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Briefing Contents
1.
Evaluation of US global missile defence
area in Europe deployment plans
2.
Information on current situation and
development plans of missile defence in
Russia
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Missile Threat Evaluation
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Iran and North Korea possess missiles with a
maximum range of up to 1200 km
The prospects of missile programs development until
2015 – creation of missiles with a maximum range of
up to 3500 km
– Cause – the lack of:
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technologies
–
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“new” missile development is based on SCUD-type BM
modernization
testing grounds
trajectory measurement and data processing systems
Missile threat in the Middle East
1.
There is no present no long-term
missile threat for USA
2. There could be a threat for Europe
from small and medium range BMs.
To fight them operation theater
AMD measures could be used
Missile weapon
possessors
Iran
Israel
Saudi Arabia
India
Pakistan
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Shihab -5
3500 km
(potential)
Shihab -4
2000 km
(potential)
Shihab-3
1200 km
Ballistic Missile Testing Standard
Pattern
Midcourse phase target
measurements
Terminal phase target
measurements
Target
separation
zone
Ground-supported trajectory
measurement and radiotelemetering
means
Warhead analysis
after drop
Maximum BM range testing track
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1. Iran doesn’t potentially have BM testing
tracks on its territory
2. There is a lack of necessary test results
registration infrastructure, including for
launches toward offshore waters
2000 km
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Russian BM
possible
trajectories
ABM site defence
zone
Radar station
in the Czech
Republic
Kozelsk
Tatischevo
BM launch sector from
the Iranian territory
against Europe
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Iran’s BM
Russia’s BM
The Missile Defence Area in Poland doesn’t provide equal protection for
all NATO states but is capable of threatening Russia’s BM launched towards
north-west
The Russian Federation Comments
ABM site does not provide for the defense of
all European states
 The aim of providing “equal protection” for all
US NATO allies will require further ABM site
capabilities buildup
Conclusion. Present configuration of ABM
theatre is not final. Russian concern will
only grow
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Missile Defence Area Optimal Location
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Missile defence site approximation to possible BM
launch area will enhance system efficiency
–
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ABM sites location on the territories of Turkey,
France, Italy would be more reasonable if an aim of
countering BM from the south was pursued
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The choice of the area in Poland is reasonable if it is meant
for countering Russian BMs
In addition, such a location wouldn’t pose such evident
threat for Russia’s deterrent forces
US missile defence area possible location not
aimed against Russia’s deterrent potential while
providing protection for Europe
Kozelsk
Tatischevo
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Iran’s BM
Russia’s BM
Thesis: the information support of ABM site
(radar station in Czech and frontline radars)
aren’t directed against Russian Federation
Varde
Fylingsdales
Thule
Shemya
The Czech
Republic
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Integration of AMD radar stations in Czech with
modified radar stations in Thule, Fylingsdales, Varde, Shemya
The Russian Federation Comments
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The United States have an extensive network of radars
upgraded for missile defence tasks outside the national
territory
The integration of existing radars with interceptor missiles in
Poland will provide early detection and interception of Russian
BMs
–
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To provide target indication for the radar in the Czech Republic
a transportable forward-deployed radar positioning is provided
close to the Russian border
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The radar in the Czech Republic has a circle coverage area and can be
rapidly reoriented from the southern to the eastern direction
Forward-deployed radars will detect both short and medium-range BM
launched from the Middle East and Russia’s BM
10 GBI missiles do not pose a threat
for Russia’s deterrent forces
Russian evaluations are based not on declared
intentions, but on potential possibilities of capability
enhancement
ABM site potential can be promptly enhanced by
means of:
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Increasing the number of interceptor missiles
Increasing interceptor missile velocity
Using separating warheads for BM destruction
Conclusions
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The real aims of creating a missile defence deployment area in Europe do not
conform with the declared and are focused on changing the existing security
system in Europe
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Missile defence ABM site in Europe will influence the deterrent potential
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The deployment of the ABM site won’t have catastrophic consequences because we know
how to repulse them
Russia will have to take adequate measures in order to sustain defence capabilities that, in
essence, will mean the transition to stalemate which we left after Cold War perid
Missile defence ABM site in Europe is a global-scale destabilizing factor
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The US missile defence in Europe is intended to counter BMs equipped with penetration
aids, neither Iran nor North Korea have them
The use of silo-launchers in the ABM site is intended to increase ABM site sustainability to
nuclear weapons effects in case of response strike
The number of interceptor missiles is not of fundamental importance, the most important is
the fact of missile defence infrastructure development (radar facilities, command and control
systems etc.)
Other states can be involved in seeking counter-measures
 E.g. – satellite interception performed by China
- Potentially long-term “ecological mine” will be created in Europe
- Use of Missile Defence System will make up conditions for littering near-Earth space
Current Situation and Development
Plans of Missile Defence in Russia
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Russia’s Missile Defence Development
Outlook

Political prospects – we suppose that the ABM Treaty
principles were rational
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Technical prospects – non-strategic TMD modernization,
upgrading and new systems development
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–
–
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we do not have plans of rushing into a missile defence
“competition”
counters real threats
does not disturb regional stability and the existing balance since it
does not threaten strategic deterrent forces
does not encourage missile arms race
does not have space defence potential
is significantly less expensive
may be deployed in any region if necessary
TMD Systems
• The S-300 air defence missile system is designed to provide highly efficient
defence against aeroballistic, tactical and theater BM attacks (with ranges up to
1500 km) in an intense ECM environment
• The S-400 air defence missile system is designed to provide protection of vital
facilities from attacks of existing and prospective air weapons and BMs with a
range of up to 3500 km
• missiles of various types with different engagement areas are used
allowing to create a multi-layered TMD
S-300
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S-400
The purpose of Russian proposal
is creation of:
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preconditions for wide discussion of the issues related to the
development and deployment of missile defense systems in Europe
basis for revising US unilateral decisions on deployment of global
missile defense system components in Europe
practical mechanism to estimate missile attack risks and threats for
Europe up to 2020
pool of states interested in development of concept & architecture of
MD system in Europe
terms for equal security of all MD participants
terms for minimizing the negative ecological consequences of US
strategic MD components deployment in Europe
the preconditions for reducing MD programs expenses
Radar data allows
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to determine the certain fact of conducting the test, time and place
of missile launch and estimate the time and area of missile
warhead impact
to identify the type of launched missile and determine whether
it is a launch vehicle or a ballistic missile
to identify the propulsion type (solid or liquid) and technological
development level basing on indirect parameters
to measure missile trajectory parameters and to record warhead
or construction parts separation
to conduct comparative analysis of launches and specify the
accuracy of delivering the payload to the target
Combined Centre for Missile
Launches Data Analysis
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Could be created in Europe on the basis of existing
NATO data processing centers (for example
CJFACC, CAOC) or the new one
Main purpose – acquiring and processing real-time
data on detected missile launches in South and SouthEast (for Europe) directions
The obtained data will be used for impartial monitoring
of missile programs in the region to develop
recommendations on adequate response
Features
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Open for all interested European states
Can be operated by combined crew
Basic data source – Russian radars in Gabala and
Armavir
The connection of additional data sources is not excluded
Interaction with Russian-US Joint Data Exchange Centre
(for exchange the data from missile warning systems) is
not excluded
Later the use of the Centre data for information support of
European MD tasks solution is possible
Operational Radar in Gabala
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In service from c 1985
The task - detection of BM launches from Indian ocean
and seas areas and medium range BMs and
operational-tactic missile launches from Middle East.
Main radar's performance
- Operating range - up to 6000 km;
- Detection area
• Angle of elevation - 2 to 45 degree;
• Azimuth - 104 degree.
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- In service with MOD of Russia
The status of the radar is determined by RussiaAzerbaijan agreement of January 25, 2002)
- No controversial questions
The radar is subject to upgrade and modernization
- In case of making a decision on
modernization
Building radar in Armavir
•Started in 2006
•The radar will consist of 2 sector stations
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- South-West sector - directed to the Mediterranean
Sea
- South-East sector - directed to the Middle East
•South-West sector radar station is being
completed.
In 2006 the radar was operating on the air
•Main performance:
- range - 4200 km
- Angle of elevation - 1 -60 degree
- Azimuth - 120 degree
The radars in Gabala and Armavir can operate
together. It practically gives the control over
almost all the regions of the Northern hemisphere
where the missile threat can appear from
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