Standard Setting in High

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Transcript Standard Setting in High

Class 5
Antitrust, Winter, 2015
Finding the Agreement
Randal C. Picker
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law
The Law School
The University of Chicago
773.702.0864/[email protected]
Copyright © 2000-15 Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved.
Sherman Act Sec. 1

Every
contract,
combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.
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2
Sherman Act Sec. 1

Every
contract,
combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.
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3
What would happen if the monopolist
could have more than one price?
P
10
CS
PM
Demand Curve
Profits
PC
TC
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DWL
Marginal Cost
QM
10
QC
Marginal Revenue
Q
4
Perfect Price Discrimination (1st Degree PD):
Set different prices for each consumer
P
10
No deadweight loss: monopolist
sells exactly the Q that would be
sold in competition
Demand Curve
Profits
Big distribution impact
PC
Marginal Cost
Total Cost
QC
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10
Q
5
Production of Property: The
Great American Novel

Supply
Novelist-wannabe
contemplates writing book. It
will cost her $12 to do so
Once written, each copy of the book can be
produced for $1

Demand
Two
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consumers: One would value the book at 10,
the second at 5
6
What happens?

Possibilities with Single Price
Private
Values
 Price of 10, sells one copy at total cost of 13
 Price of 5, sells two copies, for revenues of 10
and costs of 14
 The book will not be produced
FC = 12, MC = 1
VC1 = 10, VC2 = 5
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What happens?
Social
Values
 One copy: Cost of 13, value of 10, net loss of 3
 Two copies: cost of 14, value of 15, social gain
of 1
 Two copies should be produced, but won’t be

Price Discrimination Would Solve
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Chicago Tribune, July 12, 1934
Third Degree Price Discrimination:
Expressly different prices for different
consumer types
Is the matinee price 3rd degree
PD or something else?
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Copyright © 2013 Randal C. Picker
10
Filling the Movie Theater
Movie Theater
(100 seats)
Assume:
Fixed Costs = 500, Marginal costs = 0
Two types of consumers
Type Y: 80 consumers, VY = 10
Type S: 20 consumers, VS = 4
Different types are readily identifiable
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Movie Theater
(100 seats)
Filling the Movie Theater
First try: Set ticket price at $4
What happens?
80 Ys, VY = 10
20 Ss, VS = 4
F = 500
All 100 consumers attend the movie
Total revenues = 100*4 = 400
The firm doesn’t cover costs, so we shouldn’t
think of that as a sustainable competitive
outcome
Social Welfare (SWF) = 80*10 + 20*4 -500 = 380
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Movie Theater
Filling the Movie Theater
(100 seats)
80 Ys, VY = 10
Second try: Set ticket price at $5 20 Ss, V = 4
S
What happens?
F = 500
80 Type Y consumers attend the movie
Total revenues = 80*5 = 400
The firm doesn’t cover costs, so we shouldn’t
think of that as a sustainable competitive
outcome
S types who we want to attend the movie don’t
SWF = 80*10 – 500 = 300
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Movie Theater
Filling the Movie Theater
(100 seats)
80 Ys, VY = 10
Third try: Set ticket price at $6.25
20 Ss, VS = 4
What happens?
F = 500
80 Type Y consumers attend the movie
Total revenues = 80*6.25 = 500
The firm just cover costs but makes no “profit”, and
these are the features of a competitive outcome
S types who we want to attend the movie still don’t
SWF = 80*10 – 500 = 300 = 3.75*80
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Movie Theater
(100 seats)
Filling the Movie Theater
80 Ys, VY = 10
20 Ss, VS = 4
F = 500
Fourth try: Set different prices for different groups:
Drop price on Y Types to $6.
Set price on S Type at $1
How do the Y Types experience this?
What happens?
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Filling the Movie Theater
Movie Theater
(100 seats)
Fourth try: PY = 6, PS = 1
What happens?
80 Ys, VY = 10
20 Ss, VS = 4
F = 500
All 100 consumers attend the movie
Total revenues = 80*6 + 20*1 = 500
The firm just covers costs
SWF = 10*80 + 4*20 – 500 = 380
We have maximized SWF while covering
costs of operation
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Copyright © 2013 Randal C. Picker
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Movie Theater
(100 seats)
Filling the Movie Theater
Fourth try: PY = 6, PS = 1
But we have done this by charging different
prices to different consumers (price
discrimination).
Each Y type effectively pays $6 of the fixed costs,
while each S type pays $1 of the fixed costs
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Filling the Movie Theater
Movie Theater
(100 seats)
This is an exercise in allocating the recovery of the
fixed costs across the two groups of consumers.
That defines a price schedule:
NY ∗ PY − MCY + NS ∗ PS − MCS = F
Fixed costs recovered from
Y Type on each sale
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Fixed costs recovered
from S Type on each sale
18
Movie Theater
(100 seats)
Filling the Movie Theater
Assume:
Fixed Costs = 500, Marginal costs = 0
Two types of consumers
Type Y: 80 consumers, VY = 10
Type S: 20 consumers, VS = 4
Different types are readily identifiable
How should the theater segment
consumers if the types aren’t identifiable?
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Movie Theater
(100 seats)
Filling the Movie Theater
Things that Won’t Work:
• Sell two types of tickets, Y-tickets for
$6 and S-tickets for $1 and ask
customers to select the tickets that
match their type
• Have two theaters right next to each
other, one selling $6 tickets and the
second $1 tickets
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Filling the Movie Theater
Movie Theater
New Movie
Movie Theater
6-month old movie
Could this work?
Have two theaters next to each other:
the first plays a new movie (the first-run
theater) while the second plays a sixmonth old movie (the second run theater)
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Filling the Movie Theater
Movie Theater
New Movie
Movie Theater
6-month old movie
Two key conditions for this to work:
V1Y − P1Y
Gain to type Y from
seeing movie when it
first comes out
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>
V2Y − P2Y
1 + r6
Value now of gain to
type Y from seeing
movie in six months
22
Filling the Movie Theater
Movie Theater
New Movie
Movie Theater
6-month old movie
Two key conditions for this to work:
V1S − P1S
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Gain to type S from
seeing movie when
it first comes out
<
V2S − P2S
1 + r6
Value now of gain to
type S from seeing
movie in six months
23
Filling the Movie Theater
Movie Theater
New Movie
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Movie Theater
6-month old movie
Note the investments that need to be
made in market segmentation:
• We are making some viewers wait to
see the movie when we could have
them seeing it now (have two 1st run
theaters instead of one 1st run and
one 2nd run), but we need the delay to
separate the customers
Copyright © 2013 Randal C. Picker
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Is the hypo Interstate Circuit?
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Interstate
Circuit
(1939)
Motion
Picture
Paramount
2
Distributors
8
O’Donnell GM
Hoblitzelle Pres
Interstate
Circuit
43 Theatres
1st and 2nd Run
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Exhibitors
Texas
Texas
Consolidated
Theatres
66 Theatres
1st and 2nd Run
26
The Letter

Format


July 17, 2015
Letter sent on Interstate Circuit letterhead
Addressed to 8 distributors
27
The Letter

Key Content
On
April 25th, the writer notified you that in
purchasing product for the coming season 34--35,
it would be necessary for all distributors to take
into consideration in the sale of subsequent runs
that Interstate Circuit, Inc., will not agree to
purchase produce to be exhibited in its 'A' theatres
at a price of 40 cents or more for night admission,
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The Letter

Key Content
unless
distributors agree that in selling their
product to subsequent runs, that this 'A' product
will never be exhibited at any time or in any
theatre at a smaller admission price than 25 cents
for adults in the evening.”
“The writer will appreciate your acknowledging
your complete understanding of this letter”
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Evaluating the Evidence

What does the evidentiary record look like to
an outsider?
If
you were a second-run theatre, what would you
think?
What evidence would be available to you?
If you were going to bring a private antitrust
action, how would you frame the complaint?
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Finding the Conspiracy
Paramount
8
Interstate
Circuit
7
6
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2
5
3
4
31
Result

Says the Court
“While
the District Court’s finding of an agreement
of the distributors among themselves is supported
by the evidence, we think that in the
circumstances of this case such agreement for the
imposition of the restrictions upon subsequent-run
exhibitors was not a prerequisite to an unlawful
conspiracy.”
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Result
“It
was enough that, knowing that concerted action
was contemplated and invited, the distributors
gave their adherence to the scheme and
participated in it.”
“Each distributor was advised that the others were
asked to participate; each knew the cooperation
was essential to successful operation of the plan.”
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Result
“Acceptance
by competitors, without previous
agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan,
the necessary consequence of which, if carried
out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is
sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy
under the Sherman Act.”
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Theatre Enterprises (1954)

Rejects “conscious parallelism” standing alone
as sufficient for finding of violation:
“The
crucial question is whether respondents’
conduct toward petitioner stemmed from
independent decision or from an agreement, tacit
or express.
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Theatre Enterprises (1954)
“To
be sure, business behavior is admissible
circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder
may infer agreement. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
United States, 1939, 306 U.S. 208.”
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Theater Enterprises (1954)
“But
this Court has never held that proof of
parallel business behavior conclusively
establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that
such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act
offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously
parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads
into the traditional judicial attitude toward
conspiracy; but ‘conscious parallelism’ has not yet
read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.”
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Making Sense of the Cases

Theater Enterprises (1954)
Knowing
parallel behavior alone insufficient
Seems to contemplate mere “tacit” agreement

Interstate Circuit (1939)
Direct
evidence of offer (the letter) and inference
of conspiracy from parallel behavior coupled with
failure to rebut same
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Entry Scenarios

Hypo 1
AT&T
and Verizon fear entry by the other; get
together and agree that neither will enter the
other’s markets; sign contract in blood
Section 1 violation?
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Answer

Yes, of course
Market
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division is per se violation of Section 1
40
Entry Scenarios

Hypo 2
AT&T
believes that entry by it into Verizon’s
markets would result in responsive entry from
Verizon into AT&T markets
Result would create competition but wouldn’t
change market shares and would simply lower
prices, so AT&T declines to enter, as does
Verizon
Section 1 Violation?
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Answer

No violation
Just
parallel, self-interested conduct
No agreement not to enter but just two unilateral
decisions
Individual firms don’t have obligation to create
socially optimal level of competition
No violation of Section 1 under current law
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Framing Twombly

Questions
Is
Twombly Hypo 1? Hypo 2? Something else?
Can we judge that from the complaint?
What evidence/facts will be available to plaintiffs,
absent discovery, to separate 1 from 2?
Where will that evidence be available?
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Twombly Complaint
44
“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants entered into
a contract, combination or conspiracy to
prevent entry
in their respective local
“
telephone and/or high-speed internet
services markets by, among other things,
agreeing not to compete with one another
and to stifle attempts by others to compete
with them and otherwise allocating
customers and markets to one another.”
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Twombly Complaint ¶ 4
45
“Although the RBOCs contend that the
CLECs are hurting them by leasing network
components at below-cost rates, the RBOCs
have refrained from engaging in meaningful
head-to-head competition in each other’s
markets.”
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Twombly Complaint ¶ 39
46
“The failure of the RBOCs to compete
with one another would be anomalous in
the absence of an agreement among the
RBOCs not to compete with one another
in view of the fact that in significant
respects, the territories that they service
are non-contiguous. …”
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Twombly Complaint ¶ 40
47
“The failure of the RBOCs that serve the
surrounding territories to make
significant attempts to compete in the
surrounded territories is strongly
suggestive of conspiracy, since the
service of such surrounded territories
presents the RBOC serving the surround
territories with an especially attractive
business opportunity that such RBOCs
have not meaningfully pursued.”
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Twombly Complaint ¶ 40
48
“In the absence of an agreement not to
compete, it is especially unlikely that
there would have been no efforts by
surrounding and dominant RBOCs to
compete in such surrounded territories.”
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Twombly Complaint ¶ 41
49
“On October 31, 2002, Richard Notebaert
the former Chief Executive Officer of
Ameritech, who sold the Company to
Defendant AT&T in 1999 and who
currently serves as the Chief Executive
Officer of Defendant Qwest, was quoted
in a Chicago Tribune article as saying.”
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Twombly Complaint ¶ 42
50
“it would be fundamentally wrong to
compete in the AT&T/Ameritech territory,
adding ‘it might be a good way to turn a
quick dollar but that doesn’t make it
right.’ Jon Van, Ameritech Customers Off
Limits: Notebaert, Chicago Tribune,
October 31, 2002 Business, pg. 1.”
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Twombly Complaint ¶ 42
51
“In the absence of any meaningful
competition between the RBOCs in one
another’s markets, and in light of the
parallel course of conduct that each
engaged in to prevent competition from
CLECs within their respective local
telephone and/or high speed internet
services markets and the other facts and
market circumstances alleged above,”
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Twombly Complaint ¶ 51
52
“Plaintiffs allege upon information and
belief that Defendants have entered into
a contract, combination or conspiracy to
prevent entry in their respective local
telephone and/or high speed internet
service markets and have agreed not to
compete with one another and otherwise
allocated customers and markets to one
another.”
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Twombly Complaint ¶ 51
53
Framing Twombly

What is the complaint with the complaint?
Inadequate
notice?
 The defendants can’t tell what the plaintiffs are
alleging?
Does the complaint tell us whether we are in hypo
1 or 2?
 Is that the complaint’s job?
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Framing Twombly

Flipping
If
any complaint can allege parallel conduct and
then just quote language from Section 1, what
complaint will be dismissable under Rule 12(b)(6)?
Is that what this complaint does?
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Conley v. Gibson

Justice Black
“the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.” 355 U.S., at 45-46.

Is this paragraph 51?
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Shall We Start with Old Form 9?


This is the old version; revised now at Form 11
The Key Sentence
“On
June 1, 1936, in a public highway called
Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts,
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle
against plaintiff who was then crossing said
highway”
Is this paragraph 51?
 2015
July 17,
57
Finding Evidence

What evidence of agreement should be
available at the pleading stage?
If
a secret agreement exists, the better the parties
to it are at keeping secrets, the less public info will
exist about it.
How is a plaintiff supposed to get access to
information about the existence of a wellfunctioning conspiracy?
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Finding Evidence
Is
the Notebaert statement to the Tribune a leak
about a secret agreement? Something else?
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Our Two Problems

Fishing Expeditions to Extract Settlements
Plaintiff
simply alleges parallel behavior to do
discovery that is costly for defendants with the
hope of inducing a settlement offer from the target
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Our Two Problems

Successful Conspirators Won’t Leave Public
Tracks
All
the plaintiff will observe is parallel behavior but
good conspirators will not leave anything in the
public record that would make it possible for a
plaintiff to show agreement
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Our Two Problems
Worse:
we will only catch the bad conspirators
and the good conspirators will control more
economic activity
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Says the Court

Holding
“In
applying these general standards to a § 1
claim, we hold that stating such a claim requires a
complaint with enough factual matter (taken as
true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”
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Says the Court

Holding
“Asking
for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls
for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.”
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Says the Court

Holding
“Hence,
when allegations of parallel conduct are
set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be
placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct
that could just as well be independent action.”
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Text Messaging

Key Question
How
is the complaint in Text Messaging different
from that in Twombly?
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Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker
66
HFCS Analysis of Proof

Section 1 Could Cover Tacit Alone (No
Communication between the parties) But …
“Section
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1 of the Sherman Act forbids contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade. This statutory language is broad enough to
encompass a purely tacit agreement to fix prices,
that is, an agreement made without any actual
communication among the parties to the
agreement.”
Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker
67
HFCS Analysis of Proof

Offers Through Action
“If
a firm raises price in the expectation that its
competitors will do likewise, and they do, the firm’s
behavior can be conceptualized as the offer of a
unilateral contract that the offerees accept by
raising their prices.”
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Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker
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HFCS Analysis of Proof

But Actual Verbal Agreement is General
Standard
“***
Nevertheless it is generally believed, and the
plaintiffs implicitly accept, that an express,
manifested agreement, and thus an agreement
involving actual, verbalized communication, must
be proved in order for a price-fixing conspiracy to
be actionable under the Sherman Act.”
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Five Situations

Try Five
1.
Independent behavior
2. Parallel behavior
3. Consciously parallel behavior
4. Tacit agreement
5. Express agreement or conspiracy
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Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker
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Five Situations

What is the standard for an “agreement”?
And
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distinguish pleading and proof
Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker
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Five Situations

The Cases
Theatre
Enterprises rejects conscious parallelism
as sufficing for agreement but seems to
contemplate that agreement can be “tacit or
express”
HFCS suggests that tacit is consistent with the
language of Section 1 but caselaw and parties
seem to contemplate express agreement
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Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker
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Two Types of Evidence


Economic Evidence on State of Competition
Noneconomic Evidence on Agreement
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Copyright © 2000-12 Randal C. Picker
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Market Structure and Price Fixing

Hard to Fix Prices If
Large
number of sellers
Heterogenous product (many qualities)
Good substitutes in production or consumption
Purchasers are concentrated
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