Transcript Slide 1
An expanding trade agenda of the EU and possible implications for Turkey’s trade policy, with special reference to free trade agreements Dr. M. Sait AKMAN Marmara University EU Institute and TEPAV 14 - 15 May 2010, Istanbul
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Outline
Changing nature of EU trade policy (Global Europe strategy) Turkey’s alignment with the EU’s preferential trade regime Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) impact on Turkey?
Which criteria for a sustainable relationship between TR-EU in FTA issue What to do in FTA issue?
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Changing nature of EU trade policy (Global Europe strategy)
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EU Trade Strategy: Global Europe
Lisbon Strategy in the world (EU growth and job strategy) with a mid-term review in 2005.
(2000) to make the EU the most competitive economy Complement Lisbon agenda by introducing an external dimension: Global Europe Strategy (2006) a trade policy complying with the objectives of growth and employment.
a trade policy adopted to the changing global context
Emergence of new powers Fragmented and globalised production process Need for innovation and R&D
Europe 2020 Strategy (2010) (for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth); and its new trade strategy for EU2020 implementation and explore new directions based on priorities announced and considering recent economic and trade policy developments such as the global crisis.
, to assess 4
Key facts on EU trade
EU exports:
EU (27) is the leading exporter (16.2% in goods in 2009) Over 2/3rds EU exports are intra-EU (of which 90% is among EU15) North America and Asia are the EU27’s main markets outside Europe, each accounts less than 1/10 th EU exports. Africa, Latin America and the Middle East have marginal shares
EU imports:
EU (27) is the leading importer (17.4% in goods in 2009) The pattern on the import side is very similar to the export side Main difference is trade deficit with Asia (12% imports vs. 7% exports) EU average tariff is low (average bound rate is about 3.5%) 5
Market share in value terms (1995-2005)
source:
BACI and CEPII, see E. Commission
Global Europe
6
1600
EU trade deficit rises since 1995
Exports
(Billions of euro)
Imports 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 -200 -400
-5,0 -3,3 -17,4 -43,8 -56,8 -138,9 -90,7 -41,5 -61,9 -67,6 -119,7 -183,6
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EU tariffs are low in manufacturing goods
Textiles and clothing Transport equipment Leather, rubber, shoes & travel gds Chemicals and photographic supplies Electric machinery Non-agricultural articles n.e.s.
Mineral products, precious stones Metals Non-electric machinery Wood, pulp, paper and furniture 12 22 17 14 14 23 12 10 10 10 Average High Dairy products Grains Live animals and products thereof Tobacco Coffee and tea, cocoa, sugar, etc.
Fruit and vegetables Beverages and spirits Fish and fishery products Oil seeds, fats, oils and their products Other agricultural products Cut flowers and plants 19 26 75 71 76 76 101 114 150 192 210 0 50 100 150 200 250 Source: WTO’s Trade Policy Review, EU 2007 8
EU exports are destined to less dynamic markets compared to the US and JAP
EU has to export to more ‘dynamic markets’
On 10 most dynamic markets On 20 least dynamic markets % of total exports going to the most/least dynamic markets Contribution to the rise of world imports over a ten year period US 78% Japan 76% EU25 46.9% 67.6% 0.7% 1.8% 3.3% 5.3% 9
EU is competitive in up-market goods
EU investment in high-quality goods is key to growth and jobs Intellectual property protection is important for EU firms Up-market products
30 25 20 15 10 5 0 EU 2 5 US A Ch ina Ja pa n Ot h. De v 1995 BR I Ot h. Em .
Ro W 2004 10
EU high-tech product exports
lose share in total
Innovation and high-tech goods are essential for EU competitiveness 25% World Market Share for High-Tech Products (2005) 20% 15% 10% All products High-Tech products 5% 0% EU Japan US China
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EU performs well in services exports
EU needs liberalisation in ‘trade in services’ 30% 25% World Market Share in Commercial Services 20% 15% 2001 2007 10% 5% 0% EU US Japan China
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Asian share is high in EU imports
EU needs to export more to Asian markets: (Korea, India, ASEAN...)
EU needs a deeper agenda (WTO +)
1.
Insufficient market access: services
2.
Insufficient protection of EU interests:
Intellectual property (TRIPS); Investment (TRIM); technical barriers (TBT)
3.
Need for new multilateral regulations (competition):
Competition; govn. procurement;
4.
Need for new multilateral regulations (market failures):
environment; labour standards 14
WTO+ topics in selected EU FTAs source:
FTA / CU
Industry Agric.
Custom Exp.tax
SPS TBT STE ADD CVM State Aid Pub.proc.
TRIMs GATS TRIPs
WTO+ Total
x x
12
x x x x x x x x x x x
9
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
10
x
11
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
10
x
10
x
9
x x x x x x
11
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
11
x x x x x x x x x x
10
x x x x x x x x x x x
11
x x
12
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
10
x x x x x x x x x x 14 13 14 0 8 14 13 14 14 13 13 x x
12
4 14
148
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Source: Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2009)
EU policy change towards regionalism
Lamy argued, in his Trade Policy Assessment document that: “our arguments in favour of a better regulated multilateral
world have been less effective. Indeed, arguably as a result, trade policy or the WTO has too often been the sole focus for efforts to strengthen international governance, which risks weakening its legitimacy both internally within the Union, and in the outside world. I don’t believe the WTO can or should remain the sole island of
governance in a sea of unregulated globalization.” (European Commission, 2004, p. 5) 16
Different terms, similar objective, varying paths
Terms EU document WTO event aims / emphasis hot topics Santer-Brittan 1995-1999 1996 communic.
1996 Singapore Market access (non-reciprocal) NTBs New Rules Singapor issues Built-in agenda Path WTO WTO+ Prodi-Lamy 1999-2004 2004-2009 Barrosso-Mandelson Barrosso Ashton ‘08 2010 Barrosso II-de Gucht Lisbon Strategy 2006 Global Europe ReviewLisbon EU 2020
Trade strategy for EU 2020
Seattle Summit ‘99 Doha R. ’01 Cancun ’03 July 2004 Hong Kong 2005 Business support Societal needs Market access (reciprocal) New Rules 2006 Doha suspended Market opening is not enough but right internal policies Built-in Development Jobs and growth Investm.
IPR Gov.Pro.
RTAs -Assess progress in Global Europe -Sustainable and inclusive growth -Global crisis eff.
high-tech ‘green’ g.
Services Raw mat.
Climate c.
WTO WTO+
RTAs
RTAs
WTO
RTAs
WTO
Turkey’s alignment with EU’s preferential trade regime
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Article 16 of Association Council Decision No 1/95:
“
With a view to harmonizing its commercial policy with that of the Community, Turkey shall align itself progressively with the preferential customs regime of the Community within five years as from the date of entry into force of this Decision. This alignment will concern
both the autonomous regimes and preferential
agreements with third countries. To this end, Turkey will take the necessary measures and negotiate agreements on mutually advantageous basis with the countries concerned. The Association Council shall periodically review the progress made.”
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FTAs Turkey had concluded:
Turkey has completed 26 Free Trade Area agreements in conformity with the EU’s FTAs : 10 of these lapsed due to the accession of these countries in the EU ( Poland, Hungary, Czech Rep., Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania ) 13 of the FTAs are in force ( EFTA, Israel, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-H, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Egypt, Albania, Georgia, Montonegro ) 3 are waiting for ratificiation of the Parliament ( Serbia, Chile, Jordan ) ‘ In all of these agreements, Turkey already achieved the concessions which the EU had secured previously in FTAs with the said countries ’ 20
Current State of the EU and Turkish FTAs
EU’s Free Trade Agreements
(in force and in the pipeline)
Status of Turkey’s FTA EFTA Israel
FYROM -Macedonia
Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Palestine Tunisia Morocco Syria Egypt Albania Chile Montenegro Serbia South Africa Jordan Mauritius Lebanon Faroe Islands Mexico Algeria South Korea Ukraine India GulfCooperationCouncil
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,Uruguay) ACP (Africa, Carribean and Pacific)
Central America
ANDEAN (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador) (Talks with Colombia and Peru are finalized) ASEAN (South East Asia)
Libya
In force (1992) In force (1997) In force (2000) In force (2003) In force (2003) In force (2005) In force (2005) In force (2006) In force (2007) In force (2007) In force (2008) Agreement signed in 2010 Agreement Signed in 2008 Agreement Signed in 2009 Exploratory talks Agreement Signed in 2009 Negotiating Negotiating Negotiating Attempted to negotiate Attempted to negotiate Negotiations to start in April 2010 Exploratory talks Negotiations started Negotiating Negotiating Attempted to negotiate Attempted to negotiate Attempted to negotiate Attempted to negotiate Negotiating
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Turkey’s trade with the FTA partners
(as a % of its total trade, 2008) TR import from.. TR Exports to.. TR trade with EFTA Israel FYROM -Macedonia Croatia Bosnia and Herz.
Palestine Tunisia Morocco Syria Egypt Albania Georgia Montenegro Chile Serbia Jordan TOTAL MEXICO S. KOREA LEBANON ALGERIA S. AFRICA (appr.) TOTAL -potential FTAs (appr.) SUB-TOTAL (appr.)
Source: IMF (DoTS), 2008
3.10
0.70
>.10
>.10 >.10
>.10 0.20
0.20
0.30
0.50
>.10 0.30
>.10 0.20
>.10 >.10
6.0
0.20
2.00
>.10
1.60
0.80
4.65
10.65
2.50
1.50
0.20
0.30
0.40
>.10 0.60
0.70
0.80
1.10
0.20
0.80
>.10 >.10
>.10 0.30
9.70
>.10
0.20
0.50
1.20
0.90
2.90
12.60
2.90
1.00
>.10
0.10
0.20
>.10 0.30
0.40
0.50
0.70
>.10
0.50
>.10 0.10
>.10 0.10
7.0
0.20
1.30
0.30
1.50
0.80
4.10
11.10
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EU 16 FTA partners (appr.) Total
Turkey’s preferential trade
(as a % of its total trade, 2008) TR imports from
37.4
TR exports to
48.3
TR trade with
41.7
6.0
43.4
9.7
58.0
7.0
48.7
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The impact of EU
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) on Turkey: Main arguments
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
1.
Preference erosion for Turkey in the EU market:
Turkey loses its share in EU markets as other partners of the EU secured improved access by means of FTAs .
Being Turkey’s most stable and largest export market, the EU’s preferential advantage under the CU is decreasing.
- This argument is not convincing against the EU, as the latter can legitimately claim that it has freedom to regulate its bilateral trade relations with third countries; - nor it is economically rationale from the vintage of competitiveness and free trade 25
EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
2.
FTA partners of the EU have the opportunity to have an easier access to Turkish market:
FTAs with the EU allow them a tariff- free (circumvention) access to Turkey , of FTA partners’ goods, once entering into free circulation within the EU.
This will be more visible in indirect imports from more competitive countries like S. Korea, India and ASEAN whose export s may hit several labour and capital intensive sectors .
This argument is correct, but it depends on the potential volume of trade that can be deflected into Turkey via the EU. the argument must also consider that this is a result of ‘competitiveness problem’ and Turkey must develop an ‘adjustment strategy’.
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
3.
FTA partners do not have the obligation to
negotiate with Turkey an FTA despite ‘Turkey clause’ :
These countries with which the EU has FTAs do not reciprocate because Turkish goods cannot have preferential access in their markets via the EU
- To counter this argument the EU has added ‘Turkey clause’ in its FTAs.
- In practice, Turkey had concluded FTAs with several of these countries, or started negotiations recently like Korea and India. But, not effective in the cases of Mexico or S. Africa).
- The argument is more convincing if formulated as such:
Reluctant behaviour by third countries cause substantial delay, and disadvantages to Turkey . This must be compensated.
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
4.
Asymmetry effect in trade agreements:
A. Turkey is not as forceful as the EU in negotiations - This argument can be invalidated as Turkey already secured many concessions in its first-generation FTAs, that the EU had obtained.
- However, this may be more challenging issue in second-generation FTAs B. liberalisation is asymmetrical in FTAs at Turkey’s expense. - Turkey abolished tariffs upon entry into force of the Agreement, while has to wait for progressive dismantling from partners.
(Morocco 9 years, Tunisia 9 years, Egypt until 2020 in List 4, Syria 12 years).
- However, limited competitiveness of these countries’ industries, this helped Turkey to persuade them conclude FTAs. In the case of Jordan, for example, the non-simultaneous reductions in tariff schedules were included in the Preamble!
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
5.
Turkey enters in FTA markets later than the EU (the latecomer effect):
Turkey has to follow the EU to make FTAs, sometimes a couple of years later, hence putting Turkish exporters into a disadvantageous position with regards to EU exporters who has a preferential status in third country markets much before .
- This is a convincing argument, as the EU does not allow Turkey to negotiate jointly, or ask for its partner to continue parallel negotiations with Turkey. This argument is commercially sensible in markets where the EU and Turkish exporters have rivalry (e.g. Lebanon, Jordan...) 29
EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
6.
Tariff-revenue loss for Turkey:
Circumvention of exports not directly from third countries, but by way of trade deflection via the EU, induce a tariff-revenue loss for Turkey
- This argument has a ground, but especially in sectors with tariff peaks and for imports originating from countries that constitute a significant share in Turkish market. - In 2008, the largest-share country in Turkish imports (that has an FTA with the EU) was Algeria (1.6%). TUR mainly imports energy goods with low tariffs.
- If the aim is no circumvention, and import via the EU is not especially destined to Turkish market → The side that has the right to collect the customs revenue will be the EU anyway, but not Turkey 30
EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
7.
Preferential agreements shift attention away from the Doha Round and multilateral WTO rules :
“Turkey's FTAs makes its trade regime complex and difficult to manage. Future trade agreements could further complicate the trading environment creating a web of incoherent rules and detract from multilateral efforts, given the limited resources available” Turkey TPRM Report (WTO, 2003: 17).
- This is a forceful argument. The regional agreements are only second-best and can only be accepted if they do not undermine the WTO and Doha Round.
than - Turkey may have disadvantages in liberalising trade by means of FTAs, rather the WTO.
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Tariffs before and after NAMA
Calculation by UFT Economic Research Section based on the formulas and coefficients suggested in the latest Draft on NAMA Modalities (4th Rev.) where the coefficients are assumed to be 8 and 25 for the developed and the developing countries respectively where the formula is (i.e. t1= [a or (x,y or z)]*t0 / [a or (x,y,or z)]+t0 )
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
8.
Turkey cannot have its own FTAs independently of the EU:
Turkey cannot negotiate preferential agreements and has to refrain from negotiating with third countries with which the EU has not accorded yet
- Legally, this argument is open to challenge. - Is there any specific country with which Turkey desires a preferential link, but cannot make due to EU opposition!
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
9.
EU priorities do not match Turkish trade strategy :
EU has its own priorities and normative concerns to reflect in FTAs without taking into account Turkey’s priorities
- This is a major argument when one considers that Global Europe strategy is more keen on preserving the interests of European multinationals in third country markets, especially concerning investments, non-tariff barriers, intellectual property rights, competition rules and government procurement as well as other regulatory areas such as environmental and labour standards. - The negotiations do not necessarily reflect Turkish inerests and, nor they may match priority areas in Turkish strategy.
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Criteria for a sustainable relationship between TR-EU in FTA issue
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Customs Union Decision 1/95
Turkey has aligned its trade policy to EU’s past policy arrangements trade
Turkey also pledged to align its policy to EU’s future trade strategy
The future shape of EU’s trade strategy depends on several unforseen developments. Thus, Turkey currently is trade strategy . state of affairs will only be acceptable in Turkey , , and in the future will be exposed to any change and shifts in EU But TR cannot participate in decision making of EU directly. Therefore, it seems that the current
if at least some of the following criteria are satisfied :
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Certainty criterium
1.
If the EU trade strategy is sufficiently clear, transparent and foreseeable for Turkey amidst global challenges and developments:
Turkey has the disadvantages because it has little possibility to predict the next EU step. The uncertainty can only be mitigated if Turkey is allowed to participate in decision making, or it is sufficiently consulted and informed by the EU . But consultation mechanism does not work properly and Turkey’s access to detailed information has limitations 37
Compatibility
criterium
2.
If the EU trade strategy matches Turkey’s trade policy priorities
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EU and Turkish Trade Strategies: Are they compatible?
Priorit y topics EU Global Europe Strategy Turkish Export Strategy Plan Market Access:
‘ensuring greater openness in other markets’...
‘export structure conducive towards sustainable export increase’
High-tech goods
Innovation and high-tech goods; investment in high-quality goods
High-quality products Services Access to input markets WTO + issues Priority markets Negotiation forum
Essential for EU market strategy Services are considered EU access to resources and cheap global sourcing in third country markets Deeper trade agenda to include competition, TRIPs, investment, regulatory standards and govn. proc.
Korea, India, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN, Canada ...
Preferential trade (FTAs…) relations have priority and bilateral Provide exporters with inputs at internationally competitive prices via domestic resources No specific emphasis on a deeper agenda (except the inclusion of services and investment in part.) Neighbouring and surrounding countries essentially Preferential trade ( due to the ‘EU effect’ Art. 16 of CU Decision) 39
WTO
criterium
3.
If the EU is committed to, and a firm defender of the WTO, and if multilateral negotiations have the primacy in EU trade strategy The EU gives only a ‘lip service’ to the completion of Doha Round and the WTO as a forum for trade negotiations.
Furthermore, ‘many FTAs have adverse effects on the multilateral trading system’ (EU Trade Study Group Report, ECIPE 2010) 40
Hegemony/leadership criterium
4.
If the EU is a ‘normative hegemon’ which has the ability to urge Turkey (and almost all of its spokes) to behave in harmony with the rules and norms it sets out.
However, the EU’s normative and hegemonic role to provide stability in the world trading system is problematic see next page 41
Does Global Europe strategy make the EU a ‘ normative power ’? (1)
1.
The EU is not an angel itself:
Protectionism in CAP Trade defense instruments (i.e. anti-dumping..) Standards protectionism!
2.
Enlarged EU dilutes single entity in external action:
not all MS are interested in market opening abroad for FDI, services etc.
3.
‘behind-the-border’ issues and globalisation process
makes trade policy politically contentious: not only between the EU- third c., but domestic divison on Singapore issues 42
Does Global Europe strategy make the EU a ‘ normative power ’? (2)
4 .
EU competence on many trade-related matters is
weak: That puts the E. Commission in difficulty in external negotiations in new areas (energy, investment, services (partly), environment, social clause...) 5.
Export of European social and regulatory model
(European norms, values, domestic rules...) is in many cases confronted with the WTO jurisdiction: DS rulings against the EU measures) 43
Compensation criterium
5.
If Turkey’s perceived loss is compensated to satisfy Turkey under institutional, procedural and/or financial mechanisms; or if the customs union is extended to areas where Turkey can obtain extra benefits
services agriculture
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Agriculture
Only ‘processed agricultural products’ are included in CU regime; Expansion of Customs Union regime to agricultural goods would lead to noticeable increase of Turkish agricultural exports into the EU market (by 14% in vegetables; 12.5% in fruits; 38.5% in processed agr.) (Lehmann et.al. 2007); see also Eruygur and Çakmak (2005).
Cost of Turkey’s adoption of the CAP must be considered Turkey’s position in Doha Round diverges as it supports G 33 and developing c. position in sensitive goods and SSM; and G-20 and Cairns group position on domestic subsidies. 45
Accession negotiations criterium
6.
If the accession process goes smoothly: But remember the difficulties in opening chapters; 8 chapters are suspended (although they are concerned with trade issues) due to Cyprus issue.
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Political belief
criterium
7.
If the EU accession process continues to be politically a prevailing idea in Turkish public (or at least in the policy-making circles) despite all uncertainties.
It is visible that this has lost ground among several circles/elites in Turkey which once adhered to EU’s anchoring role or its ‘conditionality’, but became disappointed due to ‘open-endedness’ of the accession process .
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‘Turkey now stands between the CU that cannot be rolled back and the full membership that is not conceivable in a foreseeable future’
My intention here is not to frame a pessimistic scenario ; but to make a concise analysis of the current case of TR-EU relations, considering the global and
domestic factors that may cause a convergency
between Turkish and EU trade strategies . It should also be noted that it is not clear even for the EU itself; - how its internal reshuffling affects its external action and its global role - how the new Lisbon Treaty will shift the power among domestic actors (e.g. institutions and others) 48
What to do in FTA issue?
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What to do in FTAs issue? (1)
INSTITUTIONALLY:
1.
A
Free Trade Agreement Study Group
under the CU Joint Committee to be established in order to discuss technically challenging issues.
This may help Turkey to recieve regular and comprehensive
information about EU’s FTA negotiations.
Turkey already offered a welcomed the idea.
trade policy study group and E. Commission
2.
An informal
sub-committee under Article 133 Committee
(under the initiative of trio Presidency) where TR business community and NGOs can express their concern on EU trade agreements.
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What to do in FTAs issue? (2)
TURKEY TO REMIND THE EU:
3.
should
to apply key economic criteria
consider risk that preferential access to EU markets currently enjoyed by our neighbouring and DC partners may be erodod’.
→ ‘while making FTAs the EU
This criterium is not instrumentalised (for TR). EU must consider the likely impact on Turkey of its FTAs strategy by adding Turkey into its
impact analysis.
4.
EU should not ask for concrete examples of injury in TR industries as a result of its FTAs,
as injury from FTAs can be hypothetical now but more physical in the future .
5.
EU not to ratify its FTA with Turkey until the third country starts negotiations
This idea was not welcomed by the EU at all.
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What to do in FTAs issue? ( 3)
COUNTER MEASURE AS A COMPENSATION:
6.
Article 58(2)
of the Decision 1/95 should be applicable:
If discrepancies between Community and Turkish legislation or differences in their implementation in an area of direct relevance to the functioning of the Customs Union, cause of threaten to cause impairment of the free movement of goods or deflections of trade and the affected Party considers that immediate action is required, it may itself take the necessary protection measures...
Article XXIV ad. Para. 9 of GATT can be applicable.
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What to do in FTAs issue? ( 4 )
MULTILATERAL (OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL):
7 TR must insist on
the multilateral path and completion of Doha
(most EU FTA partners will be unwilling on Doha if they achieve preferential access in EU and US markets).
8 Use
dispute settlement mechanism
if the EU FTAs harm Turkey’s rights deriving from the WTO rules and agreements
It is not practical nor friendly among Customs Union partners, and considering Turkey’s accession process .
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references
Akman, M. S. (2006), ‘The Compatibility of Turkish and the EU Trade Policy Agenda: The Case in the Process of Doha Development Round’, paper presented in 3rd ECPR Pan-European Conference, Istanbul, 2006. Checkel, J. (2000), Compliance and Conditionality, ARENA Working Papers WP 00/18, Oslo. ECIPE (2010), A Modern Trade Policy for then EU: A Report to the New European Commission and Parliament from the EU Trade PolicyStudy Group. ECIPE Publication.
Eruygur, O. and E. Çakmak (2005), ‘Trade Implications of Extending the Turkey-EU Customs Union Agreement to Agricultural Products, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA Paper no. 12438.
Evenett, S. (2007) ‘The Trade Strategy of the European Union: Time for a Rethink?’ Discussion Paper 2007-14, Un. St. Gallen.
Evenett, S. (2007), ‘Trade Policy: Time for a Rethink’, in A. Sapir (ed.) Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy, Bruegel Publ.
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European Commission (2006), Global Europe Competing in the world: A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Security, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130380.pdf
European Commission (2008), Global Europe: EU Performance in the Global Economy, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_141196.pdf
Horn, H.; P. Mavroidis and A. Sapir (2009), ‘Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements’, CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No.7317.
Mercenier, J. and E. Yeldan (1997), ‘On Turkey’s Trade Policy: Is a Customs Union with Europe Enough?’, European Economic Review, 41, 871-880.
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Ülgen, S. and Y. Zahariadis (2004), ‘The Future of Turkish-EU Trade Relations: Deepening vs. Widening, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 3(4) Woolcock, S. (2007), ‘European Union policy towards Free Trade Agreements’ ECIPE Working Paper, No.3.
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Thank you!
Dr. M. Sait AKMAN Marmara University and TEPAV [email protected]
Tel. +90 312 292 55 05 Fax. +90 312 292 55 55
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