Transcript Dealing with the changing security environment

An evaluation of the
Defence White Paper 2009
Peter Abigail
Rod Lyon
Defence White Paper Policy Alignment
What do we want our military to do?
How do we want to shape the strategic environment?
What is our experience?
Strategic
Policy
Operational
Commitments
Defence
Capability
•Affordability
Finance &
Management
•Efficiency
What is required?
What is affordable?
Defence White Paper 2009
Politics, themes, identity
Political ‘location’
• an overdue WP
– 3 DUs intruding onto the strategic ‘space’
• rising concern about mismatches
– between strategy, capability, and finances
• a new ALP government, writing a WP after
8 years of GW Bush
– counterfactual: what if a re-elected Howard
government had written it?
Howard’s legacy
• despite ET and WP2000, John Howard
better remembered for post-9/11 legacy
– his strategic proximity to US and Bush
– the ‘globalised’ ANZUS alliance
• that took us into Afghanistan
– a rise in army’s fortunes
– his theoretical open-ness about ‘the
privatisation of war’
Labor’s priorities
• marginalise the Coalition on strategic
policy
– reverse the more contentious elements of
Coalition defence policy
– re-state the ‘classical’ strategic verities
• re-build the linkages between strategy,
force development and money
– fiscal discipline
White Paper 2009
• Title:
– Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific
century: Force 2030
• tells you it’s more about strategy and force
development, than finances
– looking at the ‘strategic’ side here
– Peter will say more on finances and force
development
‘Restorational’ imperatives
• its key messages are ‘classical’ ones
– the main role of ADF is to engage in
conventional combat against other armed
forces
– Australia and its immediate neighbourhood
are our top strategic priorities
– maritime capabilities should be at the core of
our defence force
• the ‘reversing Howard’ messages
Strategic coherence
• but does DWP09 tell a broader, coherent
tale about
– the security environment? (mainly Chapter 4)
– Australia’s role in the world? (Chapters 5, 6,
etc)
• cautionary note: a WP is a public policy
document, not the 10 commandments
– beware reading too much into the document
Weaker global trends?
• WP2000 identified two hallmarks of a
stable, positive global order
– globalisation, and
– US strategic primacy
• WP2009 shows more hesitancy about
both
– fewer reliable ‘pillars’ in the global system?
Globalisation?
• still ensuring closer linkages between
states and regions
• but crises—demographic, environmental,
public health, TNC—are also globalised
– increasing the prospects for conflict
• and the GFC still unfolding
• so, a mixed picture of globalisation (cf
WP2000)
US strategic primacy
• 4.14: a big endorsement of continuing US
strategic primacy—out to 2030
• 4.19: US strategic primacy will be
‘increasingly tested’
• 6.23: US strategic primacy is being
‘transformed’ as economic changes redistribute strategic power
• so, a mixed picture of US primacy
A multi-polar global order?
• indeed, earlier in chapter 4, hints of a
markedly different global order
– 4.3: we’re unlikely to see the emergence of a
rival to the network of liberal, market-based
economies
– 4.4: but the global order will become
increasingly multi-polar
• driven by ‘changing patterns of…economic power
and political influence’
The security environment
• so, globally, fewer fixed points of
reference, greater uncertainties
– para 4.4: ‘many futures’
– para 3.9: ‘strategic shocks should be
expected at some stage in the foreseeable
future’
– para 3.20: ‘the range of uncertainties is
disconcertingly wide’
The Asia-Pacific
• a region ‘connected’ by economic growth
and evolving security mechanisms
• but tensions where the interests of US,
China, Japan, India and Russia intersect
– US-China; US-Japan-China the keys
• and China’s strategic future uncertain
– 2 Chinas: ‘good’ China/‘bad’ China
Southeast Asia
• paras 4.32 and 4.33: two pictures of Indonesia
– ‘the stable, democratic state with improved social
cohesion’
– ‘a weak, fragmented Indonesia beset by intractable
communal problems, poverty and failing state
institutions’
• the second less likely than first, but plays upon
an enduring worry in Australian strategy
• so, major uncertainties in both NEA and SEA
South Pacific
• the one constant in a changing world!
– 4.35: economic stagnation, political and social
instability, weak governance, crime, natural
disasters, climate change worries
• ‘enduring interests’ for Australia
– geography, history, humanitarian and strategic
reasons
The ‘afterthoughts’
• the back end of Chapter 4 contains a
series of disparate ‘add-ons’
– Middle East and Africa (troubled and violent)
– South Asia and Afghanistan (and Indian
Ocean)
– Islamist terrorism ( a generational problem)
– the growth of military capabilities in AsiaPacific and WMD worldwide (the odd man out
in this list)
– new security concerns: climate change and
resources security (uncertain consequences)
Australia’s strategic identity
• what does the WP tell us about ourselves?
– we take sovereignty and freedom of action
seriously
– we’re still nervous about our neighbours
• 5.7: ‘what matters most is that they are not
a source of threat to Australia’
– we’re nervous about US abandonment (4.17)
– we like rules-based orders at the global level,
but trust power closer to our shores
– we still think of our defence as ‘core issues
plus add-ons’
Australia’s strategic interests
• Ch. 5: ‘abiding strategic interests’
– a secure Australia
– a secure immediate neighbourhood;
– strategic stability in APac (first mention of
‘security architecture’)
– a stable, rules-based global security order
(four paras on UN rules with one on US
strategic-underpinning)
Our strategic perspective
• in chapter 6 a specific disavowal of either
a DoA or an ‘expeditionary’ view
• but clear geographical ‘layering’ of our
priorities
• and only first two priorities, DoA and
immediate region are actual force
determinants
– though other interests ‘enhance’
Self-reliance, the policy centre
• 6.16: ‘self-reliance, plus’
– self-reliant in the direct defence of Australia
and our unique interests
– plus = ‘a capacity to do more when required’,
on shared strategic interests, within the limits
of resources
• 6.20-6.22: won’t be self-reliant in critical
enablers, sensitive technologies, industry
And ANZUS
• a confusing picture
– 6.32: we would only expect the US to come to our aid
where we were under attack from a major power (!)
– 6.33 it’s the ‘enablers’ that are indispensable to us
– 6.34: ‘for as long as nuclear weapons exist, we are
able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States
to deter nuclear attack on Australia’ (?)
• the document says nothing about when we
expect to go to the aid of our ally
– nor is our ANZUS commitment a force determinant
Is an attack on Australia likely?
• no: 6.23 says we’re too remote from the
world’s trouble spots
• 6.27 says we’ve been secure because of
US strategic primacy
• but para 3.8, and 5.6:
– major powers with different interests to ours
might encroach on our approaches
– more affluent, tech-savvy neighbours may
erode our traditional advantages
ADF tasks
• deter and defeat attacks on Australia
• contribute to security and stability in South
Pacific and East Timor
• contribute to military contingencies in AsiaPacific
• and finally in support of global security
What’s NOT a task?
• being prepared to deploy to the ME, central and
South Asia, or Africa ‘to engage in ground
operations against heavily armed adversaries
located in crowded urban environments’
– the ‘Fallujah option’
• we would only do that if
– govt convinced ADF had the required capabilities
– Australian population supported such a deployment
Force 2030
• a large amount of hardware signalled in
Chapter 9
– definite numbers sit atop strategic—and
fiscal—uncertainty
– and 3.21 says they might need to be even
bigger numbers in the future
• primarily a signal about ‘weight’: that
Australia is committed to being a ‘player’
in 2030
– 4 WPs and 7 elections away
The ‘relationships’ afterthought?
• Chapter 11: a different author?
– comes after the core chapters
• on the security environment, our strategic
interests, our defence policy, our intended force
structure
– and sandwiched between ADF readiness and
Defence intelligence
• says relationships are ‘central’ to our
strategic posture
– ‘internationalist’ in outlook
– where earlier chapters ‘nationalist’
Strategy and identity
• overall: some mixed messages
– an uncertain world:
– where core stabilising influences at the global
level are weakening
– and Asian power balances are shifting
• Australia ‘hedging’ against adverse
outcomes
– but finding most of the ‘strategic weight’ for
that policy in self-reliance?
Defence White Paper 2009
Uncertainty, not strategic epiphany - yet
•Coming to terms with shifting great power relativities: multiple plausible futures
•Commitment to US Alliance: but foreshadows increased US expectations
•Strategy continuity: shaping, hedging, strategic weight, self reliance
•Four key ADF tasks: recognition of linkages
Limited liability
•Leadership in the near region
•Coalition contribution elsewhere
•Ground force exclusions
Strategic
Policy
Operational
Commitments
More, but
much later….
Defence
Capability
•Confirmation of previous plans
•Remediation of deficiencies
•Air force: fleet transitions, introductions, 100 JSF
•Army: regional focus, internal balance, Reserves
•Navy: replacements, more and more capable
•New capabilities: strike, information and emergent
•Many decisions well downstream
•Delivery capacity: DMO, industry, personnel?
Some pegs in the
sands of uncertainty
Finance &
Management
More money,
but later..….
•Uncertainty: 5-year White Paper cycle
•GFC: the collapse of revenues
•+2.5% for inflation to 2030
•Growth: +3% (ave) to 2018, +2.2% real to 2030
•Deferrals until 2016/17
•Improved preparedness management
•Strategic Reform Program
•+$130b real to 2030
Reserves
• Better integration and removing impediments to contribution
• Enhance HRR – deployable and domestic
• Army – more effective use of part-time components with options for:
– Changed internal balance
– Increased utility
– Repositories of high-end, longer lead time capabilities
• Air Force – an integrated total force
• Navy – surge for all force elements
• Focused (task-based) contributions and “sponsored Reserves”
• Implementation plan by end 2009
• Strategic Reform Program:
– Reserves costs +$40m
– Expected savings $380m over the decade
Defence Planning Horizon
Elections
2010
White Paper
FSR
Budget Audit
DCP
2013
2016
DWP
Average 3% real growth
Defence
Funding
2019
2025
DWP
2028
DWP
DWP
Average 2.2% real growth
2.5% fixed indexation
2014
2019
2024
2031
2034
DWP
2037
DWP
2030+………………
Recovery
>$8b deferrals
$20b Strategic Reform Program
2009
2022
2029
2034
2039
DCP 2006-16 IOC
Future Submarine
Counter-IED
Defence
Capability
Plan
ICT Reform
Offshore Combatants
Selected DCP 2009
JSF Weapons
Additions
YOD/IOC
Non-lethal weapons
MLH
Sealift
Satcom
MUAV
BMD
JCSE
LACM
Future Frigate
1st Pass beyond 2016
2030+………………
Questions?