Transcript COMPONENTS OF SDI

Interprovincial Water
Cooperation for Sharing
Shortages
ZAKIR HUSSAIN DAHRI &
DR. BASHIR AHMAD
THE INDUS BASIN
The Indus Basin cradles one of the oldest
civilization
Holding one of the largest irrigation
system irrigating 18.63 Mha
Fifth largest delta
Seventh largest mangrove habitat
Highly transmissive and productive
aquifer
As such the problems and challenges
are also huge!
Water Conflicts and Cooperation
Water often catalyzes conflicts but can also be a source for cooperation.
Water has hardly ever the major cause of conflict at national level
but there is a history of water-related violence at sub-national level
The conflicts between upper- and lower-riparian regions are natural
and universal.
The upper riparians usually have difficulty in accepting the rights of
lower riparians and tendency to take the larger share of water
especially during shortages.
The lower riparians on the other hand often overlook the important
aspect of efficiently utilizing the precious fresh water resources at
their end
3
Water Conflicts and Cooperation
Population growth, socio-economic development, impacts of
climate change, environmental needs, cross-border
boundaries, compounded the problems and the challenges of
the Indus basin have increased manifold which is
compounding mistrust over water sharing among the
provinces
This can aggravate existing political, ethnic or religious
tensions
The vital nature of freshwater is also a powerful incentive for
cooperation and dialogue, compelling the stakeholders to avert
conflicts and reconcile even the most divergent views
Water can provide a basis for opening dialogue & negotiations
4
Genesis and Progression of
Interprovincial Water Disputes
Pre-Partition
The dispute was essentially between Sindh and Punjab dating
1901 - Bhakra Dam on Sutlej River
1919 – Sutlej Valley project
1919 - Thal canal project
1920 - Sukkur barrage project
1925 - Greater Thal Canal Lesser Project.
5
Genesis and Progression of
Interprovincial Water Disputes
Pre-Partition
1939 - Sindh lodged a formal complaint for not developing inter-provincial river
project without satisfaction of lower riparian
1945 - Sindh- Punjab Agreement under the guidance of Rau Commission
75 % of the waters of the main-stem Indus River to Sindh, and 25 % Punjab.
94 % of the water from the five eastern tributaries of the Indus River to
Punjab, and 6 % to Sindh. No dam on Indus or on any of its tributaries
without the consent of Sindh.
Agreement could not be ratified by the respective provincial assemblies
due to partition of India in 1947
6
Genesis and Progression of
Interprovincial Water Disputes
Post-Partition (1947 – 1960)
1947 - Committee B was appointed to deal with the various problems arising
out of the partition of the Punjab reached to a "Standstill Agreement" that the
pre-partition shares of West and East Punjab in the canal waters would be
maintained, which was also accepted by the Partition Committee. However,
the matter of canal system valuation could not be agreed, which was referred
to the Arbitral Tribunal headed by the Chief Justice of India, Sir Patrick Spense.
Strangely, the matter was not pursued by Pakistan till the tenure of the
Tribunal expired on March 31, 1948. Very next day India cut off water supplies
of all canal systems entering into Pakistani territory
1948, - Inter-Dominion Agreement also known as Delhi Agreement
1960 – Indus Water Treaty
7
Genesis and Progression of
Interprovincial Water Disputes
Post-IWT



During India-Pakistan water dispute,
Pakistan’s internal water conflicts
calmed down until signing of IWT
Instead the conflicts reappeared on
and forefront with greater intensity
and hostility due to growing water
shortages.
The government of Pakistan made
several attempts to pacify, control and
dilute the growing unrest among
provinces and resolve the longstanding water dispute, which has now
taken a new twist.
1968 Akhtar Hussain Committee
1970 Fazal-e-Akbar Committee
1977
Indus Waters Commission
(Anwar-ul-Haq Commission)
1983 Haleem Commission
1991
Water Apportionment
Accord
8
Competing Interests
The major competing interests
that confront and govern water
management include:
Domestic use
Agriculture
Hydropower generation
Ecosystems
Recreational use
Esthetic & spiritual interests
9
Water Cooperation
Water cooperation refers to the joint planning,
development, management and optimal use of
freshwater resources at local, national, regional and
international levels among various players and sectors.
The concept of water cooperation entails working together
towards a common and mutually beneficial goals
Water cooperation can act as a pathway for peace and
security in trans-boundary river basins and aquifer systems,
sustainable development, environmental integrity, eradication
of poverty and hunger, and universal water access.
10
Water Cooperation and the
1991 Water Accord
After many years of distress Pakistan recorded a landmark
achievement by creating a unique testament of political maturity and
interprovincial solidarity on March 16, 1991
WAA is the product of difficult and longtime efforts
Envisioned to promote national solidarity and interprovincial trust
building to make the way for water infrastructure development.
Served as an important moderating function in the interprovincial
hydro-politics
Despite few inherent weaknesses, worked reasonably well and is
largely considered as landmark
11
Key Features of the 1991 Water
Accord (1/2)
Clause 2 apportioned the 117.35 MAF
of river water by allocating 55.94 MAF
to Punjab, 48.76 MAF to Sindh,
8.78 MAF to KPK and 3.87 MAF to
Balochistan
PROVINCE
KHARIF
RABI
TOTAL
PUNJAB
37.07
18.87
55.94
SINDH
33.94
14.82
48.76
3.48
1.80
2.30
1.20
5.78
3.00
2.85
1.02
3.87
KPK
Clause 4 distributed balance waters
during floods and from future storages
(37% to each Punjab & Sindh, 14% to
KPK and 12% to Balochistan)
(a)
(b) CIVILCANALS
BALOCHISTAN
12
Key Features of the 1991 Water
Accord (2/2)
Clause 6 admitted the need for storages wherever feasible
Clause 7 recognized the need for below Kotri environmental
flows and provisionally allowed 10 MAF until the optimum
volume is determined through separate studies
Clause 13 recommended establishment of IRSA for
implementing the accord
Clause 14.a required system-wise allocations to be worked
out separately on ten-daily basis while clause14.b The record
of actual average system uses for the period 1977-82, would
form the guide line for developing a future regulation pattern.
13
Major Issues and Constraints
1) Trust Deficit
Persistent lack of interprovincial trust is the fundamental
reason for all the interprovincial issues
Ignorance and negligence of the logical apprehensions of
the affected entities simply worsens the situation
Aggravated by provincial clashes on accord interpretations
and IRSA’s failure to enforce the accord in an equitable and
universally acceptable manner
14
Major Issues and
Constraints
2) Hydrological
Limitations
and
Physical
Declining trend of river flows
 Gradual decrease in river flows
 Western rivers flows decreased from
139.7 MAF during Pre-Tarbela (19371976) period to 128.2 MAF during
Post-Tarbela (1976-2013) period (8.23
% decrease).
 Drastic reduction in eastern river
inflows – 17 MAF
15
Major Issues and Constraints
Probability of IRS inflows for Pre-Tarbela (1937-76) Period
Uncertain and irregular
flow pattern of the IRS
with very high annual as
well as seasonal variability
Max flows are double than
min flows
Kharif season flows are 5
fold of the Rabi season
flows
Recurring floods and
droughts
Probability of
Exceedence (%)
Minimum
10
25
50
75
80
Maximum
Western Rivers
Kharif
Rabi
Annual
156.1
33.0
187.7
135.1
26.4
161.0
125.4
23.9
146.6
117.1
21.3
139.7
108.2
19.1
130.9
105.7
19.0
125.4
76.2
15.5
93.1
Eastern Rivers
Kharif
Rabi
Annual
31.8
14.7
36.0
26.1
7.0
30.8
21.3
3.8
25.7
16.5
2.6
19.3
12.8
1.6
14.4
11.5
1.5
14.2
3.1
0.8
4.3
Total
207.7
187.2
173.8
156.7
149.4
147.7
107.5
Probability of IRS inflows During 1937-2013 Period
Probability of
Exceedence (%)
Minimum
10
25
50
75
80
Maximum
Western Rivers
Kharif
Rabi
Annual
156.1
33.0
187.7
129.9
28.0
158.2
124.5
24.6
146.4
112.4
21.9
135.4
99.9
19.5
120.3
97.3
19.1
117.4
75.7
13.9
91.2
Eastern Rivers
Kharif
Rabi
Annual
31.8
14.7
36.0
22.5
4.7
28.7
16.7
3.1
19.9
10.3
1.8
12.7
3.9
1.0
5.3
3.3
0.8
4.7
0.1
0.2
0.3
Total
207.7
178.6
164.4
150.4
129.5
125.7
92.6
Probability of IRS inflows for Post-Tarbela (1976-2013) Period
Probability of
Exceedence (%)
Minimum
10
25
50
75
80
Maximum
Western Rivers
Kharif
Rabi
Annual
134.9
30.7
161.6
128.7
28.4
153.0
120.3
25.8
144.0
105.0
22.3
128.2
96.5
20.1
117.5
92.1
19.8
115.4
75.7
13.9
91.2
Eastern Rivers
Kharif
Rabi
Annual
16.8
6.3
20.0
12.4
3.5
15.5
7.6
1.9
9.4
4.0
1.0
5.6
1.6
0.4
2.1
1.1
0.4
161.6
0.1
0.2
0.3
Total
170.1
166.3
154.5
134.5
120.8
118.3
92.6
Major Issues and Constraints
Limited storage facility
 The current storage capacity of
14.262 MAF is only 10% the
river inflows
 The per capita storage capacity
of less than 100 cubic-meter in
Pakistan is among the lowest
relative to other arid countries
in the world
 Pakistan can barely store 30
days of IRS water whereas the
dams of the Colorado and
Murray-Darling rivers can hold
900 days of river runoff.
17
Storage Dam
Storage Capacity (MAF)
Gross
Live (Original)
Live (2013)
Tarbela
11.62
9.680
6.581
Raised
Mangla
5.882+2.88
8.762
5.341+2.88
8.221
7.392
0.87
0.717
0.87
21.252
18.618
14.262
Chashma
Total
Major Issues and Constraints
Inadequate irrigation infrastructure
IBIS a 20th century system designed at the CI of 60 %, which
has now increased to over 130 %
The cropping pattern on which the water demands and
withdrawals were worked out did not include the high delta
crops like rice and sugarcane
18
Major Issues and Constraints
3) Opacity in Sharing of Shortages
Water disputes usually aggravate during shortage periods
Declaration of initial conditions for sharing the shortages
Accord declares pro rata sharing of shortages based on
ten-daily average uses, system-wise and seasonally adjusted
figures (clause 2 and14.a)
Punjab wants sharing of shortages as per clause 14.b
(historical formula based on av. actual uses during 1977-82),
Due to disagreement, IRSA accustomed water sharing on
ad hoc basis and has currently adopted the three-tier
modus operandi that works in practice, but not without
disagreements and disputes.
19
Three-Tier System
20
Allocations v/s Actual Uses
Accord Allocations (Clause 2)
(114.35 MAF)
Punjab Sindh KPK Balochistan
Post-Accord Actual Uses
(Average 97.84 MAF)
Punjab
Sindh
KPK Balochistan
MAF
55.94
48.76
5.78
3.87
49.94
40.88
4.51
2.51
%
48.92
42.64
5.05
3.38
51.04
41.78
4.61
2.57
(+2.12) (-0.86)
(-0.44)
(+/-%)
Low-Availability Scenario (Historical Use)
(less than 102.74 MAF)
(-0.81)
Medium-Availability Scenario
(102.74 – 114.35 MAF)
Punjab
Sindh
KPK
Balochistan
Punjab
Sindh
KPK
Balochistan
MAF
54.51
43.54
3.06
1.63
60.19
48.49
3.65
2.02
%
53.06
42.38
2.98
1.59
52.64
42.41
3.19
1.77
21
Major Issues and Constraints
4) Institutional Constraints
•
Issues in accord implementation
•
Issues in conflict resolution
•
Inadequate legal cover
22
Major Issues and Constraints
5) Future Water Infrastructure and Operation of
Existing Reservoirs and Link Canals
• Large storage reservoirs to regulate and ensure
year-round supplies
• unless provincial grievances addressed, water
infrastructure projects may not go ahead
• carryover dams for water shortages and generate
low-cost hydropower
• standard and agreed operating rules for operation
of major reservoirs and link canals
23
Major Issues and Constraints
6) Environmental Flows and Disposal of Pollutants
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
below Kotri outflows influenced by extreme natural variability of inflows
and upstream water developments
Downstream flows are highly erratic and unregulated as most of the
flows are released during water surplus period
Different view point of provinces on environmental flows
1991 water accord did recognize need for environmental flows and
provisionally allocated 10 MAF
IPOE recommended a perennial flow of 5,000 cfs throughout the year
(3.62 MAF/year) and 25 MAF in any 5 years period
Lack of clarity regarding how these e-flows are to be shared by the
provinces
IRSA has been including environmental flows from “off the top” while
calculating allocations for provinces
24
Major Issues and Constraints
Extent and probability of below Kotri outflows during Post-Tarbela period
25
Options for Promoting InterProvincial Water Cooperation
1) Trust Building
Establishment of independent water forums
Cooperative management
Rational decision-making
True implementation of the accord
Maximizing benefit sharing - royalty of hydro-power to
all provinces as per water entitlements, integrated
watershed management, ecotourism, aquaculture,
biodiversity habitat, and other livelihood opportunities
are the additional non-consumptive incentives
26
Options for Promoting InterProvincial Water Cooperation
1) Trust Building
Compensating the damages-compensation and
resettlement -There is no compensation for the loss of
livelihoods
Develop state-of-the-art and reliable system of water
measurement to provide reliable information for
making rationalized decisions to resolve interprovincial disputes
Transparency in data collection and information
exchange
Recognition of environmental integrity
27
Options for Promoting InterProvincial Water Cooperation
2) Strengthening and Empowering of IRSA
Technical
 Water accounting (discharge measurement and
monitoring), analyzing water demands, forecasting water
availability, estimating system losses, conflict
management, and transboundary water cooperation
Institutional
 Hydrology,and Flood Forecasting Divisions my be
transferred to IRSA
 Linkages with Pakistan Commission for Indus Waters to
ensure synergy and consistency with the major policy
positions.
More autonomy, authority and financial resources to
ensure true implementation of water accord.
28
Options for Promoting InterProvincial Water Cooperation
3) Harmonizing the Accord (1/2)
The 1991 accord is widely believed to be landmark that has
moderated the interprovincial hydro-politics in Pakistan.
However, the growing conflicts among the provinces further
recognize and emphasize the need for the accord to be
more stable, predictable and flexible enough to adjust the
future changes.
Many of the important water laws, international protocols
and customary rules were not available at the time of
signing the accord. The emerging concerns regarding
climate change, water trading and trans-boundary aquifers
need to be adhered and adjusted in the accord.
29
Options for Promoting InterProvincial Water Cooperation
3) Harmonizing the Accord (2/2)
The current settings of the accord need to be
adhered, improved and strengthened by
harmonizing the accord with the current issues
through consensus-based addendums and
supplements while securing and ensuring water
rights and entitlements of each province within
the existing domain.
30
Options for Promoting InterProvincial Water Cooperation
4) Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanism (1/2)
The 19991 water accord was signed without an adequate
conflict resolution mechanism. It completely relies on the CCI
to resolve interprovincial issues including development and
distribution of shared water resources. Due to absolute
political nature and structure of the CCI, small provinces are
often reluctant to refer the disputed matters to the CCI.
Alternatively IRSA is empowered to resolve the issues
regarding implementation of the accord through democratic
way by casting the votes of the members and if needed of the
Chairman
31
Options for Promoting InterProvincial Water Cooperation
4) Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanism (2/2)
IRSA members are representatives of the provinces and ethically
bound to protect the rights of their parent province
Hence, the historical hostilities, rivalries, and bargaining for the
future intentions significantly influence the autonomy and neutrality
of IRSA.
Urgent need for developing and evolving an effective and recognized
conflict resolution mechanism at federal level on practical and
sustainable basis.
Technical committee to assist the decision making body.
Similarly, the CCI may also be restructured with a blend of
professionals and politicians to effectively play its active role in
developing consensus among the provinces.
32
Options for Promoting InterProvincial Water Cooperation
5) Legal Framework
Reasonably well-defined water rights at national level but relatively
vague at the system level
Legal cover to most of the water rights is either inadequate or absent.
No comprehensive set of water laws that define water rights,
allocations, uses, values, pricing, subsidies, conservation, or polluter
penalties
Over two dozens of the existing provincial acts and ordinances
passed from time to time covering the various aspects of water, need
to be integrated, updated and extended in a comprehensive manner
to clearly define water rights supported by adequate legal cover
based on the ground realities.
33
Options for Promoting InterProvincial Water Cooperation
6) Market excess water
Make an amendment in the Water Apportionment Accord
and allowing provinces to market their excess water
especially Balochistan so that on one side the province is not
deprived from their entitlement and at the same time it will
result in efficient use of water through selling of extra water
and maintaining transparency in distribution of water.
THANKS
35