Transcript Slide 1

2011 MADCS Conference
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FMA is a tool to help identify:
 Priorities for rehabilitation
 Improvements for operation, maintenance and data
collection
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Uses a team of people to brainstorm possible
modes of failure
 Facilitator, Dam owner, engineer and dam safety
person
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Looks at all the potential ways a dam could fail
and their likelihood of failure
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Not just “another study”
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Not a result of analysis by only one engineer
or one company - all information is reviewed
by a team with different perspectives
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Not just a group of outside professionals –
the owner is involved for the whole process
EVERY DAM OWNER WANTS TO
AVOID THIS…
WHY DO A FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS?
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Many eyes looking at data may uncover
unforeseen problems
Obvious concerns may be of less significance
than previously thought
Enhancements in monitoring and inspections
Data gaps exposed
Broader range of individuals become
educated and aware of potential problems
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Same concept as a FERC FMA, but requiring
far less time and money
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More applicable to typical Montana earthen
dams
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Reasonable cost and effort for private
owners
Four basic components
1) identify facilitator and assemble core
team
2) collect data for team review
3) conduct FMA (morning dam
inspection, afternoon brainstorming
session)
4) summarize results in a report
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Identify a Team Facilitator
Identify a Team Organizer
Identify a Core Team
Identify Participants
Collect Data
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Construction drawings &
reports
Monitoring data
Inspection reports &
photographs
Studies
O&M plans
Core Team Review of Data
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Thorough review
Ask, “How could the dam fail?”
Have failure modes been identified and is proper
monitoring being done?
Review should be accompanied by
Questionnaire sent by Facilitator to “think
failure modes”
Things to Do Before FMA (Facilitator &
Organizer)
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Meeting time and location
Visual aids
Conference call before meeting
Morning Inspection Before FMA
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All participants involved
Look over dam/appurtenances
“Think and see” potential failure modes
Interview dam tender or operation personnel
Afternoon Brainstorm FMA Session
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All participants involved
Identify and discuss potential failure modes
Organize into failure conditions:
 Normal operation
 Seismic loading
 Hydrologic loading
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Categorize failure modes
Failure Categories
I – Highlighted Failure Modes (High repair priority; high
failure risk; high failure consequences)
II – Failure Modes Considered but not Highlighted (A
concern, but lower repair priority; lower failure consequences)
III – More Info Needed in Order to Classify (Information
lacking; need more data)
IV – Failure Mode Unlikely but Not Ruled Out (Unlikely
but not impossible; low priority)
V – Failure Mode Ruled Out (Not realistic; no concern)
Failure Mode Considerations
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Factors making it less
likely or more likely
Consequences
Risk Reduction Measures
Future Data Needs
Major Findings and Understandings
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Probably the most important component
All participants state their own MFU’s
Summation of FMA
Recorded for the
results report
Documentation of Major Findings and
Understandings
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Summary of FMA
Actions recommended
Statement on adequacy of documentation
Appendices of data
Core team should review before finalizing
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Get “free” participants to
reduce cost but don’t
sacrifice quality
Clearly organize data for
easier review
Make all visuals large and easy to read
Clearly document everything
Stay on task – facilitator needs to be efficient
Write up results immediately to maintain
correctness
Get Dam Safety to help
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Guidance for future operations
Determine rehabilitation decisions
Identify investigations needed
Prioritize maintenance and repairs
Eureka Dam located in Teton County, northwest of Choteau
FMA for Eureka Dam was conducted in 2008
Relatively informal – not organized
in standard fashion
If Eureka Dam failed, Choteau and
the highway would be flooded
Issues:
1.
Old outlet pipe showing
corrosion and settlement
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Seepage exiting at toe and
collected in toe drain trench
Category I - Corrosion and failure where gate tower connects to outlet conduit,
causing piping along outlet, progressive erosion of embankment
Factors that make this more likely
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Settlement at connection, previous gap
sealed recently
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Age of pipe
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Similar failure mechanism in many
Montana dams
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Uncertainty with bituminous coating
in this area;
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Difficult to inspect
Factors that make this less likely
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Bituminous coating appears to
protect pipe well
Category I - Corrosion and failure where gate tower connects to outlet conduit,
causing piping along outlet, progressive erosion of embankment
Consequences of Failure
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Failure of dam
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Loss of reservoir contents
Risk Reduction Measures
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Increase inspections to an annual basis
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Add diaphragm filter around outlet pipe
Data / Information Needs
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Can embankment soils withstand erosion?
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Need sample of embankment soils
Category III - Piping of embankment materials into foundation
Factors that make this more likely
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Some unexplained depressions on
upstream face could be related to piping
of embankment materials into foundation
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No filters or drains in embankment
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No knowledge about foundation preparation
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Settlement of outlet pipe after construction
suggests foundation problems and possible
internal cracking of embankment
Category III - Piping of embankment materials into foundation
Factors that make this less likely
• Embankment constructed under supervision of State Water
Conservation Board; foundation prep likely
• Beck piezometers show slight upward gradient from foundation
• Dry embankment and wet foundation support idea that upward
gradient is present (water is moving directly from reservoir through
bedrock foundation)
• Low percentage of piping failures in dams are from this failure mode
Category III - Piping of embankment materials into foundation
Consequences of Failure
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Failure of Dam
Data / Information Needs
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Is embankment made of material
that is subject to piping?
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Need sample of embankment soils
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What is phreatic gradient within dam
and foundation?
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Nested piezometers in embankment
and toe are needed
Recommendations from Simplified Failure Mode Analysis
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Implement risk reduction measures for Category I failure modes
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Increase outlet inspection frequency
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Diaphragm filter around outlet pipe
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Collect missing information on Category I and III issues
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Install nested piezometers in embankment and foundation
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Collect samples of embankment and foundation materials
Make plans to rehabilitate outlet works
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Simplified FMA is cheap and not time
consuming
Good for when repair $ are tight
Good when unsure where to focus
investigations
Helps get more people involved
Can open eyes to things not thought of
Gary Fischer, P.E.
Hydrometrics, Inc./Carroll College
[email protected]
406-443-4150