payment systems
• meter, billing and
collection – fraud and
bribery
•
•
•
•
•
•
Unexplained
variations in
revenues
•
Corruption
assessments
Citizen monitoring
and oversight
Report cards
Transparency in
reporting
Citizen oversight and
monitoring
Complaints
redressed
Reform to customer
interface (e.g.
women cashiers)
2.3 Chain of impacts
2.4 Local governance
Specific governance challenges at local level require
different approaches
Decentralisation brings new challenges and
opportunities
Corruption has more immediate and corrosive impact
Improvements may also be more rapid and wide
reaching
In WASH, community management as a key
paradigm
Tackling poverty is a key issue
3.1 Decentralization versus
centralization in India
Davies (2004) identified
high levels of corruption
Petty corruption (falsify meter
reading, speed repairs etc)
Kickbacks from contractors
Transfers within administration
Decentralisation linked to higher
levels of corruption. Why?
Opportunity to plan activities
linked to decentralisation
programmes
3.2 Report cards in India
Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in Bangalore developed
report cards for citizens to rank performance of public
service agencies (including water)
Monitored public satisfaction with staff behaviour, quality
of service, information, and corruption (speed money)
Initially showed lows levels of public satisfaction,
agencies not citizen friendly, lacked customer orientation,
corruption a serious problem
Second survey 5 years later revealed limited
improvements
Third survey 4 years later showed noticeable progress by
all agencies
3.2 Report cards in India
Report cards influenced key
officials in understanding
perceptions of ordinary citizens
Public agencies launched
reforms to improve the
infrastructure and services
Government agencies showed
greater transparency and more
responsiveness
CRCs acted as a catalyst in the
transformation of services in
Bangalore
3.3 Using freedom of
information laws
India adopted a Right to
Information Act in 2001
The citizens group
Parivartan in Delhi has been
active in supporting its use
There have been examples
where an application under
the act has brought
immediate results on a water
issue
Source: Earle & Turton
3.4 Lesotho Highlands Water
Project
Largest international water
transfer was from LesothoSouth Africa
Construction contracts
awarded fraudulently
Foreign companies paid
bribes
Successful prosecutions
set precedents
Source: Earle & Turton
3.4 Lesotho Highlands Water
Project
Precedents from prosecution
Bribes are still illegal
even if not acted on
after corrupt agreement
Jurisdiction can be taken
where the impact is felt
Crucially, courts can
gain access to
Swiss bank accounts
Source: Earle & Turton
3.5 Pipe manufacturers in
Colombia
Procurement is vulnerable to
price fixing and collusion
Private sector pipe
manufacturers in Colombia
introduced self-regulation
Adopted an integrity pact
not to pay or accept bribes
Support given by professional
association, Transparency
International and government
Half of 167 manufacturers have
signed up
Prices have reduced by 30%
3.6 Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Transformation of a
public utility under
difficult post- conflict
(civil war) conditions
High levels of illegal
connections and
unaccounted for water,
including bribery of
utility officials
Indicators
1993
2006
22
4
Production Capacity
65,000 m3/day
235,000 m3/day
Non Revenue Water
72%
8%
Coverage area
25%
90%
Total connections
26,881
147,000
Metered coverage
13%
100%
Supply Duration
10 hours/day
24 hours/day
Collection Ratio
48%
99.9%
0.7 billion riels
34 billion riels
(US$180,000)1
(US$8.7 million)
Heavy subsidy
Full cost recovery
Staff per 1,000/connections
Total revenue
Financial situation
3.6 Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Corruption was
tackled effectively, due
to
• Leadership
• Culture of change
• External support
Led to reform and new
investment
3.6 Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Human resources
management improved
Revenue collection
improved
Rehabilitation of services
achieved harnessing
local resources
Illegal connections were
tackled, reducing
unaccounted for water
Tariffs were increased
3.7 Sanitation in Kerala
The NGO SEUF targeted
diversion of funds to reduce costs
(by ½ to ⅔) in latrine construction
Mix of strategies to tackle
corruption:
• more information
• extra checks & spot checks
• public postings
• double signatures
• action on complaints at
lowest level
• referral of problems
3.8 Money diverted from
education in Uganda
 Public expenditure tracking
(PET) survey in Uganda
 Tracked central funds allocated
for school construction
 Only 13% of funds arrived at
schools
 Transparency campaign
published, information about the
grants
 Led to capture being reduced
from 87% to 18%
 Schools near newspaper and
communication points did better in
receiving their funds
Source: Reinikka, R. and Smith, N. Undated
3.9 Kecamatan Development
Project (KDP)
 Tackling grassroots
corruption in a large rural
development project
 KDP – a central
government project focused
on poor villages and highly
dispersed
 Very high risk environment
 Weak institutions for
control
 Mapping is a key step in
tackling this
Source: Guggenheim (2007)
3.9 Kecamatan Development
Project (KDP)
Mapping identified
sources of corruption
• Bribing officials to get
projects
• Cuts taken at high levels
• Illicit fees
• Under-delivery of
materials/ work
• Embezzlement by staff
3.9 Kecamatan Development
Project (KDP)
Solutions identified
Reducing discretion
Reducing transactions
Promoting competition
Lowering costs of
acquiring information
• Promoting social controls
• Strengthening formal
oversight
• Applying sanctions
35%
30%
25%
Percent Missing
•
•
•
•
Effect of Audits on Percent Missing
20%
Materials
15%
Materials
10%
5%
Wages
Wages
0%
Control
Audits
4.1 Pro-poor anti-corruption
strategies
Are all information,
transparency and
accountability initiatives
likely to benefit the poor?
Could they even be
harmful?
Evidence shows that anticorruption actions can
harden and shift its forms
Source: Janelle Plummer (2007)
4.2 Diagnose
 A key starting point is to
understand what types and level
of corruption exist
 Frameworks can be used to
map different types of corruption
and help to identify appropriate
solutions
 Severe lack of diagnosis of
corruption and its impacts on the
poor in the WASH sector
 Poorly informed anti-corruption
activities risk merely hardening or
shifting it to other forms
 Look before you leap
Diagnose
Monitor
Mitigate
Target
Connect
solutions
4.3 Target
 Focus on water and sanitation
services that reach the poor
 May include small-scale
providers and community
managed systems
 Local government a key level in
WASH - an opportunity to prevent
corruption before it takes root
 Decentralisation to service
providers and agencies that are
closer to communities can
encourage more accountability
 Weak local agencies may be
more susceptible to being
corrupted than stronger State
agencies
Diagnose
Monitor

Mitigate
Target
Connect
solutions
4.4 Example: Indonesia
15% get water directly from utility networks
20% get water indirectly or illegally
65% rely on community-managed systems,
self-supply and small-scale providers
4.5 Connect solutions
Effective anti-
corruption programmes
combine a mix of
strategies.
Supply side measures
include high level
institutional reforms to
tackle corruption
Demand side
measures strengthen
the ability of poor
people to seek
improvements
Diagnose
Monitor
Mitigate
Target
Connect
solutions
4.6 Mitigate
In some places petty
corruption may be a
necessary evil to get access
to services
Anti-corruption measures
take away this coping
strategy
Programmes should do no
harm
put back what is lost
identify alternatives so that
the poor do not need to
engage in petty corruption
Diagnose
Monitor
Mitigate
Target
Connect
solutions
4.7 Monitor
WASH sector has little
experience in reducing
levels of corruption
Vital to observe which
strategies are effective
and which aren’t
Diagnose
Monitor
Implementation
programmes should be
flexible and build on
what works best
Mitigate
Target
Connect
solutions
4.8 Key messages
Be informed and anticipate
Be inspired by examples
and success stories
Use multiple strategies to
improve access to
information, transparency
and accountability…and
prevent corruption
Act in partnerships
Learn what works
5.1 Links and further information
 www.waterintegritynetwork.net is the website of the
Water Integrity Network based at Transparency
International in Berlin
 www.irc.nl/transparency includes materials from the IRC
International Water and Sanitation Centre and links to other
useful sources
 www.transparency.org is the website of Transparency
International, a global civil society organisation in anticorruption
5.2 Links and further information
Astana, A.N. (2004). ´Corruption and decentralization: evidence from India’s water sector´. In proceedings of the 30th WEDC
International Conference, held at Laos, 2004.Loughborough, London, WEDC.
Balcazar, A.R. 2006. The establishment of an anti-corruption agreement with pipe manufacturing companies: a Colombian
experience [online] Available at www.waterintegritynetwork.net/page/238 (A 5 minute video about the Colombian integrity pact
between pipe manufactures can be viewed at www.waterintegritynetwork.net/page/254)
Davis, J. (2004). ´Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from South Asia’s Water and Sanitation Sector´. In: World
Development, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 53–71, UK, Elsevier Ltd. www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
González de Asís, M., O’Leary, D., Butterworth, J. & Ljung, P. (forthcoming) Training modules for the Programa para mejorar la
transparencia, la rendición de cuentas y el acceso a la información en el sector del agua en Honduras y Nicaragua. World Bank
Institute. Available in English and Spanish (forthcoming)
Gonzalez de Asis, M. (forthcoming) Reducing Corruption at the Local Level. World Bank.
Plummer, J., & Cross, P., 2006 A framework for tackling corruption in the water and sanitation sector in Africa. In proceedings of
the 32nd WEDC International Conference held in Sri Lanka, 2006. Loughborough, London, WEDC.
Plummer, J. 2007. Making Anti-Corruption Approaches Work for the Poor: Issues for consideration in the development of pro-poor
anti-corruption strategies in water services and irrigation. Swedish Water House, SIWI and WIN. [online] Available at
www.swedishwaterhouse.se
Satyanand, P.M. and Malick, B. 2007. Engaging with citizens to improve services: overview and key findings. Water and
Sanitation Program-South Asia, New Delhi, India [online] Available at www.wsp.org
Shordt, K., Stravato, L., & Dietvorst, C. 2007. About Corruption and Transparency in the Water and Sanitation Sector. Thematic
Overview Paper 16. IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre, the Netherlands [online] Available at www.irc.nl
Sijbesma, C., Mathew, S., and Balachandra Kurup, K. (forthcoming) Preventing corruption in sanitation: A case from Kerala, India.
World Bank Institute, Washington.
Sohail, M & Cavill, S. 2007. Accountability arrangements to combat corruption – case study synthesis report and case study
survey reports. Partnering to combat corruption series. [online] Available at www.lboro.ac.uk/wedc/publications/
Stålgren, P. 2006. Corruption in the Water Sector: Causes, Consequences and Potential Reform. Swedish Water House Policy
Brief No. 4, SIWI, Stockholm, Sweden [online] Available at www.swedishwaterhouse.se
TI & UN-Habitat. 2004. Tools to support transparency in local governance. Urban governance toolkit series [online] Available at
www.transparency.org/tools/e_toolkit/
TI. The 2008 Global Corruption Report is focused on the water sector. Forthcoming at www.transparency.org
Woodhouse, A. 2002. Village corruption in Indonesia: Fighting corruption in the World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program.
World Bank, Washington.