Pakistan at Crossroads: War against Terrorism
Download
Report
Transcript Pakistan at Crossroads: War against Terrorism
Muqarrab Akbar
PhD student, Glasgow School for Business and Society
Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK
[email protected]
Drones
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) system
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
used for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR)
most modern technology with wide range of capability
areas where American forces cannot operate overtly
Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan
First time in 2002 Yemen in 2002 ,Salim Sinan al-Harethi,
suspected in 2000 USS Cole bombing in Aden
numbers increasing dramatically
in 2001 almost 50
in 2002 167
in 2009 over 250
in 2011 7,000
Since summer 2011, expanded in Somalia, Libya and Yemen
Before September 11, US had criticised and condemned the
Israeli policy of target killing.
FATA and Drone Attacks
one of the most dangerous and isolated region of Pakistan
Mountainous
barren and
deep valley areas
Almost 3.3 million population, only 2 percent of Pakistan
poorest regions of the world
per capita income about US $250 per year
60 percent living below poverty line
code of conduct “Pakhtunwali”
hospitality, generosity, honour, equality, pride,
compensation and retaliation
Sanctuary of Al Qaeda and Taliban
training camps and recruitment centres
exploiting the ideological and ethnical affiliations
Pakistan military launched operations in FATA
captured & killed many top leaders of Al-Qaeda and Taliban
peace agreement to pardon local leaders
US started Drone attacks in 2004
central element of defence and counter-terrorism strategy
most appropriate response
no prospect of negotiation or compromise
Pakistani forces were not willing or unable to launch an operation
US forces were prohibited to operate
first drone on Pakistan’s territory on June 18 2004
target Nek Mohammad
an influential member of TTP
Pakistani military credited itself
fear of public retaliation
Initially the covert drone -“personality strikes”
Bush era
High value target-senior Al-Qaeda members
Only eight in 4 years from 2004-2007.
Success of drone caused the increase its number
Last era of Bush
Less signature strikes
33 in 2008
Entrance of Obama
frequency of drone attacks proliferated further
“signature strikes” based on “pattern of life” analysis.
43 in first ten month of 2009
Only one vital success -- Baitullah Mehsud
Drone: A Successful Campaign
more than half of top ranking and high value targets
without endangering American marines or pilots
“the only game in town considered to be the most effective tool
and weapon against Al-Qaeda in the war on terror by the
intelligence community particularly in the areas across the
Pakistani borders.”
(Leon Panetta, director of CIA)
From 2004 to 2010
60 to 1707 members of Al Qaeda, Taliban and affiliates
groups targeted
attacks on the ISAF and the United States forces
a plausible prima facie rationale to counter such
Drone is effective because
least obstructive and most precise mean
greater surveillance capability
greater precision to hit the target
avoiding collateral damage
Against Drone attacks
Drones only work and gather surveillance on the basis of
‘pattern of life’ information
Their human operators distinguish terrorists from civilians
accuracy, precision depends widely on human intelligence
Killing rather the prosecuting the perpetrators
Exact numbers of militants and innocents killed unknown
Till June 2011-- 1,500 to 2,500 civilians on unknown killed
Accidental killings -- collateral damage is increased
Tarnishing social fabrics of society in FATA
During Obama regime
less than 13% of drone killed a militant leaders
only 2% are militant leaders in all fatalities from drone
Pakistani sources –in last three years
about 700 civilian causalities
@ 2 percent with one militant for every almost 50 civilian
UK failed to support drone openly
Germany supports the Pakistani stance
Never been criticized before its expansion
causing hostility, resentment across Pakistan
provoking retaliation against the United States
Undermining the Pakistan’s territorial integrity
No transparency and accountability
call of drones due to high civilian causality
(David Kilcullen, a former counterinsurgency advisor to Gen. David Petraeus)
Doubt about estimation of civilian causalities
militants collect and buried the dead and told that all of
them were innocent civilians
Public Response
Initially no resentment
Enhanced operation caused anti drone and anti US sentiments
March 2009 – 61 % (International Republican Institute)
2010 – 75 %
2011 – 97 %
(New America Foundation)
(Pew research Center)
2012
17 % supports killing of militants by drones
94 % considers killing innocent civilians
74% unnecessary to defend Pakistan from extremist organisations
(Pew research Center)
Opposition within US
Anne Patterson
(US Ambassador to Pakistan)
Cameron Munter (US Ambassador to Pakistan)
Adm. Mullen
Andrew M. Exum (Center for a New American Security)
David Kilcullen (former Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General Petraeus)
No empirical evidences on civilian and militant deaths
Differences in media reports
Killing of already killed
Ilyas Kashmiri in 2009 and again in June 2011
Pak- US Drift
From 2004 to 2007 , Pakistan denied US involvement
Shamsi Air Base was provided
Wiki leaks cables revealed Pakistani tacit support
Bilateral relations affected by
Raymond Davis episode (January 27, 2011 )
Drone strike at Datta Khel ( 38 civilian deaths, March 17, 2011 )
Salala Check post attack on Pak Army
US agreed to notify Pakistan if targeting more than 20 people.
Pentagon and State department favour restrictions
CIA wants to continue
Drone strikes as counter productive
Suicide attack – retaliatory measure and revenge
Emergence of “accidental guerrilla” Phenomenon
survivors converting into suicide bombers (opinion of local people)
Blowback to US forces NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan
Suicide bombing by al-Balawi in Khost
Attempt to explode in Times Square by Faisal Shahzad
Pakistani civilians, army targeted
Attacks on Naval base, military headquarters and Air base
No empirical data only anecdotal evidence
Drone Strikes and Suicide Attacks
Deaths from Drone and Suicide Attacks
Drone attacks and International Law
procedure, operations, criteria of target choosing secret
“the worst kept secret in the history of U.S. foreign policy”
(Micah Zenko, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow)
legal and moral status under US domestic and international law
Executive order 12333 prohibits the engaging in assassination
No specific International Law describe about drones
Drone similar as other weapons
American government justifies attacks to eliminate threat to US
security.
Violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations
No use of force against political independence or territorial
integrity of any state
Two exemptions
State give consent to use force on her territory or
Presently not with Pakistan’s consent as objected repeatedly
Host state unwilling to target the threat to attacking state
Launched operation in Swat, Wana and FATA
Even if Pakistan consented
Illegal to kill suspected and innocents without prosecution
Violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and
International Human Rights Law (IHRL)
No threat to US from these people
On domestic legal perspective
Violation of Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF)
these elements are not involved in September 11
“whether killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in
response to [events] in 2001.”
(Christof Heyns, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions)
“they undermine the essential foundations of human rights law”.
( Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions)
Conclusion
Letter of 26 congressmen to Obama regarding drone
Drones are
Strategically important
technical sound
wisdom of using in the area not approachable easily
Collateral damage of drones is
Accelerating violence
Instability in the region
Creating more enemies than eliminating
Emergence of Islamic Pashtunistan
Complicating US policy of withdrawal
Fragile relationship between US and Pakistan
Both partners must be eloquent on the issue
Effective use
Minimising the civilian or suspected deaths
Trust building
References
Ian Henderson, “Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the Use
of Armed Drones.” In Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law 13, edited by M.N. Schmitt, Louise
Arimatsu and T.McCormack, 134-136. Hague:Springer, 2010.
Michael J. Boyle, “Do counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency go together?”, International Affairs 86,
no.2 (2010):342.
Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens and Matt Flannes, “Drone
Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War”,
Middle East Policy XVIII, no. 3(2011):123.
Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the
CIA’s Covert Drone Program? New Yorker, 2009, October
26: 5;
References cntd....
Avery Plaw and Matthew S. Fricker, “Tracking the Predators:
Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan”,
International Studies Perspectives (2012):1–22.
M. E. O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A
Case Study of Pakistan,” Notre Dame Legal Studies Research
Paper 43, no. 9 (2009): 2-26.
Brian Williams, “The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in
Pakistan, 2004–10.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33: 871–
892.
New America Foundation.
International Republican Institute
Pew Research Center
QUESTIONS ??