How to Successfully Monetise Your CERs: Legal Aspects and

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Transcript How to Successfully Monetise Your CERs: Legal Aspects and

The ERPA and Post-2012 Implications

Hannah Logan

Norton Rose (Asia) LLP 28 August 2009

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• • • •

Content

Commercial drivers Importance of due diligence The ERPA

– – –

Commercial context Legal principles Clause specific review Post 2012-implications

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1. Commercial Drivers

• • Commercial strategy drives transaction targets, documentation and risk mitigants Post 2012 considerations • •

Seller Opportunities

– Additional CER revenue stream from the project

Potential Buyers

Compliance buyers:

reduction targets –

Financial buyers:

need to meet their binding emission CERs are bought and re-sold in the carbon market with a view to generating profits – Increasing interest in debt structures and equity stakes 3

2. Due Diligence – Key Issues

• • • •

Key Objective

– risks are identified and reflected in the commercial terms

Key Focus

– Legal, regulatory, technical, financial and commercial

Key Sources

– Seller: responses to due diligence questions, site visits – Legal: Host Country laws and regulations, documents, licences, permits and consents corporate – Buyer: own knowledge of market and previous transactions

Key Findings

– Project Owner operates the CDM project lawfully – Project Owner owns project assets and CERs 4

CDM Project Risks

(some…)

Licensing/Regulatory

appraisal (PDD) registration (CDM Exec Bd) certification verification

Technology

performance monitoring crediting period

Cost/Delay

compliance cost completion delay

Political Risk Financial

currency price

ERPA Counterparty

credit 5

Why do DD?

• •

What risks to Buyer during term of ERPA:

– Does Seller exist (no Seller no ERPA)?

– – Does Seller own the assets (who should be Seller?) Is Seller operating legally (could Seller be shut down during term)?

– – Maximising delivery Additional Risks: Litigation/insurance/corruption/reputation

Better understand Seller (valuable for ERPA negotiation):

– State owned: Profit less important, less transparent, more political; – – Private Co: More commercial and transparent, profit motive Where is power within the company (who makes decisions) 6

• • • • • • • •

Legal due diligence

Ownership of host facility / land

– e.g. ERPA is not with entity which actually owns asset

Relevant permits

(operation, construction, environmental, feasibility study) - e.g. no construction permit for original facility, old environmental permit

Lawsuits and disputes

– e.g. land ownership disputes

Mortgages and encumbrances

– e.g. bank has first lien over power generation equipment

Liabilities impacting ability to carry on business

– e.g. unpaid creditor can initiate a winding up if debt is not repaid

Anti-corruption

– e.g. reputation for corrupt practices

Tax

– e.g. transaction structure is tax efficient

Legal authority to enter into contracts

– e.g. understanding who is entitled to enter into contracts on the company’s behalf; enforceability opinion 7

Regulatory due diligence

• • • • • • •

Post 2012 regulatory framework

– international negotiations

Project construction and operational approvals

- e.g. project conflicts with local development or environmental goals

Methodology risk

- e.g. project does not use an approved methodology

Host country LoA risk

- e.g. China does not support flaring-only LFG projects

Buyer country LoA risk

- e.g. UK will not authorise participation in large hydro projects unless they comply with World Commission on Dams criteria

Validation risk

- e.g. reason to believe the project may run into problems with validation for reasons different than above

Registration risk

- e.g. reason to believe the EB may request a review of the registration application 8

3. Introduction to the ERPA

• • • • •

E mission R eduction P urchase A greement

– Purchase and sale of C ertified E mission R eductions (CERs) Most common legal instrument used in carbon market Tend to be standardised Usually English law governed Hybrid between: – – Project development agreement Services agreement – – Commodity contract (sometimes) Finance document 9

ERPA: Legal v Commercial Parameters

• • • • • • • • Delivery risk Consequences of breach Contractual v extra contractual protections Risk allocation & liability Enforceability Interaction of local law & other transaction agreements Requirements of DNAs Long term management • • • • • • • Closing v not closing the deal Meeting volume targets or compliance requirements Relationship Keep it simple & concise Flexibility Performance incentives e.g. commercial alignment Distribution e.g. monetise the asset 10

English law: legal principles

• • • • • • Clear body of contract law familiar to Buyers and internationally recognised

Freedom of contract:

parties best placed to allocate risk

Certainty of terms:

if fundamental terms (e.g. price) have not been agreed or are unclear, ERPA may be unenforceable

Agreements to agree:

generally not enforceable

Interpretation:

unclear wording construed against party seeking to rely

So:

where contract is drafted in accordance with English law, changing the governing law can have significant consequences 11

ERPA: Conditions Precedent

• •

Transfer/Purchase Obligations not binding until, e.g.:

– Completion of due diligence to the satisfaction of the Buyer – – Listing of Buyer as a Project Participant in the PDD Issuance of Letters of Approval – – Registration of the Project with the Executive Board Submission of the Statement of Modalities of Communication to the Executive Board – – Legal Opinion from Host Country law firm Commissioning of the Project

Right to walk away

– If CPs not satisfied within an agreed timeframe 12

ERPA: Sale and purchase of CERs

• • • •

Seller must transfer and Buyer must purchase:

– Pre-2012 CERs: Binding obligation to purchase all or agreed portion of CERs – Post-2012 CERs: Obligation or option of Buyer Volume Price

Payment structure:

Prepayment, payment against delivery or set-off, structure as a loan 13

ERPA: Delivery

• • •

Delivery:

all rights in and to CERs and underlying ERs transferred and assigned to Buyer upon Delivery – – constituted by transfer of CERs into Buyer’s Account Limit scope for Seller to argue cannot deliver in line with ERPA

“Hard ERPA”:

Minimum delivery obligations – Seller must deliver minimum delivery volume per Verification Period by a fixed date – Delay/failure to deliver – Event of Default

“Soft ERPA”:

(or one where Buyer has control) – Volume and delivery more flexible 14

Post 2012 CERs: Options

• • • • •

What are Post 2012 CERs?

Option:

request – creates a right to purchase underlying CERs upon Buyer exercises control over price and the time of purchase

Early approach:

free option over post 2012 ERs at Contract Price

Existing contracts:

negotiating strategy when to exercise

New contracts:

Firm Post 2012 pricing either for: – All ERs (come what may) – Only CERs that can be used for compliance 15

• • •

What does this mean for new contracts?

If retain option approach: – Consider enhancing detail of option itself – – When and how should it trigger?

How to price in the case of early termination

Delivery of all ERs

– enhance capacity to control verification etc to capture alternative markets – provide for minimum fallback to ensure delivery can occur without any argument as to certainty

Delivery of compliance CERs

– Careful drafting re trigger of rejection rights – What follows trigger? Walk away?

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Post 2012 CERs: right of first refusal

Right of First Refusal:

before a Seller sells Post 2012 CERs to a third party they must first offer them to Buyer on the same terms – Buyer has no control over price, terms or time it buys CERs (dependent upon third party offer) – If market dropped may be preferable to Option 17

ERPA: Project Participant and Focal Point

• •

Project Participant:

parties involved in the Project – Only a Project Participant can buy and sell CERs – Buyer may introduce new Project Participants in order to on-sell

Focal Point:

manages communications with the Executive Board – Can be sole or joint and cover: • • • Communication Distribution of CERs Adding and removing Project Participants – – Tends to be Buyer role - experience communicating with the EB Role of Focal Point should be returned to Seller upon termination of ERPA 18

ERPA: Costs, Monitoring, Verification and Certification

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Monitoring of Project, Verification and Certification of CERs

– Parties must communicate to maximise CERs generated – Selection of DoE (Buyer) and assistance to DoE (Seller) – Seller must keep Buyer informed as to status of the Project

Costs

– Costs split in accordance with the agreement between the parties – E.g. ERPA, PDD, Registration, EB, development, MVC 19

ERPA : Representations, Warranties & Undertakings

Both parties make statements of fact or undertakings about the Projects (complements Due Diligence)

– – – – Due incorporation and authorisation Seller owns the CERs it sells Seller won’t transfer the CERs or Project Assets to a third party Seller will operate the Projects in a prudent fashion (licences, maintenance, insurance) – – No litigation Seller will keep Buyer updated as to any changes which may affect its ability to deliver CERs – – Buyer will pay Seller on time Buyer will purchase all CERs 20

ERPA : Event of Default

• • •

Step 1 – Events of Default, e.g.

– – Failure to transfer CERs or under-delivery of CERs by Seller Failure to pay for the CERs by Buyer – – Breach of provisions of ERPA Insolvency of a party – Misrepresentation

Step 2 – Notice of EoD Step 3 – Cure the Breach

  30 days to cure default, depends on breach Seller delivers replacement CERs (from other projects or goes into market to buy CERs)  Buyer pays the outstanding amount to cure default 21

ERPA : Event of Default

• •

Step 4 – Terminate ERPA

– If breach not cured, other party can terminate on notice

Step 5 – Pay damages based on innocent party’s loss

 Include mechanism for calculating loss in ERPA 

Seller Loss:

Agreed Purchase Price minus CER market price (Seller’s Replacement Cost) 

Buyer’s Loss:

Market price minus Agreed Purchase Price (Buyer’s Replacement Cost) 22

• • •

ERPA: Enforcement

Arbitration most common dispute resolution

– Less formal means of resolving disputes – Less expensive than courts and normally quicker

New York Convention on the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards

– If both UK and Host Country are a party, neither has jurisdiction and so will not accept case regarding the ERPA

Two step process to enforce:

– Step 1: Go to seat of arbitration (e.g. Singapore) to get award; – Step 2: Get award enforced by Host Country courts against Seller assets in Host Country (assuming no assets elsewhere) • Theory: Host Country should not review the award but should enforce it • Practice: Can differ between jurisdictions 23

4. Post-2012 Issues

What do developments at EU and international level mean for contracting strategies?

– Depends on outcomes of Copenhagen – Likely that a high level international agreement will be reached – Hard to predict what the flexible mechanisms such as CDM will look like under the agreement –

Risks:

volume limits, qualitative limits, new mechanisms –

Big picture:

emission reduction commitments, climate change, new emission trading schemes, Obama factor 24

What conclusions can be drawn?

• • • •

Strong likelihood that the CDM, broadly in its present form, will continue post-2012

CERs from projects registered before 2012 can continue to be used in Post 2012 market Likely to be some form of sectoral and/or NAMA-based crediting mechanisms with an agreed timetable for further development of such mechanisms (under an international agreement) – Country-specific focus on: • advanced developing countries that are significant contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, e.g. China and India; and • countries which are strong supporters of sector or country-wide NAMAs, e.g. Korea and Mexico.

Safety net: post-2012 Carbon Credit Fund 25

SE Asia has post-2012 advantages

• • • • China and India probably less attractive post-2012 – China in particular, risk may have obligations to reduce emissions (steel and cement) – China imposes floor price on post-2012 Ex China/India, e.g. Philippines: greater possibilities for post-2012 – Lower risk will have obligations – No floor price, so prices can reflect post-2012 risks Buyers need to diversify portfolios away from India/China Going forward, more project financing involving CDM in Asia – Greater certainty as to post-2012 – CER revenues as security 26

So…

There is sufficient certainty to develop post-2012 strategy, e.g.

– Look for pre-registered projects – Be wary of industrial gas projects – Consider diversifying away from advanced developing countries (e.g. China and India) – Consider partnering with others to manage risk profile (e.g. equipment/technology providers) – Alternative business models – Hedge against price falls by taking equity stake and floating price – Engage with DNA: an efficient and informed DNA is a great benefit 27

Further information

• • • Contact details: Hannah Logan – Senior Associate Norton Rose (Asia) LLP Singapore [email protected]

www.nortonrose.com

Handouts: – Global climate change and carbon finance – Asia clean energy and carbon – Clean energy production and supply – Others on request Newsletter and updates 28

Our international practice

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Presentation

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“partner”) accepts or assumes responsibility, or has any liability, to any 2 3 4 Any reference to a partner means a member of Norton Rose LLP or a consultant or employee of Norton Rose LLP or one of its affiliates with equivalent standing and qualifications.

This presentation contains information confidential to Norton Rose Group. Copyright in the materials is owned by Norton Rose Group and the materials should not be copied or disclosed to any other person without the express authorisation of Norton Rose.

This presentation is not intended to give legal advice and, accordingly, it should not be relied upon. It should not be regarded as a comprehensive statement of the law and practice in this area. Readers must take specific legal advice on any particular matter which concerns them. If you require any advice or information, please speak to your usual contact at Norton Rose Group.

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